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Remuneration Governance in Germany and the 
United Kingdom 
Walter Philipp Kanzow 
Abstract 
Every year during the so-called “annual general meeting season” the remuneration of top 
managers makes it into the headlines of newspapers and onto the political agenda. Excessive 
executive remuneration is a long-standing problem, which has repeatedly caused regulatory 
action in the last two decades.  
The scholarly debate on executive remuneration is multifaceted and due to frequent reforms, 
quickly dated. This thesis focuses on remuneration governance, which is the system by which 
executive remuneration is set and monitored. In a critical comparison of the current German 
and UK remuneration governance rules it questions the effectiveness of the three main 
mechanisms of remuneration governance – namely the (supervisory) board as the 
remuneration setter, the disclosure of executive remuneration, and the shareholder vote on 
executive remuneration. Taking the latest reforms into account, the strengths and weaknesses 
of the two systems are identified. The thesis finds that the current remuneration governance 
instruments are not satisfactory. Suggestions for improvement are made, based in part on the 
experiences made in the other jurisdiction. 
An often neglected facet when examining remuneration governance is the influence of EU 
measures on national remuneration governance rules. The thesis finds generally a limited 
impact of EU measures in the past. For the future the question arises at which regulatory level 
measures for improvement should be taken. 
Further reforms regarding the (supervisory) board are – at least on a European level – not very 
promising. Rather the harmonisation of disclosure rules is suggested. Only EU measures 
could lead to standardisation sufficient to increase the disclosure’s informative value, clarity 
and comparability. In particular the form of the disclosure should be standardised. A 
standardised remuneration report would furthermore be predestined to be the subject-matter of 
an improved, harmonised shareholder vote. Enhanced transparency and comparability would 
empower shareholders and reduce agency costs. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and Foundations 
 
A. Introduction to the Topic 
“Greed is good!” This famous statement by “Gordon Gekko” in the movie “Wall Street”1 
seems to underlie many remuneration agreements between listed companies and their top 
managers. Flawed remuneration structures and inefficient governance mechanisms have been 
related to several major corporate scandals.
2
 Then again, executive remuneration is an 
important incentive for managers. Their “greed”, meaning their interest in high remuneration, 
can be “good” when used to improve corporate performance.  
In the last decade the literature on executive remuneration has grown at a “pace rivalled only 
by the growth of executive pay itself.”3 The plethora of reforms in the aftermath of the 2008 
global financial crisis has added to this development.
4
 The extensive and complex debate  
addresses many different aspects ranging from economists searching for the optimal pay 
structure to lawyers examining the regulatory side and politicians considering it a “target for 
legislation”.5 The debate is not confined to individual jurisdictions either but is enriched by 
legal comparisons, legal transplants and supranational regulation.
6
 
This thesis compares the remuneration governance regulations in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. It focuses on listed public companies, since in both countries special remuneration 
governance rules exist for this kind of company. The topical remuneration governance of 
banks is excluded because of banks’ particular corporate governance, which differs from that 
of “generic firms”, bank-specific executive remuneration problems and special regulations.7  
                                                         
1 O Stone, Wall Street (Film, 20th Century Fox, 1987). 
2 G Ferrarini, N Moloney and MC Ungureanu, “Understanding Directors’ Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical 
Analysis” (2009) ECGI Law Working Paper No 126/2009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1418463> accessed 18 Sept. 2014, 3. 
3 A Bruce, T Buck and BGM Main, “Top Executive Pay: A View from Europe” (2005) 42(7) JMS, 1493-1506, 1493. 
4 Well-illustrated by the number of recent monographs on this topic e.g. Crass, L, Die Vergütung von Vorstandsmitgliedern 
börsennotierter Aktiengesellschaften: Eine rechtliche und ökonomische Analyse der Vorstandsvergütung und Wege zu einer 
optimierten Vergütungspolitik (Dr. Kovac, 2012); J Hupka, Das Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung (Heymanns, 
2012); E Meyer, Vorstandsvergütung: Eine rechtsökonomische Analyse zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung 
(Nomos, 2012); J Raapke, Die Regulierung der Vergütung von Organmitgliedern und Angestellten im Aktien- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht (Peter Lang, 2012); KM Sheehan, The Regulation of Executive Compensation: Greed, Accountability and 
Say on Pay (Edward Elgar, 2012); R Stenzel, Rechtliche und Empirische Aspekte der Vorstandsvergütung (JWV, 2012). 
5 G Ferrarini, N Moloney and MC Ungureanu, “Understanding Directors’ Pay” (fn.2), 4. 
6 cf. ibid., 4. 
7 cf. PO Mülbert, “Corporate Governance of Banks” (2009) 10(03) EBOR, 411-436. 
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B. Object of the Thesis 
I. Object  
1. Definition and Delineation 
The thesis focuses on the regulation of remuneration governance. Remuneration governance 
has to be distinguished from the other main aspect of research on executive remuneration, 
namely remuneration design.  
Remuneration governance consists of a number of components or layers. The three main 
layers are remuneration-setting by the (supervisory) board, disclosure of executive 
remuneration and shareholder vote on executive remuneration.
8
 These linked mechanisms 
shall lead to more effective remuneration structures, improved alignment of management and 
shareholder interests and finally, enhanced corporate performance. Inspired by Cadbury’s 
popular definition of corporate governance,
9
 remuneration governance can be defined as the 
system by which the remuneration of executive directors is set and monitored. 
Remuneration design concerns the terms of contract of executives and the structure of 
remuneration. It deals with the criteria used to determine remuneration and employment (e.g. 
firm performance), the consequences for the executive (e.g. pay level) and the linking 
mechanism between remuneration criteria and remuneration consequences.  
Governance and design are highly interrelated. Flawed governance can lead to value-
destroying remuneration practices and excessive remuneration can often be ascribed to poor 
governance.  
2. Course of Action 
The thesis will not venture into the complex design sphere. Rather, it will examine how the 
present problems of remuneration governance should be addressed, and by whom. 
It will, first, examine and evaluate remuneration governance in Germany and the UK with 
particular regard to recent reforms and possible improvements. Second, it will investigate the 
European Union’s (EU) influence on remuneration governance in the two countries in the past 
as well as current measures and plans. Finally, it will develop suggestions for future 
regulation.  
                                                         
8 cf. M Döll, “Das Votum zum Vergütungssystem nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG” (2010) 64(3) WM, 103-112, 103. 
9 A Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee, 1992), para 2.5. 
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II. Relevance 
The topic is highly relevant for a number of reasons.  
First, remuneration governance in Germany and the UK has been subject to several reforms in 
recent years. Say-on-pay supported by effective disclosure seems to have emerged as the 
“réforme du jour”10. This has been emphasised by recent reforms in both countries. A 
profound, comprehensive and comparative analysis of the current situation, the three main 
mechanisms and possible improvements seems indicated to enhance the understanding of 
remuneration governance and ameliorate the mechanisms.  
Second, the EU has become increasingly involved in the regulation of executive 
remuneration. However, there is disagreement as to whether this is a positive development 
and how the EU should act regarding executive remuneration in the future, if at all. For a 
well-founded answer, the EU’s role in this field has to be examined in detail.  
Third, the thesis aims to fill a gap. The literature on remuneration governance covering the 
three main instruments and their interplay is surprisingly scarce. Comparative research on this 
issue focusing on Germany and the UK does not yet exist. Only very few publications on 
remuneration governance comprise a “European perspective”. Research on the influence of 
EU measures on remuneration governance in the Member States and on the right regulatory 
level for future regulation is needed.  
III. Contributions  
This thesis offers original research on possible improvements in remuneration governance 
regulation in Germany and the UK. It makes precise suggestions for changes to the rules – 
such as enhanced, standardised disclosure and an optional, binding say-on-pay vote on parts 
of a new, standardised remuneration report. Existing research is often restricted to 
descriptions of the current situation, whilst the thesis at hand analyses remuneration 
governance de lege lata and de lege ferenda. 
Compared with existing research the thesis allows a better understanding of national 
remuneration governance regimes for the following reasons. First, it offers a detailed 
comparison and evaluation. The identification of similarities and differences as well as 
strengths and weaknesses offers additional insights. It shows for example that the two regimes 
have converged in many respects but opposing axioms such as transparency and practicability 
                                                         
10 G Ferrarini, N Moloney and MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in 
Europe” (2010) 10(1) JCLS, 73-118, 86. 
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have been balanced differently. Second, it is more comprehensive than previous works 
providing the theoretical, political, economic and historical context of remuneration 
governance. Third, it elucidates how the two systems influence each other and finds the UK to 
be the more innovative and influential system. 
Moreover, original insights into the interaction between the three main remuneration 
governance instruments are offered. This is the first time the three main remuneration 
governance instruments have been examined together in a legal comparison. The analysis at 
hand examines each instrument in-depth but also the interactions between the instruments. 
This offers the unique possibility to make statements regarding their effectiveness, interaction 
and possible improvements. This is particularly important when looking at disclosure and say-
on-pay. The effectiveness of each depends on the other; they should therefore be improved 
together. Earlier research that has concentrated solely on one layer lacks this dimension. 
Another contribution of this thesis is that it offers an up-to-date analysis of the German, UK 
and EU remuneration governance rules, including the latest reforms and current reform 
proposals. The existing comparative literature on the individual remuneration governance 
instruments is dated. The scarce, non-comparative literature on the 2013/2014 reforms is 
mainly descriptive and/or obsolete as the German reform failed “at the last minute”. This 
thesis brings the research on remuneration governance up to date and fills a gap regarding 
recent initiatives and reforms. Taking them into account changes and substantiates the 
discussion on future regulation. For example, the appraisal of the likelihood of binding 
shareholder votes has changed dramatically since earlier research dealt with this issue. 
Finally, the thesis provides new insights into the role of the EU in remuneration governance 
regulation. Many national reforms are rooted in EU measures. An extensive analysis of EU 
measures’ effects on German and UK remuneration governance has not been undertaken 
before. The findings on the EU’s influence give the unprecedented opportunity to suggest 
improvements of German and UK remuneration governance at the right regulatory level.  
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C. Comparative Approach 
This thesis uses a modified traditional comparative law approach.
11
 It is traditional in that it 
follows the typical comparative law research structure suggested by Zweigert/Kötz
12
: After a 
preliminary part it describes the rules in the two legal systems and compares them looking for 
similarities and differences. Finally, it evaluates them critically and makes suggestions for 
improvements. The chosen approach is functionalist as the thesis compares rules that fulfil a 
certain function, namely the setting and monitoring of executive remuneration. 
The traditional, functionalist approach has the advantage that it is clear, logical and concise 
whilst being comprehensive. Its “blueprint” is not “simplistic”13 but well-structured and 
guiding. Another criticism is that the traditional approach can only be applied to legal systems 
that are legally, politically and economically equally developed.
14
 The subject of the thesis 
makes this criticism negligible. The traditional approach is also said to regard some areas of 
law as less suitable for a comparative analysis because they are heavily influenced by distinct 
cultural values or socio-political peculiarities.
15
 Company law and remuneration governance 
are not such areas of law but are widely considered to be comparable. 
The critics of the traditional, functionalist approach are right, however, in arguing that this 
approach can be too narrow and restricted to the positive law. This thesis will avoid the 
common mistake of merely describing two legal rules and neglecting the actual comparison 
and critical analysis. It explains the underlying theories and concepts, highlights for each 
remuneration governance instrument the historical, political and economic context, takes 
various kinds of sources into consideration and looks at both the “law in the books” and the 
“law in action”. Instead of merely focusing on the positive law, it also considers data and 
experiences from practice as well as empirical facts. Hence, a range of comparative law 
techniques, which modify the traditional, functionalist approach chosen, is applied in order to 
further the understanding of remuneration governance regulation in Germany and the UK. 
  
                                                         
11 cf. M Siems, Comparative Law (CUP, 2014), 13ff. 
12
 K Zweigert, H Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung (3rd ed, Mohr, 1996), 31-47. 
13 cf. M Siems, “Numerical Comparative Law – Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?” 
(2005) 13 CJICL, 521-540, 537. 
14 M Siems, Comparative Law (CUP, 2014), 32. 
15 e.g. HC Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research  (CUP, 
1949), 32, 73. 
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D. Central Hypotheses and Structure 
The thesis will revolve around four central hypotheses. 
 Hypothesis 1: The setting and monitoring of executive remuneration by (supervisory) 
boards is not satisfactory and should be improved. 
 Hypothesis 2: Enhanced, standardised disclosure could lead to more effective 
remuneration governance. 
 Hypothesis 3: Say-on-pay is a useful instrument in need of further refinements. 
 Hypothesis 4: Further EU measures could ensure better remuneration governance. 
 
The structure of the thesis will be based on these hypotheses. The remainder of the first 
chapter will clarify the theoretical foundations including the definition and purpose of 
executive remuneration and the justifications for its regulation. In the second to the fourth 
chapter the three layers of remuneration governance under German and UK law will be 
analysed critically regarding their effectiveness followed by a comparison. The aim is to 
suggest improvements. The fifth chapter will examine past, current and future EU measures 
regarding executive remuneration; will then evaluate them and suggest improvements. 
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E. Theoretical Framework 
Executive remuneration is the total material compensation an executive receives within a 
company. Its purpose, however, is contentious. The three main theoretical perspectives are 
called optimal contracting approach, managerial power approach and intrinsic motivation 
approach.
16
 The former two approaches are based on the dominant theory in this field: agency 
theory. The latter approach is based on the stewardship theory. In the following, agency 
theory, its influence on remuneration governance and its meaning for the thesis will be 
elucidated and evaluated. Similarly, stewardship theory will be examined.  
I. Agency Theory 
1. The Theory 
Agency theory is based on the separation of ownership and control in companies.
17
 The 
agency relationship exists between the principal who delegates work and the agent who 
performs it. The theory deals with the problems, which may arise when agents make decisions 
on the principals’ behalf.18 Companies are described as a “nexus of contracts”.19 The theory’s 
underlying assumption is that both sides seek to maximise their individual utility.
20
 The 
principal invests his wealth in the company and designs corporate governance mechanisms to 
maximise his utility, whilst the agent accepts the management of this investment as it offers 
the opportunity to gain more utility than by accepting other opportunities.
21
 As long as the 
utility functions of both parties coincide there is no agency problem. However, further 
assumptions are that agents’ interests diverge from their principals’ interests and that they are 
risk averse. 
Two resulting situations can be identified:
22
 (1) the principal possesses complete information 
about the agent’s actions ‒ in this case it would be unnecessary and inefficient to offer 
additional incentives or transfer additional risks to the agent; (2) the principal does not 
possess complete information regarding his agent’s behaviour. Here agency problems are 
                                                         
16
 G Ferrarini, N Moloney and C Vespro, “Executive Remuneration in the EU Comparative Law and Practice” (2003) ECGI 
- Law Working Paper No. 09/2003 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=419120> accessed 18 September 
2014, 5. 
17 cf. AA Berle, GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan, 1933). 
18 EF Fama, MC Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26(2) J Law Econ, 301-325. 
19 cf. MC Jensen, WH Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure” 
(1976) 3 JFE, 305-360; AA Alchian, H Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 Am 
Econ Rev, 777-795. 
20 MC Jensen, WH Meckling (fn.19), 305. 
21 JH Davis, FD Schoorman, L Donaldson, “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management” (1997) 22(1) AMR, 20-47, 22. 
22 LR Gomez-Meija, RM Wiseman, “Reframing Executive Compensations: An Assessment and Outlook” (1997) 23(3) J 
Manage, 291-374. 
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likely. They could be solved by either obtaining the necessary information or alternatively by 
offering the agent incentives to align his interests with the principal’s interests. By offering 
incentives, the principal transfers the risk of deviating from his interests to the agent. As it is 
assumed that the agent is risk averse and opportunistic, the agent should behave in a way to 
receive the incentive and consequently maximise shareholder wealth. 
2. Agency Problems 
Agency problems can arise between different groups. They can arise between managers 
(agents) and shareholders (principals), controlling shareholders (agents) and minority 
shareholders (principals) or between the company – especially the shareholders – (agents) and 
other stakeholders (principals).
23
 Regarding executive remuneration the focus is on the 
relationship between managers and shareholders.  
3. Agency Costs 
The principal will generally be unable to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s interest 
without accruing costs.
24
 These so-called agency costs can be defined as the sum of 
“monitoring costs”, “bonding costs” and “residual loss”.25  
“Monitoring costs” consist of the principal’s expenditures in order to “measure, observe and 
control” the agent’s behaviour.26 They entail for example the costs of auditing, drafting 
remuneration agreements and disclosing compliance with a corporate governance code. 
“Bonding costs” are those costs generated by creating and adhering to systems that are there 
to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s best interests – for example in the case of share-
ownership of the agent or the costs of additional information disclosure to the shareholders.
27
 
“Residual loss” signifies agency costs/losses that arise from persisting conflicts of interests 
despite monitoring and bonding.  
The more complex the agent’s tasks are and the more discretion he has, the larger the agency 
costs tend to be.
28
 Corporate governance rules aim at reducing these costs. Generally, 
principals and agents alike are interested in their reduction.
29
 
                                                         
23 J Armour, H Hansmann, R Kraakman, “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” in R Kraakman et al (eds), The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law (2nd ed, OUP, 2009), 35-53, 36. 
24
 MC Jensen, WH Meckling (fn.19), 308. 
25
 ibid., 308. 
26
 ibid., 308. 
27 cf. F Easterbrook, D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press, 1996), 10. 
28 cf. S Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal’s Problem” (1973) 63(2) AER, 134-139. 
29
 J Armour et al (fn.23), 37. 
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Different legal strategies for the reduction of agency costs exist. Prescriptive “regulatory 
strategies” determine the substantive terms of the principal-agent-relationship and 
“governance strategies” aim at enabling principals to control the agents’ behaviour.30 One 
governance strategy is to reward agents for successfully furthering the principal’s interests 
(e.g. pay-for-performance regime).
31
 Another one is the ex-ante removal of conflicts of 
interest (e.g. independent directors deciding on remuneration).
32
 
The legal strategies depend on compliance and enforcement. Enforcing compliance with 
governance strategies is primarily the task of the principal.
33
 
4. Critique of Agency Theory  
Agency theory is “an important, yet controversial, theory”.34 A multitude of views and 
criticisms regarding agency theory as well as a number of alternative approaches can be found 
in the literature.
35 
4.1. An Alternative: Stewardship Theory 
Regarding the analysis and enhancement of corporate governance mechanisms and especially 
with regard to executive remuneration, the stewardship theory is particularly worth examining 
as an alternative.
36
 
Its assumption regarding human behaviour is that pro-organisational, collectivistic behaviour 
has higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviour.
37
 Hence, stewards – this 
theory’s equivalent of agents – are trustworthy and, given the choice between self-serving and 
cooperative behaviour, they opt for the latter. Even in situations where the interests of 
principal and steward are not aligned, the steward still “places higher value on cooperation 
than defection”38. The explanation for this behaviour is that by maximising the principal’s 
wealth the steward maximises his utility functions.
39
 
Stewards are not entirely altruistic but they realise the “trade-off” between their needs and the 
company’s objectives and believe that by working for the latter they meet their personal 
                                                         
30 ibid., 42. 
31 ibid., 43. 
32
 ibid., 43. 
33
 ibid., 45. 
34 K Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review” (1989) 14(1) Academy of Management Review, 57-74, 57. 
35 Overview in T Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The philosophical foundations of corporate governance 
(Routledge, 2008). 
36 Examining all the theories in this field would also exceed this thesis’ scope. 
37 JH Davis, FD Schoorman, L Donaldson (fn.21), 24. 
38 ibid., 24. 
39 ibid., 25. 
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needs, too. Correspondingly, non-financial motives like the need for recognition and the 
intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance impact on stewards’ actions. Hence, the main 
difference between the two theories is the focus on extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
respectively.
40
 
4.2. Discussion  
Agency theory offers a useful tool for explaining relationships in which the interests of the 
parties involved are not aligned but can be made more congruent through monitoring and a 
well-planned remuneration system.
41
  
However, the extensive literature in this field has challenged almost all its assumptions.
42
 
Agency theory has been criticised for simplifying the description of human behaviour by 
labelling all motivation as self-serving.
43
 It is said to ignore the option that various individuals 
in diverse situations may behave in different ways.
44
 Also the assumption that agents are 
inherently risk adverse was seen as a limitation.
45
 Furthermore, agency theory’s assumptions 
would limit its generalisability.
46
 Finally, agency theory has been criticised for its “over 
abstraction”.47 
Then again, stewardship theory merely replaces one kind of determinism with another.
48
 The 
criticism of simplification applies equally to stewardship theory’s description of human 
behaviour. Generally, stewardship theory’s underlying assumptions are not more convincing 
than those of agency theory. Managers may not always act to align their interests with those 
of the principals. Rather, it is not unreasonable to assume that most people are – to various 
extents – driven by self-interest.49 This is also widely regarded as “age old and widespread”50 
as well as “socially quite legitimate”51. 
                                                         
40 ibid., 27. 
41
 ibid., 24. 
42 For an overview: A Yao, M Magnan, “Where is the Theory for CEO Compensation?” (2009) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458443> accessed 25 September 2014. 
43 cf. MC Jensen, WH Meckling, “The nature of man” (1994) 7(2) J Appl Corp Finance 4-19; C Doucouliagos, “A note on 
the evolution of homo economicus” (1994) 28(3) JEI, 877-883. 
44 P Wright, A Mukherij, MJ Kroll, “A reexamination of agency assumptions: extensions and extrapolitions” (2001) 30 J 
Socio-Econ, 413-429, 414. 
45 LR Gomez-Mejia, RM Wiseman, “Does agency theory have universal relevance? A reply to Lubatkin, Lane Collin and 
Very” (2007) 28 J Org Behav, 81-88, 82. 
46
 JH Davis, FD Schoorman, L Donaldson (fn.21), 24. 
47 A Dignam, M Galanis, The globalization of corporate governance (Ashgate, 2009), 40. 
48 T Clarke (fn.35), 9. 
49 J Hendry, “Beyond Self-Interest: Agency Theory and the Board in a Satisficing World” (2005) 16 BJM, S55-S63, S57. 
50 CM Daily et al, “Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data” (2003) 28(3) AMJ, 371-382, 372.  
51 J Hendry (fn.49), S57. 
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The stewardship theory’s assumptions are certainly not true for everyone. Intrinsic motivation 
will not suffice for most people. Many corporate scandals such as that in which Enron was 
involved severely challenged the “tenets of stewardship theory”.52 Agency theory may be 
simplifying. However, it does not intend to make individual predictions for behaviour but 
rather attempts to come up with a prognosis for the behaviour of most people belonging to a 
certain group.
53
 It remains usable even if a minority acts “in contradiction to the theory”.54 
Agency theory is suitable for drafting corporate governance rules. It may neither “apply in all 
situations”55 nor may it “tell the whole story”56 but it allows a clear description of the central 
conflicts and problems in a company. Moreover, agency theory does not exclude a 
stewardship approach with respect to some aspects – especially in cases where the interests of 
agent and principal are aligned.
57
 The two theories can co-exist to some extent.
58
 
Also, agency theory’s central normative statement, the reduction of agency costs, is 
convincing. Even if not every agent will act in an opportunistic way, the risk of such 
behaviour must be addressed when drafting rules. The dangers of agency relationships have 
been illustrated repeatedly by corporate scandals and self-serving behaviour.
59
 Empirical 
evidence also supports agency theory’s assumption that there is a conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders.
60
 There is room for stewardship-theory-based rules insofar as the 
interests of managers and shareholders are indeed congruent.
61
 However, intrinsically 
motivated action can be undermined by the absence of control mechanisms and sanctions.
62
 In 
that case the intrinsically motivated person sees that someone who acts opportunistically and 
shirks “gets away with it”, which undermines the former’s own motivation.63 
On balance, despite its shortcomings, agency theory can provide a solid theoretical 
framework. Moreover, it is the dominant theory
64
 and the current remuneration governance 
regulation is based on it.
65
 Hence, for its analysis the thesis will use agency theory as its basis. 
                                                         
52
 T Clarke (fn.35), 20. 
53 H Eidenmüller, “Kapitalgesellschaftsrechts im Spiegel der ökonomischen Theorie” (2001) JZ, 1041-1051, 1042. 
54 ibid., 1042. 
55
 JH Davis, FD Schoorman, L Donaldson (fn.21), 43. 
56 A Nyberg et al, “Agency Theroy Revisited: CEO Returns and Shareholder Interest Alignment” (2010) 53 AMJ, 1029-
1049, 1031. 
57
 LR Gomez-Mejia, RM Wiseman, (fn.45), 82. 
58 JH Davis, FD Schoorman, L Donaldson (fn.21), 42. 
59 D Miller, C Sardais, “Angel Agents: Agency Theory Reconsidered” (2011) 25(2) AMJ, 6-13, 12 
60 D Band, “Corporate Governance: Why Agency Theory is not Enough” (1992) 10(4) EMJ, 453-459, 457. 
61 LR Gomez-Mejia, RM Wiseman, (fn.45), 82. 
62 J Heath, “The Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory” (2009) 19 BusEthicsQ, 497-528, 522. 
63 ibid., 522. 
64
 G Ferrarini, N Moloney and C Vespro, (fn.16), 5. 
65 Germany: P Velte, “Stewardship-Theorie” (2010) 20 ZP, 285-293, 288; UK: K Sheehan, “Say on Pay and the Outrage 
Constraint” in RS Thomas, JG Hill (eds.), Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Elgar, 2012), 255-283, 255; EU: J Lee, 
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II. The Purpose of Executive Remuneration 
The answer to the next question, what the purpose of executive remuneration is, depends on 
the theoretical approach chosen. 
1. Alignment of Interests: Optimal Contracting  
The dominant view is that well-drafted remuneration contracts can offer powerful means for 
aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests, thus reducing agency costs.66 
Correspondingly, executive remuneration shall alleviate the agency problem.
67
 In order to 
render the separation of ownership and control harmless, the interests of managers and owners 
have to be aligned.
68
 Managers cannot be trusted to set their own pay, given that their interest 
in receiving more pay for less work creates agency costs. Therefore, in arm’s-length 
bargaining, the board, defending the interests of the company and the shareholders, tries to 
conclude the best contract possible.
69
 
Following this “optimal contracting” approach executive remuneration provides an ex ante 
incentive for executives to maximise shareholder value by offering them the opportunity to 
share the achieved gains ex post.
70
 Correspondingly, the agency problem is solved by paying 
the executive his reservation value and additionally an apportionment of the “profits”. 
Thereby, the utility of both can be maximised and the risk of non-performance can be 
efficiently divided between them.
71
  
Thus, executive remuneration has the purpose of providing managers with efficient incentives 
to align their interests with those of the shareholders in order to maximise the shareholder 
value.
72
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“Regulatory regimes and norms for directors‘ remuneration: EU, UK and Belgian law compared” (2012) 13(4) EBOR, 599-
637,  614. 
66 cf. M Jensen, K Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives” (1990) 98(2) JPE, 225-264; M Jensen, K 
Murphy, “CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay But How” (1990) 3 J Appl Corp Finance, 36-49. 
67 cf. LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 15. 
68 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem” (2003) Harvard John M Olin Discussion Paper 
04/2003 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=364220> accessed 18 September 2014, 1.  
69 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.67), 18. 
70 K Sheehan, “Say on Pay and the Outrage Constraint” in RS Thomas, JG Hill (eds.), Research Handbook on Executive Pay 
(Elgar, 2012), 255-283, 257. 
71 ibid., 3. 
72 LM Bebchuck, JA Fried, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem” (fn.68), 1. 
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2. Alignment of Interests: Managerial Power  
A second, more recent approach rooted in agency theory is the “managerial power” approach, 
which doubts that remuneration contracts solve the agency problem.
73
 Following this 
approach optimal remuneration contracts are possible in theory only. In reality the managers 
have power over the board.
74
 Therefore, in the negotiations the board does not focus on the 
shareholders’ interests.75 Instead of true arm’s-length bargaining with efficient results the 
board allows rent-extraction by the managers.
76
 The managers have power over the board as 
the directors’ re-appointment depends on them and the managers can affect the directors’ 
remuneration.
77
 There are also social and psychological reasons such as friendship and 
loyalty.
78
 Moreover, directors have only a minor stake in the firm and suffer from information 
asymmetry. Another reason why optimal contracting outcomes will not occur is that market 
forces lack strength and are insufficiently fine-tuned, allowing deviations from optimal 
contracting.
79
 
The approach identifies “outrage” i.e. “negative reactions by outsiders” and the costs these 
may generate as the only constraint.
80
 Sufficiently high “outrage costs” such as reputational 
harm or risk of losing shareholders’ support deters managers from rent-extraction.81 However, 
to avoid “outrage” managers try to “camouflage” the true remuneration, meaning obscuring 
and legitimising the rent-extraction.
82
 Hence, there are limits regarding what the board will 
accept and the markets will permit, but still managers can achieve more favourable contracts 
than under true arm’s-length bargaining.83 
While the “optimal contract” approach regards the purpose of executive remuneration as 
solving the agency problem, the “managerial theory” approach does not see executive 
remuneration as a remedy but as an “amplifier”84 and an “agency problem in itself”85. 
                                                         
73 cf. LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.67), 61ff. 
74 ibid., 23. 
75 ibid., 62. 
76 ibid., 62. 
77 ibid., 25-26. 
78 ibid., 31. 
79 LM Bebchuck, JA Fried, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem” (fn.68), 4. 
80 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.67), 64. 
81 LM Bebchuck, JA Fried, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem” (fn.68), 5. 
82 ibid., 4. 
83 ibid., 5. 
84 P Geiler, L Renneboog, “Executive Compensation: Incentives and Externalities” in HK Baker, R Anderson (eds), 
Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research and Practice (Wiley, 2010), 263. 
85 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.67), 62. 
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3. Intrinsic Motivation 
A third view questions the significance of financial incentives for the appropriate motivation 
of executives.
86
 According to this approach high remuneration is not necessary but a possible 
source of perverse effects. Although this view is dubious, it may be supported by the reported 
low pay-performance-sensitivity of executive remuneration packages.
87
  
Closely related is the stewardship theory’s view on executive remuneration. Here executive 
remuneration plays only a secondary role in the motivation of managers.
88
 Being focused on 
intrinsic rather than extrinsic rewards, the theory declares that executives are motivated by the 
need to receive recognition from others, esteem and self-actualisation.
89
 The purpose of 
executive remuneration would still be motivation of managers but it would be a minor aspect 
and not necessary for the alignment of interests. 
4. Evaluation 
The views on the purpose of executive remuneration vary. The concept of intrinsic motivation 
is not convincing as the stewardship theory itself lacks persuasiveness, as argued above. The 
agency-theory-based approaches are more convincing, despite the theory’s limitations such as 
the fact that it simplifies the description of human behaviour by labelling all motivation as 
self-serving,
90
 ignoring the possibility that various individuals in diverse situations may 
behave differently
91
 or assuming that agents are inherently risk adverse.
92
 
The answer to the subsequent question, whether the “optimal contracting” or the “managerial 
power” variation of the agency theory is preferable, is not clear cut. Remuneration is certainly 
an effective incentive, which aligns interests. However, shortcomings exist, which need to be 
addressed through remuneration governance instruments. Hence, executive remuneration can 
align manager and shareholder interests and solve agency problems. Yet, it needs effective 
monitoring and control through shareholders (and other stakeholders) to avoid rent-extraction 
by the managers. The managerial power theory’s assumptions are plausible. Moreover, 
                                                         
86 LA Stout, “On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Oeconomicus to Join 
Your Board)” (2003) 29 DJCL, 1-24, 1; BS Frey, M Osterloh, “Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats” (2005) 
14(1) J Management Inquiry, 96-111, 107ff. 
87 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.67), 8. 
88 J Otten, “Theories on executive pay: A literature overview and critical assessment” (2007) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088272> accessed 18 September 2014, 16. 
89 JH Davis, FD Schoorman, L Donaldson (fn.21), 25. 
90 cf. MC Jensen, WH Meckling, “The nature of man” (1994) 7(2) J Appl Corp Finance 4-19; C Doucouliagos, “A note on 
the evolution of homo economicus” (1994) 28(3) JEI, 877-883. 
91 P Wright, A Mukherij, MJ Kroll, “A reexamination of agency assumptions: extensions and extrapolitions” (2001) 30 J 
Socio-Econ, 413-429, 414. 
92 LR Gomez-Mejia, RM Wiseman, (fn.45), 82. 
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mechanisms like individualised disclosure and say-on-pay can more readily be justified under 
the managerial power view, with its suspicion of managers’ power over the board.93 
III. Agency Theory’s Influence 
It has already been seen that the concept of “the governance problem”94 and the purpose of 
executive remuneration depend on the theoretical framework chosen. The next question 
concerns the influence of agency theory on the field of remuneration governance regulation.  
Agency theory is the guiding principle of the current remuneration governance regulation and 
determines its aims, concepts and methods. Remuneration governance regulation is based on 
the assumption of extrinsic motivation of managers. It relies on (1) financial incentives set by 
the (supervisory) board to align manager and shareholder interests,
95
 (2) monitoring and 
control through the shareholders on the basis of disclosure and (3) sanctions for aberrant 
behaviour, e.g. through negative votes on the remuneration policy. Thus, the current system 
responds to the assumption that managers are individualistic, opportunistic and self-serving. 
Following this approach the aim of remuneration governance is the reduction of agency costs.  
Both agency-based approaches to executive remuneration, optimal contracting and managerial 
power, have been influential. The (supervisory) board’s competence to negotiate and 
determine the individual manager’s remuneration mirrors the concept of optimal contracting. 
In arm’s-length bargaining the (supervisory) board, acting in the interest of the company and 
the shareholders, tries to conclude the best contract possible.
96
 Rules on supervisors’/non-
executive directors’ (NEDs’) independence seek to ensure arm’s-length bargaining. Also the 
managerial power approach has been highly influential and led to policy innovations.
97
 The 
perception that managers had too much influence on the setting of their own remuneration 
sparked calls for a greater role for shareholders in remuneration governance. They led to 
reforms in remuneration governance such as extensive disclosure requirements and say-on-
pay. The approach’s continuing popularity can be seen in recent reforms that, first, require 
better information disclosure to enhance shareholder information and, second, strengthen the 
shareholders’ role by making the vote (partly) binding.  
                                                         
93 K Sheehan, “Say on Pay and the Outrage Constraint” (fn.70), 258. 
94 S Learmount, “Theorizing  Corporate Governance: New Organizational Alternatives” (2002) ESRC Working Paper No. 
237 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP237.pdf> accessed 9 October 2014, 5. 
95
 T Clarke (fn.35), 7. 
96 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.67), 18. 
97
 A Edmans, X Gabaix, “Is CEO Pay really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Conracting Theories” (2009) 15(3) EFM, 
486-496, 486. 
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If the stewardship theory were more influential, then the diametrically opposed assumptions 
about the nature and behaviour of managers would lead to different remuneration governance 
rules and instruments. Managers would not have an “inner motivational problem”.98 
Remuneration governance would not be focused on interest alignment, control and sanctions. 
Stewardship-based remuneration governance would strive to enable the managers to achieve 
the “good corporate performance to which they aspire”.99 The effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanismsmechanism would not be judged on their ability to reduce agency 
costs but on whether or not they help the manager to “formulate and implement plans for high 
corporate performance”100. Thus, instead of incentivising and controlling managers, 
regulation would have to “provide clear, consistent role expectations and authorise and 
empower senior management”101. The consequences would be manifold. Agency theory 
propagates a system of checks and balances whilst stewardship favours the concentration of 
power and authority.
102
 For example agency theory supports the separation of the roles of 
CEO and chairman, whereas stewardship sees a combination as advantageous, leading to 
greater effectiveness and shareholder returns. Motivating and controlling structures are 
agency theory’s aim whilst “facilitative and empowering structures” 103 are envisaged by the 
stewardship theory. 
Agency-theory-based remuneration governance reforms focus on the improvement of the 
(supervisory) board by enhancing the supervisors’/NEDs’ independence, professionalism and 
motivation. The remuneration-setting process shall be made more transparent. Disclosure 
shall be enhanced and standardised to ensure better informed shareholders. The reforms also 
aim at increasing the influence of shareholders through say-on-pay. They aim to reduce 
agency costs. A stewardship-based approach, by contrast, would focus on empowering 
executives, removing agency cost reducing initiatives, reducing NEDs’ influence and 
removing remuneration disclosure requirements, among other things.
104
 
Thus, agency theory leads to an entirely different approach to executive remuneration than the 
stewardship theory does. The influence of the underlying theory is, hence, fundamental. The 
choice of theory has a significant impact on the perception of executive remuneration as well 
as the justification, objective and instruments of remuneration governance.  
                                                         
98 cf. L Donaldson, JH Davis “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder 
Returns” (1991) Australian Journal of Management, 49-65, 51. 
99 ibid., 51. 
100
 ibid., 51. 
101
 ibid., 51. 
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 ibid., 52. 
103
 ibid, 52. 
104 cf. A Dignam, “Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement” (2013) 66 
Current Legal Problems, 401-441. 
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Against the background of the above-mentioned concerns regarding stewardship theory, an 
approach based solely on intrinsic motivation and trust seems, on balance, not practicable. 
The reduction of (potential) agency costs seems the more convincing guideline for shaping 
remuneration governance rules. 
IV. Agency Theory’s Meaning for This Thesis 
The preceding critique of the different theoretical approaches showed that, on balance, the 
assumptions of the agency theory regarding managerial motivation and behaviour seem more 
convincing. Therefore, agency theory is used as the theoretical framework based upon which 
this thesis deals with executive remuneration.  
This choice of theoretical approach influences the whole thesis. It determines the purpose of 
executive remuneration, the assumptions regarding managerial behaviour etc. Therefore, 
when dealing with remuneration governance, this thesis examines, compares and critically 
analyses the different instruments that have been developed in Germany and the UK to 
address agency conflicts regarding executive remuneration. Agency theory considers a 
solution to agency problems to be effective if it reduces agency costs. In the following 
chapters this thesis therefore assesses the different remuneration governance instruments’ 
effectiveness and suggests improvements with this yardstick in mind. The remuneration 
governance instruments shall prevent excessive remuneration and reduce agency costs.  
An evaluation of the current remuneration governance rules based purely on the stewardship 
theory would lead to diametrically opposing assessments and, consequently, would suggest 
other improvements. Hence, agency theory has a fundamental meaning for this thesis. It 
influences the approach, concept and criteria of the analysis. 
V. Justification for Regulation 
Finally, the justification for regulating executive remuneration will be examined. 
In the recent debate on executive remuneration two reasons for regulation were advanced, 
namely the wrong incentives that were set by the remuneration structure – especially the 
taking of excessive risks – and the excessive amount of remuneration.105 The amount should 
not allow regulation unless there is a market failure.
106
 In the market for managers, market 
                                                         
105 A Cahn, ‘Vorstandsvergütung als Gegenstand rechtlicher Regelung” in Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung: 
Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010 (De Gruyter, 2010), 431-456, 431. 
106 ibid., 432. 
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failure can stem from various sources. Factors such as information asymmetry or externalities 
are of particular importance.
107
  
Externalities are the costs (or benefits) of exchange which accrue to a third party not involved 
in the transaction.
108
 Executive remuneration could cause externalities by setting incentives 
that increase the managers’ willingness to take (excessive) risks. For example increased 
systemic risks cause costs that are externalised by the firm and fall instead on the society.
109
 
Also incomplete information can cause market failures. If the shareholders have incomplete 
information about the manager’s services, a judgment about the services provided and 
especially the trade-off between price and quality is not possible. Consequently, the 
competitive process cannot generate efficient outcomes. Rather, information asymmetry can 
lead to adverse selection in the choice of managers. Another consequence of information 
asymmetries could be moral hazard, as the principal cannot judge the quality of the agent’s 
services.  
Consequently, regulation is indicated. It can play a significant role in reducing agency 
costs.
110
 Both agency-based theories – optimal contracting and managerial power – see market 
failures. The optimal contracting theory focuses on the problem of information asymmetry. 
The managerial power theory goes even further. Arguing that managers use their power over 
boards to extract rents, it identifies an additional failure. Both approaches justify regulation. 
  
                                                         
107 cf. A Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon, 1994), ix. 
108 cf. J Mundt, “Externalities: Uncalculated Outcomes of Exchange” (1993) 13(2) JMK, 16-53, 46.  
109 JC Coffee, “Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate Systemic Risk” (2010) Columbia Law and 
Economics Working Paper No 380 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675015> accessed 18 September 2014, 4. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The First Layer: The (Supervisory) Board 
 
A. Introduction 
The regulation of executive remuneration is multi-layered. Three layers of regulation can be 
identified.
111
 The rules regarding the setting of executive remuneration including the 
competence to determine the remuneration and procedural and material rules are the first 
layer.
112
 A second layer is constituted by the rules regarding the disclosure of executive 
remuneration. A third layer, which gives shareholders the right to have a say, are the rules on 
shareholder voting on executive remuneration. The layers are not only inter-linked but, 
following the agency theory, they also share the aim of reducing agency costs.  
This chapter addresses the first hypothesis, namely that the setting and monitoring of 
executive remuneration by (supervisory) boards is not satisfactory and should be improved. 
Hence, this chapter intends to find out, first, whether the supervisory board of a German 
Aktiengesellschaft and the board of a UK public limited company are effective remuneration 
governance instruments. Secondly, it sets out to establish what could be improved. In order to 
find answers the regulatory framework of the remuneration-setting will be examined. A 
catalogue of conditions for an effective setting of managers’ remuneration will be developed 
and employed. Finally, the two systems will be compared and analysed for their respective 
strengths and weaknesses.  
  
                                                         
111 cf. the model by M Döll (fn.8), 103. 
112 cf. M Döll (fn.8), 103. 
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B. Germany 
Excessive remuneration is a long-known problem in Germany. Over seventy years ago the 
problem of “enormous salaries” and “bonuses without relation to performance or efficiency of 
the management board members” was already being discussed and resulted in regulatory 
action.
113
 
Since the mid-1990s the remuneration of German managers has risen steadily,
114
 albeit not as 
high as that of their American or British counterparts.
115
 German commentators state that 
there is a market failure regarding managers’ remuneration.116 Yet, they cannot agree on the 
failure’s extent and how to address it.117  
After a long period of stability a series of reforms has changed the legal framework in which 
Aktiengesellschaften (AG) operate.
118
 The last two decades have been characterised by a vivid 
and ongoing corporate governance debate which have led to several amendments to the 
Aktiengesetz (Public Companies Act; AktG)
119
 and the introduction and repeated revision of a 
best practice code.
120
 This “permanent reform”121 included inter alia new rules regarding the 
adequacy of executive remuneration, its disclosure and the involvement of shareholders in the 
pay-setting process.
122
 The VorstAG is the most important reform for this chapter. It was part 
of the German government’s reaction to the 2008 global financial crisis,123 which was – 
according to the government – promoted by flawed incentives and short-term focused 
remuneration systems.
124
 Besides recent reforms the AGs’ distinctive feature of a dual board 
structure makes the German way of dealing with the issue of executive remuneration 
particularly interesting. 
                                                         
113 F Schlegelberger, L Quassowski, Aktiengesetz vom 30. Januar 1937 (Vahlen, 1939), § 78 AktG 1937 m.no.1. 
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2011/view> accessed 18 September 2014. 
115 R Stenzel (fn.4), 203ff. 
116 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (2009) 54(15) AG, 517-529, 517. 
117 ibid., 517. 
118 M Nietsch, “Corporate Governance and Company Law Reform: a German Perspective” (2005) 13 (3) Corporate 
Governance, 368-376, 368. 
119 BGBl. I, 1089. 
120 German Corporate Governance Code, available at <www.ebundesanzeiger.de>. 
121 U Seibert, “Aktienrechtsreform in Permanenz?” (2002) 45 Die Aktiengesellschaft, 417-420, 417. 
122 cf. concerning adequacy and involvement of shareholders: Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG), 
BGBl. I 2009, 2509; regarding disclosure: Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen (VorstOG), BGBl. I 2005, 
2267. 
123 M Weber, “§ 87” in W Hölters (ed), Aktiengesetz, Kommentar (Beck/Vahlen, 2011), m.no.2. 
124 cf. BegrRegE BT-Drucks. 16/12278; Beschlußempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses, BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 1. 
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In the following, the German board model will be described briefly and the setting of 
executive remuneration will be analysed in detail. An analysis will follow, to evaluate 
whether the supervisory board has been fulfilling its task effectively.  
I. The German Board Model 
The AktG requires Aktiengesellschaften to have three organs namely Hauptversammlung
125
 
(general meeting), Vorstand
126
 (management board) and Aufsichtsrat
127
 (supervisory board). 
They have different and non-overlapping competences and functions,
128
 which are defined in 
detail in the AktG. 
The general meeting is a decision making body
129
 and offers the company’s shareholders the 
possibility to enforce their rights.
130
 It has the decision making power in the cases enumerated 
in § 119 (1) AktG. It is responsible for, among other things, appointing and removing 
supervisory board members (insofar as they are not appointed by the employees) and 
changing the Satzung (articles). The general meeting can also compel the competent organ to 
bring actions against supervisory and management board members for breaches of their 
duties.
131
 Indirectly it can cause the removal of management board members by passing a vote 
of no confidence.
132
 It also has certain unwritten competences.
133
 However, it is excluded 
from managing and directing the company.
134
  
1. The Vorstand (Management Board) 
Two mandatory boards exist called Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat. The Vorstand is entrusted with 
managing and directing the company (thus called the management board in English) while the 
other organs are excluded from this power, § 76 (1) AktG. The Aufsichtsrat has a supervisory 
task (hence supervisory board).
135
  
                                                         
125 §§ 118ff AktG. 
126 §§ 76ff AktG. 
127 §§ 95ff AktG. 
128 cf., however, § 23 (5) AktG. 
129 A Pentz, “§ 17. Vorstand und Hauptversammlung” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts (CH Beck 2006), 
597.7. 
130 § 118 (1) sentence 1 AktG. 
131 § 147 (1) AktG. 
132 § 84 (3) sentence 2 AktG. 
133 cf. Holzmüller Decision, BGHZ 83, 122 = NJW 1982, 1703; Gelatine Decision, BGHZ 159, 30 = NJW 2004, 1860. 
134 cf. § 119 (2) AktG. 
135 M Kort, “§ 76”, in K Hopt, H Wiedemann, Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz (4th ed, de Gruyter, 2009) m.no.2; W 
Hefermehl, G Spindler, “§ 76”, in W Goette, M Habersack, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (3rd ed, CH Beck 
2008), m.no.1. 
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1.1. Appointment 
The AktG provides that the management board can consist of one or more members but the 
details are left to the articles.
136
 Candidates have to fulfil certain statutory criteria. First, they 
have to be a fully legally competent, natural person who has not been convicted of certain 
(mainly insolvency-related) crimes and who is not prohibited from practising a profession by 
court or administrative order if the company’s purpose lies in this activity.137 Second, they 
cannot be member of the company’s supervisory board at the same time.138 The articles can 
require additional criteria.
139
  
The maximum duration for appointments is five years and reappointments are possible.
140
 The 
German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) requires explanation of reappointments 
occurring more than one year prior to the end of the current appointment to prevent 
circumvention of the maximum duration.
141
 It is common but not mandatory
142
 that one 
candidate is appointed by the supervisory board to be Vorstandsvorsitzender (comparable to 
CEO) who is primus inter pares.
143
 He controls, coordinates and represents the collegial 
organ. 
Regarding the appointment two legal relationships need to be distinguished. Management 
board members have a contractual relationship under the law of obligations due to their 
Anstellungsvertrag (service contract) and a relationship under company law due to their 
Bestellung (appointment stricto sensu).
144
 Due to their close factual and legal connection the 
supervisory board is responsible for both.
145
  
1.2. Removal 
The distinction between these two legal relationships is also relevant for the removal of 
management board members. The supervisory board is competent for both.
146
  
                                                         
136 § 76 (2) sentence 1 AktG. 
137 § 76 (3) AktG. 
138 § 105 (1) AktG; (2) provides an exception. 
139 cf. U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz: AktG (10th ed, CH Beck, 2012), § 76 m.no.26.  
140 § 84 (1) AktG.  
141 cf. 5.1.2. GCGC; J Du Plessis, I Saenger, “The General Meeting and the Management Board as Company Organs”, in J 
Du Plessis et al, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Springer, 2007), 42. 
142 M Kort, “§ 77”, in K Hopt, H Wiedemann (eds) (fn.135), m.no.49. 
143 § 84 (2) AktG. 
144 BGHZ 79, 38, 41; BGHZ 89, 48; U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz: AktG (10th ed, CH Beck, 2012), § 84 m.no.2; HJ Mertens, “§ 84 
in W Zöllner, U Noack (eds), Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (3rd ed, Heymanns, 2010), 2. 
145 G Thüsing, “§ 4. Bestellung und Anstellung des Vorstands” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129), 101. 
146 For the service contract: § 112 BGB; for the appointment: § 84 (3) sentence 1 AktG. 
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During the term of appointment management board members may only be removed on 
grounds of a “compelling reason”.147 Whilst this term is not defined in the AktG, a non-
exhaustive list of examples is given.
148
 A termination of the service contract similarly requires 
a “compelling reason”149 and is possible only if the appointment is revoked. The requirement 
of a “compelling reason” aims at securing the management board’s independence from the 
supervisory board.
150
  
1.3. Powers and Duties 
The management board is responsible for directing the company (Leitung),
151
 managing its 
business (Geschäftsführung)
152
 and representing it (Vertretung)
153
.  
The relationship between “directing the company” and “managing the company’s business” is 
not clear. Some commentators assume that the terms are to a large extent identical.
154
 Others 
regard the terms as partly overlapping.
155
 Most regard “managing” as the wider term which 
includes “directing”.156 Thus, managing involves every legal or factual action for the 
company whilst directing is narrower, meaning the leading of the company.
157
  
The management board directs the company independently, § 76 (1) AktG. Its entrepreneurial 
discretion is primarily limited by the company’s objective.158 In practice, the supervisory 
board is able to indirectly influence the management board’s decisions.159 Moreover, it may 
exert influence if the articles prescribe its approval. It even may have a veto regarding certain 
decisions.
160
 In principle, the general meeting cannot interfere with the management and 
direction of the management board. Still, the management board can refer matters to the 
general meeting voluntarily, § 119 (2) AktG. Here it can make a final decision.
161
 
                                                         
147 § 84 (3) sentence 1 AktG. 
148 § 84 (3) sentence 1 AktG. 
149 § 626 BGB.  
150 G Thüsing, “§ 5. Abberufung und Kündigung des Vorstands” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129), 159. 
151 § 76 (1) AktG. 
152 § 77 AktG. 
153 § 78 AktG. 
154 J Semler, Leitung und Überwachung der Aktiengesellschaft (2nd ed, Heymanns, 1996) m.no.3ff. 
155 H Henze, “Leitungsverantwortung des Vorstands – Überwachungspflicht des Aufsichtsrats” (2000) BB, 209-215, 209ff. 
156 W Hefermehl, G Spindler, “§ 76”, in W Goette, M Habersack, (fn.135), m.no.17. 
157 H Fleischer, “§ 2. Vertretungs- und Geschäftsführungsbefugnis des Vorstands” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129), 
157. 
158 H Fleischer, “§ 1. Leitungsaufgabe des Vorstands” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129), 23. 
159 J Du Plessis, I Saenger (fn.141), 53. 
160 cf. § 111 (4) sentence 2 AktG.  
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Further limitations of the management board’s competence to manage and direct were 
established in a series of seminal decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof.
162
  
2. The Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board) 
The third organ is the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board). This mandatory counterpart to the 
management board is a key characteristic of the German board structure.
163
 It was introduced 
as early as 1861 to create independent control of the management for the shareholders’ sake 
and to protect the public interest.
164
 
2.1. Appointment 
The appointment depends on multiple factors such as the company’s size, sector of business 
and articles. Generally, the general meeting elects the members, § 101 (1) AktG. If 
codetermination legislation applies, a distinction has to be made between the appointment of 
shareholder representatives and employee representatives, for which special rules apply.
165
 
The supervisory board comprises at least three people.
166
 The articles or the codetermination 
acts may require more – up to 21(!) – members. Candidates have to be a fully legally 
competent, natural person, not under custodianship according to § 1903 BGB.
167
 Supervisory 
board membership is inter alia impossible if the candidate is member of the company’s 
management board or serves on ten other mandatory supervisory boards already.
168
 The same 
applies if the candidate has been a member of the company’s management board within the 
last two years, if there are interlocking relationships or if the candidate is a representative of a 
dependent company.
169
 
                                                         
162 Holzmüller BGH, 25 February 1982 – II ZR 174/80, BGHZ 83, 122ff; Gelatine, BGH, 26 April 2004, – II ZR 155/02; 
(2004) 57 NJW 1863; In Macrotron (BGH, 25 November 2002, – II ZR 133/01; (2001) 24 ZIP 387ff.) the court 
acknowledged the general meeting’s inherent powers but used a new dogmatic foundation. Recently, Macrotron has been 
overruled by BGH, Decision of 08.11.2013 - II ZB 26/12. 
163 M Lutter, G Krieger, Rechte und Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats (5th ed, Otto Schmidt, 2008), § 1 m.no.7. 
164 K Hopt, “The German Two-Tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms” in K Hopt et al (eds), Comparative Corporate 
Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Clarendon Press, 1998), 230.  
165 For details: M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.163), § 1 m.no.10ff. 
166 cf. § 95 AktG. 
167 § 100 (1) AktG. 
168 Chairperson counts for two, § 100 (2) sentence 3 AktG. 
169 § 100 (2) AktG. 
Feldfunktion geändert
 44 
 
2.2. Removal  
Supervisory board members can be removed before the end of their term by vote of three-
quarters of the votes cast at the general meeting.
170
 The articles may establish different 
quota.
171
 Neither a cause nor a compelling reason is required.
172
  
2.3. Powers and Duties 
The supervisory board’s main tasks are the “personnel competence”173 and the supervisory 
function,
174
 meaning appointment and dismissal of management board members and their 
monitoring.
175
 Attached to the supervisory function is an advisory function.
176
 Nowadays, the 
supervisory board is also co-responsible for directing the company.
177
 Moreover, it represents 
the company vis-à-vis the management board. 
2.3.1. Supervision 
Monitoring is the supervisory board’s primary task, § 111 (1) AktG. The object of the 
monitoring is the management board’s managing of the company. The meaning of 
“managing” here is different from that in § 77.178 Here it indicates the “directing” of the 
company. As the supervisory board is not involved in the day-to-day management of the 
business it cannot be the supervisory board’s task to monitor all of the “managing” (in the 
sense of § 76) done by the management board.
179
 The supervision’s intensity differs according 
to the company’s situation.180 
2.3.2 Personnel Competence 
The supervisory board’s second main task is appointing management board members, § 84 (1) 
sentence 1 AktG. This competence is mandatory and exclusive.
181
 It cannot be delegated to a 
committee, § 107 (3) sentence 3. The supervisory board is also competent to conclude the 
service contract with management board candidates, § 84 (1) sentence 5. The decision on the 
service contract can generally be delegated but the committee’s decision may not anticipate 
                                                         
170 § 103 (1) AktG. 
171 Except for employee representatives. 
172 M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.163), § 1 m.no.30. 
173 § 84 AktG. 
174 § 111 AktG. 
175 C Jungmann, “The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems: Evidence from the 
UK and Germany”, (2006) 4 ECFR, 426-474, 432. 
176 A Pentz, “§ 16. Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129), m.no.1 
177 M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.163), § 1 m.no.57. 
178 A Pentz, “§ 16. Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129), m.no.32. 
179 M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.163), 3 m.no.66. 
180 ibid., § 3 m.no.86. 
181 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz: AktG (12th ed, CH Beck, 2012), § 84 m.no.5. 
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the full supervisory board’s decision on appointment.182 Importantly, since 2009 the 
remuneration decision can no longer be delegated, § 107 (3) sentence 3.  
II. Setting and Controlling Executive Remuneration  
After recapitulating the organisational structure of German AGs, the legal framework for 
setting management board members’ remuneration will be examined. 
1. Determination of the Remuneration of Management Board Members 
First, the remuneration setting competence will be analysed. Following the agency approach 
the remuneration is set to align manager and shareholder interests. 
1.1. Competence of the Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board as a whole (“Plenum”) has the exclusive, non-delegable competence to 
conclude service contracts with management board candidates, which includes setting their 
remuneration.
183
  
1.2. Legal Frame of the Decision  
Setting management board members’ remuneration is an entrepreneurial and organisational 
task, which offers the supervisory board a large margin of discretion.
184
 
Regarding the duty of care and liability of supervisory board members the business judgement 
rule as codified in § 93 (1) AktG for management board members can be applied analogously 
to supervisory board members, § 116 AktG.
185
  
The general duty of care of the supervisory board when exercising its competences is – 
regarding the aspect of management’s remuneration – specified by the requirement of 
adequacy.
186
  
                                                         
182 General opinion e.g. U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.181), § 84 m.no.12. 
183 § 84 (1) sentence 1, 5 AktG; M Weber, “§ 87” (fn.123), m.no.10. 
184 B Dauner-Lieb, “Die Verrechtlichung der Vorstandsvergütung durch das VorstAG – Methodische Probleme im Umgang 
mit Rechtsunsicherheiten” (2009) Der Konzern, 583-593, 586; K Cannivé, D Seebach “Vorstandsvergütung als neue 
Haftungsfalle für Aufsichtsratsmitglieder? – Haftung und Verhaltenspflichten der Aufsichtsratsmitglieder nach Inkrafttreten 
des VorstAG” (2009) Der Konzern, 593-601, 599. 
185 H Fleischer, “Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung im Aktienrecht (Teil II)” (2005) DStR, 1318-1323, 1319. 
186 C Seibt, “§87” in K Schmidt, M Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz: Kommentar (Otto Schmidt, 2008), m.no.1; H Fleischer, “§87” 
in G Spindler, E Stilz (eds), Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (CH Beck, 2010), m.no.1. 
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2. “Adequacy” of the Remuneration 
The management board member’s right to remuneration is based on its service contract. The 
freedom of contract is important in German civil and company law. This freedom’s 
underlying assumption is that equipollent parties can best organise their contractual 
relationships independently, without state interference.
187
 Companies shall be able to freely 
negotiate the reward for a managers’ performance.188  
This freedom is limited by § 87 (1) AktG, which establishes mandatory parameters for the 
remuneration’s adequacy (Angemessenheit).189 It uses flexible, general criteria which precede 
the stricter provisions of § 134 BGB (legal prohibition) and § 138 BGB (breach of good 
morals).  
2.1. Rationale of § 87 (1) AktG 
The adequacy requirement was introduced to prevent management board members from 
enriching themselves at the expense of the company to a greater extent than the company’s 
economic success would justify.
190
 Having no objective of protecting the managers, it 
concerns only the upper limit.
191
 The purpose is to protect the company, its shareholders and 
creditors from losses due to excessive remuneration.
192
 Excessive remuneration not only 
causes damage to the company and its shareholders, it can actually destroy investors’ 
confidence and in the long run even harm the acceptance of the existing economic system.
193
 
It is not the purpose of § 87 (1) to positively confirm the adequacy of a given remuneration. 
Rather it aims at barring clearly inadequate remuneration.
194
 
2.2. Historic Development 
Initially German public companies legislation did not regulate the adequacy of management 
board members’ remuneration.195 Remuneration was to be agreed without state 
interference.
196
  
                                                         
187 cf. M Körner, “Die Angemessenheit von Vorstandsbezügen in § 87 AktG – eine unbeachtete Vorschrift?”(2004) NJW, 
2697-2702, 2698. 
188 I Akin, Corporate Governance & Vorstandsvergütung: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zum deutschen und US-
amerikanischen Recht (Shaker, 2006), 102. 
189 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” in W Zöllner, U Noack, Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (3rd ed, Heymanns, 2010), 
m.no.4. 
190 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.186) m.no.2. 
191 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.4. 
192 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.2; M Weber, “§87” in (fn.123), m.no.1; HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.4. 
193 M Körner (fn.187), 2698; HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.2. 
194 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189) , m.no.7. 
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Incisive historic events led to rules on “adequacy”.197 The early 1930s saw a severe economic 
crisis. Still, managers often received “huge salaries” regardless of the company’s economic 
situation.
198
 Many companies were economically severely burdened with the high 
remuneration of their managers.
199
 There was no option to limit or reduce the remuneration. 
The issue was first regulated by a 1931 emergency decree
200
. It allowed the reduction of 
excessive remuneration after conclusion of the contract under certain circumstances, and 
made it possible for the government to set remuneration caps.
201
  
A major company law reform led to a separate act on public companies, the AktG 1937. In its 
§ 78, rules on adequacy of executive remuneration were introduced into German law for the 
first time.
202
  
Today’s AktG was created in 1965. The amended provision on adequacy moved to § 87 (1), 
where it can still be found generally unaltered. The only modification was that the supervisory 
board had the duty to ascertain that the remuneration’s adequacy was limited to the date when 
the remuneration was set.
203
 
For many years § 87 (1) was dormant and only came back to general attention with the 
Mannesmann case
204
, which concerned excessive payments to managers after a take-over.
205
  
In 2009 the VorstAG reform amended § 87. Among other things, the criteria for determining 
the remuneration’s adequacy were extended. The reasons for reform were: (1) reacting to the 
2008 financial crisis, which was at least in parts caused by flawed remuneration schemes
206
 
and (2) general unease about the level of managers’ remuneration207.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
195 e.g. §§ 207-249 ADHGB. 
196 C Gareis, O Fuchsberger, Das Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch nebst sich daran anschließenden Reichsgesetzen 
(Guttentag, 1891), 455. 
197 cf. AM Schüller, Vorstandsvergütung: Gesellschaftsrechtliche Fragen der Vergütung des Vorstands in der 
börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft (Nomos, 2002), 114ff.       
198 F Schlegelberger, L Quassowski (fn.113), § 78 AktG 1937 m.no.1. 
199 T Grattenthaler, Die Vergütung von Vorstandsmitgliedern in Aktiengesellschaften: Eine grundlegende Betrachtung mit 
ausgesuchten Schwerpunkten aus rechtswissenschaftlicher Sicht (Peter Lang, 2007), 321. 
200 3. Notverordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen vom 6.1.1931  (RGBl. I, 537). 
201 ibid., 557. 
202 E Geßler, “Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat im neuen Aktiengesetz” (1937) JW, 497-503, 499. 
203 B Kropff, Aktiengesetz. Textausgabe des Aktiengesetzes vom 6. 9. 1965 mit Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs und 
Bericht des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestags (IDW Verlag, 1965), 111. 
204 BGH, 21.12.2005 - 3 StR 470/04. 
205 G Thüsing, “Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116), 517. 
206 H Fleischer, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG)” (2009) NZG, 801-806, 801. 
207 U Seibert, “Das VorstAG – Regelungen zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und zum Aufsichtsrat” (2009) 
63(32) WM 1489-1493, 1489. 
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2.3. Criteria for “Adequacy”  
The supervisory board has to make sure that the remuneration is in an adequate relation to the 
member’s tasks, its performance and the company’s economic situation.208 Also, the 
remuneration may not exceed the “usual remuneration”209 unless there are specific reasons for 
it. The enumeration is non-exhaustive.
210
 The criteria have to be paid attention to 
cumulatively.
211
 None of the criteria is paramount for the supervisory board’s entrepreneurial, 
discretionary decision. 
Since the criteria set out in § 87 (1) are undetermined legal terms, it is worth examining them 
in detail.  
2.3.1. Aufgaben des Vorstandsmitglieds – Tasks of the Management Board Member 
The management board member’s tasks are the first criterion. “Tasks” means the functions 
and activities allocated, according to § 77 (1) sentence 2 AktG, to an individual management 
board member.
212
  
2.3.2 Leistungen des Vorstandsmitglieds – Performance of the Management Board 
Member 
A criterion introduced in 2009 is the management board member’s performance. It was 
already considered previously but its explicit mentioning shall emphasise its role as a central 
parameter.
213
 
The setting of remuneration in the service contract concerns payments for performances in the 
future. Hence, an assessment can only be prospective. Reference points for this prognosis can 
be e.g. comparable performances in the past for this or another company.
214
 
This criterion’s usefulness for concretising “adequacy” is doubtful.215 First, the uncertainties 
regarding future performances are substantial. Second, the supervisory board will always 
anticipate good or excellent performance as otherwise it would not be allowed to appoint this 
candidate.
216
 
                                                         
208 § 87(1) sentence 1 AktG. 
209 “übliche Vergütung”; § 87(1) sentence 1 AktG. 
210 Seibt, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.5; M Weber, “§87” in (fn.123), m.no.16. 
211 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.181), § 87 m.no.2. 
212 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.10. 
213 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116), 518. 
214 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” in W Zöllner, U Noack (fn.144), m.no.12. 
215 cf. HJ Mertens, “Vorstandsvergütung in börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften” (2011) 56(3) AG, 57-63, 57. 
216 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189) , m.no.13. 
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2.3.3. Lage der Gesellschaft – Situation of the Company 
Another criterion is the company’s situation. “Situation” means the overall economic 
circumstances, which include the net assets, the financial situation and the results of 
operation.
217
 Also factors like the company’s size218, turnover219, number of employees220, the 
stock market price as an indicator of the future development of the company
221
 and external 
factors like markets, politics and legal environment
222
 can be taken into account. 
However, even an excellent company situation cannot justify remuneration which is 
inadequately high in relation to the individual management board member’s tasks.223 Then 
again, a poor economic situation does not necessarily mean low remuneration. In the case of a 
reappointment this may be right but higher incentives may be necessary to find personnel that 
are able to restore the company’s profitability.224  
2.3.4. Üblichkeit der Vergütung – Conventionality of the Remuneration 
The remuneration should not exceed the “usual remuneration” unless there are specific 
reasons for it.  
It is debated whether the conventionality of the remuneration is an indicator of adequacy
225
 or 
whether it is a separate, additional criterion
226
 for the limitation of managers’ remuneration. 
Both views come to the same result: that conventionality reduce remuneration instead of 
increasing it by referring to the usual level of remuneration.  
Conventionality can have a horizontal and a vertical facet. Horizontal conventionality refers 
to what is usual in companies of the same sector, comparable size and similar complexity in 
the same country.
227
 Vertical conventionality means that the management board member’s 
                                                         
217 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.14. 
218 M Peltzer “Wider den ‘greed’ – Betrachtungen zu §§ 86 – 87 AktG” in U Schneider et al (eds), Festschrift für Marcus 
Lutter zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, 2001), 571-586, 574. 
219 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.9. 
220 G Thüsing “Auf der Suche nach dem iustum pretium der Vorstandstätigkeit - Gedanken zur Angemessenheit i.S.d. § 87 
Abs. 1 AktG” (2003) ZGR, 457-507, 469. 
221 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.9. 
222 M Weber, “§87” in (fn.186), m.no.25. 
223 T Grattenthaler (fn.199), 341. 
224 M Hoffmann-Becking, “Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten bei Anreizsystemen” (1999), NZG, 797-804, 798; U Hüffer, 
Aktiengesetz (fn.181), § 87 m.no.2. 
225 B Hohhaus, C Weber, “Die Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung gem. § 87 AktG nach dem VorstAG” (2009) DB, 
1515-1520, 1516; H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.15; G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der 
Vorstandsvergütung” ( fn.116), 518; H Fleischer, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG)” 
(fn.206), 802. 
226 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.16. 
227 cf. BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 15; para 4.2.2 GCGC. 
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remuneration should fit into the company’s pay structure.228 Not every remuneration that is 
“usual” is adequate. This would require a functioning market for managers.229 Similarly, 
remuneration above market level is not necessarily inadequate.
230
  
The usefulness of the conventionality requirement inserted by the VorstAG is questionable. 
Regarding the horizontal facet, the criticism should be raised that companies of the same size, 
sector and country may well differ in their economic success. Given that, it makes little sense 
to argue that the less successful company’s remuneration structure is relevant for that of the 
successful company or vice versa.
231
 Vertical conventionality could allow the management 
board to increase the employees’ wages and thereby change the adequacy of their own 
remuneration, which could lead to bizarre results.
232
 
2.3.5. Further Criteria and Particularities for Listed Companies 
For the decision whether the remuneration is adequate, other – not explicitly mentioned – 
aspects can be relevant as well, such as the particular skills, knowledge or experience of a 
candidate.
233
  
A particularity for listed companies is that the remuneration structure has to be oriented 
towards sustainable growth, § 87 (1) sentence 2. The supervisory board must ascertain that 
variable remuneration components are based on a multi-year assessment. 
2.4. Points of Reference  
Having established the criteria for adequacy, it is necessary to establish the points of 
reference. 
2.4.1. Gesamtbezüge – Total Remuneration  
“Adequacy” refers to the total remuneration of a (single) management board member.234 
“Total remuneration” has to be interpreted broadly.235 It comprises all benefits a manager 
                                                         
228 cf. BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 15. 
229 H Fleischer, “Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung im Aktienrecht (Teil I)” (2005) DStR, 1279-1283, 1282; HJ 
Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.16; M Weber, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.24. 
230 M Weber, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.24. 
231 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.16. 
232 cf. J Wagner, J Wittgens, “Corporate Governance als dauernde Reformanstrengung: Der Entwurf des Gesetzes zur 
Angemessenhet der Vorstandsvergütung” (2009) BB, 906-911, 907.  
233 M Oltmanns, “Kommentierung §87 AktG ” in T Heidel (ed) Aktienrecht und Kapitalmarktrecht (3rd ed, Nomos, 2011), 
m.no.4. 
234 § 87 (1) sentence 1 AktG. 
235 M Weber, “§87” in (fn.186), m.no.4. 
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receives from the company regarding its work for that company.
236
 § 87 (1) contains a non-
exhaustive enumeration of its elements. They can be divided into four categories: (1) fixed 
salary (2) perquisites (3) variable compensation and (4) pensions including severance 
payments etc.
237
 The monetary value of the total remuneration is the basis for the adequacy 
test. The rationale is to allow the necessary flexibility to consider individual circumstances.
238
 
It may be economically reasonable during a crisis to agree on a low fixed salary and at the 
same time agree on an extraordinarily high variable compensation to reward a successful turn-
around.
239
 
2.4.2. Temporal Point of Reference 
The remuneration has to be adequate at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
 240
 In the 
case of subsequent alteration of the service contract the supervisory board has to re-examine 
whether the remuneration is (still) adequate. 
The fixing and limiting of the adequacy test to the time of the conclusion of the contract is 
important. Without this temporal aspect it would be almost impossible to assess adequacy due 
to uncertainties that it would be very difficult to overcome.
241
 
2.5. Specification of the Adequacy Requirement  
“Adequacy” is a term which needs to be filled.242 Many believe that it is hardly possible to 
specify the adequacy requirement more than the provision itself does.
243
 How could the term 
be clarified? 
(1) The easiest way to achieve clarity as to what is adequate would be by introducing precise, 
absolute limits. So-called remuneration caps are a perennial topic in legal discussion.
244
 
Recently they were considered again.
245
 The GCGC 2013 even recommends them.
246
 Their 
                                                         
236 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.189), m.no.18. 
237 C Seibt, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.4. 
238 ibid.,m.no.4. 
239 M Weber, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.4. 
240 cf. T Grattenthaler (fn.223), 334. 
241 ibid, 334. 
242 H Fleischer, “Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung im Aktienrecht (Teil I)” (fn.229)1281. 
243 cf. U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.181), § 87 m.no.2; H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.186), m.no.22. 
244 cf. just T Baums, “Vorschlag eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Transparenz von Vorstandsvergütungen” (2004) ZIP, 
1877-1884, 1879; K Kiethe “Höchstgrenzen für Vorstandsvergütungen im Maßnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur 
Aktienreform 2003 – verfassungswidrig und standortgefährdend” (2003) BB, 1573-1579; M Körner (fn. 187Fehler! 
Textmarke nicht definiert.), 2701; U Hüffer, “Aktienbezugsrechte als Bestandteil der Vergütung von 
Vorstandsmitgliedern und Mitarbeitern” ZHR (1997) 214-245, 235; G Thüsing, “Die Angemessenheit von 
Vorstandsvergütungen ” (2003) DB, 1612-1615, 1613. 
245 cf only suggestion by J Poss, MP and others, BT-Drucks. 17/13472. 
246 4.2.3 GCGC 2013. 
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clarity and effectiveness is positive. However, there are both methodological and factual 
arguments against caps. Methodologically, the introduction of such a limit is hardly 
convincing, as the legislator intentionally chose “soft factors” instead of setting a fixed upper 
limit.
247
 From a factual point of view, the introduction of a cap would not allow sufficient 
flexibility for the wide array of varying needs of different companies.
248
  
(2) Alternatively, “adequacy” could be specified by establishing a framework which offers 
orientation depending on the company’s size. An interesting suggestion is classifying 
companies as e.g. small, medium or large
249
 and setting maximum total remunerations, e.g. 
€150,000, €200,000 and €700,000 for the different groups.250 There would be a refutable 
assumption that remuneration below this threshold is adequate. Exceeding remuneration 
would require particular justification. One may criticise both the generalisation and the exact 
numbers of this example. However, this suggestion would rebut the mentioned one-size-does-
not-fit-all argument to some extent.  
(3) Another suggestion to specify “adequacy” is to use tax law guidelines for the hidden 
distribution of profits.
251
 The idea is to make recourse to the corporate tax law principles 
regarding the “adequacy” of managing members’ (Gesellschafter-Geschäftsführer) total 
remuneration.
252
 This transfer of terms and concepts is not advisable. It creates more 
uncertainties than it helps to clarify. 
(4) Due to the difficulty of identifying adequate remuneration, identifying obviously 
inadequate remuneration has been suggested.
253
 § 87 (1) could be understood as a prohibition 
of inadequate remuneration rather than a definition of adequate remuneration.
254
 This is not a 
bogus specification. By identifying clear excesses the adequacy requirement can be 
concretised. This less tight control has its merits as managers’ remuneration cannot be 
determined with mathematical precision with just one outcome being right.
255
 The 
Bundesgerichtshof has spoken of a “margin of appreciation” regarding the setting of 
remuneration of managers in limited liability companies.
256
 It argued that certain 
remuneration is not inadequate solely because other remuneration could be regarded as “more 
                                                         
247 H Fleischer,“Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung im Aktienrecht (Teil I)” (fn.234229), 1281. 
248 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.19. 
249 Classification based on the classification in § 267 HGB. 
250 O Lücke in O Lücke (ed), Vorstand der AG (CH Beck, 2004), § 2 m.no.240. 
251 cf. G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.35; G Thüsing, “iustum pretium“ (fn.225220), 460. 
252 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.23. 
253 O Lücke (fn.255250), § 2 m.no.118. 
254 cf. HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.7; H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.24. 
255 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.24. 
256 cf. BGHZ 111, 224, 227; BGH NJW 2006, 522, 523. 
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adequate”. This idea can be transferred to § 87 (1). By ruling out obviously excessive 
remuneration it is possible to limit remuneration without the problem of defining what 
remuneration would be adequate. 
To summarise, further specifying the adequacy requirement is difficult. The most practicable 
way is to identify and sanction obviously inadequate remuneration. It corresponds to the 
provision’s rationale, which is not to confirm the adequacy of a certain amount but to prevent 
inadequate remuneration.  
2.6. Legal Consequences of Inadequate Remuneration 
The question arises what the legal consequences of inadequately high remuneration are. 
2.6.1. Voidance of the Agreement? 
Could the agreement be void? A breach of the adequacy requirement does not affect the 
validity and enforceability of the service contract including the inadequately high 
remuneration agreed therein.
257
  
Similarly, § 87 (1) is not a Verbotsgesetz (prohibition) in the sense of § 134 BGB.
258
 It merely 
concretises the supervisory board’s duties.259 
The contract could in fact be void under the conditions of § 138 (2) BGB (breach of good 
morals).
260
 The agreement of inadequate remuneration would have to be contra bonos mores 
(sittenwidrig). The hurdles are so high that the conditions of § 138 BGB will very rarely be 
fulfilled.
261
 
Thus far, the contract including the remuneration agreement would not be void. However, 
could the very supervisory board decision which infringes § 87 (1) be void? Then the offer of 
the service contract and consequently the service contract would not be valid. The relevant  
                                                         
257 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 87 m.no.8; H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.57; M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), 
m.no.25; G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack, (fn.135128), m.no.80; Seibt, “§87”(fn.190185), m.no.10; M Weber, 
“§ 87”(fn.123116), m.no.46. 
258 Prevailing opinion; HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.5; M Kort, “Zivilrechtliche Folgen unangemessen 
hoher Vorstandsvergütung - eine Mannesmann-Spätlese” (2007) DStR 1127-1133, 1127ff.; C Seibt, “§87” (fn.190185), 
m.no.17; G Thüsing, “iustum pretium” (fn.225220), 505; Other opinion: M Oltmanns, “Kommentierung §87 
AktG”(fn.238233), m.no.6; FJ Säcker, S Stenzel, “Das zivilrechtliche Schicksal von gegen § 87 Abs. 1 AktG verstoßenden 
Vergütungsvereinbarungen” (2006) JZ, 1151-1157, 1152. 
259 K Langenbucher, “Die Bereicherungsrechtliche Rückforderung unangemessener Vorstandsbezüge” in Theodor Baums et 
al (eds) Festschrift für Ulrich Huber zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 861-870, 863. 
260 T Beiner, Der Vorstandsvertrag: Leitfaden für die Bestellung und den Anstellungsvertrag einer Aktiengesellschaft 
(Boorberg, 2005), m.no.248; M Hoffmann-Becking, “Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten” (fn.229224), 798; M Kort, “§ 87”, 
(fn.135128), m.no.25; G Spindler, “Vergütung und Abfindung von Vorstandsmitgliedern” (2004) DStR, 36-45, 42. 
261 K Langenbucher (fn.264259), 861. 
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§ 108 AktG does not state under which conditions a supervisory board decision is void.
262
 The 
courts have repeatedly decided that any supervisory board decision that breaches mandatory 
provisions of an act or the articles can be void.
263
 Voidance occurs if either the content or the 
procedure of the decision has breached mandatory provisions.
264
 Procedural flaws causing 
voidance are e.g. lacking a quorum or an incorrect composition of the supervisory board.
265
 
As regards the content, the decision has to breach a prohibition in the sense of § 134 BGB or 
another law established in the public interest in order to be void.
266
 As already mentioned, § 
87 (1) is not that kind of prohibition. Examples of breaches of provisions established in the 
public interest are the appointment of a person who does not fulfil the criteria to become 
management board member and discretionary decisions that exceed the margin of 
discretion.
267
 Whether § 87 (1) is such a provision is questionable, but the issue has not yet 
been resolved.  
To summarise, a breach of the adequacy requirement of § 87 (1) neither causes voidance of 
the supervisory board’s decision nor of the service contract itself. 
2.6.2 Liability for Damages 
The next question is whether the supervisory board members are potentially liable for 
damages. 
The supervisory board has the duty to adhere to the requirement of adequacy, § 87 (1). If the 
supervisory board agrees to an inadequate remuneration it breaches this duty. As a result its 
members may be liable to pay damages according to §§ 116 (1) and (3) in conjunction with 
§ 93 (2) AktG. The breach must be culpable.
268
 The member is not liable if it took due care 
and acted like a conscientious supervisory board member. Thus, it has to have cared like an 
average supervisory board member and must have acted in the best interest of the company.
269
 
Paying more than necessary and thereby wasting company assets is neither in the company’s 
interest nor does it fulfil the requirements regarding the level of care. Following § 93 (2) 
sentence 2 the supervisory board members have the burden of proof.  
                                                         
262 U Hüffer “Beschlußmängel im Aktienrecht und im Recht der GmbH – eine Bestandsaufnahme unter Berücksichtigung der 
Beschlüsse von Leitungs- und Überwachungsorganen” (2001) ZGR, 833-874, 868. 
263 cf. BGHZ 135, 244ff.; BGHZ 124, 111ff.; BGHZ 122, 342ff. 
264 cf. BGHZ 135, 244, 247; M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.165158), § 11 recitals 735 and 736. 
265 M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.165158), § 11 m.no.736. 
266 T Baums, “Der fehlerhafte Aufsichtsratsbeschluß” (1983) ZGR, 300-345, 326ff. 
267 M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.165158), § 11 m.no.736. 
268 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 83 m.no.14. 
269 cf. M Brauer “Die Aktienrechtliche Beurteilung von ‚appreciation awards’ zu Gunsten des Vorstands” (2004) NZG, 502-
509, 504. 
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Supervisory board members may have to pay damages to the company for the conclusion of a 
contract containing an inadequate remuneration agreement. 
2.6.3. Opinion 
Making the supervisory board liable for damages seems prima facie a good solution. It has a 
double function: compensating the company’s loss and threatening the supervisory board with 
sanctions in order to avoid the occurrence of losses in the first place.
270
 However, it faces 
several problems in practice. First, it is difficult to assess the loss caused.
271
 The loss could be 
only the part of the remuneration which exceeds the adequate remuneration.
272
 It would be 
necessary to be able to quantify the adequate remuneration in numbers. The court will 
generally be unable to quantify the precise loss due to a lack of parameters to quantify 
adequate remuneration.  
Another problem is the competence to bring the action for damages. It would be for the 
management board to bring the action, § 78 AktG.
273
 Promising actions for damages have to 
be brought if the management board does not want to risk liability itself.
274
 Nevertheless, it 
would be unrealistic to assume that the management board would bring actions against the 
supervisory board if it was involved in the events, too.
275
 Since this dilemma is well-known 
the Bundesgerichtshof ruled in the seminal ARAG decision that organs are generally obliged 
to take an action for damages against members of (other) organs.
276
 Moreover, the general 
meeting can force the management board to act, § 147, or a qualified minority can bring an 
action on behalf of the company, § 148 AktG. However, shareholders face collective action 
and free-rider problems.  
3. Adapting the Service Contract – Subsequent Reduction of Remuneration  
The supervisory board’s responsibility for setting adequate remuneration has also been 
strengthened by amending § 87 (2) AktG. It allows for subsequent reduction of the 
remuneration if the situation for the company deteriorates and the agreed remuneration would 
be inequitable for the company. Its aim is the same as the adequacy requirement’s aim, 
                                                         
270 A Cahn (fn.10598), 451. 
271 ibid., 449. 
272 ibid., 449.  
273 A Pentz, “§ 16. Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129122) 573. 
274 Drygala, “§106” in K Schmidt, M Lutter (eds) (fn.190185), m.no.36. 
275 Similar: M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.165158), § 13 m.no.1013. 
276 BGHZ 135, 244, 252. 
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namely protection of company, shareholders and creditors against losses caused by excessive 
management remuneration.
277
 
Subsequent remuneration reduction raises several questions as it pierces the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.
278
 Generally, a reduction would only be possible if the two contracting parties 
agreed on new terms.
279
 § 87 (2) constitutes a unilateral right to alter a legal relationship.
280
 It 
cannot be impeded or precluded by way of an agreement between the parties or the articles.
281
  
3.1. Conditions 
To increase the provision’s effectiveness in practice,282 the GCGC-legislator eased the 
conditions for subsequent reduction in 2009. Today  subsequent reduction requires only that 
after the remuneration-setting a deterioration (previously: significant deterioration) of the 
company’s situation occurred, so that the continued granting of the remuneration would be 
inequitable (previously: severely inequitable) for the company. The conditions can be further 
eased, contractually.
283
 
3.1.1. Deterioration of the Company’s Situation 
The first condition is the deterioration of the company’s situation. Economic difficulties 
suffice.
284
 Insolvency and acute crisis are not necessary.
285
 
The deterioration has to have occurred after the conclusion of the service contract and may 
not have been foreseeable at that time.
286
  
3.1.2. Inequity for the Company 
The second condition is that the continued payment of the remuneration is inequitable for the 
company. It is inequitable either if the manager has acted contrary to his duty or if the 
deterioration of the company’s situation happens during his/her time as a management board 
member and can be ascribed to him.
287
 It is a case-by-case decision and the member’s role and 
                                                         
277 C Seibt, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.1 
278 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.104. 
279 HJ Fonk, “Die Zulässigkeit von Vorstandsbezügen dem Grunde nach” (2005) NZG, 248-254, 250. 
280 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.98. 
281 U Baeck, C Götze and C Arnold, “Festsetzung und Reduzierung der Geschäftsführervergütung – welche Änderungen 
bringt das VorstAG?” (2009) NZG, 1121-1127, 1125. 
282 H Fleischer, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG)” (fn.211206), 804. 
283 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.94. 
284 Examples in BegrRegE BT-Drucks 16/12278, 6. 
285 ibid., 6. 
286 G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.87. 
287 cf. BegrRegE BT-Drucks 16/12278, 6. 
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personal circumstances have to be considered.
288
 The greater the manager’s role and mistakes 
the more likely it is that the continuation of the payment is inequitable.
289
  
A reduction is not justified if the supervisory board notices it set the remuneration too high or 
if the member’s performance is disappointing.290  
3.2. Competence and Procedure  
Only the full supervisory board can decide on this matter, § 107 (3) sentence 3 AktG . 
The supervisory board shall reduce the remuneration to an adequate level, § 87 (2) sentence 1. 
The reduction itself happens by a unilateral declaration by the supervisory board which 
directly alters the obligations vis-à-vis the member.
291
 The level is adequate if the 
management remuneration has been reduced to a level which is just bearable for the 
company.
292
 The reduction has to be precise regarding the reduced remuneration components 
and cannot be retroactive.
293
 
3.3. Legal Consequences 
The reduction directly changes the content of the service contract which persists, § 87 (2) 
sentence 2. The affected management board member in return has a right to extraordinary 
dismissal (außerordentliche Kündigung). It can also bring an action against the company for 
performance (Leistungsklage) regarding the payment of the full remuneration.
294
 
Current or future remuneration is affected by the reduction.
295
 According to the travaux 
préparatoires
296
 and in contrast to the pre-VorstAG prevailing opinion in the literature,
297
 
severance payments as well as pensions and related payments can be reduced as well.  
                                                         
288 A Weisner, L Kölling, “Herausforderung für den Aufsichtsrat – Herabsetzung von Vorstandsbezügen in Zeiten der Krise” 
(2003) NZG, 465-468, 466. 
289 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.97. 
290 C Seibt, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.11. 
291 M Kort, “§ 87”(fn.135128) m.no.296; G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.99; Seibt, “§87” 
(fn.190185), m.no.12. 
292 C Seibt, “§87(fn.190185), m.no.12. 
293 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.98. 
294 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 87 m.no.9a; C Seibt, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.12; M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), 
m.no.298; G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.100; HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), 
m.no.98; discussed are also a Feststellungsklage (declaratory action) and an action for determination according to § 315 (3) 
sentence 2 BGB. 
295 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.102. 
296 BT-Drucks. 16/12278, 6. 
297 cf. G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.93 with further references. 
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3.4. Subsequent Reduction: Opinion 
Instead of merely ensuring the equity of management board remuneration, § 87 (2) has 
become a tool to ensure its adequacy as well. However, it does not completely embrace the 
new aim. For a reduction to an adequate level of remuneration the company’s situation still 
has to have deteriorated. The result is a strange “ambiguous position”298 and even 
arbitrariness. Whether a reduction to the desired (adequate) level can be made depends on 
whether or not there accidentally is deterioration or not. If the aim is to achieve adequate 
remuneration it should not depend on such circumstances.  
The new § 87 (2) criteria should be interpreted restrictively due to the constitutional 
protection of property in Art 14 Grundgesetz, which includes contractual entitlements.
299
 
Even if the constitutional concerns are debatable,
300
 concerns regarding the piercing of the 
pacta sunt servanda principle
301
 and the fact that, in case of economic difficulties, variable 
remuneration will decrease anyway,
302
 plead for a narrow interpretation. Subsequent 
reduction should remain ultima ratio.
303
 
III. Evaluation 
For a long time laying down procedures revolving around the supervisory board was the 
preferred approach in Germany to secure an appropriate level of executive remuneration.
304
 
However, corporate scandals and the 2008 financial crisis are frequently analysed in terms of 
(supervisory) boards failing to fulfil their role as monitors of the remuneration process.
305
 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is that the supervisory board is not effective in setting adequate 
remuneration and needs improvement. Its effectiveness will be evaluated. Criteria for an 
efficient and satisfactory setting of executive remuneration will be developed. Then, the 
German approach will be examined against these criteria. Subsequently, an analysis will 
determine whether the German board system in practice fulfils the criteria. This will make it 
possible to decide whether the supervisory board is an effective and satisfactory remuneration 
governance tool. 
                                                         
298 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 523. 
299 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.94. 
300 MP Weller, “Die Systemkohärenz des § 87 Abs. 2 AktG – eingeschränkte Vertragstreue beim Vorstandsvertrag auf Grund 
Fremdinteressenwahrung” (2010) NZG, 7-12, 8ff. 
301 B Dauner-Lieb (fn.188183), 589. 
302 JH Bauer, C Arnold, “Festsetzung und Herabsetzung der Vorstandsvergütung nach dem VorstAG” (2009) AG, 717-731, 
725; B Dauner-Lieb (fn.188183), 590. 
303 H Fleischer, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG)” (fn.211206), 804. 
304 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 525. 
305 cf. G Ferrarini, N Moloney and MC Ungureanu, “Understanding Directors’ Pay” (fn.22), 15. 
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Deutsch
(Deutschland)
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: (Standard)
Times New Roman, 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: (Standard)
Times New Roman, 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Deutsch (Deutschland)
 59 
 
1. Requirements for effective Remuneration Governance by the Supervisory Board  
Four criteria should be fulfilled: (1) independence, (2) professionalism and (3) motivation of 
the decision-making body and (4) transparency of the decision itself and of the procedure.
306
 
Adherence to these requirements should lead to appropriate and efficient remuneration 
agreements.  
1.1. Independence 
The most important requirement is that the body deciding on the remuneration is independent. 
Independence is to be understood in a wide sense, comprising internal and external 
independence. Internal independence means independence of mind or in fact. The decision on 
remuneration should not be affected by individual interests or influences like social ties that 
may compromise professional judgement. External independence signifies independence in 
appearance of the decision-makers and includes the organisational provisions to ensure 
independent decisions.  
An antagonism of interests between remuneration setters and recipients should ensure that the 
decision is unbiased and efficient. The composition of the decision-making body is of utmost 
importance. It is necessary that the election process of the decision-makers does not create 
dependences between them and the ones whose remuneration they will determine. Conflicts 
of interest have to be prevented. 
The decision on remuneration should neither directly nor indirectly be influenced by the 
management. Indirect influence may be exerted via compensation consultants that hope to 
conclude further contracts with the management. A more direct way of influencing is the 
ability to impact the decision-makers’ position, compensation and reputation. “Interlocking 
directorships” should be avoided and, more generally, the decision-makers should not be 
managers elsewhere as they are unlikely to be too harsh on their peers.  
1.2. Professionalism 
A second important requirement is the decision-making body’s professionalism. Due to the 
complexity of modern remuneration systems and possible implications it is necessary that the 
body consists of highly qualified individuals with sufficient expertise. To avoid mere rubber-
stamping, the decision-makers have to be critical, sufficiently engaged and informed, and 
undertake substantive (research) work. 
                                                         
306 cf. criteria in M Lutter, “Defizite für eine effiziente Aufsichtsratstätigkeit und gesetzliche Möglichkeiten der 
Verbesserung” (1995) 159 ZHR, 287-309, 287ff. 
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In order to make valuable contributions to the discussions on remuneration they need to have 
negotiation skills and a strong understanding of the firm. A sufficient level of (inside) 
knowledge to assess the manager’s performance against the background of the market, the 
economy and wider factors is essential for efficient decisions. 
1.3. Motivation 
A third requirement is that the decision-making body is motivated and committed. Every 
member of the relevant body should devote the necessary time and attention to its duties. The 
members should have frequent meetings and appropriate preparation for each of the decisions. 
The number of other professional commitments should be limited in order to ensure proper 
performance of their duties as a part of the decision-making body. 
Motivation requires positive and negative incentives. Setting executive remuneration should 
be compensated adequately. It should not be seen as part of an “honorary post” regarding both 
commitment and compensation. However, there should also be a clear responsibility for the 
setting of management remuneration, which goes hand in hand with clear and enforceable 
liability. Liability in turn requires rationalisable and reviewable decisions. 
1.4. Transparency 
A final requirement is that the decision-making should be transparent. Transparency can have 
different meanings. Here it signifies that it is understandable how the agreement on a certain 
amount and structure was achieved. Transparency covers the decision-making procedure as 
well as the criteria for decision-making. The aspect of disclosure will be dealt with separately.  
2. Assessing the Law in the Books 
The developed criteria will now be applied. 
2.1. Independence 
The mandatory rules of the AktG require a strict separation of those who set the remuneration 
from those who receive it. The dual board structure ensures prima facie the decision-makers’ 
independence.  
Several safeguards for the supervisors’ independence from the management board exist. 
Paramount is the incompatibility of management board and supervisory board positions, 
§ 105 (1) AktG. This shall primarily prevent managers from monitoring their own 
performance but similarly the management is prevented from directly setting its own 
 61 
 
remuneration.
307
 The incompatibility of the two functions is an essential factor for the 
supervisory board’s external independence. Both external and internal independence shall be 
ensured by a “cooling-off period”, § 100 (2) no. 4 AktG. Former members of the management 
board generally cannot be appointed to the supervisory board for a period of two years after 
the end of their contract. This shall ensure personal discontinuity and prevent overly strong 
social ties between members of the two boards.  
Central to independence is the absence of conflicts of interest. It follows from § 116 in 
conjunction with § 93 (1) sentence 2 AktG that the supervisory board members are not 
representing any individual interests but are required to act in the company’s interest.308 
Regarding the remuneration decision, an antagonism of interests between supervisory and 
management board should exist, as the intention is to protect the company’s assets by 
spending as little as possible to recruit the best managers that can be afforded, whilst the 
others are interested in maximum compensation for themselves. Generally, conflicts of 
interest should be rare, as supervisory board members are elected by the general meeting and 
the likelihood of their re-election depends on satisfactory performance, which includes the 
setting of adequate management remuneration. The supervisor’s election by the general 
meeting should also prevent the creation of dependencies between the supervisor and the 
management.  
The antagonism of interests between the two boards could be limited if the composition of the 
supervisory board was characterised by “interlocking directorships” and more generally if 
management board members of other companies were on the supervisory board. Strictness 
regarding remuneration would indirectly affect them. Hence, interlocking directorships are 
prohibited, § 100 (2) no. 3 AktG. Indirect influence may be exerted by the management board 
via compensation consultants that do not want to risk losing the opportunity of further 
contracts with the management by being too strict when assessing adequate remuneration.  
A positive aspect regarding the supervisory board’s independence could be the mandatory 
involvement of employee representatives.
309
 Their interests are less likely to be aligned with 
those of the management. 
The GCGC, in contrast to the AktG, distinguishes between independent and other members of 
the supervisory board.
310
 It recommends having an adequate number of independent members 
                                                         
307 H Fleischer, “§ 16. Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129122), m.no.4. 
308 M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.165158), § 12 m.no.893. 
309 cf. supra. 
310 cf. para 5.4.2 GCGC. 
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on the supervisory board to ensure independent control and advice. Members are not to be 
considered independent if they have “business or personal relations with the company, its 
executive bodies, a controlling shareholder or an enterprise associated with the latter which 
may cause a substantial and not merely temporary conflict of interests”.311 It recommends that 
no more than two members of the supervisory board should have been members of the 
company’s management board before or have held directorships with important 
competitors.
312
 
To summarise, in theory the supervisory board should be sufficiently independent. However, 
despite its high regulatory density the AktG contains only a few – although more and more – 
specific rules on the avoidance of conflicts of interest. The act seems to have a certain 
tolerance of these conflicts.
313
 The GCGC tries to be more specific, defines independence and 
emphasises the need for truly independent supervisory board members. The system’s 
backbone and an essential factor for unbiased decisions is the separation of remuneration-
setters from remuneration-recipients. 
2.2. Professionalism 
Another important factor is the supervisory board’s professionalism. The AktG does not set 
out many requirements. Generally, following § 100 (1) AktG every fully legally competent, 
natural person which is not under custodianship according to § 1903 BGB can become a 
supervisory board member. Whether or which additional qualifications are required is 
debated.
314
 Some knowledge of economics, accounting and law is required.
315
 Members do 
not have to be experts but at least “financial literacy” is necessary.316 According to the 
Bundesgerichtshof a member of the supervisory board must have or acquire the minimum 
knowledge and skills to understand without help all routine business processes and be able to 
appropriately decide on them.
317
 
The GCGC states that the supervisory board “has to be composed in such a way that its 
members as a group possess the knowledge, ability and expert experience required to properly 
complete its tasks”318. It is worded as a “must provision”, merely repeating the existing legal 
                                                         
311 Para 5.4.2 GCGC. 
312 Para 5.4.2 GCGC. 
313 UH Schneider, “Wettbewerbsverbot für Aufsichtsratsmitglieder einer Aktiengesellschaft?” (1995) BB, 365-370, 367.  
314 cf. J Semler, “§ 100”, in B Kropff, J Semler, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (2nd ed, CH Beck, 2004), 
m.no.76ff.; J Hopt, M Roth, “§ 100, in K Hopt, H Wiedemann (eds) (fn.135128) m.no.22ff. 
315 K Berger, Die Kosten der Aufsichtsratstätigkeit in der Aktiengesellschaft (Peter Lang, 2000), 5. 
316 M Peltzer, “Handlungsbedarf in Sachen Corporate Governance” (2002) 5 NZG, 593-599, 597. 
317 BGHZ 85, 293 = AG 1983, 133. 
318 5.4.1 GCGC. 
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situation. The code recommends specialist knowledge and experience for certain positions.
319
 
The legal literature recommends ascertaining the existence of sufficient expertise and a 
selection of supervisory board candidates not ad personam but ad causam.
320
 
An option the German system offers to lessen the problem of lacking expertise is the 
possibility of setting up committees consisting of specialised supervisory board members. 
§ 107 (3) allows them except for certain matters. These committees allow efficient division of 
work in which particularly competent members deal with certain complex matters.
321
 This 
increases efficiency and avoids rubber-stamping. However, remuneration decisions cannot be 
made by a committee, § 107 (3) sentence 3.  
Well-founded remuneration decisions require sufficient and substantial information. A 
problem of the German system is that the main source of information on parameters like the 
manager’s performance is the management board. The supervisors suffer from information 
asymmetry.
322
 
To summarise, the legal requirements are insufficient. They do not ensure that supervisory 
board members are able to make valuable contributions to the discussion of management 
remuneration. Against the background of highly complex incentive schemes and the 
possibility of liability, a sufficient understanding of the legal and economic implications 
should be required. Similarly, sound information as a basis for good decisions is needed. It 
could be argued that the supervisory board members have the option of using experts’ advice. 
Compensation consultants’ advice is certainly valuable. However, this should not lead to 
“outsourcing”, which increases the risk of involving parties which are not independent but 
may be inclined to be lenient regarding remuneration due to conflicting interests. The demand 
for additional qualifications of supervisory board members by courts, legal literature and the 
GCGC is to be welcomed. The legislator’s decision that remuneration committees cannot 
make the final decision anymore can be seen critically regarding the criterion professionalism. 
2.3. Motivation 
In order to ensure efficient and satisfactory decisions it is necessary that the supervisors are 
sufficiently committed and motivated. Indicators are, inter alia, the time devoted to a decision 
and its preparation, the frequency of meetings and potential other professional commitments. 
The AktG clearly does not regard the work of a supervisory member as a full-time occupation. 
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The possibility of holding up to ten supervisory board memberships simultaneously, § 100 (2) 
no.1 AktG, illustrates this. The GCGC recommends that not more than three (non-group) 
supervisory board mandates are held.
323
 The perception of supervisory board membership as 
an “honorary position”324 is also reflected in the supervisors’ modest remuneration.325 This 
approach conflicts with the substantially increased liability that supervisory board members 
may incur.
326
 
Regarding the supervisory board members’ motivation and commitment the evaluation is 
split. The statutory requirements are very low. Efficient monitoring and profound examination 
of questions of management board remuneration take time. They are hardly possible if the 
responsible person holds up to ten board memberships simultaneously. A step in the right 
direction is the GCGC’s recommendation of a maximum of three memberships. The 
pecuniary incentive is relatively low but has increased in recent years.
327
 Also, it is positive 
that the legislator “reminds”328 the supervisors in § 116 sentence 3 of the possible liability for 
damages if they set inadequately high remuneration.
329
  
2.4. Transparency 
The decision’s transparency is another important point. Two aspects are central: (1) The 
(re-)increased role of the full supervisory board in remuneration decisions. (2) The 
determination of “adequacy” of the remuneration. 
As mentioned above, the decision on remuneration cannot be delegated anymore. This runs 
counter to the international development which generally encourages the use of committees 
for remuneration-setting.
330
 The travaux préparatoires show that the prohibition is supposed 
to ensure and increase the transparency of the remuneration-setting.
331
 As most of the 
elements of a service contract are related to remuneration, the Plenum has to decide – at least 
regarding first time appointments – on the entire service contract.332 In this the new provision 
exceeds the former GCGC recommendation which stated that the full supervisory board “shall 
resolve and review the Management Board remuneration system including the main contract 
                                                         
323 Para 5.4.5 GCGC. 
324 C Jungmann (fn.177170), 463. 
325 cf. M Lutter, G Krieger (fn.165158), § 12 m.no.844. 
326 cf. supra. 
327 D Fockenbrock, “Aufsichtsräte wechseln zu Festgehalt” Handelsblatt of 14 April 2011. 
328 cf. BT-Drucks 16/12278, 8. 
329 But S Lingemann, “Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung – Das VorstAG ist in Kraft” (2009) 36 BB, 1918-1924, 
1923: apparent need for reminding is “detached from reality”. 
330 C Teichmann, “Pay without Performance? Vorstandsvergütung in Deutschland und Europa” (2009) GPR, 235-259, 237. 
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elements”333. The remuneration agreement’s details should be left to the committee according 
to the GCGC. The amendment ensures greater transparency especially of the decision-making 
process.
334
 However, also previously every supervisory board member had the opportunity to 
gain insight into the agreement and the Plenum could seize the decision-making.
335
  
It could be argued that the GCGC’s solution was advantageous. Generally, efficient decision-
making is hardly possible if the supervisory board has up to twenty-one members. This would 
plead for decision-making by a (smaller) committee. Especially decisions on management 
remuneration can be highly controversial and – with employee representatives present – 
politicised.
336
 Moreover, the candidate may prefer confidentiality regarding certain aspects 
that determine the remuneration. Ensuring confidentiality is easier in smaller circles.
337
 The 
confidentiality argument has lost much of its vigour with the ever increasing disclosure 
requirements since the VorstOG reform.
338
  
The present regulation still allows the negotiation of details in a committee.
339
 Just the final 
decision has to be made by the Plenum. This offers the advantage of efficient negotiations by 
expert groups and subsequently justification in front of all members of the board, which then 
legitimise the agreement and bear the responsibility for it. The legislator seems to have found 
a golden mean between transparency and practicability.
340
 
Transparency also depends on the rationalisability and reviewability of the decisions. The 
supervisory board is required to ensure the “adequacy” of the remuneration. Regarding the 
adequacy the supervisory board has discretion. It is difficult to review judicially.
341
 By 
specifying the criteria the legislator tried to reduce the margin of discretion and make the 
decision more transparent. However, the criteria lack clarity and, given good rationalisation, 
any amount is justifiable. As a result of this vagueness there have been hardly any judicial 
reviews of the criteria so far.
342
 
To summarise, the transparency of the procedure itself is satisfactory. However, the main 
parameter for the determination of management board remuneration – adequacy – is too 
                                                         
333 Para 4.2.2 GCGC 2008, emphasis added. 
334 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 524. 
335 A Cahn (fn.10598), 445. 
336 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 524. 
337 A Cahn (fn.10598), 446. 
338 G Thüsing, “Angemessene Vorstandsvergütung durch Transparenz” (2004) 59(47) BB, 1. 
339 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 524. 
340 cf. F Kempter “Stellungnahme zum Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung” <http://www.kapitalmarktrecht-im-
internet.eu/de/Rechtsgebiete/Gesellschaftsrecht/Artikelgesetze/85/VorstAG.htm > accessed 18 September 2014; different G 
Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 524. 
341 T Grattenthaler (fn.228223), 345. 
342 ibid., 345. 
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vague. The decisions are hardly rationalisable and reviewable. Then again, this leaves the 
supervisory board room for manoeuvre to find the appropriate solution for each case. 
2.5. Summary – Theory  
The dual board structure, especially the incompatibility of management and supervisory 
functions (including remuneration-setting), is at least in theory a good solution to the danger 
of conflict of interest. Greater doubts exist regarding the professionalism and motivation of 
the supervisory board members. Insufficient requirements regarding qualification and 
commitment can impede remuneration-setting. Regarding transparency the evaluation is split 
as the AktG provides for a well balanced modus operandi between practicability and 
transparency. However, the substantive criterion of adequacy is less convincing. 
3. Assessment of the Law in Practice 
It is important – especially in legal comparisons – to look beyond the “law in the books”. The 
“law in action” may differ considerably from the theory. The focus here will shift to the 
practice. 
3.1. Independence 
In practice the effectiveness in ensuring independence of the separation of remuneration-
setters and remuneration-receivers may be doubted. The main problem is that many 
supervisory board members come from the same circles as the management board members 
e.g. as managers of other listed companies.
343
 Personal links and the concentration of 
supervisory board positions lead to interdependencies.
344
 This network is often called the 
“Deutschland AG”345 or “Germany Inc.”346. Among the network’s members a tacit agreement 
that “mutual back scratching” and high remuneration are in everybody’s interest is purported 
to exist.
347
 The supervisory board can indirectly be the judge in its own case regarding 
remuneration.
348
 Although this network seems less strong than it used to be,
349
 it should not 
be underestimated.
350
  
                                                         
343 cf. K Jäkel, K Neumann, “Dreiecksbeziehungen” Financial Times Deutschland of 26 January 2012. 
344 H Hirt, “The Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors: A Critical Assessment with Particular 
Reference to the German Two-tier Board System (Part I)” (2003) ICCLR, 245-257, 253. 
345 cf. M Lutter, “Defizite” (fn.313308), 301. 
346 cf. B Cheffins, “Metamorphosis of the ‘Germany Inc.:’ The Case of Executive Pay” (2001) 49 Am J Comp L, 497-539. 
347 H Hirt (fn.351346), 253. 
348 P Jaspers, “Mehr Demokratie wagen – Die Rolle der Hauptversammlung bei der Festsetzung der Vergütung” (2010) ZRP, 
8-11, 9. 
349 cf. B Schwetzler, MO Sperling, “Die Entflechtung der Deutschland AG” (2008) AG, R468-470; C Kellermann, 
“Disentangling Deutschland AG” in S Beck et al (eds), Surviving Globalisation? (Springer, 2005), 111-132. 
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Managers of other companies on the supervisory board are experienced and have specialist 
knowledge.
351
 Still, in practice, the supervisory boards’ personnel and their lack of 
independence are the German model’s Achilles heel. 
The election of supervisory board members also raises doubts regarding independence. 
Generally, the shareholders elect the supervisory board members, § 101 (1) AktG.
352
 The 
candidates should be nominated by the supervisory board only, § 124 (3). In practice the 
nomination may differ depending on the shareholder structure:
353
 If there is a major 
shareholder the nomination usually comes from him. If there is not, the nomination comes 
from the supervisory board chairman after consultation with leading members of the 
supervisory board and the “CEO”, or the candidates are selected by the management board 
after consultation with the supervisory board chairman who in turn consults leading members 
of his board.
354
 The practice contravenes the rationale of § 124 (3), which is to ensure the 
supervisory board members’ independence. 
To summarise, frequently supervisors have a personal interest in high remuneration
355
 – 
unless they are employee representatives – as they often are managers of another company.356 
Whether employee representatives actually have a moderating influence on the remuneration 
decision can be doubted, as several high-profile cases of the last years illustrate.
357
 In practice 
the antagonism of interests regarding management remuneration which is supposed to ensure 
market pricing of the managers’ services is insufficient.358 Differences exist, however, 
depending on the company’s size. Recent empirical data shows generally greater compliance 
with the independence-related GCGC provisions by DAX30-companies than by smaller listed 
companies.
359
 
 
3.2. Professionalism 
For the supervisory board’s professionalism the “Deutschland AG” has positive 
consequences. Many supervisors are managers in other companies or representatives of banks 
                                                         
351 I Saenger, J Du Plessis “The Supervisory Board as a Company Organ”, in J Du Plessis et al (fn.141134), 70. 
352 Specific rules for employee representatives exist if the co-determination rules apply. 
353 H Hirt (fn.351346), 254. 
354 M Lutter, “Defizite“ (fn.313308), 301. 
355 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (2005) ZHR, 299-309, 300. 
356 G Thüsing, “iustum pretium” (fn.225220), 466. 
357 Examples in: C Seibt “Interessenkonflikte im Aufsichtsrat” in S Grundmann et al, Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. 
Geburtstag am 24. August 2010 (De Gruyter, 2010), 1363-1390, 1365ff.  
358 cf. G Bitter, “Diskussionsbericht zu den Referaten Kramarsch, Martens, Hoffmann-Becking” (2005) ZHR, 181-184, 181. 
359 A v. Werder, J Bartz, “Corporate Governance Report 2014: Erklärte Akzeptanz des Kodex und tatsaächliche Anwendung 
bei Vorstandsvergütung und Unabhängigkeit des Aufsichtsrats” (2014) 17 DB, 905-914, 910. 
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and, hence, highly qualified individuals with good expertise. Such members offer the 
supervisory board the necessary knowledge and negotiation skills to achieve efficient 
outcomes regarding remuneration. The role of employee representatives could be more 
problematic as they may lack the expertise to understand highly complex remuneration 
structures. Then again, they may have a profound inside knowledge of the company, enabling 
them to assess the managers’ performance particularly well. The board’s diversity in 
experience, knowledge and contacts can be beneficial, leading to more efficient outcomes.  
The large size of (some) supervisory boards can be a negative. The larger the boards are, the 
more likely it is that internal divisions will occur,
360
 negatively affecting their effectiveness in 
discharging their functions. In larger supervisory boards processes become less efficient, 
discussions take longer, some members may be unable to voice their opinions, which may 
lead to a loss of interest and a sense of responsibility. 
3.3. Motivation 
Despite several reforms, supervisory board membership is still regarded as honorary.
361
 The 
incentives – positive and negative – are insufficiently strong. The position is not highly paid 
and “low powered” incentives like morals and reputation do not suffice to overcome potential 
conflicts of interest.
362
 
Even if the supervisory board member is keen to play its part and possesses the necessary 
expertise it faces problems having sufficient time to deal with the legally and economically 
complex service contract.
363
 It is unlikely that having up to ten supervisory board 
memberships allows undertaking substantive work for each – or any – of them. The relevant 
GCGC provision recommending not more than three simultaneous board memberships is 
followed by 100% of the DAX30- but only 76.5% of the SDAX-companies.
364
 Also, meetings 
should be more frequently
365
 and better prepared in order to increase the supervisory boards’ 
efficiency.  
The possibility of being liable for damages, which the legislator emphasised, faces the above-
mentioned problems in practice: (1) it is difficult to determine the damage;
366
 and (2) the 
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competence to bring an action for damages is problematic.
367
 , so it is not an effective 
incentive either. 
3.4. Transparency 
The VorstAG increased the remuneration decision’s transparency by making it a mandatory 
decision of the full board. However, the decrease in efficiency of a full board and its lack of 
expertise can be criticised.
368
 Then again, previously committees have been criticised for 
insufficient expertise, too.
369
 The new situation rather seems to strike a balance between 
transparency and practicability. Still, a significant moderating effect with regard to 
management board members’ remuneration has not been noted yet. 
Also the adequacy requirement is not satisfactory in practice. The criteria are open to 
interpretation to such an extent that almost any amount can be justified. It does not provide 
the necessary tools for either the supervisory board or the courts to deal with excessive 
remuneration. 
3.5. Summary – Practice 
The “law in action” clearly differs from the “law in the books”. The separation of 
remuneration-setting and remuneration-receiving suffers from several problems in practice. 
Frequently the essential antagonism of interests of supervisors and managers does not exist to 
the necessary extent. The result of this flaw is a substantive bias among the decision-makers. 
Crucial for the quality of the remuneration setting are also the qualification and commitment 
of the supervisory board members. Qualification and expertise are in practice often better than 
the low statutory requirements would lead one to expect. Still, there is room for improvement. 
The commitment and the time they invest could be increased. However, here the practice just 
follows the framework set by the AktG. Finally, the rules on transparency – although 
improved – are not entirely convincing in practice. 
IV. Interim Findings: Effectiveness of the German Supervisory Board 
The German model’s characteristic separation of managers and supervisors with the latter 
being exclusively responsible for the setting of the former’s remuneration is highly 
convincing in theory. In practice it suffers from several shortcomings. On balance, the 
                                                         
367 ibid., 451. 
368 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 525. 
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analysis supports the initial hypothesis concerning the supervisory boards’ unsatisfactory 
performance when it comes to remuneration setting. 
An important shortcoming is the lack of independence, which is primarily caused by links 
between supervisory and management board members. This problem is difficult to eradicate 
as it is a characteristic facet of the “Deutschland AG”. Also regardingNor is there much to 
recommend in the other criteria developed to assess supervisory board performance a lot is 
left to be desired. 
The VorstAG-reform intended to tackle these shortcomings. Its aims were to promote 
sustainable and adequate remuneration, to strengthen the supervisory board’s responsibility 
and to increase transparency.
370
 It changed the framework for remuneration setting, the inner 
organisation of the supervisory board and the duties in times of crisis. Still, its results are not 
entirely convincing. 
The changes to the adequacy requirement of § 87 (1) are not satisfactory. Despite introducing 
additional criteria and attempting to specify “adequate” remuneration, the new provision still 
says, like its predecessor, only that excessive remuneration is prohibited. That may be 
sufficient to calm the public debate and unsettle “greedy managers”. It did not improve the 
legal framework for management board members’ remuneration. 
The possible reduction of remuneration in times of crisis according to § 87 (2) has been 
modified in the hope that it will be used more frequently. This has not yet occurred. 
The problem of lacking independence in practice has not been solved. Also the GCGC, which 
aims at alleviating the problem, cannot ensure efficient remuneration-setting. Prohibiting 
decision-making by remuneration committees is controversial. Still, it is positive as it is likely 
to improve the transparency of the decision-making process. 
Still in need of improvement are the legal consequences of excessive remuneration. Ideas 
could be the threat of voidance of the service contract or the possibility of reclaiming 
excessive pay, as in France and Switzerland. The liability for damages of supervisory and 
management board members and especially the enforcement of these claims could be 
improved. 
The German approach is theoretically appealing but in practice far from being perfect. On 
balance, the findings support the first hypothesis about the ineffectiveness of supervisory 
boards in remuneration matters and the need for improvements.  
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C. United Kingdom 
Following the analysis of the German supervisory board’s effectiveness regarding executive 
remuneration the same analysis will be conducted regarding the boards of UK public limited 
companies (plcs) to assess whether the hypothesis of the board’s insufficient effectiveness and 
its need of improvements can be supported by evidence regarding the UK, too.  
Using the UK approach as a comparison with the German approach, which is characterised by 
dense regulation, promises to be particularly interesting, as the UK approach provides hardly 
any mandatory rules on executive remuneration.  
Excessive executive remuneration has been central to the UK corporate governance debate for 
a long time,
371
 and has been addressed repeatedly.
372
 The last two decades saw several 
initiatives and reforms that addressed the problem of excessive remuneration.
373
  
In order to assess the board’s effectiveness regarding executive remuneration, the UK board 
model will briefly be described, the setting of executive remuneration will be analysed before 
using the  criteria mentioned above to assess the existing mechanisms’ effectiveness. 
I. The UK Board Model  
The UK provides a particularly interesting environment for examining the board’s 
effectiveness when it comes to executive remuneration.
374
 UK companies generally have a 
one-tier board structure.
375
 The unitary board, which discharges both managing and 
supervisory functions, is the “norm”.376 However, the Companies Act (CA) 2006 requires 
neither a unitary nor a dual board structure.
377
 
1. General 
UK companies have two “primary collective organs”, namely the shareholders in general 
meeting and the board of directors.
378
 Generally, the CA 2006 is silent regarding the 
distribution of power between the two organs. Only certain key matters such as the right to 
                                                         
371 cf. IM Ramsay, “Directors’ and officers’ remuneration: the role of the law” (1993) JBL, 351-374, 351. 
372 I MacNeil, “The trajectory of regulatory reform in the UK in the wake of the financial crisis” (2010) 11(4) EBOR, 483-
526, 521. 
373 B Cheffins, R Thomas, “Should Shareholders Have a Greater Say over Executive Pay? Learning from US Experience” 
(2001) 1(2) JCLS, 277-315, 277. 
374 PM Guest, “Board structure and executive pay: evidence from the UK” (2010) 34(6) Camb J Econ, 1075-1096, 1079. 
375 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd ed, OUP, 2012), 234; J Dine, M Koutsias, Company Law 
(7th ed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 122. 
376 PL Davies, S Worthington, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (9th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), 420. 
377 ibid., 420; different: J Rickford, “Fundamentals, Developments and Trends in British Company Law – Some Wider 
Reflections; Second Part: Current British Priorities and Wider Reflections” (2005) 2(1) ECFR, 63-106, 73ff. 
378 A Dignam, J Lowry, Company Law (7th ed, OUP, 2012), 289. 
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alter the articles, s. 21, and to alter share capital, ss. 617, 641, are reserved to the general 
meeting. It is left to the articles to set the scope of power of the organs and their relationship 
to one another.  
Default rules for the division of power are set out in the Model Articles (MA) and – prior to 
2006 – in the Table A Articles.379 Although the originating power of the company is located 
in the general meeting,
380
 the shareholders do not have general supervisory powers over the 
directors nor do they have managerial power except in cases of special resolutions. Yet they 
can remove directors if they are not content with their performance and in the absence of an 
effective board the general meeting has a residual authority to use the company’s powers. 
2. The Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the “central depository of corporate power”381 and the company’s 
“most important decision-making body”382. Reading the CA 2006 does not lead such an 
understanding. Neither the act nor its predecessors state anything about the board’s function 
and its role within the company.
383
 An obligatory management structure is not set out.
384
 It is 
left to the articles to determine the board’s powers and tasks. This contrasts with most other 
European jurisdictions – most notably Germany – in which the division of power between 
shareholders and the board is specified as mandatory in the companies legislation.
385
  
Nowadays, “virtually all” boards of listed companies consist of two kinds of directors: 
executive and non-executive directors (NEDs).
386
 Executive directors serve as directors but 
also hold – typically full-time – management positions in the company. They manage the 
company’s business and usually have separate service contracts with the company.387 NEDs 
just occupy a director’s office, are usually part-time appointments and act as monitors of the 
management.
388
 Prior to the introduction of the corporate governance codes in the 1990s, the 
boards of listed UK companies were typically dominated by executive directors. The code 
                                                         
379 D Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (2nd ed, OUP, 2012), 191. 
380 ibid., 191. 
381 ibid., 234. 
382 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 420. 
383 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 234. 
384 G Morse, Palmer’s Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), s. 8.001. 
385 A Dignam, J Lowry (fn.385380), 289. 
386 C Jungmann, (fn.177170), 436. 
387 A Dignam, J Lowry (fn.385380), 296. 
388 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.201. 
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committees regarded NEDs as a potential solution to the problem of conflicts of interest. Now 
at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should consist of independent NEDs.
389
  
2.1. Appointment  
Section 154 (2) CA 2006 requires that every public company has at least two directors. 
Directors are not fully defined. Section 250 merely describes them as “any person occupying 
the position of director, by whatever name called”. At least one of them has to be a natural 
person, s. 155 (1). The minimum age is sixteen years, s. 157. Those who have experienced 
bankruptcy and certain other classes of individuals that are e.g. disqualified from directing a 
company are not eligible.
390
 
The act does not provide rules regarding the competence to appoint directors, the mode of 
appointment and the period it is for.
391
 The act merely stipulates that appointments in public 
companies generally have to be voted on individually except where there is unanimity to a 
block resolution, s. 160. Contracts for more than two years need prior authorisation by the 
members, ss. 188, 189. Apart from that it is left to each company’s articles to set the rules for 
the directors’ appointment.  
Generalising the patterns of appointment found in practice is difficult. Advice is offered by 
the MA and their predecessors the Table A articles. The MA are provided by the Secretary of 
State according to s. 19 CA 2006. They apply by default unless other articles are registered by 
the company which exclude or modify the MA. Article 20 MA states that anyone who is 
“willing to act as a director, and permitted by law to do so, may be appointed to be a director 
by ordinary resolution or by a decision of the directors”. When the board is empowered by the 
articles to appoint new directors it can only make appointments that are consistent with the 
powers given to it, e.g. subject to procedural qualifications.
392
 The appointee must be eligible 
and the directors have to use their power to appoint “in a manner consistent with their general 
duties”393. The general meeting keeps an inherent power to fill vacancies on the board,394 
which must “be exercised for the benefit of the company as a whole and not to secure some 
ulterior advantage”395. 
                                                         
389 B.1.2 UKCGC. 
390 cf. s. 216 Insolvency Act 1986 and s. 2ff. Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
391 SD Girvin et al, Charlesworth’s Company Law (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), 381; PL Davies, S Worthington 
(fn.383378), 397; L Sealy, S Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (8th ed, OUP, 2008), 245. 
392 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.512. 
393 ibid., s. 8.513. 
394 Worcester Corsetry Ltd v Witting [1936] Ch 640, CA. 
395 Re HR Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62, CA. 
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For listed companies a significant body of more detailed rules exists: the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (UKCGC).
396
 It applies to listed UK companies and provides a set of 
comply-or-explain recommendations,
397
 which are clearly rooted in the agency theory. The 
Code recommends a “formal, rigorous and transparent procedure” for appointing directors.398 
The board should be of sufficient size.
399
 A nomination committee should lead the 
appointment process making recommendations to the board.
400
 The majority of the 
committee’s members should be independent NEDs.401 Candidates should have the necessary 
skills, independence, experience and knowledge and NEDs should not be appointed for more 
than six years.
402
 Directors of FTSE 350 companies should submit themselves for re-election 
annually and directors of other listed companies every three years.
403
 
Another particularity for listed companies is that the London Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
require the directors collectively to have “appropriate expertise and experience for the 
management of the business”.404 The companies are also required to ensure that all directors 
are free of potential conflicts or, where they exist, to provide sufficient arrangements to avoid 
a detriment to the interests of the company.
405
 
Regarding executive directors distinction has to be made between “holding office”, meaning 
being a director, and their service contract for the management of the company.  
2.2. Removal 
The CA 2006 contains more extensive rules on the removal of directors. The removal 
counterbalances the board’s influence on the appointment process. A director may be 
removed by an ordinary shareholder resolution at any time, following service of an 
appropriate notice of the resolution and regardless of any agreement to the contrary between 
the director and the company, s. 168. If the board insists on “appointing” a new director 
against the opposition of a large fraction of shareholders, the latter may just remove the 
director in question.
406
  
Further circumstances in which directors can be removed are listed in Art. 21 MA. 
                                                         
396 UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010). 
397 ibid., 4. 
398 B.2 Main Principle UKCGC. 
399 B.1 Supporting Principle UKCGC. 
400 B.2.1 UKCGC. 
401 B.2.1 UKCGC. 
402 B.2.2 and B.2.3 UKCGC. 
403 B.7.1 UKCGC. 
404 R.3.8 London Stock Exchange Listing Rules. 
405 ibid. 
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2.3. Powers and Duties 
Regarding the division of power within the company, consulting the CA 2006 is not very 
fruitful. More instructive are the MA and the Table A articles.
407
 
According to Art. 70 Table A “the business of the company shall be managed by the directors 
who may exercise all the power of the company”. Any power may be delegated to a 
committee or an executive, Art. 72. Article 3 MA differs slightly: directors have general 
authority and “are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for which 
purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company”. The power may be delegated to 
whoever the board “thinks fit”408. Thus, the directors are no longer “managing the business” 
but are “responsible for the management”. This does not imply a loss of the management 
function but illustrates a subtle change regarding the board’s functions away from 
management towards supervisory and delegating functions.
409
 However, this should not be 
overestimated. UK boards are still characterised by being entrusted with both management 
and control.
410
 Even in large companies the board has a significant managerial function.
411
 
The UKCGC provides that companies should be “headed by an effective board which is 
collectively responsible for the long-term success of the company”412. It describes the board’s 
function as to “provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company”413. 
Executive and non-executive directors have – according to the law – the same powers.414 
NEDs are not restricted to monitoring but may even take the initiative in management 
decisions.
415
 In practice the difference between executives and NEDs is more important. The 
former are likely to have greater authority to represent the company, are better informed and 
more difficult to remove.
416
 Following the UKCGC NEDs “should scrutinise the performance 
of management”417. They are the primary monitoring element of the unitary board and were 
introduced to support the shareholders’ position.  
                                                         
407 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 234. 
408 Art. 5 MA. 
409 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 234-235. 
410 KJ Hopt, P Leyens, “Board Models in Europe – Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy” (2004) 1(2) ECFR, 135-165, 150. 
411 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 236. 
412 A.1 Main Principle UKCGC. 
413 A.1 Supporting Principle UKCGC. 
414 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.202. 
415 KJ Hopt, P Leyens (fn.417412), 150. 
416 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.202. 
417 A.4 Supporting Principle UKCGC 2010. 
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The directors also have various duties. Since their codification in 2006 they can be found in 
ss. 171-177 CA 2006. NEDs are subject to these duties as well and can be held liable for their 
breach.
418
 
II. Setting and Controlling Executive Remuneration 
The next step is to identify who is competent to set executive remuneration and what the legal 
framework for the remuneration decision is.  
1. General 
Prima facie directors are not entitled to any remuneration even based on quantum meruit or 
“equitable allowance”.419 The rationale lies in the law of trusts “legacy”.420 Unless the trust 
instrument provides for remuneration the trustee would, effectively, apply trust funds for his 
own benefit instead of the beneficiaries’ benefit.421 Directors are in a similar position to 
trustees.
422
 Due to the no profits rule
423
 they have – just as any fiduciary – no entitlement to 
payment for their services.
424
  
The outcome differs if the articles or service contract provide otherwise.
425
 Directors’ 
remuneration can come from the fees received for acting as a director and – for executive 
directors – the salary and other benefits receivable under the service contract. Service contract 
is defined by s. 227 CA 2006. Fees may be paid following respective provisions in the 
articles, a resolution of the company or unanimous consent by the members on the issue
426
.
427
  
Executive directors’ main sources of income are salary and other benefits. This work will 
focus on these sources. 
                                                         
418 cf. Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498; I Stratton, “Non-executive directors: are they super-fluous?” 
(1996) 17 Co Law, 162-165, 164. 
419 Hutton v West Cork Railway CO [1883] 23 ChD 654; Guiness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 (House of Lords).  
420 A Dignam, J Lowry (fn.385380), 304. 
421 ibid., 304. 
422 SD Girvin et al (fn.398393), 384. 
423 Henderson v Merret Syndicates [1995] 2 AC 145, HL, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; cf also Dunstan v Imperial Gas Light 
Co [1832] Bar. & Ad. 125; Re George Newman and Co [1895] 1Ch 674; Ex parte Cannon [1885] 30 ChD 629. 
424 Hutton v West Cork Railway CO [1883] 23 ChD 654 at 672 per Bowen LJ; Moriarty v Regent’s Garage Co Ltd [1921] 1 
KB 423 at 446 per McCardie J. 
425 A Dignam, J Lowry (fn.385380), 304. 
426 Re Duomatic Ltd [1969] 1All ER 161. 
427 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 400. 
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2. Competence 
2.1. Competence of the Board 
Generally, the CA 2006 remains silent regarding the competence to determine executive 
directors’ remuneration. Therefore, companies are relatively free in choosing their 
remuneration procedure. Commonly, the articles provide that the board or a board committee 
is competent to set a service contract’s terms.428 Also Art 23 (2) MA stipulates the board’s 
competence. The board members have to act bona fide in the interest of the company when 
exercising this competence.
429
 The common law default rule for such a situation where a 
director enters into an agreement with the company – i.e. self-dealing – was the voidance of 
the contract in the absence of shareholder approval.
430
 Directors considered this rule to be 
inconvenient and worked towards amended articles. For over a century directors have been 
competent to set directors’ remuneration.431 Usually, companies amended the default articles 
such that the director had to disclose his interest in the transaction and only disinterested 
directors were allowed to vote.
432
 Until today it is common that the board member whose 
remuneration is negotiated is not permitted to vote on the issue.
433
 Nevertheless, a stark 
conflict of interest of the directors is rather obvious in this situation.  
2.2. Remuneration Committees 
The problem of conflicts of interest was dealt with by focussing on the procedure of 
remuneration-setting. The idea was to exclude not only the directly affected director from 
voting on the remuneration but to side-line executive directors generally in the process.
434
 
Cadbury (1992) recommended introducing a committee system including a remuneration 
committee to enhance the boards’ effectiveness and to improve and strengthen the role of 
NEDs.
435
 It should consist “wholly or mainly” of NEDs and executive directors should play 
“no part in the decision on their own remuneration”.436 
                                                         
428 ibid., 400; SD Girvin et al (fn.398393), 384. 
429 UK Safety Group Ltd v Heane [1998] 2 BCLC 208. 
430 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 400. 
431 ibid., 400. 
432 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 291. 
433 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 400. 
434 ibid., 401. 
435 cf. 4.42 Cadbury Report. 
436 ibid. 
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The 1995 Greenbury Committee recommended setting up remuneration committees 
consisting only of NEDs, which do not hold cross-directorships and are not involved in the 
day-to-day management of the company, in order to avoid conflicts of interest.
437
  
Since then more reports and recommendations have been published. They led to the 
Combined Code (1998) and the UKCGC (2010). Like its predecessors its current (2012) 
version recommends the establishment of a “formal and transparent procedure” for setting the 
remuneration of individual directors.
438
 The board should establish a remuneration committee 
consisting of at least three independent NEDs who have the delegated competence to set the 
executives’ remuneration.439 The remuneration of NEDs in turn is – depending on the articles 
– determined by the board itself, a specific committee or the shareholders.440 
The rationale of remuneration committees is to reduce the influence of the management over 
the determination of their own remuneration and to allow arm’s-length negotiation.441  
2.3. Setting the Amount 
2.3.1. Discretion of the Board or Committee 
When exercising the remuneration setting competence the board/committee has to act within 
its legal restrictions and in compliance with the directors’ general duties.442 The awarded 
payment has to be voted on bona fide and its purpose must be proper, i.e. it must be 
remuneration for the management services. It may not be a disguised improper return of 
capital to shareholders since that would be ultra vires.
443
 
Within these legal restrictions the board/committee has discretion as to the amount paid.
444
 
The precise amount is purely a question of internal management.
445
  
2.3.2. Limits to the Discretion 
The board or committee has a wide discretion in determining executive remuneration as long 
as it is within the legal boundaries and does not violate any directors’ duties. However, fixing 
excessive remuneration which is not affordable to the company may be seen as providing 
                                                         
437 A.1 Greenbury Report. 
438 D.2 Main Principle UKCGC 2010/2012; B.2 Main Principle Combined Code 2008. 
439 D.2.1, D.2.2 UKCGC. 
440 D.2.3 UKCGC. 
441 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 292. 
442 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.910. 
443 cf. Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 1016.  
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evidence of the unfitness of the determining directors and could lead to a disqualification 
order for the relevant director.
446
 If the awarded remuneration is excessive and bears no 
relation to the services the company receives from the relevant director it may be challenged 
as a “fraud on the minority”.447 Another limit to the determining body’s wide discretion exists 
if the company is in severe financial difficulties. Section s. 212 Insolvency Act 1986 provides 
that the liquidator of a company that is in the course of winding up can apply to the court to 
examine the conduct of the determining body and the court may if necessary compel the 
responsible directors to pay compensation.
448
 
III. Evaluation 
The criteria mentioned above will be used to analyse the effectiveness of the UK approach.  
1. The Law in the Books 
1.1. Independence 
In the absence of statutory provisions regarding the remuneration-setting process, the MA and 
correspondingly most companies’ articles determine that the board is competent to set the 
remuneration. This situation can be described pointedly as one where executives write their 
employment contract with one hand and then sign it with the other.
449
 The deciding body 
clearly lacks independence. Conflicts of interest are inevitable.
450
 The executive directors 
could award “themselves” remuneration packages which are not congruent with shareholder 
interests.
451
 Under these circumstances neither internal nor external independence would be 
given.  
The best practice codes since Cadbury recommend the presence of independent NEDs on the 
board
452
 and the delegation of the remuneration setting to a committee, which consists of 
independent NEDs.
453
 The committee’s significance for the decision’s independence “cannot 
                                                         
446 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Van Hengel [1955] 1 BCLC 545. 
447 Nolan v Parsons [1942] OR 358, CA (Ont). 
448 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.915. 
449 cf. OE Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting (Free Press, 1985). 
450 M Ezzamel, R Watson, “Boards of Directors and the Role of Non-Executive Directors in the Governance of Corporations” 
in K Keasey, S Thompson and M Wright (eds), Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International 
Comparisons (John Wiley, 2005), 97-116, 106. 
451 MJ Conyon, SJ Peck, “Board Control, Remuneration Committees and Top Management Compensation” (1998) 41(2) 
AMJ, 146-157, 148. 
452 cf. 4.1 Cadbury Report; B.1.1 UKCGC. 
453 4.42 Cadbury Report; D.2.1, D.2.2 UKCGC. 
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be understated”.454 Prima facie this is an effective institutional device to resolve potential 
conflicts of interest.
455
 External independence is safeguarded as the ones determining the 
remuneration are organisationally and regarding their appearance clearly distinct from the 
recipients. Independence of mind and a willingness to challenge – internal independence – 
should theoretically be ensured under these conditions, too. The remuneration committees are 
important for limiting the likelihood of excessive, self-serving management remuneration. 
They also offer a forum to discuss the appropriate design and reward structure for executive 
remuneration so that management and shareholder interests can be aligned. 
However, it is worth having a closer look at the Code’s concept of independence. A director is 
deemed not to be independent if there are “relationships or circumstances which are likely to 
affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement”456. A director should not be 
considered independent if he (a) is a former employee of the company (until five years after 
the employment ended), (b) had a direct or indirect business relationship with the company 
within the last three years, (c) receives remuneration from the company other than his fees, (d) 
holds cross-directorships, (e) represents a significant shareholder or (f) served for over nine 
years on the board.
457
 The required degree of independence is very high.
458
 It seems difficult 
to justify and it limits the pool of qualified candidates. 
The Code’s strict independence requirement shall ensure uninfluenced decisions and an 
antagonism of interests. However, it might be too strict. The “perfect” independent NED 
would be an individual with no previous links to the company or its managers. Such a NED 
would lack the necessary understanding of the corporate context
459
 and would not know what 
motivates the individual executive. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that it is a “comply-
or-explain” recommendation and that the assumption of lacking independence is refutable. 
Nevertheless, it remains to be feared that companies might choose the line of least resistance 
and just “tick all the boxes” in order to satisfy potential investors. The NEDs’ higher degree 
of independence may come at the cost of lower qualification and professionalism. 
                                                         
454 MJ Conyon, “Institutional Arrangements for Setting Directors’ Compensation in UK Companies” in K Keasey, S 
Thompson and M Wright (eds), Corporate Governance; Economic, Financial, and Management Issues (OUP, 1997), 103-
121, 110. 
455 R Bonet, MJ Conyon, “Compensation Committees and Executive Compensation: Evidence from Publicly Traded UK 
Firms” in K Keasey, S Thompson and M Wright (eds), Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International 
Comparisons (John Wiley, 2005), 138. 
456 B.1.1 UKCGC. 
457 B.1.1 UKCGC. 
458 cf. HC Hirt (fn.351346), 252. 
459 R Bender, “The Platonic Remuneration Committee” (2011) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1782642> accessed 18 September 2014, 11. 
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1.2. Professionalism 
The CA 2006 contains no professional requirements for directors. Based on this, one could 
assume that the remuneration-setters are not particularly qualified for their task, and that they 
do not have sufficient information and expertise or (inside) knowledge of the firm. All this 
would be necessary for an effective mechanism for executive remuneration-setting. 
Historically NEDs’ only purpose was to offer an air of integrity and respectability to the 
management.
460
 Nowadays, the corporate governance codes present more requirements for 
NEDs. Already the Higgs Report (2002) stated that a NED needs to “acquire the expertise and 
knowledge to properly discharge their responsibilities” as well as a sufficient understanding 
of the company and the market in which it operates.
461
 Increased requirements regarding skills 
and commitment were recommended by the reports of Turner and Walker, too.
462
 Also the 
current UKCGC contains recommendations regarding the qualification and professionalism of 
the ones determining executive remuneration. On appointment it should be ensured that the 
board has the “appropriate balance of skills and experience”.463 The flow of information to the 
directors should be fast and they should have access to external experts.
464
 
Executive and non-executive directors are on the same board and both are involved in the 
management. This should allow the latter to have access to the same information. Better 
information should make the remuneration decisions swifter and the outcomes more efficient. 
The higher frequency of board meetings could have a positive impact on the understanding of 
the business and increase the knowledge of the company’s day-to-day business.465 As a result, 
the remuneration committee members could be in a good position to assess the factors that are 
relevant for an efficient remuneration decision. 
According to the law in the books professionalism should be satisfactory despite the absence 
of statutory requirements.  
1.3. Motivation 
In the absence of statutory provisions regarding NEDs’ motivation and commitment turning 
to the Code is worthwhile. 
                                                         
460 M Sweeney-Baird, “The role of the non-executive director in modern corporate governance” (2006) 27(3) Co Law, 67-81, 
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It recommends that directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company in order 
to effectively discharge their duties.
466
 Especially full-time directors of other companies 
should not hold more than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company.
467
 For 
NEDs the expected time commitment should be set out in advance and candidates for the 
chairmanship should disclose other significant commitments.
468
 
It shall be prevented that board membership is regarded as honorary. In the past NEDs were 
just appointed because of their name or high profile being neither particularly motivated nor 
qualified to control the management or set adequate remuneration. This window dressing 
approach was partly blamed for excessive remuneration. The UKCGC advocates more 
professional and committed NEDs. The reports of Turner and Walker also demanded this.
469
 
Still, the recommendations are thin and the incentives (financial or other) for NEDs to 
effectively fulfil their tasks are low.
470
 The recommendations have not led to sufficient 
commitment. Increased incentives like higher remuneration for NEDs may be more effective. 
Likewise, low equity holdings of the NEDs may limit their vigilance and their willingness to 
invest time and effort into negotiations on remuneration. Thus far, the only real incentives for 
NEDs are signalling their managerial competence to potential employers and the possibility of 
liability for a breach of directors’ duties.  
1.4. Transparency 
A final important criterion for effectiveness is the transparency of the process. The CA 2006 
focuses on disclosure – which will be dealt with in the next chapter – and provides in 
ss. 228ff. that the directors’ service contracts have to be made open to inspection by the 
members.  
The UKCGC tries to ensure the transparency of the process. Following D.2.1, the 
remuneration committee has to make available the terms of reference it uses for the 
determination of executive directors’ remuneration, explain its role and the authority it has. 
The relatively small size of the committee might be good for attaining a high level of 
professionalism and competence. However, it limits the number of people directly involved in 
the process. This leads to less publicity and control.  
                                                         
466 B.3 UKCGC. 
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469 A Turner, (fn.469464), 93; D Walker (fn.469464), 47. 
470 cf. I Stratton (fn.425420), 164 whose findings still seem valid. 
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1.5. Summary – Law in the Books 
The effectiveness of the board and the remuneration committee can be doubted. The absence 
of any valuable provisions in the CA 2006 regarding the procedure of remuneration-setting 
leaves a wide discretion to the companies. The refusal of a one-size-fits-all approach is 
laudable. A positive result is flexibility. However, it also allows – and has often led to – 
procedures that lead to conflicts of interests and the perceived “self-service” of managers. 
The Code offers more guidelines but maintains a wide discretion for the deciding body 
regarding the amount and structure of the remuneration. Its central aim seems to be ensuring 
independence of the ones setting executive remuneration. By establishing remuneration 
committees consisting of independent NEDs,
471
 it replicates the two-tier board distinction 
between remuneration-setting and remuneration-receipt, albeit within the one-tier board. At 
least in theory the remuneration committee seems independent.  
2. Assessment of the Law in Action 
For many years scepticism has existed as to the board’s effectiveness as an internal corporate 
governance mechanism and in particular as the body responsible for executive remuneration 
setting.
472
 This scepticism will be examined for whether it is justified when it comes to the 
law in action. 
2.1. Independence  
For several reasons there are doubts regarding remuneration committees’ independence in 
practice.
473
  
The first one is the significant role executive directors play in the nomination and, therefore, 
appointment of NEDs.
474
 Generally, UK company law provides that the general meeting 
appoints the board which in turn appoints the management. Shareholders in widely held 
companies have little influence on the NEDs’ appointment. Frequently there are provisions in 
the company’s articles – for example notice requirements – that render it difficult for 
shareholders to put up candidates against the board’s nominees.475 Furthermore, there are 
                                                         
471 D.2.1 UKCGC. 
472 R Esen, “Internal Control within the Legal Structure of UK and German Companies: Prospects for Change” (2001) 1(1) 
JCLS, 91-106, 94. 
473 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 401. 
474 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 239. 
475 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 398. 
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rational apathy problems.
476
 The shareholders do not get involved with the nomination 
process for the board and typically just rubber-stamp the board’s nomination.477 This is even 
true if an independent nomination committee exists, because it is influenced by the 
management, too, and relies on the latter’s advice regarding nominations.478 Hence, directors 
including NEDs are generally “appointed” by the executives and neither shareholders nor 
creditors have significant influence.
479
 As the executive directors were effectively the ones 
that brought them onto the board by nominating and recommending them the NEDs feel 
beholden and grateful to the executive directors.
480
 
The second reason is that the NEDs usually have some social connection to the executive 
directors.
481
 Due to these bonds their loyalties can be first to the executive director and only 
second to the company. This does not have to take place at a conscious level but may equally 
be done subconsciously.
482
 Thus, on accepting the nomination to the board the candidate 
forfeits some of its vaunted independence.
483
 
Thirdly, often the board’s chairman is member of the remuneration committee. The Code 
“permits” this.484 Probably the chairman was independent upon appointment but as he works 
closely with the management it is probable that bonds of loyalty and affinity develop between 
him and the executives. The board’s chairman should not chair the remuneration committee 
according to D.2.1 UKCGC. Still, due to his central role on the board he probably has 
significant influence in the committee so that his lacking independence could be particularly 
severe. 
A fourth point to question the independence of remuneration committee members and the 
committee’s effectiveness is the fact that there could be a “cosy collusion” between executive 
and non-executive directors.
485
 The executives and NEDs sit on each other’s remuneration 
committees and could increase each other’s remuneration. 
                                                         
476 The term derives from M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 
University Press, 1965); cf. JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law 
(Clarendon Press, 1993), 54. 
477 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 240. 
478 ibid., 292. 
479 C Jungmann (fn.177170), 435. 
480 D Kershaw (fn.386381), 240. 
481 ibid., 240. 
482 CA O’Reilly, BGM Main, “Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: A review and synthesis” 
(2010) 19(3) ICC, 675-712.  
483 R Bender (fn.466461), 11. 
484 D.2.1 UKCGC. 
485 M Ezzamel, R Watson, “Wearing Two Hats: The Conflicting Control and Management Roles of Non-Executive 
Directors” in K Keasey, S Thompson and M Wright, Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues 
(OUP, 1997), 73. 
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Fifthly, recent empirical research has shown that the UKCGC’s provisions on 
independence
486
 are the Code’s provisions with the highest non-compliance rates.487  
Finally, it is important to note that the independence of NEDs is of the most use if it reflects 
independence of mind – internal independence – and a willingness to challenge.488 Instead of 
focusing on this the UK approach concentrates on structures, as they are easier to identify and 
regulate.
489
 
To summarise, the independence of NEDs and remuneration committees can be doubted in 
practice. 
2.2. Professionalism 
The UKCGC’s qualification requirements for remuneration committee members are not 
particularly high. Therefore, it is not surprising that in practice the members of these 
committees often are not experts. They need to obtain the necessary data and expertise from 
external pay consultants.  
On the one hand, this is positive as compensation consultants are experts, have a good 
overview over the market and are likely to strike a “good deal” for the company. On the other 
hand, there is the problem that pay consultants are often part of consultancy firms that offer 
other services to the company as well. They may be inclined to recommend overly high 
remuneration in order to get further contracts with the management. 
Another critical point is the strict independence requirement, as it excludes many highly 
qualified individuals. Generally it is difficult to find individuals with sufficient knowledge 
and experience to understand the company’s business.490  
In theory, the NEDs should also be well informed since they participate in board meetings and 
have management tasks as well. However, it is doubtful whether the flow of information is as 
perfect in reality. There is the danger that the NEDs just get filtered information and base their 
remuneration decision on this information.
491
  
                                                         
486 Section B.1.2 UKCGC. 
487 FRC, Developments in Corporate Governance 2013: The impact and implementation of the UK Corporate Governance 
and Stewardship Codes (FRC, 2013), 11. 
488 T McNulty, J Roberts and P Stiles, Creating accountability within the board: The work of the effective non-executive 
director (DTI, 2003), 29. 
489 R Bender (fn.466461), 11. 
490 C Jungmann (fn.177170), 459. 
491 ibid., 459. 
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2.3. Motivation 
The NEDs’ dual role may have a negative effect on the commitment to the remuneration 
committee’s work. If the NEDs are more closely involved with the management there is not 
sufficient time left to deal with monitoring and the complex service contracts including 
remuneration agreements.  
The meetings of remuneration committees are frequently held just before or after the usual 
board meetings.
492
 Often they last only about one hour and thereby do not allow for detailed 
and in-depth discussions.
493
 Setting complex remuneration structures, which avoid unintended 
consequences, requires not only significant knowledge and expertise but also time and 
resources. Remuneration committees which – on average – meet twice a year cannot fulfil 
these requirements.
494
 
2.4. Transparency 
The transparency of the remuneration-setting process conflicts with its practicability. Small 
groups of specialists can find better solutions more swiftly than large unwieldy boards. The 
Code stipulates that the task of remuneration-setting should be delegated entirely to a 
remuneration committee. In practice most listed companies have implemented this, as 
empirical evidence shows.
495
 According to the Code the committee’s terms of reference for 
the decision also have to be published.  
Nevertheless, leaving ex post disclosure aside, the procedure of remuneration setting lacks 
publicity since only a few individuals are involved. Under such circumstances collusion 
between executive and non-executive directors is more likely to occur. 
2.5. Summary – Law in Action 
The law in action differs from the law in the books. NEDs’ independence does not live up to 
the expectations created by the Code’s strict recommendations. For an independent decision 
on executive remuneration, the NEDs’ nomination procedure and the personal links of 
executive and non-executive directors have to be seen critically.  
                                                         
492 M Ezzamel, R Watson, “Boards of Directors and the Role of Non-Executive Directors in the Governance of 
Corporations”(fn.457452), 107. 
493 ibid., 107. 
494 ibid., 108. 
495 S Arcot et al, “Corporate governance in the UK: Is the comply or explain approach working?” (2010) 30 Int'l Rev L & 
Econ, 193–201, 196. 
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Then again, the standard regarding professionalism is higher than the relevant weak regulation 
would lead one to expect, despite the conflict with the strict independence requirement. The 
role of compensation consultants is ambiguous. Disclosure requirements cannot reduce 
respective risks sufficiently. 
Central problems regarding the commitment and motivation are that the post of a NED is in 
practice still considered to be “honorary” and the involvement of members of the 
remuneration committee in the day-to-day management. Their dual role limits the NEDs’ time 
and resources for their role as decision-makers regarding executive remuneration.  
IV. Interim Findings: Effectiveness of the UK Board 
The UK model of executive remuneration-setting is characterised by the absence of binding 
regulation. This offers flexibility and allows finding the best solution for the individual 
company instead of a “one-size-fits-all approach”. However, this freedom has frequently led 
to remuneration-setting procedures which are opaque and which have allowed self-serving 
directors to act in their own interest.  
Therefore, for listed companies the UKCGC recommends remuneration committees 
consisting of independent NEDs. By artificially separating the members who decide on 
executive remuneration from the ones receiving it, the UK model imitates a two-tier structure 
to avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure independence. 
The UKCGC’s (too) strict independence criteria, however, also have a negative side. The 
difficult task of finding qualified and motivated personnel for NED posts has become even 
more complicated. Highly qualified and/or motivated individuals like former managers or 
controlling shareholders are excluded. Commitment and professionalism of the remuneration 
committee in practice can be criticised. The difficult question of remuneration cannot be 
decided in short meetings before or after the actual board meeting. 
To summarise, the UK board and its remuneration committee can – despite positive 
developments due to the best practice codes – not be considered to be a sufficiently effective 
remuneration governance instrument and needs improvements. Hence, on balance, for the UK 
the first hypothesis on the unsatisfactory performance of boards in executive remuneration 
matters holds true. 
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D. Comparison 
Having examined the (supervisory) board as a remuneration governance instrument in the two 
jurisdictions, a comparative analysis will allow new insights. Commonalities and differences 
as well as strengths and weaknesses will be identified in order to allow suggestions for 
improvement.  
I. Commonalities and Differences 
1. General 
In the last two decades the remuneration of listed companies’ executives has risen 
significantly in both countries.
496
 Commentators in both jurisdictions see a market failure in 
the context of executive remuneration. Repeatedly public discontent about the high level of 
managers’ remuneration has led to quick regulatory responses. One can speak of a 
“permanent reform” in this field in both countries in recent years.497  
While the focus in the UK was predominantly on self-regulatory corporate governance codes 
and binding legislation only as a last resort, the approach in Germany was different. 
Traditionally, German public company law offers a high degree of regulation.
498
 Provisions 
on the procedure of remuneration-setting existed for decades already including provisions that 
are aimed at ensuring an adequate level of management remuneration. This in conjunction 
with the – at least theoretically – high degree of independence of the remuneration-setting 
supervisory board necessitated only minor changes to the existing regulatory framework. A 
comply-or-explain best practice code was introduced. Yet the GCGC has, to a large extent, 
merely a communicative function explaining the complex system and showing that a good 
system of remuneration governance already exists.
499
  
The UK system, in contrast, leaves the organisation of the procedure of executive 
remuneration-setting entirely up to the private parties involved. More detailed and strict 
provisions are made by best practice codes, which are based on a comply-or-explain 
mechanism. Thus, the UK approach differs in that it merely provides best practice guidelines 
                                                         
496 J Schwalbach (fn.114107). 
497 The notion was coined by U Seibert in “Aktienrechtsreform in Permanenz?“ (2002) 45 AG, 417-420, 417; For the UK: K 
Keasey, H Short and M Wright, “The Development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK” in K Keasey, H Short, M 
Wright, Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues (OUP, 1997), 21-44, 40. 
498 cf. e.g. § 76ff. 
499 cf. M Nietsch (fn.118111), 370. 
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but leaves the enforcement to some extent to the market and especially institutional 
investors.
500
 
Finally the two countries’ systems share the criticism that the codes have only led to “box-
ticking” – meaning a change in form rather than in substance.501  
2. Board Structure 
The board structure is the “most obvious”502 difference between the two systems. German 
companies are characterised by a mandatory two-tier structure while UK companies usually 
have unitary boards. 
Prima facie the German separation of the ones who determine the remuneration and those 
who receive it seems advantageous. Not separating these roles causes conflicts of interest and 
a lack of external and internal independence. However, the low level of regulation in UK 
company law allows flexibility. The establishment of remuneration committees consisting of 
independent NEDs is possible and best practice. Hence, a significant convergence can be 
noted as both systems entrust a separate, independent body with the remuneration-setting 
process now. Still, important differences persist. 
2.1. Appointment of Executives 
The appointment of management board members is regulated in great detail in the German 
AktG. Candidates cannot be members of the company’s supervisory board at the same time. 
Apart from that the AktG provides only a few general and easy to fulfil criteria. The 
supervisory board is exclusively competent to appoint management board members. Also, one 
has to distinguish between the appointment stricto sensu and the service contract.  
The CA 2006 does not provide many rules regarding the appointment of board members. The 
act does not regulate the procedure of appointment at all. Generally, it is left to the company’s 
articles to lay down rules. The UKCGC recommends the use of a remuneration committee 
consisting of independent NEDs. Finally, a distinction needs to be made between two legal 
relationships: the appointment to the director office and the service contract for management 
services. 
                                                         
500 O Rode, Der deutsche Corporate Governance Kodex: Funktionen und Durchsetzungsmechanismen im Vergleich zum 
britischen Combined Code (Peter Lang, 2009), 71. 
501 J Solomon, A Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (John Wiley, 2004), 50; M Nietsch, (fn.118111), 374. 
502 PL Davies, “Board Structures in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing Divergence?” (2002) 2(4) Int’l Comp 
Corp L J, 435-456, 435. 
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Thus, there are commonalities. Both systems entrust the appointment of executives – which 
usually entails the setting of their remuneration – to bodies that are separate from the 
recipients of the remuneration. Using individuals that are – at least in theory – independent 
assures investors that the managers are not using the company’s assets for their own benefit. 
However, whilst converging – especially in the best practice codes503 – the independence 
requirements differ.
504
 Finally, in both systems a distinction must be made between the office 
as a director/management board member and the service contract for management services. 
Another commonality is the significant influence that the management board and executive 
directors each have (in practice) on the appointment of new (supervisory) board members. 
This has an impact on the independence of the ones setting the executives’ remuneration. 
2.2. Removal 
Management board members can be removed by the supervisory board for compelling 
reasons only. The executive and non-executive directors of UK companies can be removed at 
any time by an ordinary shareholders’ resolution regardless of any agreement between the 
board member and the company.  
The rationale for the higher requirement for removing management board members is that 
they should be able to take decisions in the interest of the company which may be unpopular 
without fearing their own removal. This protects the management from interference by the 
supervisory board in management matters. That increases the management’s independence 
from shareholders who may be interested in short-term gains only. Yet it may also lead to the 
entrenchment of managers. The threat of direct removal without the requirement for a 
“compelling reason” could enhance the managers’ accountability.  
2.3. Powers and Duties 
In German companies the management board is competent to direct the company and manage 
its business. The supervisory board is entrusted with the managers’ appointment and removal, 
their remuneration and their supervision. 
The CA 2006 by comparison does not stipulate rules on the division of powers but leaves this 
to the company’s articles. Usually the board has all powers except those that are statutorily 
required to remain with the general meeting. The Code, being more detailed, provides that the 
                                                         
503 e.g. the views on representatives of controlling shareholders on (supervisory) boards. 
504
 cf. on reasons for this WG Ringe, “Independent Directors: After the Crisis” (2013) University of Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series, Paper No 72/2013 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293394> accessed 18 September 2014, 15. 
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board’s function is to “provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company”505. Consequently, 
as to powers, the UK board and the German management board are similar. 
The independent NEDs recommended by the UKCGC resemble the supervisory board. The 
description of the NEDs’ tasks in A.1 UKCGC is almost identical to that of the supervisory 
board’s task in 5.1.1 GCGC. An important difference is that NEDs are participating in the 
management of the company whilst supervisory board members do not. Taking part in more 
meetings offers the former better information than their German counterparts receive, who 
struggle with information asymmetry. Good information is essential for adequate 
remuneration decisions. Then again, NEDs’ dual role may leave insufficient time for the 
supervisory work and may be negative for their independence. 
3. Setting and Controlling Executive Remuneration 
Using the functionalist comparative law approach, the remuneration-setting in the two 
jurisdictions will be compared. 
3.1. Competence 
Following detailed statutory provisions in Germany the full supervisory board has the 
exclusive competence to determine management remuneration.
506
 Delegation to a committee 
was widespread but is not permitted anymore.
507
  
The situation in the UK is diametrically opposed. The CA 2006 neither stipulates the 
exclusive competence of one organ nor a specific mode. Due to the previously mentioned 
concerns over conflicts of interest and independence, the best practice is to entrust 
independent NEDs that form a remuneration committee with this task. 
The question arises what the purpose of the UK remuneration committee and its German 
equivalent is and why the latter is not competent to make remuneration decisions (anymore). 
The remuneration committee in UK companies has been created in order to ensure that 
executive directors cannot decide – at least indirectly – on their own remuneration. The 
driving concerns were the apparent issues of self-dealing, the required antagonism of interests 
and internal and external independence of the decision-makers.  
                                                         
505 A.1 Supporting Principle UKCGC. 
506 § 84 (1) sentences 1, 5 AktG; M Weber, “§ 87”(fn.123116), m.no.10. 
507 cf. § 107 (3) sentence 3 AktG. 
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Due to the supervisory board’s exclusive competence, management board members should 
(theoretically) have no influence on the remuneration decision anyway. The reasons for 
creating remuneration committees in Germany were different: (1) their greater 
professionalism, knowledge and understanding of the firm i.e. delegating the decision to 
specialists should deliver more efficient outcomes; (2) German supervisory boards with up to 
21 members can be too large and unwieldy, so delegating the remuneration question to a 
small group of specialists made sense,
508
 (3) committees could also relieve the full 
supervisory board of some of its work load,
509
 so that the supervisory board does not neglect 
its primary task of monitoring the management board’s actions,510 (4) Small committees 
allowed for confidentiality in the remuneration negotiations, which may be necessary at some 
stages.
511
 Therefore, open, objective and confidential negotiations in a small group were 
recommended by the GCGC.
512
 
Why did the legislator change its mind in 2009? Probably the main motive for prohibiting the 
delegation to a committee was strengthening the supervisory board’s responsibility for the 
managers’ remuneration. This corresponds with the full supervisory board’s responsibility 
(Gesamtverantwortung). If not all members of the supervisory board were involved in the 
remuneration decision it would be difficult to justify that the extended liability of § 116 AktG 
applies to all members. Furthermore, it could be argued that the remuneration decision is of 
such significance that the full supervisory board should legitimise it. Another central rationale 
for the change was increased transparency of the process.
513
 This reason cannot convince 
entirely as the managers’ remuneration has to be disclosed individually anyway. Still, it may 
improve the transparency of the procedure as such. 
To summarise, the rationales for introducing remuneration committees in Germany and the 
UK differed due to the different starting points. The German move back to decisions by the 
full supervisory board may surprise. However, the discussions can still take place in an expert 
committee; it’s just that the decision has to be taken by the full board. 
                                                         
508 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 524. 
509 M Hoffmann-Becking et al, “Stellungnahme des Deutschen Anwaltvereins – Handelsrechtsausschuss zum Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG)” (2009) 
<http://anwaltverein.de/downloads/Stellungnahmen-09/DAV-Stellungnahme-32-2009.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 
m.no.23. 
510 T Kremer “Stellungnahme zur öffentlichen Anhörung des Rechtsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages am 25. Mai 
2009” (2009) <http://www.kapitalmarktrecht-im-
internet.eu/de/Rechtsgebiete/Gesellschaftsrecht/Artikelgesetze/85/VorstAG.htm> accessed 18 September 2014. 
511 T Strieder, DCGK Praxiskommentar (Erich Schmidt, 2005), 107. 
512 4.2.2 GCGC 2008. 
513 S Lingemann (fn.336331), 1922. 
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3.2. Legal Frame of the Decision 
The legal framework of the remuneration decision also shows commonalities. It is the 
entrepreneurial and organisational task of the German supervisory board and the UK 
remuneration committee respectively to decide on the amount and the structure of the 
remuneration package.  
Both jurisdictions accord a large margin of discretion to the deciding bodies.
514
 Both 
correspond in that they provide that the remuneration should be sufficient to attract and 
motivate talented personnel, but not more. They also share an emphasis on the company’s 
long-term success and performance-related pay. 
However, the German rules are stricter and more detailed. By establishing the adequacy 
requirement, § 87 (1) AktG, the legislator limits the freedom of contract. It is explicitly aimed 
at preventing excessive remuneration in order to protect the company and its stakeholders 
against losses due to disproportionate remuneration of the management. Besides this 
limitation of the freedom of contract the German law offers another, even more incisive 
instrument: The subsequent reduction of management remuneration if the situation for the 
company deteriorates and the agreed remuneration would be inequitable, § 87 (2).  
The UK system refrains from limiting private autonomy and upholds the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. The committee is free to decide on remuneration as long as it is within the 
legal boundaries and does not violate any of the determining directors’ duties.  
II. Strengths and Weaknesses 
One of the central functions of comparative law is to enable one jurisdiction to learn from the 
experiences of another.
515
 If a problem exists in several jurisdictions it can be helpful to 
transfer the solution found in one jurisdiction to another. However, inspiration or “legal 
transplants” are only possible within the boundaries of path dependence.516 
With this in mind the analysis will now turn to the strengths and weaknesses of the two 
approaches. The underlying hypothesis is that the remuneration setting by the (supervisory) 
board is unsatisfactory and in need of improvement. Focusing on the meta-criteria 
independence, professionalism, motivation and transparency, the two jurisdictions will be 
                                                         
514 Germany: B Dauner-Lieb (fn.188183), 586; K Cannivé, D Seebach (fn.188183), 599; M Weber, “§ 87”(fn.123116), 
m.no.14; UK: G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.913; Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83; Normandy v Ind. Coope & Co [1908] 1 Ch 84. 
515 K Zweigert, H Kötz, (fn.1212), 15. 
516 cf. L Bebchuck, MJ Roe, “A Theory of Path-Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance” (1999) 52(127) Stan 
L Rev, 127-170. 
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examined for whether they strike a balance between opposing axioms. This will allow the 
identification of positive aspects of each approach as well as aspects in need of improvement. 
1. Independence vs. Professionalism 
Analysing the two systems of remuneration governance by the (supervisory) board revealed 
conflicting regulatory aims. 
On the one hand, the decision-making body is supposed to be uninfluenced by the 
remuneration-recipients. Besides being independent of mind the body’s members shall appear 
independent to an outside observer. Potential conflicts of interest of the decision-makers will 
be avoided by ensuring that their interests are not congruent with those of the recipients. 
Ideally the individuals making the decision would have no links – personal or business – with 
the company or its managers and be organisationally separate. 
On the other hand, it is necessary that the ones making the remuneration decision are highly 
qualified and have sufficient expertise due to the complex nature of remuneration-setting. 
They are supposed to be informed, critical and sufficiently engaged. For sound decisions they 
require a profound understanding of the firm and inside knowledge. The obvious solution 
would be to appoint former managers of the company or executives of other listed companies 
to determine executive remuneration as they have profound knowledge of the matter, can 
assess management performances and have the necessary assertiveness. 
The German legislator opted for a focus on independence by using the clear and mandatory 
separation of supervisory and management boards. As membership of one organ excludes 
membership of the other, a high degree of neutrality and independence should be ensured. In 
theory, managers have no influence on the determination of their remuneration. Conflicts of 
interest should be avoided as the supervisory board members’ re-election depends – 
theoretically – on satisfactory performance, i.e. that they are able to appoint the best managers 
possible whilst protecting the company’s assets.  
This focus on independence which is illustrated by the high density of regulation in this 
respect is contrasted by the low statutory requirements regarding the qualification of 
supervisory board members. Almost any adult fulfils the AktG’s requirements. Higher 
requirements are set by the courts and the GCGC. Having realised this problem the legislator 
allows the use of remuneration committees which can draft the service contract but cannot 
make a decision on it.  
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Still, the remuneration committees, too, need individuals with sufficient expertise. A solution 
which is widespread is the appointment of the company’s former management board members 
or managers of other companies as supervisory board members. They possess the necessary 
skills and knowledge to assess the performance of present managers and the market value of 
candidates. However, their appointment compromises the supervisory board’s independence, 
due to social cohesion and solidarity between these supervisory board members and the 
management. 
The GCGC-Commission recognised this problem. The GGCC recommends truly independent 
members on the supervisory board.
517
 The GCGC, having seen the failed attempt of the AktG 
to ensure independence, sets more concrete provisions to safeguard supervisory board 
independence. However, whether the non-binding recommendations can improve 
independence without limiting professionalism is doubtful. 
The focus on independence and simultaneous negligence regarding professionalism of both 
AktG and the GCGC was counteracted in practice. The management having influence on the 
supervisory board member’s nomination and the fact that most supervisory board members 
belong to a network of successful managers allows the appointment of highly qualified 
individuals. Then again, it hinders arm’s-length bargaining on remuneration. 
The UK approach faces a similar dilemma. The CA 2006 remains generally silent regarding 
both independence and professionalism. In practice that led to procedures being established 
by the companies’ articles according to which directors decided on executive directors’ 
remuneration. A stark conflict of interest was evident. Such a procedure was an invitation to 
self-serving behaviour.  
Therefore, the UKCGC recommends entrusting independent NEDs with this task. 
Independent NEDs should form a remuneration committee. Thereby a separation of 
remuneration setters and recipients is established, as in the German model. Additionally, 
independence is defined very narrowly by the UKCGC. Companies adhering to the Code’s 
recommendations should hardly face conflicts of interest. However, a new problem arises: the 
lack of professionalism. The independence criteria are so strict that it becomes extremely 
difficult to find independent but sufficiently qualified NEDs.  
An advantage of NEDs over supervisory board members could be the fact that they are 
involved in the day-to-day management of the business together with the executives. This 
                                                         
517 5.4.2 GCGC. 
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could allow for a better flow of information which is indispensable for efficient remuneration 
decisions. Then again, being in frequent meetings with the executive directors can lead to 
collegiality and loyalty between NEDs and executives. As a result the desired and vaunted 
independence could be forfeited. 
To summarise, both systems struggle to reconcile the requirements of independence and 
professionalism. An additional problem is that the law in the books and the law in action 
differ significantly since, in practice, companies ensure qualified decisions at the cost of the 
independence of the decision-makers. Neither approach can ensure sufficient expertise and 
knowledge of the decision-makers while at the same time ensuring their independence. 
2. Practicability vs. Transparency 
Another problem is the balance between practicability and transparency of the procedure
518
.  
Practicability is best ensured if a small group of specialists deals with the issue of executive 
remuneration. In a small group decisions can be made more swiftly than in larger groups. 
Members of a specialist group have greater expertise so that their decisions are likely to be 
more efficient. 
Transparency is best ensured if the remuneration-setting process is public and rationalisable. 
Instead of a small group it seems advantageous if a wider group can inspect the service 
contract prior to signing, and can assess the remuneration’s amount and structure. Following 
the metaphor that sunlight helps to disinfect, this greater publicity and the scrutiny by the full 
board helps avoiding self-serving behaviour. 
The difficulty in striking the right balance between the two axioms can be illustrated by the 
changes to the German rules. Traditionally, delegation of the remuneration decision to a 
committee was possible
519
 and recommended.
520
 Since 2009 this practice has been prohibited. 
The then legislator strove for increased transparency. Another advantage is making the full 
supervisory board responsible for the decision, which can have consequences for its members’ 
liability as well. However, the change also has disadvantages. Now the complex issue of 
remuneration is discussed in a group of up to 21 people. Needless to say, neither do all 
members of the supervisory board have the necessary expertise nor will it allow for swift 
decisions. Also, confidentiality is difficult to achieve.  
                                                         
518 Disclosure will be dealt with below. 
519 BGHZ 65, 190, 191. 
520 cf. 5.1.2 GCGC 2008. 
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Thus, has the German legislator opted for an increase in procedural transparency at the cost of 
a decrease in practicability? It is important to note that the decision has to be made by the full 
board. It is still possible for a committee to negotiate with the candidate and draft a service 
contract. Specialists can discuss the issue but a wider group scrutinises the remuneration 
agreement before accepting it and takes responsibility for it. The practicability remains almost 
the same but the transparency is increased. 
In the UK the balance between transparency and practicability is different. The best practice 
involving delegation of the decision to a remuneration committee emphasises practicability. 
Remuneration committees are small groups of specialists who are experienced in assessing 
management performances and can ensure efficient remuneration. Is sufficient transparency 
ensured? The committee has to make available its terms of reference. Then again, only a very 
limited number of people is involved in the process of remuneration-setting. Limited publicity 
increases the risk of collusion between remuneration-setters and -recipients, and may foster 
inefficiencies. Whether disclosure is a cure will be discussed in the next chapter. 
All in all, the two systems put the main emphasis on different points. The UK focuses on 
practicability. The German procedure emphasises transparency but it allows modi operandi 
that ensure the procedure’s practicability. The German solution seems advantageous. Yet, it 
cannot be “transplanted” into the UK system due to the absence of a separate supervisory 
board in the latter. 
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E. Findings of this Chapter 
This chapter focused on the question of whether the supervisory board of German AGs and 
the board of UK public companies are effective remuneration governance instruments. The 
aim was to test the hypothesis that the setting and monitoring of executive remuneration by 
(supervisory) boards is not satisfactory and should be improved.  
In the present form both boards’ ability to ensure the motivation of managers and at the same 
time prevent remuneration excesses has to be doubted. 
The two systems differ greatly at first glance but have converged significantly in the last two 
decades. The self-regulatory codes have played an important role in this respect. Especially in 
the UK they have improved the mechanism and led to a significant convergence with the 
German system. Establishing a separate body in UK companies consisting of independent 
individuals is functionally similar to the German supervisory board. It could be argued that 
there is a de facto development of UK boards towards a two-tier structure – at least regarding 
remuneration. However, several differences remain and emphasis is put on different aspects. 
Moreover, it is important to look beyond the law in the books. Regarding the law in action 
several similarities, especially common problems, can be seen. 
The current remuneration governance by the (supervisory) board is flawed. Reverting to the 
meta-criteria of independence, professionalism, motivation and transparency, this finding will 
be substantiated below. 
Merely looking at the extensive and detailed provisions of the German AktG, the impression 
could be gained that the remuneration decision is made by a body consisting of clearly 
independent individuals without conflicts of interest. Reading the UKCGC’s 
recommendations could lead to a similar assumption. Under these conditions the 
(supervisory) board would probably be an effective remuneration governance mechanism.  
In practice, however, this cannot be confirmed. One reason is that the managers have prior 
significant influence on the decision-makers’ nomination. This creates gratitude and 
dependences. Also, NEDs and supervisory board members often belong to the same circle as 
the managers so that there is social cohesion and loyalty. Moreover, being too strict regarding 
remuneration could affect the NED’s or supervisor’s compensation as executives of other 
companies via comparisons. In the UK there is also the additional problem that executive and 
non-executive directors decide on each other’s remuneration. 
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Also regarding the other criteria the situation is critical. The statutes in both countries do not 
set high requirements regarding the qualification of supervisors and NEDs respectively. The 
choice is frequently between competent but not independent candidates or independent but 
not particularly qualified candidates. External compensation consultants are a popular solution 
in both countries. However, these could be affected by conflicts of interest as well. 
Specialised remuneration committees could be another solution. The two systems follow 
different approaches in this respect. In the UK a full delegation of the task of remuneration-
setting to a committee is possible. In Germany committees are permitted to prepare the 
remuneration decision but the final decision has to be made by the full supervisory board. The 
German solution seems a better one. It ensures swift and well-thought-through drafts by 
experts which then have to be defended in front of the full board, which takes the 
responsibility for it. Simultaneously the process ensures greater transparency by involving 
more people, thus creating greater publicity.  
There persist further severe problems in both systems. Being supervisory board member and 
NED respectively is often seen as an honorary post. Despite rising remuneration in recent 
years, highly qualified individuals are not sufficiently incentivised to sacrifice enough time to 
make substantiated and well-informed decisions. Although this problem has been recognised 
in both countries, there have been surprisingly few initiatives to address it. The lack of 
unfiltered information has not been dealt with satisfactorily either, despite having been 
identified as a central problem a long time ago. It is particularly important in Germany, with 
two separate boards, which increase the problem of information asymmetry. 
A significant difference between the systems is that the supervisory board is under a strict 
duty to ensure appropriate levels of remuneration and even can (and must) subsequently 
reduce the remuneration in certain situations. However, due to the vague criteria, the 
adequacy requirement has little effect. Recent reforms like the much discussed VorstAG were 
used as publicity by the government but did not in fact lead to significant improvements. 
To summarise, neither the German supervisory board nor the UK board is an effective 
remuneration governance instrument. Therefore, this chapter’s findings support, on balance, 
the first hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Second Layer: Disclosure 
 
A. Introduction 
Following the analysis of remuneration governance by the (supervisory) board, the focus will 
shift to disclosure of executive remuneration as a remuneration governance tool. Reverting to 
the mentioned layer model of remuneration governance, the second layer will be examined. 
The aim is to test the hypothesis that better remuneration governance could be achieved by 
enhanced, standardised disclosure.  
Disclosure can be defined as the “provision of information of all types by a company, both to 
the public at large and to restricted groups of information users”521. Remuneration disclosure 
means the publication of information regarding the remuneration paid to executives by 
companies and the publication of the company’s remuneration policy in the company’s 
financial statement or another relevant medium. It is part of the monitoring and accountability 
system, which is necessitated by agency theory’s aforementioned assumptions regarding 
managers (agents). 
Disclosure’s underlying assumption is that increased publicity leads to more transparency. 
Yet, disclosure and transparency as such have only very limited value. Disclosure on its own 
is merely a weak form of accountability.
522
 However, disclosure “may enable shareholders to 
exercise control and to re-align shareholder and agent interests”.523 Yet, it “only serves a 
purpose if the shareholders or other stakeholders can act on the information”.524 Hence, 
disclosure shall provide the necessary information to ensure “stronger”525 accountability of 
the (supervisory) board vis-à-vis the shareholders.
526
 The reduction of information 
asymmetries between the management and shareholders shall facilitate “policing” i.e. the 
“monitoring of the monitors” with respect to executive remuneration.527 This in turn shall 
                                                         
521 S Armitage, C Marston, “Corporate disclosure, cost of capital and reputation: Evidence from finance directors” (2008) 40 
BritAcountRev, 314-336, 315. 
522
 cf. on the different forms of accountability S Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking Corporate 
Governance (Ashgate, 2007), 77ff. 
523 M Ward, “Director Remuneration: a gap in the disclosure rules” (1998) 6(1) Corporate Governance , 48-51, 48. 
524 KE Sorensen, “Disclosure in EU corporate governance – a remedy in need of adjustment?” (2009) 10(2) EBOR, 255-283, 
272. 
525 S Bottomley (fn.529523), 78-79. 
526 cf. R Bahar, “Executive Compensation: Is Disclosure Enough?” (2005) Centre de droit bancaire et financier, Université de 
Genève Working Paper, 23. 
527 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 301. 
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reduce agency costs. Hence, based on the disclosed information, enhanced control by the 
shareholders, e.g. through say-on-pay or exit, and improved prevention, e.g. through 
“outrage” and stricter remuneration-setters, shall avoid excessive executive remuneration.528 
Disclosure has frequently been heralded as a remedy to the (supervisory) board’s 
shortcomings in remuneration governance.
529
 The effectiveness of disclosure as (auxiliary) 
means against excessive remuneration will be examined. Disclosure regulation under German 
and UK law will be described, analysed and evaluated before a comparison is drawn between 
the two approaches, trying to identify the “better law” and making suggestions for 
improvements. As mentioned above, the effect of disclosure depends on action being taken 
based on the information that disclosure makes available. Therefore, this thesis examines 
disclosure in the context of the other remuneration governance instruments – especially say-
on-pay. 
Thus, this chapter examines the hypothesis that enhanced, standardised disclosure could 
facilitate more effective remuneration governance. 
  
                                                         
528 cf. C Villiers, Company Reporting and Company Law (CUP, 2006), 2ff. 
529 cf. only R Bahar (fn.533525), 23. 
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B. Germany 
In the last two decades the remuneration of managers has become considerably more 
professional and complex in Germany.
530
 However, especially since the Mannesmann case it 
was widely perceived that the lex lata was deficient.
531
 In 2005 the legislator reacted with a 
fundamental reform regarding the disclosure of executive remuneration, the VorstOG
532
. It 
was a reaction to demands in the legal literature,
533
 an EU recommendation
534
 widespread 
non-compliance with the corresponding GCGC recommendation,
535
 and the wish to converge 
with international standards
536
.  
There was a consensus in the Bundestag that the adequacy of executive remuneration had to 
be ascertained and investors and shareholders should be better protected.
537
 The adopted 
VorstOG led to a paradigm shift.
538
 First, the voluntary self-control through the GCGC was 
replaced by a classic regulatory measure. Second, the individualised remuneration disclosure 
meant an unprecedented level of individualised publicity,
539
 which led some commentators to 
question its constitutionality.
540
 
This thesis will explore whether the existing rules on disclosure ensure satisfactory 
remuneration governance or whether improvements such as standardisation are indicated. 
This will allow conclusions on the merits of the second hypothesis, which states that 
enhanced, standardised disclosure could lead to better remuneration governance. 
I. The Historic Development  
Rules on disclosure of the remuneration of a company’s management have a long history in 
Germany. As early as 1884 a reform of the ADHGB
541
 introduced, in Art 185 lit a no 4 
                                                         
530 MH Kramarsch, “Organvergütung” (2005) 169 ZHR, 112-123, 112. 
531 T Baums, “Vorschlag eines Gesetztes” (fn.249244), 1877. 
532 Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung vom 3.8.2005 (BGBl. I 2267). 
533 cf. T Baums, “Vorschlag eines Gesetztes” (fn.249244), 1877-1884; G Thüsing, “Angemessene Vorstandsvergütung durch 
Transparenz” (fn.345340), 1. 
534 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004. 
535 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (2005) 30 DB, 1611-1617, 1611. 
536 In 2001 France introduced Art. L 225-102-1 Code de Commerce, in 2002 the UK introduced the Directors Remuneration 
Report Regulation and in the US respective legislation had been introduced ten years earlier. 
537 G Thüsing, “ Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.116109), 1389. 
538 S Augsberg, “Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte einer gesetzlichen Offenlegungspflicht für Vorstandsbezüge” (2005) 38 (4) 
ZRP, 105-109, 105.  
539 ibid., 105.  
540 ibid., 109.  
541 Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch, BGBl. des Norddeutschen Bundes 1869, 404. 
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ADHGB 1884,
542
 the requirement of listing the costs of organising and administering the 
company in the financial statement as expenditure.
543
  
A catalyst for further regulation was the world-wide economic crisis of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. A 1931 emergency decree introduced detailed provisions on accounting and 
publicity.
544
 The new § 260 a (3) no 6 Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)
545
 provided for the first time 
the requirement to disclose the remuneration of management board and supervisory board 
members.
546
 The 1931 reform shifted the objective from merely informing and protecting the 
company’s creditors and shareholders to informing a wider public since the economic 
situation of a company may be in the public interest.
547
 
The AktG 1937 aimed at tackling shortcomings which had become evident in the 1930s.
548
  
§ 128 (2) no 7 set out a duty to disclose the remuneration of the management board as a whole 
in the company’s annual accounts.549 Also severance payments and pensions paid to former 
members of the management board had to be disclosed.
550
 The requirement to disclose 
management and supervisory board remuneration separately instead of cumulated in one sum 
was new as well.  
The AktG 1965 introduced the separate disclosure of remuneration of present management 
board members and former members’ pensions, severance payments etc. in order to allow a 
comparison of the total remuneration of the present management board of different 
companies.
551
  
In 1985 an accounting law reform,
552
 which implemented an EC directive,
553
 changed the 
place of the disclosure to the notes to the annual accounts, § 285 (1) no 9 HGB.
554
 The reason 
for moving the information there was the wish to provide additional information without 
overloading the financial statement or the profit and loss account. The provision itself was 
                                                         
542 RGBl. 1884, 123ff. 
543 MB Masling, Publizitätspflichten für Vorstandsgehälter (Peter Lang, 2009), 164. 
544 Notverordnung über Aktienrecht, Bankenaufsicht und Steueramnestie vom 19.9.1931, RGBl I 1931, 493. 
545 Handelsgesetzbuch vom 10. Mai 1897 (RGBl, 1897, 219).  
546 MB Masling (fn.550542), 165. 
547 E Schwark, Anlegerschutz durch Wirtschaftsrecht (CH Beck, 1979), 178. 
548 G Wöhe, “Die Entwicklung der Rechnungslegungsvorschriften der Kapitalgesellschaften im 20. Jahrhundert” in K 
Küting, G Langenbucher (eds) Internationale Rechnungslegung: Festschrift für Professor Dr. Claus Peter Weber zum 60. 
Geburtstag (Schaeffer-Poeschel, 1999), 65-90, 69. 
549 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.87. 
550 R Teichman, W Köhler, Aktiengesetz: Gesetz über Aktiengesellschaften und Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien vom 30. 
Januar 1937 (3rd ed, Schneider, 1950), § 128, m.no.7. 
551 R von Godin, S Wilhelmi, Aktiengesetz vom 6. September 1965 (4th ed, de Gruyter, 1971), §160 m.no.12. 
552 Bilanzrichtlinien-Gesetz vom 19.12.1985, BGBl. I, 2355. 
553 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978. 
554 For a Konzern: § 315 (1) no 6 HGB. 
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moved (back) to the HGB as it affected all companies (Kapitalgesellschaften) of a certain size 
irrespective of their legal form. All big and medium-sized public companies, § 288 HGB, 
have the duty to disclose the remuneration of their board members as a group. 
Individual disclosure was first introduced in Germany by the GCGC. Its first version in 2002 
suggested individualised disclosure.
555
 One year later it recommended it.
556
 Listed public 
companies had to explain non-compliance with this provision, § 161 AktG. Still, many DAX-
companies preferred not to disclose the management board members’ remuneration 
individually.
557
  
In 2003 an EU Company Law Action Plan argued for individual disclosure of executive 
remuneration in the annual accounts.
558
 This postulation was substantiated in a 2004 EU 
Recommendation.
559
 This recommendation, the lack of compliance with the relevant GCGC 
recommendation and developments in other jurisdictions influenced the German legislator. In 
2005 a thorough reform of the disclosure regulation, the VorstOG, followed. Minor changes 
were finally brought by the VorstAG 2009. 
II. Regulation of Disclosure 
After the historical development the current rules on the disclosure of management board 
members’ remuneration will be analysed.  
1. Duty to Disclose  
1.1. Limited Duty to Disclose under the AktG 
Surprisingly, the AktG provides hardly any rules on remuneration disclosure. In  
§ 193 (2) no 3 AktG it merely requires disclosure if share options are to be fulfilled with 
conditional capital
560
 (bedingtes Kapital, § 192 AktG) or with own shares purchased by the 
AG (§ 71 (1) no 8 sentence 4 AktG).
561
  
Could a duty to disclose follow from § 131 AktG, which generally offers the shareholder an 
extensive right to information? The right is restricted by certain limitations in § 131 (3) that 
allow the management board to refuse information in certain cases and by the requirement of 
                                                         
555 cf. 4.2.4 GCGC 2002; HM Ringleb in HM Ringleb et al (eds) Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex 
(1st ed, CH Beck, 2003), m.no.552. 
556 4.2.4 sentence 2 GCGC. 
557 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 5.  
558 cf. s. 3.1.3. 
559 Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 29.12.2004, OJ (2004) no L 385, 55. 
560 Authorised but unissued capital. 
561 M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), m.no.242. 
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“necessity”. “Necessity” means that information will be disclosed to the shareholder if it is 
required for an adequate evaluation of an item on the general meeting’s agenda.562 This item 
could be e.g. the approval of the management or supervisory board’s actions (Entlastung).563 
Prior to the VorstOG the question arose whether shareholders consequently had a right to 
have the management board members’ remuneration disclosed in an individualised form.564 
According to the prevailing doctrine shareholders generally could not request this information 
as it was not “necessary” for their decisions.565 The discussion is obsolete regarding listed 
public companies.
566
 The right to information does not apply to individualised disclosure of 
management remuneration as this information is generally already available in the notes to the 
annual accounts following § 285 (1) no 9 lit a sentence 5 HGB.
567
 In cases like opt-outs or 
non-listed public companies it is either considered not to be necessary or denied for data 
protection reasons.
568
 The only exception could be concrete indicators for a breach of the 
supervisory board’s duties.569  
Consulting the AktG for rules on disclosure of management board remuneration is not futile. 
This is surprising due to the otherwise comprehensive character of the act. 
1.2. Duty to Disclose under Accounting Law 
In contrast to public company law accounting law provides rules on remuneration disclosure. 
Since before the VorstOG reform, the HGB has required all public companies to disclose the 
total remuneration (Gesamtbezüge) of all management board members, supervisory board 
members and retired organ members in the notes to the annual accounts,  
§ 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a HGB.
570
 The aggregate remuneration of each group needs to be 
disclosed.
571
 
The VorstOG introduced for listed public companies a duty of extensive individualised 
disclosure of management remuneration, § 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a.
572
 Also the “main 
                                                         
562 D Kubis, “§131” in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.33ff. 
563 ibid., m.no.47. 
564 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534),1617. 
565 KP Martens, “Vorstandsvergütung auf dem Prüfstand” (2005) ZHR, 124-154, 150; M Lutter, “Fragerecht und 
Informationsanspruch des Aktionärs und GmbH-Gesellschafters im Konzern” (1985) AG, 117-124, 118. 
566 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 87 m.no.17. 
567 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.90; M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), m.no.243. 
568 KP Martens (fn.575567), 150; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1617. 
569 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1617. 
570 For a Konzern: § 314 (1) no 6 lit a HGB. 
571 M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), m.no.267. 
572 § 314 (1) no 6 lit a HGB (new) respectively. 
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features” of the remuneration system shall be disclosed, § 289 (2) no 5. For non-listed public 
companies, or listed ones that decided to opt out, only limited disclosure requirements apply. 
2. Duty to Disclose – The VorstOG 
Prior to the VorstOG the publicity and consequently the transparency of executive 
remuneration was not satisfactory. Without being individualised and classified the 
information on the remuneration of managers was of limited use to shareholders and 
investors. The VorstOG led to a paradigm shift and is central to the regulation of 
remuneration disclosure in Germany. In this section the disclosure rules will be examined in 
detail. Emphasis will be put on the VorstOG and its consequences. 
2.1. Objectives of the VorstOG 
First, the regulatory objectives will be analysed.  
2.1.1. Disclosure as an Instrument for Monitoring 
A central reason for the introduction of individualised disclosure can be found in AGs’ 
remuneration- and control-hierarchy.
573
 The supervisory board determines the management 
board members’ remuneration. The supervisory board in turn is monitored by the general 
meeting (“monitoring of the monitors”)574. This system shall reduce agency costs. Prior to the 
VorstOG, the monitoring by shareholders and the capital market was criticised as being not 
sufficiently efficient.
575
  
The VorstOG introduced individualised disclosure of executive remuneration aiming at 
strengthening the shareholders’ monitoring function.576 Disclosure enables the shareholders to 
control whether the supervisory board has fulfilled its duty to negotiate adequate management 
remuneration.
577
 It facilitates the shareholders’ control over whether the manager’s 
remuneration is adequate in relation to the managers’ task, the company’s economic situation, 
etc.
578
 This is indispensable, since the necessary antagonism of interests in the negotiations of 
remuneration between supervisory board and managers may be missing. Thus, the objective is 
to improve the “monitoring of the monitors”579 through publicity and transparency. Publicity 
                                                         
573 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 6. 
574 T Baums “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 300. 
575 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (2005) 26(32) ZIP, 1389-1397, 1390. 
576 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
577 cf. BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 5. 
578 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 106; H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.80; M Kort, “§ 87”, (fn.135128), m.no.263;G 
Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1389. 
579 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 300. 
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and transparency merely offer an informational basis for decisions but the agency cost-
reducing effect depends on policing action being taken by shareholders (or other stakeholders 
if possible).  
Correspondingly, the travaux préparatoires to the VorstOG postulate the improvement of the 
shareholders’ position regarding monitoring as the main purpose of the reform.580 The 
government stated that the introduced individual disclosure shall primarily enable the 
shareholder to assess whether the remuneration is adequate within the meaning of 
§ 87 (1) AktG.
581
 This in turn would enable action to be taken in the case of excessive 
remuneration. 
2.1.2 Disclosure as an Instrument for Prevention 
Prevention is a second objective of individualised disclosure.
582
 On the one hand, disclosure ‒ 
and in particular the disclosure which names each member of the management board 
individually ‒ shall  discourage managers from demanding excessively high remuneration.583 
In the long run this shall even curb the general level of executive remuneration.
584
 On the 
other hand, the supervisory board’s anticipation of improved and more substantiated 
monitoring by the shareholders and potential “outrage” shall curb the levels of executive 
remuneration.
585
 
The VorstOG’s travaux préparatoires do not adopt the idea of prevention.586 The reason for 
this is not evident. Probably doubts regarding the effectiveness of individualised disclosure as 
a means for prevention existed. Instead of limiting executive remuneration it was feared that it 
could rather lead to a “ratcheting up”587 effect.588 A discussion was held as to whether 
“outrage” might prevent optimal outcomes in the remuneration negotiations.589 The 
experiences in the US, which introduced extensive disclosure requirements earlier but still 
                                                         
580 BegrRegE BR-Drucks. 398/05, 1 and 5. 
581 ibid., 1 and 5. 
582 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 300; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-
Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
583 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612 
584 cf. M Hoffmann-Becking, “Rechtliche Anmerkungen zur Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsvergütung” (2005) 169 ZHR, 155-
180, 173; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
585 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 305. 
586 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
587 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.6750), 68. 
588 R Marsch-Barner, “Aktuelle Rechtsfragen zur Vergütung von Vortstands- und Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern einer AG” in G 
Crezelius et al (eds) Festschrift für Volker Röhricht zum 65. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, 2005), 401-419, 407; E Schwark, 
“Zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” in R Damm et al (eds) Festschrift für Thomas Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag am 
20. Februar 2005 (de Gruyter, 2005), 377-398, 385. 
589 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
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witnessed steeply rising executive remuneration, might have kept the legislator from 
mentioning prevention as an objective. 
Still, although disclosure is aimed at the shareholders and explicitly not the general public it is 
fair to say that attention by the media and the general public is likely to be a deterrent to 
excessive remuneration (“outrage constraint”590).591 This is also suggested by findings of 
organisational behaviourists.
592
 Furthermore, the argument of a ratcheting-up effect has to be 
seen critically, since managers and supervisors are generally well informed by remuneration 
consultants about the general level of remuneration.
593
 Also the rise in remuneration in the US 
and other countries after the introduction of disclosure rules does not mean that this 
development was caused by disclosure.
594
 Other factors, such as the introduction of share 
options during the period in question, could have been the cause.
595
 Then again, disclosure 
could lead to the infamous “Lake Wobegon Effect596 meaning that no company wants to 
disclose that its managers are paid below average, thus implying that they are sub-standard.  
2.1.3. Disclosure as an Instrument for Information and Protection of Investors 
A third objective is to inform the shareholders and the capital market. Detailed disclosure of 
executive remuneration can give current and potential investors insight into the remuneration-
based incentives of individual managers.
597
 Information on provisions for severance 
payments, pensions etc. may provide the investor with valuable knowledge for assessing the 
manager’s actions in a take-over situation.598 This can lead to better-informed transaction 
decisions by investors. Disclosure may also impart information on the monitoring structure in 
the company.
599
 
Closely related is the possibility of regarding disclosure as an opportunity for the company 
and especially the supervisory board to signal its own integrity.
600
 Investors can assess the 
work of the supervisory board with regard to executive remuneration which might allow 
conclusions to be drawn regarding its work in general. 
                                                         
590 LM Bebchuk, JA Fried, Pay without Performance (fn.6750), 68. 
591 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1390. 
592 e.g. KA Diekmann, “’Implicit justifications’ and self-serving group allocations” (1997) 18 J Org Behav, 3-16. 
593 T Baums, "Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 306. 
594 ibid., 306. 
595 ibid., 306. 
596 cf. S Schaefer, RM Hayes, "CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect” (2009) 94(2) JFE, 280-290. 
597 H Fleischer, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.81. 
598 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 10. 
599 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” ((fn.362357), 306. 
600 Deutsches Aktieninstitut, Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen 
(Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz (2005), <http://www.kapitalmarktrecht-im-
internet.eu/de/Rechtsgebiete/Gesellschaftsrecht/Artikelgesetze/60/VorstOG.htm> accessed 18 September 2014. 1. 
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Some argue that the disclosed information on executive remuneration is of no interest to the 
capital market.
601
 The value of the information from individual disclosures was low and 
investors did not draw any conclusions from it. However, being informed about the pay-
performance-link, the company’s remuneration policy and the managers’ incentives, which 
may affect their future actions, seems important for investment decisions. Empirical research 
shows the importance of disclosure for investors.
602
 
The objective of investor information and protection is mentioned repeatedly in the travaux 
préparatoires.
603
 However, the general meeting can decide to opt out meaning not to disclose 
executive remuneration individually. Hence, the information of potential investors cannot be 
the main objective. Their information and protection is merely a “reflex” of the (present) 
shareholder protection by improving the conditions for monitoring.
604
 The emphasis of the 
reform was on the facilitation of the control whether the remuneration was adequate.
605
 The 
information of the capital market seems to be a welcome side effect.  
2.2. The Regulation in Detail 
As a second step the provisions on individualised disclosure will be examined in greater 
detail. 
2.2.1. Personal Scope 
Regarding disclosure, the law distinguishes between listed and non-listed public companies.  
Listed companies are all companies those whose shares are admitted to an organised market, 
meaning a market which is regulated and supervised by a body recognised by the state, which 
takes place regularly and which is accessible directly or indirectly by the public, § 3 (2) AktG. 
Admittance to a comparable foreign market suffices.
606
  
All public companies have the duty to disclose, in the notes to the annual accounts, the total 
remuneration of the management board as a group, according to § 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a 
                                                         
601 K Nieding, E Sünner, “Pro & Contra: Offenlegung von Organvergütungen?” (2005) 38(1) ZRP, 39, 39.  
602 A Bassen, M Kleinschmidt, S Prigge and C Zöllner, “Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex und Unternehmenserfolg – 
Empirische Befunde” (2006) 66 Die Betriebswirtschaft, 388-406. 
603 cf. BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 5, 8 and 10. 
604 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87” (fn.193188), m.no.88. 
605 cf. H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
606 G Böcker, “Die kleine AG als Alternative zur GmbH?” (2002) RNotZ, 129-164, 131, S Lingemann, D Wasmann, “Mehr 
Kontrolle und Transparenz im Aktienrecht - Das KonTraG tritt in Kraft” (1998) BB, 853-862, 854; D Leuering, S Simon, 
“Offene Fragen zur Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung” (2005) 8(23) NZG, 945-950, 946. 
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sentence 1-3 HGB. Within the AG it is the management board’s task to publish the 
information.
607
  
Listed public companies have the additional duty to individually disclose the management 
board members’ remuneration, § 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a sentence 5. 
2.2.2. Duties 
§ 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a sentence 5 HGB requires listed public companies to: (1) state in the 
notes to the annual accounts separately the remuneration (Bezüge) of each management board 
member giving the manager’s full name. Bezüge is legally defined in sentence 1 of the 
provision. (2) Each remuneration package has to be classified into three groups: non-
performance-related remuneration, performance-related remuneration and long-term incentive 
components.  
Furthermore, § 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a sentence 6 emphasises that payments for the time of 
the termination of the contract also have to be disclosed individually.
608
 This includes 
agreements on pensions and severance payments.
609
 The basic data for these payments has to 
be made public – not the cash value or the accrual made.610  
§ 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a sentence 7 provides that benefits a manager receives from or is 
promised by a third party with regard to the manager’s work as a management board member 
has to be disclosed as well. The objective is to elucidate potential conflicts of interest.
611
 A 
third party is any person or company other than the one making the annual accounts to which 
the disclosure belongs.
612
 A potential example is the payment of a parent company to a 
member of the subsidiary’s management board.613 Managers as parts of the organ 
management board are obliged to notify their company if they receive a payment from a third 
party due to their duty to loyalty and often also due to contractual obligations.
614
 Surprisingly, 
the legislator did not cover the case of payments by a third party or the company to a person 
that is close to the manager, e.g. their spouse.
615
 Such payments could be considered a 
circumvention of the rule.
616
 
                                                         
607 § 264 (1) HGB with § 78 (1) AktG. 
608 Beschlussempfehlung Rechtsausschuss BT-Drucks. 15/5860, 18. 
609 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 7. 
610 Beschlussempfehlung Rechtsausschuss BT-Drucks. 15/5860, 18. 
611 ibid., 19. 
612 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1616. 
613 D Leuering, S Simon, “Offene Fragen zur Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütung” (2005) 8 (23) NZG, 945-950, 947. 
614 Beschlussempfehlung Rechtsausschuss BT-Drucks. 15/5860, 19; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-
Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1616. 
615 G Thüsing, “ Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1993. 
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Finally, § 289 (2) no 5 provides that the main features of the remuneration system (Grundzüge 
des Vergütungssystems) shall be disclosed in the management report (Lagebericht). If 
information required by § 285 sentence 1 no 9 lit a sentence 5 to 8 is given in the management 
report it does not have be disclosed in the notes to the annual accounts anymore. Explaining 
the remuneration system shall improve the understanding of the parameters for 
remuneration.
617
 The legislator explicitly abstained from making this a binding requirement in 
order to allow the practice to develop relevant standards.
618
 
2.2.3. Opt-Out  
Individualised disclosure can be omitted if the general meeting decides accordingly with a 
three-quarters majority of the registered capital (Grundkapital) present at the meeting, § 286 
(5) sentences 1, 2 HGB. 
The opt-out can be for one to up to five years from the resolution on and is effective for the 
following accounting year, 286 (5) sentence 2. The resolution can be repeated during the 
period of exemption or after its expiry.
619
 The general meeting’s opting-out resolution also 
requires a respective general meeting agenda and a respective proposal by one of the boards 
according to § 124 (3) sentence 1 AktG.
620
 A duty to make such a proposal exists merely if 
concrete disadvantages for the company have to be feared.
621
 Management board members 
who are also shareholders – and thus would actually be able to vote on the non-disclosure of 
their remuneration – are barred from voting on the opt-out following an analogous application 
of § 136 (1) AktG.
622
 However, they can decide on the setting of the general meeting’s 
agenda.
623
 
Despite opting out, the general meeting can still decide to disclose more information than 
what is mandatory on the total remuneration of the management board.
624
  
The possibility of an opt-out exists nowhere but in Germany.
625
 The rationale given for the 
opt-out option is increased flexibility.
626
 Individualised disclosure increases transparency and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
616 ibid., 1993. 
617 BegrRegE BR-Drucks. 398/05, 12. 
618 Beschlussempfehlung Rechtsausschuss BT-Drucks. 15/5860, 21; P Hennke, T Fett, “Vorstandsvergütungs-
Offenlegungsgesetz: erste Praxiserfahrungen und Stellungnahme zu E-DRS 22” (2007) 62(23) BB, 1267-1272, 1267. 
619 cf. S Mutter, “Aktienrechtliche Sorgfaltspflichten versus Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz – VorstOG?” (2005) 
AG, R333. 
620 M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), m.no.275. 
621 ibid.; U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 87 m.no.16; stricter: S Mutter (fn.630622), R333. 
622 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 12. 
623 D Leuering, S Simon (fn.624616), 950. 
624 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1394. 
625 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1614. 
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improves the monitoring by the shareholders. However, as argumentum e contrario this 
means that the shareholders should have the option of not disclosing individually if they 
prefer not to.
627
 This choice illustrates once again that information of the capital market is a 
secondary objective only as otherwise the disclosure would not be at the shareholders’ 
discretion.
628
 
2.2.4. Sanctions 
With regard to the sanctions for breaching the disclose duty the legislator chose to rely on the 
existing rules.
629
 A member of the management or the supervisory board acts illegally 
(ordnungswidrig) if acting contrary to the provisions of § 285 HGB.
630
 Due to § 76 (3) AktG 
only a natural person – not the company as such – can act illegally.631 Aside from the question 
of responsibility there is the question of who will be fined. Fines can be imposed on legal 
persons whose organ acted illegally. Thus, listed companies can face a fine of up to €50,000 
following § 334 (1) no 1 lit d, no 2 lit 4, (3) HGB.
632
  
Furthermore, a contestation of the approval of the supervisory board’s actions (Anfechtung 
der Entlastung) by the general meeting could be possible, § 243 (1) AktG. An action for 
information, § 132 AktG, could be considered as well but it is facing the aforementioned 
problems.  
Moreover, para 4.2.4 GCGC which concerns the individual disclosure still applies, despite the 
regulation of individual disclosure by statute.
633
 § 161 AktG establishes a legal obligation for 
the declaration of compliance with the GCGC. If non-compliance is not explained 
consequences could include various claims for damages, fines and the contestability of the 
approval of actions (Entlastung) of the supervisory board.
634
 
The sanctions for omitting the non-mandatory report explaining the remuneration system as 
part of the management report, § 289 (2) HGB, are less clear.
635
 They depend on the 
interpretation of “shall” in the provision. Some commentators argue that in contrast to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
626 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 11. 
627 ibid., 11. 
628 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1614. 
629 G Thüsing, “ Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1994. 
630 § 334 (1) no 1 lit d HGB. 
631 M Hoyos, F Huber, “§ 334” in H Ellrott et al (eds), Beckscher Bilanzkommentar: Handels- und Steuerrecht (8th ed, CH 
Beck, 2012), m.no.2. 
632 And for certain companies according to §§ 340n and 341n HGB respectively. 
633 cf. BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 12. 
634 R Runte, “§ 161” in T Bürgers, T Körber (eds), Heidelberger Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (2nd ed, CF Müller 2011) 
m.no.17ff. 
635 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1994. 
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usual meaning of “shall” in § 289 (2) HGB as “generally” or “as a rule” it should contain a 
stronger element of voluntariness as for example in “can”.636 However, whether the travaux 
préparatoires may be interpreted in this way can be doubted. Rather the legislator merely 
tried to express the idea that the precise content of the report is not regulated. De facto a duty 
to provide the information on the remuneration system’s main features exists.637 It is limited 
by the principle of materiality.
638
 
III. Evaluation 
Following the disclosure rules’ examination they will be evaluated. First, the linkage of 
disclosure and “policing” will be highlighted. Second, advantages and disadvantages of 
mandatory individualised disclosure will be discussed. Third, the current disclosure regulation 
will be analysed, focusing on its ability to achieve the desired objectives, its problems and 
shortcomings as well as possible alternatives. 
1. General 
1.1. Disclosure and Policing 
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance instruments including remuneration 
governance instruments such as say-on-pay is closely linked to the availability, usefulness and 
accuracy of information.
639
 Insufficiently informed shareholders (or other stakeholders) 
cannot use the existing remuneration governance mechanisms effectively.
640
 It is self-evident 
that without detailed and understandable information on executive remuneration, which may 
alert them to shortcomings in the (supervisory) board’s exercise of its task to set executive 
remuneration, the shareholders are unlikely to act against excessive remuneration.
641
 Hence, 
disclosure of information is pivotal to shareholder control of the (supervisory) board i.e. 
“monitoring of the monitors”. 
This dependency of disclosure on policing action by shareholders (or others) – for which in 
turn it is a prerequisite – has to be borne in mind when evaluating its effectiveness. 
                                                         
636 cf. G Spindler, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen - VorstOG” (2005) NZG, 689-692, 691; D 
Leuering, S Simon (fn.624616), 948. 
637 H Merkt in KJ Hopt, A Baumbach (eds), Handelsgesetzbuch (35th ed, CH Beck, 2012), § 289 m.no.2; KW Lange, “§ 289” 
in K Schmidt (ed), Münchener Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch:HGB (3rd ed, CH Beck, 2013), m.no.94. 
638 H Merkt (fn.648640), § 289 m.no.2; KW Lange, (fn.648640), m.no.94. 
639 E Ferran, “The role of the shareholder in internal corporate governance: enabling shareholders to make better-informed 
decisions” (2003) 4(4) EBOR, 491-516, 496. 
640 cf. MB Fox, “Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance”, in K.J. Hopt, et al., Comparative Corporate Governance - 
The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Clarendon Press 1998) ch. 9. 
641 cf. E Ferran, “The role of the shareholder in internal corporate governance: enabling shareholders to make better-informed 
decisions” (2003) 4(4) EBOR, 491-516, 496. 
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1.2. Need for Additional Information? 
As the “added value” of individualised disclosure has repeatedly been doubted and the level 
of necessary transparency seems unclear,
642
 it is worth examining the arguments which can be 
brought forward regarding individualised disclosure. Central to the debate on individualised 
disclosure is the conflict between transparency of executive remuneration and the justified 
interest of the company and its managers to keep information on remuneration confidential. 
First, the question of whether there is an actual need for additional information as provided by 
individualised disclosure will be dealt with. 
Critics of individualised disclosure have argued that additional information on remuneration 
is not per se desirable,
643
 that it is more important to make it possible for investors to make 
rational investment decisions and to improve the control structures within companies.
644
 Some 
even argue that present and potential shareholders are not interested in the additional 
information,
645
 that it would not afford them significant additional insight. Critics assert that, 
for an approximate assessment of the remuneration’s adequacy, it is enough to know the total 
sum of executive remuneration and the ratio of fixed to variable remuneration.
646
 The post-
VorstOG rules would not facilitate monitoring whether the supervisory board negotiated 
satisfactorily regarding the managers’ remuneration.647 Moreover, as the already previously 
existing right to information, § 131 AktG, was rarely used in practice to gain information on 
executive remuneration it could be doubted that shareholders are more interested now.
648
 
It has been argued that instead of being used in investment decisions, disclosure could lead to 
a misuse of the individualised remuneration data in the public discussion.
649
 Moreover, other 
stakeholders such as employees, who are actually already protected by contractual and legal 
devices, could use the data, although the shareholders, who should be protected by the 
disclosure, are not “outraged”. High individual remuneration of managers could be published 
in the media when unpopular business decisions such as redundancies were on the agenda.
650
 
Politicians could be called onto to intervene.
651
 Individualised disclosure would not improve 
control and facilitate rational investment decisions but would encourage envy and resentments 
                                                         
642 MH Kramarsch (fn.537529), 113. 
643 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 107.  
644 ibid., 107.  
645 M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), m.no.278. 
646 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (fn.611603), 3. 
647 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 107. 
648 ibid., 107. 
649 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 5. 
650 MB Masling (fn.550542), 213. 
651 R Bahar (fn.533525), 40. 
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in society.
652
 Thus, it is sometimes argued that disclosure of the accumulated remuneration of 
the management board as a group would be sufficient. This may also be supported by the fact 
that the management board is a collegiate organ. The “team’s” performance rather than the 
individual’s performance should matter, making individualised disclosure unnecessary.653 A 
comparison to the approval of actions (Entlastung) of organs is used as a systematic argument 
to support this view.
654
 The decision on Entlastung is generally taken for the organ as a 
whole, not for individual members. Therefore, even with respect to remuneration, the 
management board should be treated as one. 
Proponents, however, suggest that the disclosure of detailed, individualised information is 
indispensable. It is said that shareholders as the “principals” must have a right to know what 
the managers, as their “agents” are paid.655 The “informational value” of the individualised 
disclosure for shareholders and the capital market lies in the opportunity to assess whether the 
remuneration is adequate in relation to the manager’s performance (also compared with his 
peers)
656
 and to the manager’s tasks.657 Without sound information, shareholders will neither 
be able to act nor will they notice excessive remuneration in the first place. 
Additional information is supposed to increase transparency.
658
 Investors and shareholders 
can retrace the incentive structures, understand the pay-performance-link and gain a specific 
insight into the company’s expenditures. Transparency prevents misuse of companies’ funds 
and limits existing misuse.
659
 It reduces agency costs. This preventive function protects 
shareholders and creates trust into the capital market which in turn is essential for its 
functioning.
660
 The capital market is dependent on transparency.
661
 With more data on 
remuneration and especially on the pay-performance-link at hand, present and potential 
shareholders can make better informed transaction and investment decisions.
662
  
Furthermore, shareholders need extensive information if they intend to bring an action for 
damages against the supervisory board due to agreeing on excessively high management 
                                                         
652 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (fn.611603), 3. 
653 H Ziemons, “Angemessene Vorstandsvergütung und Change of Control Klauseln” in T Baums et al (eds) Festschrift für 
Ulrich Huber zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Mohr/Siebeck, 2006) 1035-1048, 1036; K Nieding, E Sünner (fn.612604), 39. 
654 T Strieder, “Anmerkungen zur individualisierten Angabe von Vorstandsbezügen im Anhang von Jahresabschlüssen” 
(2005) DB, 957-960, 958. 
655 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, “Stellungnahme vom 27.04.2005 zum Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes über die 
Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen- VorstOG-RefE” (2005), 3. 
656 K Nieding, E Sünner (fn.612604), 39. 
657 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 5. 
658 G Spindler, “§ 87”, in W Goette, M Habersack (fn.135128), m.no.120. 
659 MB Masling (fn.550542), 218. 
660 ibid., 218. 
661 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 105. 
662 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 10. 
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board remuneration. Individualised disclosure would facilitate assessing whether the 
remuneration is adequate in case the shareholders suspect that it is not.  
All in all, there is a demand and use for additional information. The shareholders benefit from 
it e.g. by having the necessary information to better monitor the supervisory board. The 
supervisory board and the company as a whole benefit from (individualised) disclosure 
because they can signal integrity.
663
 Then again, the control by shareholders which the 
additional information shall foster is not as effective as it should be.
664
 Firstly, the financial 
incentive is frequently insufficiently high due to executive remuneration being a relatively 
small portion of the companies’ results.665 Secondly, there are the usual problems for 
shareholders such as rational apathy and free-riders which keep shareholders from reacting. 
1.3. Side-Effects of Disclosure 
Despite the interest of investors in the additional information provided by individualised 
disclosure it should be examined whether it could have negative consequences. 
There could be a legitimate interest of the company not to disclose its managers’ 
remuneration in an individualised and detailed manner. For example the cooperation and the 
“team spirit” on the management board, which is a collegiate organ, could be disturbed.666 
Furthermore, the company may prefer not to disclose objectively well-founded differences in 
remuneration between managers, also in the interest of the respective managers.
667
 
Another line of criticism concerns the potentially negative consequences of individualised 
disclosure on the general level of remuneration of management board members. Some 
commentators argue that individualised disclosure would lead to a “ratcheting up” effect.668 
Others see a convergence and a levelling out of executive remuneration.
669
 Individualised 
disclosure would limit the margin for individual agreements and differentiation within the 
management board.
670
 Common to the arguments is that they believe that more detailed and 
individualised disclosure is potentially counterproductive, causing higher costs for the 
                                                         
663 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (fn.611603), 1. 
664 cf. G Thüsing, “Angemessene Vorstandsvergütung durch Transparenz” (fn.345340), 1. 
665 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1390. 
666 A Mengel, J Dissen, “Executive Compensation in the United States and in Germany” (2003) 28(2) DAJV Newsletter – 
Zeitschrift der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Juristenvereinigung, 82-84, 84. 
667 C Aha, “Ausgewählte Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten bei Aktienoptionsplänen” (1997) BB, 2225-2228, 2227; G Thüsing, 
“iustum pretium”(fn.225220), 497.  
668 cf. only G Thüsing, “iustum pretium”(fn.225220), 497; M Kort, “§ 87” (fn.135128), m.no.278. 
669 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (fn.611603), 6. 
670 HJ Mertens, A Cahn, “§ 87”(fn.193188), m.no.88. 
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companies. It would not necessarily lead to reservation regarding the absolute amount of 
remuneration.
671
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the legislator, by introducing mandatory individualised 
disclosure had the effect of “quasi disfranchising” the shareholders as they would lose the 
opportunity to appreciate the varying approaches to transparency of different companies if 
there were a statutory “standardisation”.672 Shareholders would lose the opportunity to hold, 
buy or sell the shares of companies with low transparency.
673
 It could be suspected that 
individualised disclosure would only be an “intermediate step” leading to ever increasing 
requirements of detailing, including for example the precise reasons and motives for the exact 
remuneration of a certain manager.
674
 
Proponents oppose allegations
675
 that individualised disclosure changed the “distribution of 
powers” within the company especially with regard to remuneration setting. They emphasise 
that the monitoring of the management board and of the supervisory board by the 
shareholders have to be distinguished.
676
 Individualised disclosure improves the control of the 
supervisory board by the shareholders. Setting the management board’s remuneration remains 
the supervisory board’s exclusive task. Hence, individualised disclosure strengthens and 
protects shareholders since it makes it possible for them to control the supervisory board. 
Detailed, individualised disclosure is also a confidence-building measure for shareholders and 
potential investors.
677
 Incentives and motivations of the individual managers become more 
evident if the shareholders can see how the different remuneration components are weighted. 
Similarly, present and potential shareholders can monitor the current level of remuneration on 
the market and exercise control by making investment decisions.
678
 
Individualised disclosure may be of interest or even an incentive for present and potential 
managers.
679
 It means that they are able to assess exactly the remuneration in a certain 
business sector, the relation to other managers including the “CEO” and the weighting of 
different remuneration components. This may increase the competition for excellent 
                                                         
671 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 107. 
672 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (fn.611603), 1. 
673 ibid., 1. 
674 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (fn.666658), 3. 
675 R Menke, W Porsch, “Verfassungs- und europarechtliche Grenzen eines Gesetzes zur individualisierten 
Zwangsoffenlegung der Vergütung der Vorstandsmitglieder” (2004) BB, 2533-2537, 2535; PM Wiesner “Neue Brüsseler 
Impulse für Corporate Governance und Gesellschaftsrecht” (2003) BB, 213-217, 214. 
676 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
677 MB Masling (fn.550542), 226. 
678 ibid., 226. 
679 M Hoffmann-Becking, “Vorstandsvergütung nach Mannesmann” (2006) NZG, 127-131, 128. 
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management personnel between companies as the managers have an overview over the 
various remuneration systems.
680
 
Rather than leading to increased general level of remuneration, it is argued that individual 
disclosure would have a positive, preventive effect. Firstly, being named individually may 
discourage managers from demanding excessively high remuneration,
681
 potentially leading to 
a lower general level of executive remuneration.
682
 Secondly, the levels of executive 
remuneration may also be curbed due to the supervisory board’s anticipation of improved and 
more substantiated monitoring by the shareholders.
 683
 
Finally, comparatively lower transparency standards in Germany could lead to disadvantages 
for German companies on the capital markets. Increased transparency would lead to more 
professional systems of remuneration and more investor confidence.
684
 Germany could not 
ignore international and European developments regarding disclosure.
685
 
To summarise, individualised disclosure has both negative and positive “side effects”.  
1.4. Constitutional Concerns 
Critics have suggested that individualised disclosure is unconstitutional or that its 
constitutionality is at least questionable.
686
 This claim should briefly be examined.  
Part of the general right to the protection of the personality (allgemeines 
Persönlichkeitsrecht), Art 2 (1) in conjunction with Art 1 (1) Grundgesetz, is the right to 
determine disclosure of personal information (Recht auf informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung).
687
 The individual has the right to decide for itself about the disclosure and 
use of its personal data, even if they do not belong directly to the individual’s private life 
(Intim- oder Privatsphäre).
688
 The protected data includes information on the individual’s 
economic circumstances,
689
 hence, also information on the amount and composition of the 
individual’s remuneration.690 Critics see this right infringed. Yet the right is not granted 
without potential restrictions.
691
  
                                                         
680 MB Masling (fn.550542), 226. 
681 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612. 
682 cf. M Hoffmann-Becking, “Rechtliche Anmerkungen zur Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratsvergütung” (fn.595587), 173. 
683 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 305. 
684 MH Kramarsch (fn.537529), 114. 
685 cf. Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (fn.666658), 3. 
686 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 109; other opinion: MB Masling (fn.550542), 277. 
687 BVerfGE 65, 1, 45ff.  = (1984) NJW, 419. 
688 ibid., 419. 
689 BVerfGE 77, 121, 125. 
690 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 106. 
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Critics claim that there is no legitimate reason which would justify individualised 
disclosure.
692
 In contrast to that, the proponents of individualised disclosure argue that the 
high profile of management board members especially “CEOs” justify it;693 the right to 
protect personal information could not prevail over the legitimate interest in information by 
the shareholders and the general public.
694
 They claim that anyone in such a prominent 
position with such an exceptional income has to accept publicity.
695
 Hence, some argue that, 
although individualised disclosure is an infringement of the Recht auf informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung, the measure that infringes it pursues a legitimate aim, is suitable to achieve 
this aim, and that there is no less intrusive alternative and that the individualised disclosure is 
adequate.
696
 Both the owners’ interest in receiving additional information and the general 
interest in a functioning capital market by ensuring highest possible transparency deserve 
priority.
697
 Most commentators regard the rules on individualised disclosure as constitutional.
 
698
 
1.5. Opinion 
The wide array of arguments on the topic of individualised disclosure that can be found in the 
literature illustrates how controversial this subject is. The merits of these arguments will be 
considered. 
One can agree with the critics that the disclosure of individualised and classified information 
on executive remuneration is not necessarily desirable. However, precise information is 
essential in order to ensure transparency. Transparency in turn is indispensable for a well-
functioning capital market. Its absence can cause costs and financial damage to the company 
and can negatively affect the company’s share value. The more data is available about a 
company and its internal processes the better informed investment decisions can be. However, 
additional information must not be presented in a way that the investor loses track. The 
opposite of the desired effect could ensue. In order to ensure transparency, disclosure has to 
fulfil two conditions. First, it must provide extensive information. Second, it must do this in a 
clear, structured and preferably standardised manner. To summarise, individualised disclosure 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
691 BVerfGE 65, 1, 45ff. = (1984) NJW, 419. 
692 S Augsberg (fn.545537), 106. 
693 MH Kramarsch (fn.537529), 113. 
694 KP Martens (fn.575567), 150. 
695 ibid., 150. 
696 MB Masling (fn.550542), 277. 
697 ibid., 277. 
698 Cf. U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 87 m.no.14; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” 
(fn.542534), 1614; C Seibt, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.24; G Spindler, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der 
Vorstandsvergütungen - VorstOG” (fn.647639), 691; opposing view: S Augsberg (fn.545537), 105ff.; R Menke, W Porsch, 
(fn.686678), 2533ff. 
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is desirable and indeed important as long as the data is presented in a clear and informative 
manner. Otherwise its potentially positive effects may be impeded.  
Still, even if the data is presented in a clear and informative manner, which would allow 
rational and well-informed transaction decisions by investors in theory, the control by 
investors could still remain insufficient in practice. Even with individualised information at 
hand it would be difficult for shareholders to assess the performance of the individual 
manager.
699
 Moreover, management remuneration usually is a relatively small amount 
compared with the company’s overall profits and losses. A recent empirical study shows that 
for DAX30-companies remuneration of management board members amounted to 1.48% of 
the profit and 0.58% of the total personnel expenditure.
700
 Consequently, possible losses or 
gains for shareholders, if they take action, are small. The financial incentive for the individual 
shareholder to act is limited.  
The argument that disclosure of the accumulated remuneration of all management board 
members as a group would suffice is unsound. Usually this argument is substantiated as 
follows: (1) A parallel to the approval of actions (Entlastung) which is generally for the 
management board as a group and not for each member individually is drawn. (2) 
Shareholders and potential investors are not interested in individualised disclosure.  
(1) The comparison with the approval of actions of an organ is not convincing. There is a 
significant difference between the approval of actions and the disclosure of remuneration with 
regard to the financial consequences. Executive remuneration reduces the company’s profits. 
A decision on the approval of actions in contrast does not have financial consequences as the 
decision does not preclude claims for damages, § 120 (2) sentence 2 AktG. Drawing a parallel 
does not seem justified. 
(2) The claim that present and potential shareholders were not interested in the additional 
information does not hold water. Critics quote a survey conducted prior to the introduction of 
the VorstOG in support of their argument.
701
 According to this survey 84% of the interviewed 
institutional investors regarded “information policy” as an important aspect of corporate 
governance but only 35% of them thought the same of the “transparency of executive 
remuneration”.702 Whether the survey was representative may remain an open question. Still, 
it has to be noted that over a third of the investors regarded transparency of executive 
                                                         
699 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (fn.666658), 5. 
700 Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapiere, DSW-Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2009 <http://www.dsw-info.de/DSW-
Studie-zur-Vorstandsvergue.1577.0.htm> accessed 18 September 2014. 
701 ibid. 
702 ibid. 
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remuneration as indeed important. Other studies showed that the capital market appreciates 
(voluntary) individualised disclosure.
703
 Also the pressure by the capital market not to opt out 
of individualised disclosure illustrates appreciation of additional information and 
transparency.
704
 All of this indicates that detailed, individualised disclosure is of interest to 
investors. 
Furthermore, individualised disclosure does away with the unfair advantage of big 
shareholders which have always had access to detailed information anyway and small private 
investors which have access to this information now as well. This is another facet of the 
regulation’s aim of shareholder protection. 
Mandatory individualised disclosure, according to some critics, would prevent investors from 
deliberately choosing companies with lower transparency. The reasons that an investor may 
decide to buy or hold shares in a company which prefers not to disclose information and to be 
less than transparent may vary. It could be that transparency is regarded as less important due 
to confidence in the responsible persons. Similarly, other aspects of the company or 
particularly high dividends may outweigh the lack of transparency in the investor’s eyes. 
Mandatory individualised disclosure may restrict flexibility in this sense. However, weighing 
this flexibility against the protection of shareholders, the improved control of the supervisory 
board by the shareholders and improved information of the capital market shows that priority 
should be given to the latter. 
It has been claimed that individualised disclosure would lead to envy and resentment in 
society and misuse of the data in the public debate. Whilst a look into newspapers may 
support this view initially, the question arises whether the consequences are really purely 
negative. Envy, for example, could have the positive side-effect of being a corrective to greed 
in a market economy.
705
 Another factor limiting greed could be the parsimony of others e.g. 
the shareholders. Allowing greed whilst not allowing envy and parsimony would be to 
eliminate essential factors of the economic system.
706
 The possibility of resentments in 
society and misuse of data are not desirable. However, the possibility of public “outrage” as a 
constraint of executive remuneration is of great importance. 
A central aspect of the debate is the effect that individualised disclosure has on the particular 
role the supervisory board has in German public companies. Setting management 
                                                         
703 A Bassen, M Kleinschmidt, S Prigge and C Zöllner (fn.613605), 388ff. 
704 Since 2010 none of the companies in the DAX30 opted out. 
705 H Hirte, “Die Publizität von Organvergütungen zwischen Transparenz und Voyeurismus” in TE Abeltshauser, P Buck 
(eds) Corporate Governance – Tagungsband der 1. Hannoveraner Unternehmensrechtstage (Heymanns, 2004), 75-93, 90. 
706 ibid., 90. 
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remuneration and assessing its adequacy is an exclusive competence of the supervisory board. 
Arguing that individualised disclosure is moving competences regarding remuneration from 
the supervisory board to the general meeting in a way which is inconsistent with the 
established system is not persuasive. A distinction has to be made between monitoring the 
supervisory board and monitoring the adequacy of remuneration vis-à-vis the management 
board. Individual disclosure does not alter the powers in a public company since it does not 
make the general meeting competent to set management board remuneration and decide what 
is adequate. Rather it merely facilitates the general meeting’s received task of scrutinising the 
supervisory board’s work. 
Some critics argued that individualised disclosure would disturb the “team spirit” on the 
collegiate management board. However, it seems unrealistic to assume that the managers do 
not have an idea of their colleagues’ remuneration. It remains unclear why knowing the 
details should change the relationship between the members. Rather it may increase the 
competition for excellent management personnel between companies and be an incentive for 
present and potential managers as they are able to assess exactly the remuneration in a certain 
sector, the relation to other managers and the weighting of different remuneration 
components. 
This leads to another contentious aspect. The effects of individualised disclosure of executive 
remuneration on the general level of executive remuneration in practice seem unclear. 
Experiences in other jurisdictions that introduced this instrument earlier could not prove 
positive effects on the remuneration level. To what extent the steady rise in executive 
remuneration ‒ e.g. in the US, despite the introduction of individualised disclosure ‒ can be 
attributed to other factors such as the increase of share option schemes or the long-lasting bull 
market following the introduction is not proven. However, empirical evidence from Germany 
also shows increasing remuneration of management board members despite the introduction 
of the individualised disclosure requirement.
707
 Thus, despite their theoretical merits the 
practical effectiveness of the present rules with regard to the level of executive remuneration 
is unclear.  
Finally, mandatory individualised disclosure has been called unconstitutional. A detailed 
analysis of the question of constitutionality would exceed the scope of this work. It suffices to 
                                                         
707 J Schwalbach (fn.114107). Feldfunktion geändert
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say that the prevailing opinion in the literature
708
 considers, with good arguments, the 
individualised disclosure to be constitutional. 
To summarise, the arguments against individualised disclosure cannot outweigh the positive 
aspects. Nevertheless, doubts regarding its positive effects on the general level of executive 
remuneration in practice tarnish the image. 
2. Evaluation of the VorstOG 
After examining the advantages and disadvantages of individualised disclosure in general, the 
focus will shift to the strengths and weaknesses of the VorstOG, its ability to fulfil the 
objectives set and consequently to improve remuneration governance. 
2.1. Ability to Achieve the Objectives  
In the VorstOG’s travaux préparatoires the legislator names several objectives of 
individualised disclosure. The suitability of the VorstOG to achieve them and consequently to 
improve remuneration governance has been doubted.
709
 The question arises whether the 
VorstOG reform was merely a “placebo”710 to calm voters or whether disclosure is an 
effective tool, in conjunction with policing, for controlling managers’ remuneration. In order 
to answer this question, the regulation’s ability to achieve its previously mentioned objectives 
will be examined. 
2.1.1 Monitoring  
The German disclosure regulation’s main objective is facilitating the shareholders’ 
assessment whether the supervisory board has set adequate remuneration for the managers.
711
 
The regulation enables shareholders to access a wide range of information on management 
remuneration. The absolute amount and the composition of the remuneration as well as links 
between pay and performance can be assessed for every individual management board 
member. In theory, this improves transparency significantly and consequently also the 
shareholders’ ability to assess whether the remuneration is adequate in the meaning of 
§ 87 AktG. In practice, however, the problem that the presentation of the disclosed 
                                                         
708 cf. U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 87 m.no.14; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” 
(fn.542534), 1614; C Seibt, “§87” (fn.190185), m.no.24; G Spindler, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der 
Vorstandsvergütungen - VorstOG” (fn.647639), 691; G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der 
Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1397; opposing view: S Augsberg (fn.545537), 105ff.; R Menke, W Porsch 
(fn.686678), 2533ff. 
709 D Leuering, S Simon, (fn.624616), 945. 
710 cf. G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1389. 
711 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 5. 
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information is not standardised persists. The absence of standardisation hampers the 
shareholders’ effective monitoring of the supervisory board’s setting of management 
remuneration as unclear or confusing disclosure, which differs from company to company and 
sometimes even from financial year to financial year, impedes the information’s clarity and 
comparability. 
Regarding the monitoring function of disclosure and the empowerment of shareholders to 
assess the remuneration’s adequacy the present regulation is a step in the right direction. 
However, in order to achieve the objective in practice, a further step would be needed. Instead 
of merely setting out which information has to be disclosed the regulation should also 
precisely describe how the information has to be presented. Standardisation seems indicated 
as it could lead to greater clarity and comparability, which in turn would facilitate it for 
shareholders to hold the supervisory board to account.  
2.1.2 Shareholder Information and Protection 
The above-said also applies to the second objective, namely the information and protection of 
shareholders. Again, the key issue is the clarity and usability of the disclosed information. 
Shareholders have to be able to make use of this information. Otherwise, the disclosure does 
not decrease the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Without 
information shareholders cannot protect themselves against managerial rent-extraction. 
Companies that disclose in a clear manner allow insight into the structure of management 
board remuneration and, thus, the motivation of managers. This is also important for assessing 
risks and making rational investment decisions.  
Thus, regarding shareholder information and protection the VorstOG was merely a step in the 
right direction.  
2.1.3 Prevention 
The most critical point is the measure’s ability to prevent an increase in remuneration. This 
objective is not explicitly mentioned by the legislator. A reason for this could be that the 
legislator already doubted the measure’s success in this respect. In theory, the objective can 
be achieved by naming managers and thereby discouraging them from demanding higher 
remuneration. Also, supervisory boards could be more reluctant to grant higher remuneration 
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if they anticipate better informed monitoring by the shareholders. In practice, a corresponding 
effect remains yet to be proven.
712
 The remuneration continues to rise. 
To summarise, the legislator has to some extent achieved the objectives set out in the travaux 
préparatoires to the VorstOG. However, in order to enable shareholders to effectively 
monitor the remuneration setting by the supervisory board the disclosed information should 
be clearer and more standardised.
713
 This would also lead to improved shareholder protection 
and it could even lead to lower management remuneration levels due to better monitoring of 
the supervisory board actions. 
2.2. Problems of the Current Regulation 
A detailed examination of the provisions on individualised disclosure reveals several 
problems and shortcomings.  
2.2.1. Opt-Out 
The first contentious issue is the possibility of opting out. It was heralded in the travaux 
préparatoires as a “fascinating basic idea”714. The opposition in the Bundestag had suggested 
an “opt-in” solution instead, meaning the general meeting could decide to disclose the 
remuneration e.g. with a simple majority.
715
 The opt-in was rejected as it was considered to be 
very disadvantageous for minority shareholders. 
However, is the option of an “opt-out” indeed the best solution? An opt-in or an eschewal of 
any exemption could be preferable.  
In favour of the opt-out it could be argued that it should be left to the shareholders whether 
they want to make detailed information on management remuneration available to the capital 
market or whether they are willing to accept losses in share value following a negative 
decision.
716
 The main objective of the individualised disclosure requirement is the protection 
of shareholders which consequently has to be dispensable if the shareholders wish it to be 
so.
717
  
                                                         
712 However positive findings by C Lazar, Managementvergütung, Corporate Governance und Unternehmensperformance 
(Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2007), 165. 
713 Similar S Rapp, P Schaller, M Wolff, “Struktur und Höhe von Vorstandsbezügen in deutschen Prime-Standard-
Unternehmen” (2009) AG, R156-R160, R156ff. 
714 Äußerungen im Rechtsausschuss, BT-Drucks. 15/5860, 14ff. 
715 Draft Act “Entwurf eines ersten Gesetzes zur Stärkung der Eigentümerrechte einer Aktiengesellschaft”, BT-Drucks. 
15/5582. 
716 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 307. 
717 cf. Begründung Regierungsentwurf, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 11; H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” 
(2005) 30 DB, 1611-1617, 1614. 
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For the opt-in it could be argued that many shareholders lack interest in the disclosure. They 
should not have to prove their lack of interest by voting for a respective decision.
718
 If the 
shareholders had to prove their interest (i.e. opt in) it would be ensured that they are indeed 
interested.
719
 This argues against individual disclosure as a default rule. However, the opt-in 
alternative would ignore the fact that, in general meetings of public companies with widely 
dispersed shareholdings, the proposals which are not made directly or indirectly by the 
management board or the supervisory board are hardly ever voted for by the majority.
720
 Due 
to this widely described problem
721
 and in the interest of minority protection the opt-out 
seems more suitable in practice. 
Should the opt-out option, hence, be maintained? There remain doubts regarding the 
derogation from individualised disclosure which is unique in an international comparison.
722
 
The lack of examples in other legal orders is not surprising since regarding the information of 
the capital market a mandatory rule without the possibility for the shareholders to decide to 
derogate is more convincing.
723
 Entering the capital market entails duties regarding publicity 
that should, also in the interest of the company itself, not be to the present shareholders’ 
disposition.
724
 Moreover, the opt-out option prevents companies from guaranteeing potential 
investors that in the future, after they have invested, the interests of shareholders will remain 
protected and the supervisory board will remain well-monitored.
725
 Especially minority 
shareholders would be better protected without the opt-out option. Some argued that the opt-
out is merely a pseudo-alternative as the required quorum of a three-quarter majority is hardly 
attainable in companies with widely dispersed shareholdings.
726
 Admittedly, the hurdles are 
high but not insurmountable. It is the same quorum as for changes to the company’s articles, § 
179 (2) AktG, or the dismissal of supervisory board members, § 103 (1) AktG. 
The possibility to derogate from the individualised disclosure duty counteracts the aims of 
increased transparency and improved shareholder protection. It has probably been introduced 
as a compromise to dispel doubts as to the individualised disclosure’s constitutionality.727 
However, this cannot justify the existence of this option. It could only be accepted if 
                                                         
718 Deutsches Aktieninstitut (fn.611603), 8. 
719 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (fn.666658), 12. 
720 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 304. 
721 cf. T Baums, Verhandlungen des 63. Deutschen Juristentags Leipzig 2000 – Teil F (CH Beck, 2000), F 24.  
722 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1394; H Fleischer, “Das 
Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (2005) 30 Der Betrieb, 1611-1617, 1614. 
723 H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1614. 
724 T Baums, “Zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.362357), 307ff. 
725 ibid., 306. 
726 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (fn.666658), 12. 
727 cf. BT-Drucks. 15/5860, 17. 
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
 127 
 
flexibility for the shareholders was considered to be more important than the information of 
the capital market. This seems doubious regarding a listed-company-specific – i.e. capital-
market-focussed – rule. This view can be substantiated by a look at the current practice. The 
opt-out option’s practical significance is fading especially as concerns DAX30 companies.728 
Nowadays none of them opts out. This shows the scepticism of investors regarding this 
option. In the MDAX – which covers the 50 biggest companies with regard to market 
capitalisation and stock market turnover in classic sectors after the ones in the DAX30 – 13 
companies opted out in 2010
729
 and 10 in 2012.
730
 The number is still high but the trend of 
decreasing opt-outs exists in the MDAX as well.  
In order to achieve standardisation, comparability, increased transparency and better 
shareholder protection, all listed companies should disclose information on remuneration in 
the same (individualised) manner.  
2.2.2. Contradictory Actions of the Legislator 
Some commentators have emphasised that the introduction of mandatory individualised 
disclosure contradicts an amendment of the HGB in 1994. § 286 (4) HGB 1994 stated that the 
disclosure of the remuneration of management or supervisory board members could be 
omitted if due to this information the individual remuneration of a member of these organs 
was identifiable.
731
 The 1994 amendment was supposed to ensure the protection of the organ 
members’ personal data.732 The provision applied to all public companies 
(Kapitalgesellschaften) and was effective externally vis-à-vis the public but not internally vis-
à-vis the shareholders.
733
 The right to information, § 131, remained unaffected.
734
 
The VorstOG provisions contradict the earlier rules. The legislator clearly changed its 
assessment of individualised disclosure. However, this is not unusual and is described in 
German legal methodology as “Wandel der Normsituation”735 meaning a change in the factual 
                                                         
728 In 2005, when the disclosure was still voluntary, nine companies in the DAX30 did not disclose in an individualised 
manner. In 2006 after the introduction of the new rules only one company decided to opt out. In 2008 and 2009 two 
companies did so and in 2010-2013 no company in the Dax30 opted out; cf. Vorstandsvergütungsstudien 2006-2013 
<http://www.dsw-info.de> accessed 18 September 2014. 
729 Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapiere, DSW-Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2011 <http://www.dsw-info.de/DSW-
Studie-zur-Vorstandsvergue-201.1798.0.html> accessed 18 September 2014. 
730 Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapiere, DSW-Studie zur Vorstandsvergütung 2013 < http://www.dsw-
info.de/Studien.122.0.html?id=1926> accessed 18 September 2014. 
731 S Augsberg, (fn.545537), 107. 
732 cf. R Marsch-Barner (fn.599591), 407; R Menke, W Porsch (fn.686678), 2536. 
733 MB Masling (fn.550542), 208. 
734 OLG Düsseldorf, Beschluß vom 26.06.1997 - 19 W 2/97, (1997) DB, 1609-1610, 1609. 
735 K Larenz, W Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (3rd ed, Springer, 1995), 170ff. 
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situation which forms the basis for a norm.
736
 Correspondingly, the travaux préparatoires 
state that the understanding of transparency and information on the capital market has 
changed over the preceding decade and that more information and transparency is 
demanded.
737
 Corresponding rules in the self-regulatory GCGC may be used as evidence for 
this. Moreover, a change in the factual situation seems to exist in that concerns in society 
regarding publication of personal data seem to have decreased and technological 
developments have led to more information being available and also more information and 
transparency being demanded.  
Furthermore, the German legislator corrected an earlier “error”.738 The introduction of 
§ 286 (4) HGB 1994 was based on a directive
739
 of the European Council.
740
 This directive 
was aimed at protecting the personality rights of organs of small and medium-sized 
companies.
741
 AGs are considered to be “big”742. The German legislator when transposing the 
directive into national law extended its applicability also to big companies. However, the 
directive did not contain a provision permitting this extension. Thus, the VorstOG, by 
changing § 286 (4) HGB, also aimed at returning to the actual European provision.
743
  
The legislator’s actions are contradictory. However, the change can be justified. 
2.2.3. Sanctions 
Listed companies that do adhere to the individualised disclose requirement without having 
opted out risk being fined according to § 334 (1) lit d, (2) lit f, (3) HGB. The fine can be up to 
€50,000. At first glance this may seem like an effective incentive to disclose correctly. 
However, the provision concerns big listed companies for whom the fine is merely “petty 
cash”744. Arguably, the market will punish non-compliance with the disclosure rules. Still, in 
order to protect minority shareholders more effective sanctions should be considered.  
Moreover, the legislator should clarify the nature of the sanctions for omitting reporting the 
remuneration system’s main features in the management report, § 289 (2) no 5 HGB.  
                                                         
736 Critical: S Augsberg (fn.545537), 107. 
737 BegrRegE, BR-Drucks. 398/05, 11. 
738 MB Masling (fn.550542), 210. 
739 Council Directive (90/604/EEC) OJ L 317, 16.11.1990, 57-59. 
740 BT-Drucks. 12/7912, 19. 
741 OJ L 317, 16.11.1990, 59. 
742 cf. § 267 (3) sentence 2 HGB. 
743 MB Masling (fn.550542), 211. 
744 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1394. 
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2.2.4. Lacking Clarity of “Main Features” (“Grundzüge”) 
The provision that the “main features” (“Grundzüge”) of the remuneration system shall be 
published in the management report (Lagebericht), § 289 (2) no 5 HGB, lacks meaningfulness 
and is arguably the “weakest part of the act” 745. There is no indication in the act of how to 
distinguish between “main features” and details. 
What are the remuneration system’s “main features”? Inspiration could be drawn from the 
legal literature
746
, the respective EU Recommendation
747
 or even similar provisions in other 
countries
748
. The suggestions in the literature vary, but generally the remuneration system’s 
“main features” include: information on the remuneration structure, the individual 
performance parameters, information on boni and non-cash benefits, principles of the pension 
scheme and principles of additional benefits at joining or termination.
749
 According to the EU 
Recommendation a remuneration report should contain “(a) explanation of the relative 
importance of the variable and non-variable components of directors' remuneration; (b) 
sufficient information on the performance criteria on which any entitlement to share options, 
shares or variable components of remuneration is based; (c) sufficient information on the 
linkage between remuneration and performance; (d) the main parameters and rationale for any 
annual bonus scheme and any other non-cash benefits; (e) a description of the main 
characteristics of supplementary pension or early retirement schemes for directors”.750  
Hence, it is possible to fill the term with a meaning. Still, it would be preferable if the 
provision itself was more precise. 
2.2.5. Systematic Position 
The positioning of the disclosure rules in the HGB’s section on accounting is not entirely 
convincing, either. § 285 HGB covers rules on accounting especially annual accounts and its 
notes. Thus far the systematic position is acceptable. However, it also allocates to the general 
meeting the power to opt out of individualised disclosure. The allocation of powers in the 
company should be made in the relevant code, namely the AktG. It would have been 
                                                         
745 ibid., 1393. 
746 e.g. MH Kramarsch, (fn.537529), 114. 
747 Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 29.12.2004, OJ (2004) no L 385, 55. 
748 e.g. US; informative: N Knutt, “Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal Thyself” (2005) 47 
Arizona Law Review, 493-517. 
749 cf. H Merkt in KJ Hopt, A Baumbach (eds) (fn.648640), § 289 m.no.2; H Wiedmann, “§ 289” in CT Ebenroth, K 
Boujong, D Joost, L Strohn, Handelsgesetzbuch (2nd ed, Vahlen, 2008), m.no.38. 
750 Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 29.12.2004, OJ (2004) no L 385, 55, para 3.3. 
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preferable to amend § 119 (1) or § 174 AktG in this sense.
751
 Yet, as mentioned before, the 
entire opt-out option is unconvincing. 
2.2.6. Payments from and to Third Parties  
Payments management board members receive from third parties have to be disclosed. This 
covers for example payments by the parent company to the manager of a subsidiary. This 
provision has to be welcomed as it prevents “hidden” payments via a third party. However, 
payments from the company or any other party to a third party e.g. the manager’s spouse do 
not have to be disclosed.
752
 
This could be used to circumvent the disclosure requirements. Yet, without respective 
regulation, it is unclear how to deal with this circumvention. A guideline could be established 
that it has to be assessed for whether the third party has provided services worth the paid 
amount.
753
 If not it has to be assumed it is (hidden) remuneration of the manager. The present 
provision lacks explicit rules on this issue. In the interest of legal clarity and legal certainty 
this should be changed. 
2.2.7. Classification  
The remuneration has to be classified in three groups, namely remuneration that is 
independent of success, remuneration that depends upon success and remuneration with long-
term incentives, § 285 no 9 sentence 5 HGB. This classification was introduced by the 2002 
GCGC,
754
 and has proven to be useful. Having only three categories is practicable, and the 
information is concise and should be clearer than more fragmented and broken down forms of 
presentation.  
2.2.8. Disclosure of Remuneration Consultants 
Supervisory boards frequently use the services of remuneration consultants as remuneration 
agreements have become increasingly complex and the requirements have risen. This offers, 
on the one hand, the advantage of a professionalisation of both remuneration systems and the 
supervisory board’s work.755 On the other hand, this development may be seen critically,  
since the identity of the used remuneration consultants could remain opaque and 
                                                         
751 Similar: BDI (fn.666658), 12. 
752 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen” (fn.586578), 1393. 
753 ibid., 1393. 
754 4.2.4 GCGC. 
755 MH Kramarsch (fn.537529), 115. 
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correspondingly possible conflicts of interest would remain undetected.
756
 An identification 
by name of the remuneration consultants involved and a disclosure of any other contracts 
between the consultant and the company would be a remedy. Despite European 
recommendations in this direction and respective rules in other jurisdictions,
757
 the present 
German disclosure regime does not contain such a requirement. 
2.3. Summary 
Most of the objectives the legislator mentioned in the travaux préparatoires as reasons for the 
introduction of individualised disclosure of management board members’ remuneration can – 
to varying degrees – be achieved with the present regulation. However, the effectiveness 
regarding preventing further increase in remuneration is doubtful. When closely examined the 
present disclosure provisions reveal several problems that need to be addressed by the 
legislator. 
IV. Interim Findings: Disclosure in Germany 
So far, the legislator has mainly determined what has to be disclosed but has hardly made any 
provisions on how it should be disclosed. Therefore, the levels of transparency with regard to 
management board members’ remuneration differ widely between companies.  
Further standardisation of the way how disclosed information has to be presented would allow 
better comparability between companies. Standardised presentation of key information in the 
form of tables and charts instead of solely continuous texts would be desirable. Firstly, it 
would facilitate finding the information sought. Secondly, it would hamper the attempt to 
“hide” information in long continuous texts.758 A step in the right direction is the amended 
para 4.2.5. GCGC 2013 that suggests standardisation. Hard law, however, would be more 
effective in ensuring standardisation.  
Transparency is indispensable for a well-functioning capital market and investors are 
interested in additional, more detailed information on managers’ remuneration. The current 
rules on mandatory individualised disclosure have been a step in the right direction. The 
legislator should try to eradicate existing flaws. To some extent the market has already done 
so, for example regarding the opt-out which is no longer used by DAX30-companies. In other 
                                                         
756 H Fleischer, “Aufsichtsratsverantwortlichkeit für die Vorstandsvergütung und Unabhängigkeit der Vergütungsberater” 
(2010) BB, 67-74, 73. 
757 e.g. US and UK. 
758 According to the abovementioned DSW study the reports on the “main features” of the remuneration system varied 
between one page in some companies and sixteen in others. 
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fields e.g. the reporting on the remuneration systems’ main features the legislator should be 
more precise. Clear requirements and standardisation could lead to improved transparency.  
Still, it has to be borne in mind that even ideal disclosure still depends on effective policing – 
for which in turn it is a prerequisite. This explains to some extent the doubts whether 
(individualised) disclosure actually prevents excessive remuneration in practice. Disclosure is 
effective if it informs investors and, thereby, enables monitoring and prevention. However, it 
is the monitoring that impacts on remuneration rather than disclosure itself. 
Altogether, regarding the second hypothesis the preceding section supports the view that in 
Germany enhanced, standardised disclosure is desirable. 
 133 
 
C. United Kingdom 
The UK was among the first jurisdictions to introduce mandatory individualised disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration.759 Still, there are concerns that companies do not provide sufficiently 
clear information on remuneration, and in particular on the pay-performance-link.
760
 The main 
criticism is a lack of transparency, which is caused by, among other things, too-complex 
remuneration reports.
761
 In 2011/2012 the ongoing debate led the government to initiate 
consultation procedures on possible improvements in this field.
762
 Regulatory changes 
followed in autumn 2013.
763
  
This section seeks to give answers for the UK regarding the second hypothesis, which sees 
enhanced, standardised disclosure as a means to achieve more effective remuneration 
governance. Better information disclosure facilitates the monitoring of the remuneration-
setters by the shareholders (and potentially other stakeholders), which in turn shall prevent 
excessive remuneration. In order to find answers the disclosure requirements which UK 
quoted companies have to fulfil regarding executive remuneration will be examined. 
Emphasis will also be put on the assessment of the 2013 reform and a proposal for further 
improvements. 
I. Historic Development of Disclosure 
Company law requirements on the reporting of directors’ remuneration had already evolved in 
the early twentieth century.
764
 The CA 1929 required, in s. 148, that companies provide 
information to shareholders on the issue of directors’ remuneration if the latter demand it. 
Section 196 CA 1948 required companies to produce in their accounts the aggregate amount 
of directors’ emoluments, the aggregate amount of present or past directors’ pensions and the 
aggregate amount of any compensation to present or past directors in relation to loss of office. 
                                                         
759 In 2002 already. 
760 BIS, “Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper” (2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31660/11-1287-executive-remuneration-
discussion-paper.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, m.no.34. 
761 cf. High Pay Commission, “Cheques With Balances: why tackling high pay is in the national interest” (2011) < 
http://highpaycentre.org/files/Cheques_with_Balances.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 13. 
762 BIS, “Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper: summary of responses” (2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31381/12-564-executive-remuneration-
discussion-paper-summary-responses.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
763 A first assessment of the 2013 reform has been added. 
764 The evolution’s summary is oriented towards the one in BIS, “Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper” (fn.771763), 
42ff. 
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
 134 
 
A central feature of the CA 1967 was the extension of disclosure requirements regarding 
directors’ remuneration.765 The obligation was to disclose the number of directors receiving 
emoluments in bands of £2,500, s. 6 CA 1967. 
The reformed and consolidated CA 1985 made provisions on directors’ remuneration in 
Schedule 5. The aggregate emoluments, pensions and compensation for loss of office had to 
be disclosed, para 22. If the company was part of a group structure or the aggregate 
remuneration amounted to £60,000 or more, there were additional requirements. According to 
para 25 (2), the number of directors whose aggregate emoluments fell in bands of £5,000 had 
to be disclosed.
766
 In 1989 the act was amended. The rules on directors’ remuneration moved 
to Schedule 6 as given effect by s 232.  
The early 1990s saw a recession, entailing a rise in unemployment whilst simultaneously the 
press reported ever increasing remuneration of directors. Infamous was the so-called “fat cat” 
culture (especially) in recently privatised industries.
767
 In response to public discontent and at 
the request of the Government the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) set up a committee 
on executive remuneration in 1995.
768
 The Greenbury Committee presented a report which 
resulted in wide-ranging changes to the disclosure of executive remuneration.
769
 The London 
Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules were amended in order to incorporate the committee’s 
recommendations.
770
 Compliance with them became a listing requirement.
771
 
Amongst the measures introduced by Greenbury were: The remuneration committee should 
produce a remuneration report annually,
772
 which should be annexed to the annual report and 
accounts. It should contain the company’s general remuneration policy773 and the actual 
remuneration packages, including share options and pensions individualised for each director 
by name.
774
 Also information on the pay-performance-link should be disclosed. Greenbury’s 
recommendations relied on a comply-or-explain mechanism. 
                                                         
765 LH Leigh, “Companies Act 1967” (1968) 31(2) MLR 183-193, 183. 
766 S Sheikh, “Company law: directors” (1996) 7(3) ICCLR, C53-54, C54. 
767 JN Gordon, “‘Say on Pay’: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience an the Case for Shareholder Opt-in” (2009) 46(2) 
Harvard J Legis, 323-367, 341; For an account on the 1990s situation, C Villiers, “Executive Pay: Beyond Control?” (1995) 
15(2) Legal Studies, 260-282. 
768 K Keasey et al, “The Development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK” in K Keasey, S Thompson and M Wright 
(eds), Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons (John Wiley, 2005), 21-44, 22. 
769 Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (Gee, 1995). 
770 M Cowley, “Greenbury – the changes to the listing rules” (1995) 14(7) IBFL, 72-74, 72.  
771 L Roach, “The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 and the disclosure of executive remuneration” (2004) 
25(5) Co Law, 141-148, 142. 
772 5.4. Greenbury Report. 
773 5.5.ff. Greenbury Report. 
774 5.8.ff. Greenbury Report. 
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Despite these recommendations the government remained concerned.
775
 The result of a study 
on the compliance with the best practice rules conducted for the Department for Trade and 
Industry (DTI) by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1999 was disappointing.
776
  
In 2002 secondary legislation on executive remuneration disclosure was introduced under 
s. 257 CA 1985 called the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 (DRRR 2002).
777
 
It introduced several new provisions into the CA. Section 232 was revised. Schedule 6 
provisions on disclosure would apply to unquoted companies only. A new s. 243B required 
boards of quoted companies to publish annually a directors’ remuneration report (DRR). 
According to a new Schedule 7A it should disclose in an individualised and detailed form the 
remuneration package of each director, a remuneration policy statement and a statement on 
the role of the board and the remuneration committee.  
The provisions were subsequently absorbed into the present CA 2006. The provisions on 
mandatory disclosure for listed companies could be found in Part 15 CA 2006 in conjunction 
with Schedule 8 of the Large and Medium Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and 
Reports) Regulations 2008.
778
 Recently they have moved to the large and Medium-sized 
Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013
779
. 
II. Regulation of Disclosure 
Following the historic development of executive remuneration disclosure, the focus will shift 
to its present regulation.  
1. The Regulation’s Objective 
First, the disclosure provisions’ regulatory objectives will be analysed.  
1.1. Disclosure as an Instrument for Monitoring 
Disclosure can enable shareholders of a company to judge whether the remuneration 
arrangements decided by the board or the remuneration committee “reflect an abuse of 
managerial power”780 or whether they are instead suitable to attract the best management 
personnel possible and motivate it to maximise its efforts for the benefit of the company. This 
                                                         
775 L Roach (fn.782774), 143. 
776 PwC, DTI, “Monitoring of Corporate Governance Aspects of Executive Remuneration” (1999) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file13428.pdf > accessed 18 
September 2014. 
777 SI 2002/1986. 
778 SI 2008/410. 
779 SI 2013/1981 
780 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 294. 
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information is indispensable for noticing shortcomings in the remuneration setters’ work and 
for being able to react, e.g. through a negative vote on the DRR. 
Correspondingly, the DTI stated when adopting the DRRR 2002 that the legislation’s 
objective was “to enhance the transparency in setting directors pay” and to “improve 
accountability to shareholders”.781 Also the comprehensibility of the pay-performance-link 
should be improved.
782
 Furthermore, the engagement between a company’s shareholders and 
the board on the issue of remuneration should be improved.
783
 
Thus, a central objective of the reform was greater transparency in order to enable 
shareholders to monitor the remuneration-setters more effectively. 
1.2. Disclosure as an Instrument for Prevention 
As mentioned before, individualised disclosure of remuneration can – in conjunction with (the 
threat of) the use of “enforcement mechanisms” such as public outrage or say-on-pay – be 
aimed at preventing excessive remuneration and curbing the general level of executive 
remuneration in the long run. 
However, limiting the amount of compensation was not an explicit objective of the DRRR 
2002.
784
 The government stated repeatedly that it agreed that high remuneration could be 
necessary in order to attract and retain the most qualified and talented managers on a global 
market for management services.
785
 Artificially low levels due to strict regulation could be 
disadvantageous for UK companies.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the disclosure requirements were introduced and strengthened in 
response to general discontent with the high remuneration levels of executives could be seen 
as an indicator of an intended preventive function of the disclosure regulation. Reducing 
managerial agency costs could be seen as an implicit objective or welcome side-effect. 
                                                         
781 Deloitte, “Report on the impact of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulation” (2004) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file13425.pdf > accessed 18 
September 2014, 1. 
782 W Alissa, “Boards’ Response to Shareholder Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ ‘Say on Pay’ in the UK” (2009) 
Working Paper Pennsylvania State University <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1412880> accessed 18 September 2014, 7. 
783 D Gilsham, “Say on Pay Six Years On: Lessons from the UK Experience” (2009) 
<http://www.pirc.co.uk/sites/default/files/documents/SayonPay.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 12. 
784 W Alissa (fn.793785), 7. 
785 cf. BIS, “Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper” (fn.771763), foreword. 
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1.3. Disclosure as an Instrument for Information and Protection of Investors 
The purpose of disclosure can also be informing shareholders and the capital market in 
general, reducing shareholders’ costs of getting information about remuneration and making 
shareholder actions easier.
786
 
Accountability and transparency were explicitly mentioned objectives of the DRRR 2002.
787
 
Moreover, the comprehensibility of the pay-performance-link should be improved.
788
 In the 
Company Law Reform White Paper the government emphasised the importance of 
shareholders being able to access “clear and meaningful information to enable them to have a 
constructive dialogue and increase their engagement with the company”.789 Thus, it is not the 
idea to inundate shareholders with detailed information. Rather, by ensuring transparency 
shareholders shall be enabled to access all information needed to assess both the company’s 
general remuneration policy and the individual remuneration packages.
790
  
The individualised disclosure requirement has the aim of empowering shareholders and 
improving shareholder democracy by providing the shareholders, with sufficient information 
on executive remuneration, to take well-informed and rational decisions.
791
 Only with 
accurate, clear and useful information available can shareholders effectively use other 
remuneration governance instruments such as say-on-pay. Consequently, shareholders shall 
be better protected against self-serving behaviour and excessive remuneration packages. 
2. The Regulation in Detail 
Next, the current regulation of disclosure will be analysed.  
2.1. Personal Scope 
Regarding the requirement to disclose information the CA 2006 distinguishes between quoted 
and unquoted companies. Quoted companies are required to disclose various aspects of 
directors’ remuneration in an annual remuneration report, s. 420. 
A quoted company is defined in s. 385 (2) CA 2006 as a company incorporated in the UK 
whose shares are officially listed according to the relevant provisions in Part 6 of the 
                                                         
786 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 294. 
787 Deloitte (fn.792784) 1. 
788 W Alissa (fn.793785), 7. 
789 DTI, “Company Law Reform: White Paper” (2005) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070603164510/http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/white-
paper/page22800.html > accessed 18 September 2014, 17. 
790 K Brearely, “Greenbury: benefit or burden” (1995) 14(6) JIBFL, 58-63, 62. 
791 C Villiers, “Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice” (2010) 10(2) JCLS, 309-342, 318. 
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Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 or whose shares are included in the official list of 
another Member State of the European Economic Area or whose equity share capital has been 
“admitted to dealing at the New York Stock Exchange or the exchange known as Nasdaq”792. 
The reason for including UK companies listed at certain exchanges abroad can be seen as an 
attempt to deter UK companies from escaping the strengthened disclosure requirements by 
listing their securities outside the UK.
793
 The definition of a quoted company could be altered 
by way of regulation,
794
 e.g. if UK companies sought admission to trading on an exchange 
other than those enumerated in s. 385 in order to escape the disclosure requirements.
795
 
Even companies that do not fulfil the previously mentioned listing criteria and are considered 
as unquoted are not able to remain silent on the issue of executive remuneration. However, 
their duty to disclose is less extensive. 
2.2. Duties 
Under s. 420 (1) CA 2006 directors of quoted companies are required to prepare a DRR 
annually. The finished report must be approved by the board, s. 422 (1). It had to be signed on 
the board’s behalf by a director or the company’s secretary, s. 422 (2). The DRR must be 
provided to the shareholders and the registrar, ss. 423 (1) and 441 (1). 
All directors of the company, as well as anyone who has been director of the company within 
the last five years, have the duty to inform the company about any circumstances relevant for 
the DRR, s. 421 (3). 
Provisions regarding the DRR’s content cannot be found in the CA 2006 itself. Rather, s. 421 
(1) provides that it can be determined by regulation which information has to be contained in 
the DRR. The same applies to the set-out and the content of the auditable part. 
2.2.1. Situation Until 2013 
The DRR’s content was determined in the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups 
(Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 (Regulations 2008).
796
 
The DRR was divided into two parts: a first part which does not contain information subject 
to audit and which concerns the company’s remuneration policy, and a second part which was 
                                                         
792 S. 385 (2) CA 2006. 
793 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 405. 
794 S. 385 (4), (5) CA 2006. 
795 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 405. 
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subject to audit which relates to the remuneration received by the directors in that financial 
year, Parts 2 and 3 Regulations 2008.  
2.2.2. Situation Since 2013 
A new Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013 came into force on 1 October 2013 (Regulation 2013).
797
 It 
sets out the form and content of the new DRR. Simultaneously, ss. 421 (2A), 422A and 439A 
CA 2006 were inserted. 
Now, DRRs will consist of: an “Annual Statement”, Part 2 Regulations 2013, the “Annual 
Remuneration Report”, Part 3, and the “Directors Remuneration Policy”, Part 4. In the 
“Annual Statement” the remuneration committee’s chair must provide information on major 
decisions on directors’ remuneration, substantial changes regarding it made during the year 
including the context of these changes.
798
  
The “Annual Remuneration Report” on the policy’s implementation has mainly the same 
content as before. The “most substantive”799 innovation of the new regulations here is that the 
remuneration of each director must be set out in a specified form – a table – including a single 
figure showing the total. The table is detailed containing the columns: (a) total amount of 
salary and fees (b) all taxable benefits, (c) assets received or receivable for the financial year 
as a result of the achievement of performance measures (excluding those resulting from past 
performances or subject to future performances), (d) certain assets received or receivable for 
periods of more than one financial year, (e) all pension related benefits, and (f) total amount 
of the sums set out in the previous columns.
800
 Any other remuneration must be set out in an 
additional column.
801
 Also the sum for the preceding financial year must be set out.
802
 The 
methods to calculate the sums for each column are prescribed.
803
 Further explanations, 
performance graphs etc. are required, e.g. the Director’s actual performance must be 
explained as well as the basis for the decision on the level of received variable remuneration. 
Regarding the CEO’s remuneration percentage changes to the preceding year must be 
shown.
804
 Furthermore, the “relative importance of spend on pay” e.g. the relation to the 
                                                         
797 SI 2013/1981. 
798 Part 2 SI 2013/1981. 
799 BIS, Explanatory Memorandum to The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1981 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1981/pdfs/uksiem_20131981_en.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
800 Part 3 para 7 SI 2013/1981. 
801 Part 3 para 6 SI 2013/1981. 
802 Part 3 para 9 SI 2013/1981. 
803 Part 3 para 10 SI 2013/1981. 
804 Para 19. 
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remuneration paid to the other employees of the company, has to be shown for the current and 
the preceding year.
805
 The report must entail a statement on how the company plans to 
implement the approved directors’ remuneration policy in the following year.806 Information 
on the last vote on the remuneration report and remuneration policy must be provided, too.
807
 
Regarding the approval of the DRR and the directors’ policy the percentage of votes cast for, 
cast against and withheld must be disclosed and if there was significant opposition the 
“reasons for those votes, as far as known to the directors, and any actions taken by the 
directors in response to those concerns” must be summarised.808 
The DRRs shall also have a forward-looking part on the remuneration policy. The regulations 
provide minimum requirements for the policy’s disclosure. The policy regarding all aspects of 
directors’ remuneration has to be disclosed including recruitment, service contracts and 
payments for loss of office. The “future policy table”, which contains “in tabular form a 
description of each of the components of the remuneration package for the directors of the 
company” which the policy entails, is important.809 The “statement of consideration of 
shareholder views” should be mentioned as well.810 Finally, it is interesting that the 
remuneration policy can be omitted under certain conditions if a resolution to approve the 
directors’ remuneration policy, s 439A CA 2006, is not intended, para 1 (2), (3).  
2.3. Exemption? 
The question arises whether exemptions to the individualised disclosure duty exist. 
Individualised disclosure of executive remuneration is not merely a comply-or-explain 
obligation. All quoted companies are required to produce a DRR. Still, it could be thought of 
a provision similar to s. 417 (11) CA 2006 which allows an exemption to the disclosure of 
“information about persons with whom the company has contractual or other arrangements 
which are essential to the business of the company” in the business review if “the disclosure 
would, in the opinion of the directors, be seriously prejudicial to that person and contrary to 
the public interest”.811 Yet, neither does such a provision exist for the duty of individualised 
                                                         
805 Para 20. 
806 Para 21. 
807 Para 23. 
808 Para 23. 
809 Para 25ff. 
810 Para 40. 
811 S. 417 (5) and (11) CA 2006. 
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disclosure of directors’ remuneration in the DRR nor is there room for an analogy.812 Hence, 
there is no exemption to the individualised disclosure requirements. 
2.4. Sanctions 
Next, possible sanctions will be examined. An offence is committed by anyone who was a 
director “immediately before the end of the period for filing accounts and reports” for the 
relevant financial year and who “failed to take all reasonable steps for securing compliance” 
with the disclosure requirement, s. 420 (2), (3) CA 2006. The penalty for this offence is a fine. 
Non-compliance with the disclosure requirement is sanctioned as a criminal offence.
813
 
An offence is also committed by every defaulting director if the DRR is not approved by the 
board or the company secretary. Going further than the relevant provision in the CA 1985,
814
 
s. 422 (2), (3) CA 2006 states that where a DRR is approved although it does not comply with 
the requirements set out by the act, an offence is committed by any director who knew about 
the non-compliance and who “failed to take reasonable steps to secure compliance” or failed 
“to prevent the report from being approved”. The penalty for this offence is a fine. 
A director is liable to compensate the company for any loss it suffers due to misleading or 
untrue statements in the DRR or omissions in it, s. 463 CA 2006. However, this liability is 
limited to circumstances where the misleading or untrue statement was “made deliberately or 
recklessly”815 or circumstances where the director knew that the omission was in fact a 
“dishonest concealment of a material fact”816. Liability for civil penalty or criminal offence is 
not affected hereby. 
Finally, if an auditor finds that disclosure requirements of s. 421 are not fulfilled in the DRR, 
the auditor must add a statement to his report giving the required information, insofar as he is 
reasonably able to provide the information.
817
 The rationale behind this provision is that such 
an addition to the auditor’s report is a more effective remedy than merely fining the directors 
who failed to draft correct accounts and reports.
818
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814 S. 234C (4). 
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816 S. 463 (3) (a). 
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III. Evaluation 
Previous regulation of executive remuneration disclosure has been widely described as 
“woefully inadequate”, in part because it rendered ascertaining the individual director’s pay 
virtually impossible.
819
 Until the DRRR 2002, detailed, individualised disclosure was 
voluntary and the compliance level was rather disappointing.
820
 
This section will analyse the merits and shortcomings of the UK regulation of executive 
remuneration disclosure. The objective is to answer the question whether disclosure in UK 
listed companies is an effective remuneration governance tool.  
1. Ability to Achieve the Objectives 
Several objectives of (individualised) disclosure of executive remuneration have been 
identified above. They were also shared by the UK legislator albeit to varying extents. Do the 
UK disclosure rules achieve these objectives? 
1.1. Information and Protection of Shareholders 
A central reason for introducing the current disclosure regime was the information and 
protection of shareholders. It has increased the quoted companies’ disclosure requirements 
significantly. It has been argued that this has “acted as a catalyst for increasing company 
accountability and effective shareholder engagement”.821 A study found that the DRR reforms 
had a “positive impact” insofar as they enable shareholders to scrutinize directors’ 
remuneration more easily.
822
 Others stated that investors were increasingly satisfied with the 
disclosure requirements and that communication and engagement between shareholders and 
companies had improved, according to 90% of shareholders.
823
  
These were among the reasons why the disclosure rules were not changed during the 2006 
company law reform.
824
 However, the objectivity of the first two quoted sources may be 
doubted due to their closeness to the rules’ source. Yet, also more recent and objective 
sources argue that the regulations provide shareholders with more transparent information 
with which they can work, that as a result there can be more and better informed debates 
between investors and companies and that shareholder democracy benefits from it.
825
 
                                                         
819 K Brearely (fn.801793), 58; similar: IM Ramsay, “Directors’ and Officers’ Remuneration” (fn.378373), 355. 
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821 DTI, White Paper, Company Law Reform (London, DTI, 2005), 10. 
822 Deloitte (fn.792784). 
823 Anonymous, “Directors’ pay rules work, so no need for legislation” (2005) 26(5) Company Lawyer, 146, 146. 
824 ibid., 146. 
825 C Villers, “Controlling Executive Pay” (fn.802794), 320. 
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
 143 
 
Shareholders – being better informed – also became less tolerant of “one-off awards” and the 
level of severance payments.
826
 Effective disclosure has no real value as such but better 
informed shareholders can take action (e.g. through say-on-pay) to sanction or prevent 
remuneration excesses. Hence, they are also better protected against managerial agency costs.  
In practice investors are increasingly prescriptive, going into detail as to what they consider 
acceptable with regard to remuneration packages; and companies are considering increasingly 
relational and reputational costs which would be incurred if they ignored these concerns.
827
 
Correspondingly, the BIS stated recently that shareholders were in “a strong position to 
influence the structure and amount of executive remuneration”.828 
Then again, the information disclosed has been criticised for its increasing complexity, which 
can damage relations with shareholders and investors, and create misperceptions and 
confusion.
829
 For shareholders the “greatest barrier to engaging on pay is the time” and effort 
which is required to analyse (opaque) DRRs.
830
 According to this view one consequence is a 
“low level of engagement on issues of executive pay” by shareholders.831 Recent research has 
shown that only about a third of the FTSE150-companies disclosed the dependency of 
remuneration on performance in a clear manner.
832
 Commentators voiced doubts that even if 
shareholders have access to relevant, detailed and individualised information “shareholder 
apathy” may persist.833 Such disincentives to activism could be, especially for smaller 
shareholders, the fact that executive remuneration usually does not affect shareholders’ wealth 
significantly and compared with the profits of a company executive remuneration is small.
834
 
Thus, there are not only doubts regarding the reduction of information asymmetry but also 
whether a reduction would lead to any meaningful shareholder activism. 
The current regime has led to more information being available to shareholders. Whether this 
has led to better informed and better protected shareholders is open to question. The DRRs’ 
complexity and the difficulty in comparing them limit the regulation’s success. 
                                                         
826 ibid., 320. 
827 J Trevor, “What is ‘Best Practice’ in Executive Remuneration?” (2009) CIRHM Opinion, Judge Business School 
<http://www.cihrm.jbs.cam.ac.uk/leadership/opinion/trevor_bestpracticeremuneration.pdf> accessed 18 February 2012, 2. 
828 BIS, “A long-term focus for corporate Britain: A call for evidence” (2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31563/10-1225-long-term-focus-corporate-
britain.pdf >accessed 18 September 2014, 25. 
829 High Pay Commission (fn.772764), 12. 
830 BIS, “Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper” (fn.771763), 21. 
831 High Pay Commission (fn.772764), 14. 
832 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Insight or fatigue? FTSE350 reporting” (2010) 
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1.2. Facilitate Monitoring 
The general perception of the rules’ ability to facilitate monitoring seems positive. In a recent 
consultation document the government referred to the UK as “one of the countries with the 
highest level of scrutiny surrounding executive pay”.835 Commentators claim that there is 
evidence that the existence of DRR’s requirements “concentrates the minds of both boards 
and shareholders”.836 Others state that the disclosure regime has led to increasing company 
accountability.
837
 There is even the concern whether the “regulatory scales [are] too tilted in 
the direction of accountability”.838 
It could be deduced that the objective of improved monitoring is clearly achieved. However, 
the ability to monitor the board or committee is impeded by the complexity of the disclosed 
information.
839
 If shareholders are unable to find the relevant information and to compare it 
with other companies due to its lengthy, opaque and non-standardised presentation, it is less 
likely that they will actively monitor the board regarding executive remuneration. 
Shareholders who cannot use the disclosed information will not realise shortcomings and, 
consequently, will not act by e.g. voting against the DRR. Hence, although the current 
regulation has improved the possibility to monitor in theory, the presentation of the 
information in practice hinders effective monitoring. Furthermore, there remains some risk of 
distortion of the disclosure due to conflicts of interest among the members of the board or the 
committee under whose control the DRR is prepared.
840
 The third-party verification through 
auditors is positive, because it ensures further monitoring in the shareholders’ interest. 
Thus, monitoring has been facilitated but could still be improved. 
1.3. Prevention 
Regarding prevention against excessive remuneration it could be said that the increase in 
quantity and quality of information which has to be disclosed, has not stopped the inflation of 
executive remuneration.
841
 Some consider the individualised disclosure of remuneration to be 
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838 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 303. 
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a reason for the increase rather than a limiting factor.
842
 Then again, the government did not 
state the prevention of increasing executive remuneration as an explicit objective.  
It has been argued that the current disclosure regulation, in conjunction with effective policing 
through e.g. the shareholder vote on the DRR, has been effective in controlling managerial 
agency costs, especially if one took pay increases which are not connected to performance and 
remuneration for unsuccessful directors as indicators for managerial agency costs.
843
 Absolute 
levels of remuneration as such should not be used as the criterion for the effectiveness and 
success of the measures.
844
 It seems indisputable that the absolute levels of remuneration have 
risen over the course of the last decade.
845
 The current regulation seems to have failed to 
prevent this increase. In the past the government did not consider disclosure a contributory 
factor to the increase in executive pay.
846
 Recently, the government declared that it is not 
entirely “clear what difference [the regulation] has made to overall levels of pay or to linkage 
of pay and performance”.847  
Effective control of managerial agency costs is not merely about absolute numbers but also 
about getting the best performance possible from the management and generating value for 
shareholders. Whilst an increase in absolute executive remuneration has not been prevented, 
rewards for failure have been decreased.
848
 Reducing negative facets of executive 
remuneration such as generous termination payments or non-performance-related pay can be 
seen as a success and prove that the UK disclosure rules can – as a precondition of and in 
conjunction with policing by the shareholders – be an effective remuneration governance tool.  
Still, the evaluation of the current disclosure rules is ambivalent with regard to their ability to 
fulfil their objectives. 
2. Problems and Shortcomings 
As a next step, problems and shortcomings of the disclosure regulation will be analysed. Both 
the pre-2013-reform situation and the post-reform situation will be examined in order to 
emphasise and evaluate recent developments. 
                                                         
842 Manifest/MM&K, “The Executive Direct Total Remuneration Survey 2011” (2011) 
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843 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 301. 
844 ibid., 300. 
845 Between 1998-2010 the median total remuneration of CEOs of FTSE 100 companies rose from an average £1m to £4.2m; 
Manifest/MM&K (fn.853836). 
846 D Kershaw, (fn.382377), 295. 
847 BIS, “A long-term focus for corporate Britain” (fn.839822), 25. 
848 cf. F Ferri, D Maber, “Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK” (2009) 
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2.1. No Prescribed Form 
A central criticism of the pre-2013 disclosure regulation is that, regarding the disclosure’s 
content, extensive provisions are statutorily provided whereas only very limited provision is 
made for the way the information should be disclosed.
849
 A consequence could be that the 
DRR makes finding relevant information time-consuming and difficult. Furthermore, the 
comparability of disclosed information of different companies suffers from the lack of 
standardisation. Therefore, one of the most important shortcomings of the regulation is the 
lack of provisions on a specified method of disclosure. Greater regulation in this respect could 
lead to standardisation of disclosed information on executive remuneration. This in turn 
would provide shareholders with information they are able to use at a low cost and which 
consequently allows improved monitoring and hence protection of shareholders. 
2.2. Discrepancy between Theory and Practice 
Regarding some provisions there is a discrepancy between information theoretically required 
and the information provided in practice. The pre-2013 DRR had to contain a statement of the 
company’s policy with respect to directors’ remuneration for the following two financial 
years.
850
 This was a valuable opportunity for shareholders to assess future remuneration 
agreements and in particular changes to the currently applied remuneration structure. 
However, the statements were often deficient in that they did not provide clear explanations of 
the practical consequences of the proposal.
851
 
Furthermore, criticism was voiced regarding the statement concerning how remuneration and 
employment conditions elsewhere in the company, especially of employees, had been taken 
into consideration when determining executive remuneration. The requirement as such was 
welcomed, but in practice only a few companies disclosed meaningful information in the 
DRR on how pay and employment conditions of employees had been taken into account when 
determining the directors’ remuneration.852  
2.3. Complexity  
It has been repeatedly stated that a major deficiency of DRRs is their complexity.
853
 This has 
been illustrated with the lack of a “single, aggregate figure” that would make the total 
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remuneration of executive directors easily comparable.
854
 More interested parties could then 
examine from which remuneration components this amount was composed. For a first 
impression and to satisfy public interest this single figure might be helpful. For rational 
investment decisions it would be insufficient. Moreover, such a single number could over-
simplify the matter and make it more opaque rather than clarifying it. For example a single 
number cannot show how much has been earned for past or future performance and how 
much is fixed or variable remuneration. The overall lower package of a director with a high 
base salary but poor performance may appear better than the one of a director with a higher 
aggregate sum which is due to good performance and a high percentage of performance 
related pay. This example shows that complexity is still a problem but convincing solutions 
are difficult to find. Again standardisation of content and presentation of the disclosed 
information could do the matter’s complexity justice and simultaneously satisfy the need for 
easily comparable information ‒ e.g. single figures for each kind of remuneration (fixed, 
flexible etc.) would seem more adequate. 
To summarise, the pre-2013 regulatory framework left room for improvement. 
3. Increased Transparency? 
The question arises whether increased transparency regarding executive remuneration has 
been achieved by the DRR. The DRR requirements were certainly a step in the right direction. 
However, it is equally acknowledged that there is still scope for improvement.
855
 Over time 
DRRs have increased in both length and complexity.
856
 The complexity has undermined the 
reports’ transparency. The consequence for shareholders is that they are not necessarily able 
to understand the consequences with respect to risks and costs.
857
 Directors, therefore, have 
the possibility of camouflaging remuneration to some extent. Then again, executive 
remuneration is inevitably complex.
858
 
A positive aspect of transparency which should be emphasised is the requirement to disclose 
information on any person who has provided service or advice to the remuneration committee, 
namely remuneration consultants.
859
 The provision also prescribes the disclosure of any other 
service provided by that person and who appointed them. These provisions enhance 
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transparency by revealing external influences and possible conflicts of interest. Remuneration 
consultants could otherwise be inclined to suggest more generous remuneration packages than 
necessary in order to receive further contracts from the management relating to other services 
offered by the consultancy. Reputational damage as a possible consequence should be a 
deterrent. Drawing a comparison with auditors, whose independence is similarly essential, it 
may even be desirable to adopt a provision requiring the disclosure of fees paid to 
remuneration consultants.
860
 
Generally, the demand for more and more detailed information on executive remuneration is 
widespread. But is increased transparency the result? It is undeniable that the introduction of 
the DRR has led to a wide range of information being available. Most of the current 
provisions are “sensible”861 and enable investors to assess a company’s remuneration policy, 
which allows various conclusions e.g. regarding motivation, risk-taking, managerial agency 
costs and the parameters for performance-related remuneration. They increase transparency. 
However, more information does not necessarily equal better information.
862
 If companies 
disclose too much information, shareholders are unable to “see the wood for the trees”.863 An 
overload of information amounts to a barrier to effective communication between the 
company and investors. Similarly, “boiler-plate” disclosures are not helpful. Information that 
is presented in “obscure or over-technical language” could be missed or even ignored despite 
being of relevance to an investment decision.
864
 Looking at the pre-2013 situation, the main 
concern should be to improve the form in which information is presented rather than to 
increase the amount disclosed. The DRR has improved transparency but there is still room for 
improvement. A standardised form of disclosure could lead to greater transparency. 
4. Evaluation of the Reformed Rules 
The reform seems to have addressed many of the concerns raised in this work and in the legal 
discussion in general. Literature on the new rules that is not merely descriptive does not yet 
exist.
865
 Central to the reform is the intention to improve the usability of the disclosed 
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“Understanding the new voting and reporting rules” (2013) 145(Nov) EmpLJ, 8-11; P Ellerman et al, “Directors’ 
remuneration reports: the final picture.” (2013) 24(9) PLC, 29-37; K Gompertz, “Corporate governance and executive 
remuneration: have the fat cats been reduced to semi-skimmed?” (2014) 19(1) CovLJ, 42-43; N Stretch, I Pooley, “Directors’ 
remuneration: the new regime finally starts.” (2014) 25(1) PLC, 4-5. 
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information. Rather than requiring more details to be disclosed it focuses on the presentation 
of the information. This is laudable. 
The presentation in tables regarding both the remuneration paid and the remuneration policy 
corresponds with the previously mentioned critique and suggestions for improvements. The 
result of the presentation requirements should be greater standardisation which in turn should 
facilitate the finding of relevant information and the comparability with other companies. 
The remuneration committee chairman’s “Annual Statement” may be good for a first, quick 
assessment of the DRR’s key messages and the context in which remuneration decisions were 
taken. However, the Statement’s value may be limited by the fact that their form and content 
is not prescribed. 
An interesting innovation is the requirement for the company to state, in case of high dissent, 
the details of the last votes and especially the reasons and how the board thinks to address the 
shareholders’ concerns. This measure is likely to improve transparency and accountability. 
The board will be less able to “ignore” high dissent votes. The statements are likely to be read 
closely by investors and the financial press. The threat of individual and collective 
reputational damages could induce the board to react to a high dissent vote, thereby increasing 
the vote’s effectiveness. 
Whether the new and theoretically positive rules lead to better and easier-to-use information 
in practice remains to be seen. Shareholders are likely to be better informed and better able to 
monitor the remuneration-setters. Still, important restraints to the effectiveness of disclosure 
as an instrument of remuneration governance persist, namely the shareholder’s rational 
apathy. Despite easier i.e. cheaper access to information, the relative insignificance of 
executive remuneration deters shareholders from becoming active. It is also dubious whether 
the new rules will prevent further increases in executive remuneration. 
 150 
 
5. Interim Findings: Disclosure in the UK  
Since the mid-1990s the UK legislator has repeatedly addressed the issue of information 
asymmetry between directors and shareholders. However, as Conyon stated, the path “to full 
compensation disclosure […] is a slowly travelled road”866. The current rules on executive 
remuneration disclosure are significantly more extensive than previous provisions on this 
matter. The information available to shareholders and investors is considerably “upgraded”867. 
A “modest degree”868 of remuneration disclosure has been achieved but room for 
improvement persists. The 2013 regulations tackle problems that remain. 
The central problems are the information’s complexity, an overload of information and the 
difficulty in comparing the information disclosed by different companies. These factors also 
impede the transparency of executive remuneration. The theoretical effectiveness of 
disclosure is at risk if its design is not appropriate to achieve the objectives. It has been seen 
that the objectives cannot be fully met by the regulatory framework. Shareholders that are 
unable to assess the relevant data at low cost – and who therefore cannot monitor the 
remuneration-setters – could face higher managerial agency costs and/or might prefer to 
“exit”. 
The main deficiency is not the amount and content of the disclosure but rather its form. 
Standardisation improves the comparability of executive remuneration agreements across 
similar companies. Simplification, such as a single figure that gives the total remuneration of 
each director, might be helpful as well, especially for small investors or a prima facie 
comparison. The changes brought by the recent reform are convincing and seem to address 
the main problems. 
To summarise, the UK’s executive remuneration disclosure regime – especially with the latest 
amendments – is a step in the right direction. However, even the new rules cannot solve all 
the problems regarding executive remuneration. On balance, this section’s findings support 
the second hypothesis that enhanced, standardised disclosure leads to enhancements.  
  
                                                         
866 MJ Conyon (fn.872855), 279. 
867 M Conyon, G Sadler, “Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK” 
(2010) 18(4) Corp Gov, 296-312, 298. 
868 R Tomasic, “Company Law Modernisation and Corporate Governance in the UK – Some Recent Issues and Debates” 
(2011) 1 DICTUM-Victoria Law School Journal, 43-60, 57. 
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D. Comparison 
Having analysed the legal framework for executive remuneration disclosure in Germany and 
the UK, the two regimes will be compared. Commonalities and differences as well as 
strengths and weaknesses will be identified in order to allow recommendations for further 
improvement to both systems. 
I. Commonalities and Differences 
1. General 
Disclosure of remuneration has a long history in both jurisdictions and a common ignition 
point for the development seems to have been the economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Initially, both countries focused mainly on the disclosure of the aggregate 
remuneration of executives. 
Later, stricter but voluntary disclosure requirements were introduced in both countries. In 
1995 the Greenbury Code recommended individualised disclosure and a statement on the 
company’s remuneration policy on a comply-or-explain basis. Seven years later, and clearly 
influenced by the UK example, the GCGC recommended individualised disclosure as well. 
In the same year as the German voluntary individualised disclosure rule was introduced the 
UK legislator, due to lack of compliance, took another step and adopted mandatory rules on 
the matter. Three years later the German legislator, too, had to realise that mandatory rules 
were required because of unsatisfactory compliance with disclosure requirements and adopted 
the VorstOG. 
It can be seen that the developments resemble each other. From the 1990s on the UK 
development advanced faster than the German one, influencing the latter. 
2. Regulation of Disclosure  
In both jurisdictions the company legislation is surprisingly silent on the issue of 
remuneration disclosure. The German AktG contains hardly any rules on this matter. The 
HGB is the place to find extensive disclosure provisions. Likewise, in the UK the CA 2006 
provides sparse information. The details are left to the Large and Medium-sized Companies 
and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 and its 2013 version respectively. 
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2.1. Objectives 
In both jurisdictions discontent with the high levels of executive remuneration and the non-
compliance with voluntary disclosure requirements led to mandatory rules. When introducing 
the rules on individualised and detailed disclosure, the same objectives were given. However, 
their weighting differed. 
2.1.1. Weighting of Objectives 
Monitoring by shareholders and the capital market was perceived not to be sufficiently 
efficient in Germany. Yet, this “monitoring of the monitors” is essential. The primary 
objective of the new disclosure regulation was, therefore, to improve this monitoring. 
Enabling the shareholders to assess the remuneration’s adequacy according to § 87 (1) AktG 
was the German reform’s main objective. 
In the UK, too, the improvement of monitoring was a central objective. Accountability to 
shareholders was mentioned as an important aim but it is one aim amongst others. Enhancing 
the transparency in remuneration-setting and improving the comprehensibility of the pay-
performance-link were equally important.  
The main objective of the UK disclosure reform seemed to be the information and protection 
of shareholders. Emphasis was put on improving transparency and comprehensibility in order 
to enable shareholders to access clear and meaningful information. 
Information and protection of investors was considered by the German legislator, too. It is 
mentioned repeatedly in the travaux préparatoires but not as the central objective. Also, the 
opportunity for the general meeting to decide to opt out is a clear indicator that the 
information of investors cannot be the main objective.  
Neither legislator endorsed the idea of prevention. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. 
There may have been doubts about the preventive effect of individualised and detailed 
disclosure. Even today the effectiveness of disclosure in limiting further remuneration 
increases is contested and the increase in remuneration in both countries since the reforms 
support this doubt. 
2.1.2. Ability to Achieve Objectives 
The VorstOG’s main objective was to facilitate the shareholders’ assessment of whether the 
supervisory board has determined adequate executive remuneration. The regulation provides 
shareholders with a wider range of information about the management’s remuneration. 
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Theoretically, this should lead to increased transparency and better monitoring opportunities 
for the shareholders. In practice however the lack of clarity in the information provided 
impedes the shareholders’ ability to monitor. The same is true for the objective of better 
investor information. 
Similarly, in the UK the amount of information available to shareholders has been increased 
significantly, which should theoretically lead to better informed and protected shareholders. 
Yet, this objective is not fulfilled properly since, in practice, lengthy and complex DRRs 
hinder shareholders from gathering the information they need. 
In both systems the rules on what should be disclosed satisfy the objectives of each. However, 
in practice there is the problem that, due to a lack of standardisation and simplification, 
remuneration reports tend to be of limited use to shareholders. The remuneration reports are 
overloaded with information, too complex, and the cost for shareholders to get the 
information they want is too high. Whether the new rules in the UK, which are convincing in 
theory, will lead to better and more comprehensible and useful information in practice 
remains to be seen. 
Insofar as prevention of increasing remuneration is considered to be an objective of the 
reforms, it has to be noted that, despite its merits in theory, the results in practice are fairly 
unimpressive. The theoretically appealing outrage constraint seems to have failed in practice 
as executive remuneration has risen continuously despite the reforms. 
3. Regulations in Detail 
3.1. Personal Scope 
In both jurisdictions the law prescribes different remuneration disclosure requirements for 
listed and non-listed public companies. Comparing the definitions of German listed and UK 
quoted company reveals a striking similarity. Following the legal definition German listed 
companies are German companies whose shares are admitted to a regulated market. The 
admittance to a comparable foreign market suffices, too. The CA 2006 defines “quoted 
company” as a UK incorporated company whose shares are officially listed in the UK or 
another EEA member state or at the NYSE or NASDAQ. Both legislators intend to prevent 
companies from escaping the disclosure requirements easily by including certain foreign 
listings, too.  
A further similarity is that for non-listed companies less extensive disclosure rules apply, e.g. 
individualised remuneration disclosure is not required. 
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3.2. Duties 
Listed companies in both countries have the duty to provide two kinds of information. Firstly, 
the remuneration of members of the (management) board has to be disclosed in an 
individualised and detailed way. Secondly, a statement on the remuneration policy has to be 
published. However, there are several differences as to what exactly has to be disclosed. 
Under German disclosure law the remuneration of each member of the management board has 
to be disclosed giving the managers’ full names and classified into three categories. The 
categories are non-performance-related remuneration, performance-related remuneration and 
long-term incentive components. Payments on termination of a management contract have to 
be disclosed as well as benefits received from third parties outside the company. 
Quoted UK companies have to give more and also more detailed information. The 
requirements for the second part of the DRR (since 2013 “Annual Remuneration Report”) are 
similar to the ones for German listed companies. For each director the remuneration, share 
options, LTIPs, pension payments etc. have to be disclosed, identifying the individual by 
name.  
Different from the German disclosure is the first part of the DRR (since 2013 the “Directors 
Remuneration Policy”). It requires the disclosure of the remuneration committees’ 
composition, names of advisors and other services they provide, performance criteria for 
share options and LTIPs including the methods for assessing them. Also, the relative 
importance of each remuneration component has to be explained and details on the service 
contracts with directors have to be disclosed. Finally, this first part also contains a statement 
on the company’s remuneration policy. Comparing this part of the DRR with the German 
report on the main features of the remuneration system it becomes evident that the latter 
provides less information. Moreover, it is not clear what should be considered “main features” 
in contrast to details in the first place.  
Hence, with respect to the non-audited first part and the report on main features, significant 
differences between the two regimes exist. 
3.3. Exemption 
Another significant difference exists with respect to the option to decide not to disclose 
executive remuneration in an individualised manner. Only the German regulation offers the 
possibility for the general meeting to opt out of individualised disclosure and to decide to 
disclose just minimal information or a level in between.  
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3.4. Sanctions 
In both systems the sanction for not fulfilling the duty to disclose executive remuneration as 
required is a fine but only the German rules provide a specific amount, namely up to €50,000.  
II. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The positive and negative aspects of the two approaches will be identified in the following. 
A common positive feature is the restriction of individualised disclosure to listed companies. 
Limiting the scope in this way avoids unnecessary and costly burdens on non-listed 
companies as, in their case, there is no need of the capital market for information. Against this 
argument it could be said that it is not the information of the capital market but improved 
monitoring by the shareholders that is the main objective of the regulations – at least in 
Germany. Shareholders of non-listed companies should have the necessary tools to monitor 
satisfactorily, too. However, shareholdings of non-listed companies are usually less dispersed, 
so that other forms of shareholder information should be possible. Restricting the 
requirements to listed companies is sensible. The inclusion of domestic companies that are 
listed at certain stock exchanges abroad is also useful to avoid evasion. 
The German rules require a classification of remuneration in three groups, namely non-
performance-related, performance-related and long-term incentives, whereas the UK rules 
provide a more detailed breakdown. For interested parties with sufficient expertise it might be 
desirable to receive a very detailed breakdown. However, the German approach, which is 
slightly simplifying, offers greater clarity and comprehensibility. The German legislator 
successfully tried to avoid overloading the annual accounts whilst providing all necessary 
information for a rational and well-informed investment decision. The completeness of the 
information and its usefulness seems to be well-balanced. Still, further standardisation, 
especially regarding the presentation, is necessary. 
Another strength of the German disclosure provisions is that they require the publication of 
benefits a manager received from or was promised by a third party with regard to his work as 
a management board member. This is a sensible measure to elucidate potential conflicts of 
interest. However, the provision still falls short in that it is possible to circumvent it. 
Unfortunately, the UK disclosure regime reveals a gap in this respect.  
Then again, German disclosure rules are unconvincing when it comes to other aspects. Under 
German law it is possible for the general meeting not to disclose information in an 
individualised and detailed manner. It may be consistent to argue that, because the main 
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objective of individualised disclosure is the empowerment of shareholders, disclosure should 
be at the shareholders’ discretion and not forced upon them against their will. Similarly, the 
argument may hold that it should be for the shareholders to decide whether they are willing to 
accept a potential decrease in share value for making less information available to the capital 
market. Nevertheless, a mandatory requirement of individualised disclosure without 
exemptions, as in the UK, is preferable. Entering the capital market entails a wide range of 
duties, including publicity. Hence, disclosure should not be at the disposition of present 
shareholders. Investors can never be certain that the company will keep on disclosing all the 
information the investor would like to receive in the future. The only remaining option would 
be exit at a loss. Hence, minority shareholders are less well protected when the opt-out option 
exists. The opt-out option is flawed and one of the main weaknesses of the German approach. 
A second point on which the UK solution is more convincing is the disclosure of 
remuneration consultants, other contracts they have with the company and, in future, 
potentially also the fees they received. Under German law such a provision does not exist 
despite the significant role remuneration consultants play nowadays and despite calls for such 
a disclosure requirement in the legal literature.
869
 The disclosure requirement’s merits are 
evident. Potential conflicts of interest of the remuneration consultant who would like to 
receive further contracts from the company would be elucidated. Convincing reasons for non-
disclosure are not apparent. The UK regulation is exemplary in this respect. It remains unclear 
why the German legislator neither followed this example nor took up similar 
recommendations by the EU. 
Both systems offer fairly mild sanctions. Stricter sanctions which are more than merely “petty 
cash” for big companies would be advisable. A good invention by the UK legislator is the 
idea of requiring the auditor to provide missing information insofar as it is reasonable to 
expect him to do this. This “sanction” is a more effective remedy with respect to the aim of 
shareholder information and protection than a fine. 
A further aspect where the UK solution is more convincing is the non-audited part of the DRR 
on the companies’ remuneration policy. In particular the performance graphs seem like a 
method of choice to enable shareholders to assess for example the adequacy of performance 
criteria for incentive schemes. The statement on how employment conditions and pay of the 
company’s employees are considered in the process of remuneration setting may appeal in 
theory, as it is supposed to draw attention to a healthy relationship between executive and 
                                                         
869 cf. MH Kramarsch (fn.537529), 115. Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
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employee remuneration. However, in practice this statement is often not particularly 
meaningful and may not significantly influence the remuneration negotiations between the 
remuneration committee and potential managers. 
It should be noted that both regimes have significant weaknesses. The main weakness being a 
lack of clarity, comprehensibility and usefulness in the disclosed information due to an 
overload of information, its unsatisfactory and non-uniform presentation, and the complexity 
of the disclosed data. Neither approach fulfils the objectives set, namely the informing and 
protecting of shareholders, and improved monitoring. To some extent this may be due to 
general shareholder apathy, but enhanced, standardised disclosure could improve the 
situation. The 2013 reform in the UK represents movement in the right direction. Finally, 
neither approach has been able to prevent executive remuneration from rising steadily and 
significantly. 
III. Possible Improvements 
In Germany the option to opt out – although less significant in practice today – should be 
abolished. Its rationale is unconvincing. Also, details on remuneration consultants and their 
interests should be published. In the UK there should be a requirement to disclose benefits 
received from third parties. They may influence the director’s decisions and are of interest to 
the investors. 
In both countries benefits received by certain third parties such as spouses from the company 
should be disclosed as well, in order to elucidate possible conflicts of interest and to avoid 
circumvention of the disclosure rules. Finally, further standardisation of the disclosed 
information is advisable. Decreasing information costs can lead to wider distribution of the 
information, which in turn can lead to more effective use of the information, e.g. in say-on-
pay votes.
870
 The UK rules of October 2013 are a step in the right direction. Whether they 
suffice has yet to be seen. It is to be hoped that the German legislator will focus on 
standardisation and clarity as well. 
  
                                                         
870 cf. RJ Gilson, RH Kraakman, “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” (1983) 70(4) Virginia Law Review, 549-644. 
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E. Findings of this Chapter 
This chapter sought to answer the question raised by the second hypothesis, namely whether 
disclosure of executive remuneration could be considered an effective remuneration 
governance tool.  
The current disclosure rules in both countries are a step in the right direction but they are still 
unable to ensure the desired outcomes. It is a good development that listed companies are now 
required to disclose more information on remuneration. This should lead to increased 
transparency. Better informed shareholders should find it easier to “police” the remuneration-
setting. This in turn should enhance their ability to protect themselves against managerial 
agency costs and disproportionate remuneration agreements. 
However, the current regulations have shortcomings such as a lack of provision for how the 
information has to be disclosed. Also, in particular the German rules could be improved with 
regard to the opt-out option which are unconvincing, and with regard to information on 
remuneration consultants. The UK rules are generally more satisfactory but still need some 
improvements. The very recent reforms seem promising and address this work’s main 
criticism, namely the information’s presentation. The same can be said of an amendment to 
the GCGC recommending a standardised disclosure, 4.2.5 GCGC 2013. 
Both systems have been unable to fully achieve the objectives initially set out and the 
additional aim of prevention of further increases in remuneration. Disclosure as such does not 
lead to more adequate remuneration but it is an essential element of the multi-layered systems 
of remuneration governance. It is a prerequisite for the “monitoring of the monitors” by the 
shareholders. They can act on basis of the disclosed information. 
The finding that further reforms, and especially standardisation, are needed to make 
disclosure more effective supports the second hypothesis that enhanced, standardised 
disclosure could lead to better remuneration governance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Third Layer: Say-on-Pay 
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the third layer of remuneration governance. The so-called say-on-pay, 
meaning shareholder voting on executive remuneration, links the first two layers, 
remuneration-setting and remuneration-disclosure.
871
 It shall enable shareholders, which 
gained the necessary information through disclosure, to effectively monitor the remuneration 
system set by the (supervisory) board. Once again, the aforementioned interdependence of 
disclosure and say-on-pay becomes apparent. This chapter’s underlying hypothesis is that say-
on-pay is a useful instrument in need of further improvement. 
Say-on-pay is the remuneration governance instrument that was in the public discussion the 
most in recent years. One may recall the extensive reporting on the 2012 “shareholder spring” 
in the UK.
872
 These events coincided with the government’s deliberations on reforming the 
vote, e.g. making it binding.
873
 The reform entered into force in October 2013.
874
 
In Germany, too, it has been a time of interesting developments. Inspired by a Swiss reform, a 
reform was initiated to make the vote binding.
875
 It passed the Bundestag but failed to pass the 
Bundesrat in September 2013. In the medium term a revised initiative is likely.
876
 
This chapter will examine say-on-pay under German and UK law, followed by a comparison. 
The chapter will begin with the development, the objectives and the legal framework. The 
regulation’s details and an evaluation will follow. The aim will be to find out whether this 
instrument is able to ensure adequate executive remuneration. Finally, possible improvements 
will be discussed, with the aim of discovering whether the hypothesis that say-on-pay is 
useful but needs to be refined can be supported. 
                                                         
871 cf. M Döll, “Das Votum zum Vergütungssystem nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG” (2010) 3 WM, 103-112, 103. 
872 K Burgess, D McCrum, “Boards wake up to a shareholder spring” Financial Times of 4 May 2012; H Stewart et al, 
“Anger over executive pay boils over as boards face a shareholder spring” The Observer of 6 May 2012. 
873 BIS, “Executive Remuneration: Discussion Paper: Summary of Responses” (2012) 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/e/12-564-executive-remuneration- discussion-paper-summary-
responses.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
874 A first appraisal of the reform has been added. 
875 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Kontrolle der Vorstandsvergütung und zur Änderung weiterer aktienrechtlicher Vorschriften 
(VorstKoG), BT-Drucks. 17/14214. 
876 cf. J Jahn, “Aktionäre dürfen nun doch über Managergehälter entscheiden”, FAZ of 9 November 2013, 16. 
 160 
 
B. Germany 
I. Development 
In Germany, just as in many other countries, politics identified wrong, short-term focused 
remuneration systems as one of the causes for the 2008 global financial crisis.
877
 The 
legislator reacted by reforming the rules on management board remuneration with the 2009 
VorstAG.
878
 It introduced a new § 120 (4) AktG:  
“The shareholder meeting of a listed company may make resolutions on the approval 
of the remuneration system. The resolution shall not give rise to any rights or 
obligations; in particular the obligations of the supervisory board pursuant § 87 (1) 
shall remain unaffected. The resolution shall not be contestable pursuant to § 243.”  
The sudden introduction of the shareholder vote after almost a year of debates was surprising. 
Also because the legal literature
879
 rejected the EU Recommendation of an “either mandatory 
or advisory” vote on the “remuneration statement” by the annual general meeting (AGM880  
II. Background 
The general meeting plays a central role regarding say-on-pay. A recapitulation of its role and 
function seems helpful.  
1. General Meeting as the Shareholders’ Organ 
The general meeting is one of an AG’s three mandatory organs.881 It is the assembly of 
shareholders that is explicitly referred to as general meeting, is convened according to 
§§ 121ff. and which is conducted according to §§ 129, 130 and 133ff.
882
 It is the forum in 
which the shareholders can exercise most of their rights, § 118 (1). For instance they take note 
of reports and submissions, can use their right to speak or to information and can participate 
in the company’s decision-making through voting.883 The general meeting has the function of 
informing shareholders, enabling them to discuss matters, and deciding on specific issues.
884
  
                                                         
877 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG), BT-Drucks 16/12278, 1. 
878 Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) vom 31.7.2009, BGBl. I, 2509. 
879 cf. A Arnold, Die Steuerung des Vorstandshandelns (CH Beck, 2007), 150; M Hoffmann-Becking, “Wider die 
Entmachtung der Räte” (2006) 170 ZHR, 2-8, 3; KP Martens (fn.575567), 148; R Marsch-Barner (fn.599591), 410-413. 
880 Recommendation 2004/913/EC, lit 4.2., Recommendation 2009/385/EC, lit 6.1. 
881 MCJ Göhmann, “Die Hauptversammlung” in J Frodermann, D Janott (eds), Handbuch des Aktienrechts (8th ed, CF 
Müller, 2008), 443-568, 443. 
882 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 118 m.no.4. 
883 cf. §§ 131, 133ff. AktG. 
884 R Marsch-Barner in R Marsch-Barner, FA Schäfer (eds), Handbuch börsennotierte AG (2nd ed, Otto Schmidt, 2009), § 31, 
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It is the organ in which the company’s will is formed (Willensbildungsorgan) whereas the two 
boards are the acting organs (Handlungsorgane).
885
 
2. The Relationship between the General Meeting and the Boards 
The relationship between the three organs is non-hierarchical.
886
 The competences are clearly 
divided.
887
 The general meeting is excluded from the management of the company.
888
 
Similarly, despite electing the members of the supervisory board it cannot give orders 
regarding supervision.  
The general meeting monitors the company’s administration – meaning the two boards – by 
deciding on their resolution proposals and by resolving on the approval of their actions 
(Entlastung), § 120 (1).  
3. Competences of the General Meeting 
The general meeting’s main function is to make resolutions on matters which are allotted to it 
by law.
889
 § 119 (1) provides a non-exhaustive catalogue of subject-matters.
890
 Further such 
can be found in the AktG and other acts.
891
 Matters the general meeting decides on are, e.g. 
the Entlastung of the boards and the election of supervisory board members. In all these cases 
the general meeting’s competence is mandatory and a delegation to one of the boards is 
generally not allowed.
892
 
III. Objectives of § 120 IV AktG 
As a next step, the say-on-pay vote’s objectives will be examined. The legislator emphasised 
four main objectives:  
(1) The vote is intended to enable shareholders to monitor the remuneration system and to 
signal to the supervisory board the acceptance or refusal of the system albeit without having 
legally binding effects.
893
  
                                                         
885 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 118 m.no.3. 
886 ibid., § 118 m.no.4; G Reger in T Bürgers, T Körber (eds) (fn.645637), § 118, m.no.1; M Hoffmann-Becking, 
“‚Holzmüller’, ‚Gelatine’ und die These von der Mediatisierung der Aktionärsrechte” (2008) 172 ZHR, 231-238, 231. 
887 cf. §§ 76, 111 AktG. 
888 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 76 m.no.2. 
889 R Marsch-Barner in R Marsch-Barner, FA Schäfer (fn.895900), § 31, 1038. 
890 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 119 m.no.1. 
891 R Marsch-Barner in R Marsch-Barner, FA Schäfer (fn.895900), § 31, 1038. 
892 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 119 m.no.1; G Spindler in K Schmidt, M Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz: Kommentar 
(Otto Schmidt, 2008), § 119 m.no.2. 
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(2) The vote is intended to create “purely factual consequences”894 such as improved 
discussions on remuneration and public pressure. 
(3) The vote is meant to have a positive influence on the fulfilment of the supervisory board’s 
duties emanating from § 87 (“disciplinary effect”895). It is intended to ensure an adequate and 
effective control of the remuneration system.
896
  
(4) § 120 (4) is supposed to fulfil a corresponding EU Recommendation.
897
 
In the legal literature additional objectives have been identified: One is to enable the general 
meeting to discuss executive remuneration.
898
 Another is strengthening the general meeting’s 
role regarding the setting of executive remuneration.
899
 Increased transparency has been 
named as another goal.
900
 To some extent § 120 (4) is also aimed at protecting minority 
shareholders, since majority shareholders cannot exempt the supervisory board from liability 
for inadequate remuneration, given the fact that the vote has only factual consequences.
901
  
IV. Legal Framework 
Next, the regulatory framework in which the provision operates will be examined. Emphasis 
will be on the question of whether pre-existing rules offered shareholders the opportunity to 
voice their concerns regarding executive remuneration.  
1. Entlastung according to § 120 (1) AktG 
1.1. General 
Shareholders who are not content with the executive remuneration have – and already had 
before the VorstAG – the opportunity to refuse the approval of actions (Entlastung) of either 
the supervisory or the management board or both.
 902
 
Entlastung, § 120 (1), can be defined as the shareholders’ approval of the administration of 
the company.
903
 The shareholders approve the actions of the preceding financial year.
904
 
                                                         
894 ibid., 12. 
895 J Pluta, “§ 120” in T Heidel (ed) Aktienrecht und Kapitalmarktrecht (3rd ed, Nomos, 2011) m.no.31. 
896 Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses, BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
897 ibid., 12. 
898 F Drinhausen, A Keinath, “BB-Rechtsprechungs und Gesetzgebungsreport zum Hauptversammlungsrecht 2009” (2010) 
BB, 3-10, 7. 
899 H Conrad, O Panetta, “Neuerungen durch das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütungen” (2009) NJOZ, 
3199-3205, 3202. 
900 A Begemann, B Laue, “Der neue § 120 Abs. 4 AktG – ein zahnloser Tiger?” (2009) BB, 2442-2446, 2443. 
901 J Pluta, “§ 120” (fn.906911) m.no.33. 
902 cf. WP Schick, “Praxisfragen zum Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG” (2011) 32(13) ZIP, 
593-601, 594. 
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Hence, Enlastung has a component which is related to the past.
905
 Simultaneously, it has a 
future-related component as it constitutes a “vote of confidence” for the current financial 
year.
906
 
1.2. The Resolution 
The actions of all members of the management and the supervisory board who were active in 
the preceding financial year can be approved.
907
 The resolutions for the two boards have to be 
separate.
908
 The general meeting has the exclusive and non-transferrable competence to make 
resolutions on this matter.
909
  
Regarding executive remuneration the aforesaid means that shareholders who are not content 
with the managers’ remuneration could vote against the supervisory board’s Entlastung. 
However, refusing the approval of “the administration of the company” by the supervisory 
board merely because of discontent with its remuneration-setting may “overshoot the 
mark”910. 
1.3. Partial Approval? 
One solution could be a resolution that approves the administration of the company by the 
supervisory board in general but simultaneously disapproves certain aspects e.g. 
remuneration-setting.
911
 Whether such a partial approval is possible is highly debatable.
912
  
Some argue that a partial approval is not possible at all.
913
 Their main arguments are the 
wording of § 120 (1)
914
, the Entlastung’s concept915 and its “legal nature”916. The three points 
mean essentially the same, namely that Entlastung is by definition incompatible with a partial 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
903 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 120 m.no.2. 
904 BGH NJW 1986, 129; BGH WM 1977, 361. 
905 R Sethe, “Die aktienrechtliche Zulässigkeit der sogennanten ‚Teilentlastung’” (1996) 17(31) ZIP, 1321-1327, 1322. 
906 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 120 m.no.2. 
907 J Hoffmann in G Spindler, E Stilz (eds), Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (CH Beck, 2010), § 120 m.no.3. 
908 G Spindler, “§ 120” in K Schmidt, M Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz: Kommentar (Otto Schmidt, 2008), m.no.19; PO Mülbert, 
“§ 120” in K Hopt, H Wiedemann (fn.135128) m.no.121; U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 120 m.no.8; W Zöllner, “§ 
120” in W Zöllner, U Noack (eds), (fn.145138), m.no.13; J Pluta, “§ 120” (fn.906911) m.no.14. 
909 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 120 m.no.1. 
910 M Döll (fn.882887), 105. 
911 ibid., 105. 
912Opposing views: M Hoffmann-Becking, G Krieger, “Leitfaden zur Anwendung des Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der 
Vorstandsvergütung” (2009) Beilage NZG Heft 26/2009, 11; M Döll (fn.882887), 105. 
913 J Pluta, “§ 120” (fn.906911) m.no.22. 
914 R Sethe (fn.916921), 1322; M Schüppen, “Vorstandsvergütung – (K)ein Thema für die Hauptversammlung?” (2010) 
31(19) ZIP, 905-913, 907. 
915 D Kubis in B Kropff, J Semler (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (2nd ed, CH Beck, 2004), § 120, m.no.22. 
916 WP Schick (fn.913918), 599. 
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approval. An approval of parts of the administration would ultimately be no approval at all.
917
 
Moreover, there was no indication of a possibility of partial approval, either in the 
Entlastung’s genesis or in the travaux préparatoires.918 
Other authors argue in favour of a partial Entlastung. They advance the idea that the general 
meeting’s discretion regarding the Entlastung contained “as a minus” the option of separating 
(and refusing) certain aspects of it.
919
  
A mediating, widely shared view is that partial approval is possible insofar as factually or 
temporally delimitable aspects of the Entlastung can be separated.
920
 An aspect is delimitable 
if it concerns a certain isolated issue which does not “overshadow” the entire 
administration.
921
 Moreover, any actions left out of the approval process cannot concern the 
“core of the administration”922 i.e. the supervisory board’s central tasks and functions. 
Hence, the setting of the management board members’ remuneration by the supervisory board 
has to be delimitable. It is clearly separate from the supervisory board’s other tasks, such as 
supervising the management, § 111, or reporting to the general meeting, § 171 (2). 
Remuneration-setting is delimitable. 
The second question is whether the remuneration-setting belongs to the “core of the 
administration”. Many answer this in the affirmative.923 The appointment of management 
board members, which includes remuneration-setting, has been described as one of the “most 
important tasks fulfilled by the supervisory board”924. It is the supervisory board’s “core 
competence”925 and clearly belongs to the “core of administration”. Partial approval is 
impossible. 
Even if one accepts the possibility of partial approval in general, approval of all supervisory 
board actions except the remuneration decision is impossible. Correspondingly, in practice 
partial approval of the management’s remuneration has not been attempted.926  
                                                         
917 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 907. 
918 R Sethe (fn.916921), 1322. 
919 D Kubis (fn.926931), § 120, m.no.22. 
920 V Butzke, “Entlastung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat” in W Werner et al (eds), Die Hauptversammlung der 
Aktiengesellschaft (5th ed, Schäffer-Poeschel, 2011), 362; U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 120 m.no.12. 
921 R Sethe (fn.916921), 1324. 
922 T Liebscher, “§ 120” in M Hennsler, L Strohn (eds), Gesellschaftsrecht (CH Beck, 2011), m.no.8. 
923 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 907; WP Schick (fn.913918), 599. 
924 M Lutter, G Krieger, Rechte und Pflichten des Aufsichtsrats (fn.165158), 131 m.no.331. 
925 R Marsch-Barner (fn.599591), 413; E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss über das Vergütungssystem 
nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG” (2009) 45 ZIP Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2136-2143, 2137. 
926 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher, “Erste Erfahrungen mit dem Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung” (2010) 17 AG, 623-
629, 623; M Döll (fn.882887), 105. 
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§ 120 (4) really offers something different to § 120 (1). 
2. Resolution according to § 119 (2) AktG 
A second alternative could be a resolution according to § 119 (2).  
2.1. Competence  
Following § 119 (2) the management board can require the general meeting to decide on 
management issues.  
However, the management board can only require the general meeting to make resolutions on 
issues, which could be decided by the management board itself.
927
 The management board 
does not have the competence to determine its members’ remuneration.  
Could the supervisory board require the general meeting to make resolutions on management 
issues? The supervisory board does not have this competence.
928
 There is, first, the wording 
of § 119 (2) which clearly states that the management board can require the general meeting 
to make resolutions on a management matter. Secondly, the relevant travaux préparatoires
929
 
state that otherwise the supervisory board could take away the management of the company 
from the management board by letting the general meeting decide on management matters.
 930
  
However, regarding management decisions that are original decisions of the supervisory 
board the situation is more ambiguous. The objective of § 119 (2) is, first, to exclude the 
general meeting from management decisions unless the legally competent organ for this 
decision requires it to decide on it.
931
 Second, the provision’s purpose is to enable the organ 
which is legally competent to decide on a management issue to exclude its liability vis-à-vis 
the company via a general meeting resolution on the issue.
932
 
These purposes could arguably be held to be equally fulfilled when applied to the supervisory 
board for cases in which it has the (original) competence to make a management decision, as 
it has with regard to remuneration-setting.
933
  
                                                         
927 D Kubis (fn.926931) § 119, m.no.46. 
928 ibid., m.no.46; U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 119, m.no.13. 
929 BT-Drucks. 4/171, 147. 
930 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 909. 
931 cf. BT-Drucks. IV/171, 147; BGH 21.4.1960 – II ZR 126/58, NJW 1960, 803.  
932 BGH 21.4.1960 – II ZR 126/58, NJW 1960, 803.  
933 cf. M Schüppen (fn.925930), 909. 
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2.2. Possibility of Requiring a Resolution on the Matter 
The second question is whether the general meeting would make resolutions on a 
“management decision” as required by § 119 (2).  
The resolution’s subject has to be stated more precisely. Could it be the remuneration system, 
as in § 120 (4)? The remuneration system is only an abstract set of rules on how management 
board members should be remunerated.
934
 It constitutes a preparatory and explanatory step but 
is not in itself a management decision.
935
  
Hence, a resolution identical to § 120 (4) was not already possible. 
3. Shareholder Approval 
The general meeting has further options to influence executive remuneration. If, as part of the 
remuneration, shares or share options are to be granted via a conditional capital increase, the 
general meeting’s prior approval is required, §§ 192 (1), 193. Performance targets, acquisition 
and exercise periods and the waiting period for first exercise have to be part of the resolution 
as well, §§ 192 (2) no. 3, 193 (2) no. 4. The decision as to whether a management board 
member receives share options as part of its remuneration package is still the supervisory 
board’s competence. 936 The general meeting has merely indirect influence by designing the 
share option scheme.
937
 Furthermore, the shareholders have indirect influence if the 
company’s own shares are to be acquired for share options, § 71 (1) no. 8.938  
The shareholder approval requirements clearly differ from § 120 (4) and are of limited impact 
because the shareholders can influence the managers’ remuneration only indirectly.939 
4. Provisions on Executive Remuneration in the Articles 
A final question is whether it is possible to state in the articles that the general meeting can 
determine executive remuneration. 
This would give the shareholders maximal influence on executive remuneration. However, 
§ 23 (5) sentence 1 provides that articles “may contain different provisions from the 
provisions of the [AktG] only if [the AktG] explicitly so permits”. If the articles transferred the 
supervisory board’s remuneration competence upon the general meeting it would constitute a 
                                                         
934 cf. J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 627. 
935 ibid., 627. 
936 A Arnold (fn.890895), 151. 
937 T Grattenthaler (fn.228223), 75. 
938 L Wieneke in T Bürgers, T Körber (eds), Heidelberger Kommentar Aktienrecht (2nd ed, CF Müller, 2011), § 71, m.no.42. 
939 Similar: J Hupka, Das Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung (Heymanns, 2012), 216. 
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provision which differs from § 84 (1) AktG. There is no permission for this in the AktG. 
Rather, the provisions on the competences of the organs are mandatory provisions that cannot 
be altered by the articles.
940
 
5. Summary 
The analysis has shown that options to voice discontent existed before the 2009 reform, but 
all the examined options differ from § 120 (4).  
V. § 120 (4) AktG in Detail 
The focus will now shift to § 120 (4). 
1. Personal Scope 
Listed companies’ general meetings can decide on the remuneration system, § 120 (4). The 
legislator stated that, for smaller, non-listed companies, such an elaborate regulation would 
not be necessary.
941
 Listed companies face distinct governance and monitoring problems, 
employ particularly complex remuneration structures and play a special role in society, being 
in the public focus and being a model for other organisations.
942
 For non-listed public 
companies the self-interest of the usually more limited number of shareholders should ensure 
adequate remuneration being set, as the shareholders have better links to the administration.
943
 
Finally, due to the fact that § 120 (4) relies on the extensive disclosure of information on 
remuneration by listed companies, such a vote would be less meaningful regarding non-listed 
companies which do not have to fulfil the extensive disclosure obligations.
944
 
2. Right of Initiative 
The fact that the general meeting can decide on the remuneration system does not mean it can 
act of its own accord.
945
 A corresponding item in the agenda and a “proposal for resolution” 
by the administration or the request by a qualified shareholder minority is necessary.
946
 
                                                         
940 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 23, rectial 36; G Wiesner, “§6 Satzung” in M Hoffmann-Becking (ed), Münchener 
Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts. Band 4: Aktiengesellschaft (3rd ed, CH Beck, 2007) , m.no.10. 
941 BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
942 cf. M Döll (fn.882887), 106. 
943 J Pluta, “§ 120”(fn.906911) m.no.30. 
944 M Döll, (fn.882887), 106. 
945 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 120, rectial 21. 
946 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 625ff. 
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2.1. Item on the Agenda 
The general meeting can only discuss and make resolutions on the remuneration system if its 
agenda contains the given item.
947
 Generally, the agenda is set by the one who convenes the 
general meeting, § 121 (3) sentence 2, i.e. usually the management board, 
§ 121 (2) sentence 1.
948
 Thus, generally the management board can put the remuneration vote 
on the agenda.
949
 
2.2. Initiative by the Administration 
2.2.1. Competence 
For every item on the agenda, both management and supervisory board have to make a 
“proposal for a resolution” (Beschlussvorschlag), § 124 (3) sentence 1. 
Parts of the literature regard the management board’s involvement for proposals regarding § 
120 (4) as “unfortunate”950 and argue that only the supervisory board should be allowed 
submit a proposal.
951
 The management board could otherwise have influence regarding its 
own remuneration. It was “functionally not competent” to decide on its own remuneration.952 
The supervisory board should have an “isolated” right to propose resolutions according to § 
124 (3) sentence 1 half sentence 2 analogous.
953
 
This is unconvincing. It is widely accepted that the exceptions in § 124 (3) sentence 1 half-
sentence 2 constitute an exhaustive enumeration.
954
 The conditions for an analogous 
application are not given.
955
 The argument that the management board is “functionally not 
competent” is unconvincing as well. First, the supervisory board submits proposals for the 
resolution on the supervisory board remuneration. One would have to think of the supervisory 
board as being “functionally not competent” in such a case as well but such a suggestion has 
                                                         
947 F Drinhausen, A Keinath (fn.909914), 7; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski, “‘Say on Pay’ im deutschen Aktienrecht: Das 
Vergütungsvotum der Hauptversammlung nach § 120 Abs. 4 AktG” (2009) 54(19) AG, 677-686, 680; M Hoffmann-Becking, 
G Krieger (fn.923928), 11. 
948 FJ Semler, “§ 35” (fn.155148), m.no.38. 
949 cf. § 120 (4) sentence 1: “can”. 
950 M Döll, (fn.882887), 107. 
951 C Bosse “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) – Überblick und Handlungsbedarf” (2009) 
BB, 1650-1654, 1653; J Redenius-Hövermann, “Das Votum zum Vergütungssystem” (2009) Der Aufsichtsrat, 173-175, 174. 
952 ibid., 1653. 
953 ibid., 1653. 
954 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 626. 
955 E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss” (fn.936941), 2139. 
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not yet been made.
956
 Second, being functionally not competent could also be said regarding 
proposals for the Entlastung, but still both boards submit proposals for it.
957
  
Hence, both boards present proposals for the resolution on the remuneration system.
958
  
2.2.2. Obligation to Enable Resolution? 
Generally, the boards are not obliged to put the shareholder vote on the agenda, as the 
provision’s wording indicates and the travaux préparatoires clearly state.959 The 
administration has discretion. 
2.2.2.1. Limited Discretion 
The question arises whether this discretion can be limited and whether the competence to set a 
shareholder vote on the agenda could turn into an obligation. This has to be judged according 
to the general rules.
960
 The yardstick for this decision for the management board is contained 
in § 121 (1) alt 3 and for the supervisory board in § 111 (3).
961
 Both refer to the interest of the 
company (Wohl der Gesellschaft). Hence, just under exceptional circumstances the 
administration could be obliged to set the vote on the remuneration system on the agenda.
962
  
In the literature it is rarely discussed when the administration’s discretion is reduced.963 A 
reduction of the discretion to zero meaning an obligation is generally denied.
964
  
2.2.2.2. Obligation in the Articles 
Another option to make the vote obligatory could be amending the articles so that it would be 
required as a periodical standard item on company’s AGMs.965 Whether this is possible is 
determined by § 23 (5) sentence 2, which permits additional provisions in the articles to the 
existing legal provisions unless the law contains an exhaustive regulation of the matter. A 
provision is additional if the existing provision does not have that regulatory content or if the 
existing provision’s regulatory idea is furthered.966  
                                                         
956 WP Schick (fn.913918),, 600. 
957 ibid., 600. 
958 E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss” (fn.936941), 2139; WP Schick (fn.913918), 600. 
959 BT-Drucks. 13/13433, 12. 
960 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 680. 
961 G Spindler, “§ 120” (fn.919924), m.no.58. 
962 ibid., m.no.58; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 680. 
963 M Döll (fn.882887), 107; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 680. 
964 ibid. 
965 cf. § 119 (1) alt 2. 
966 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 23, rectial 37. 
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Making the vote a standard item for AGMs and thereby requiring it to be put on the agenda 
regularly seems possible.
967
 It would not deviate from or contradict the legal provisions. 
Rather it would be an addition furthering the regulatory idea of § 120 (4).  
2.3. Initiative by a Minority of Shareholders 
If the management board does not put the vote on the agenda, a qualified minority of 
shareholders can demand it, § 122 (2).  
2.3.1. Conditions 
There are three conditions for a shareholder initiative:  
(1) The required quorum has to be fulfilled. Shareholders whose aggregate shares amount to 
no less than one-twentieth of the company’s share capital or who represent an amount of 
€500,000 of the share capital can demand that an item is put on the agenda and published, 
§ 122 (2) sentence 1. The applicants for the minority request have to prove that they were 
owners of the shares for at least three months prior to the general meeting and that they hold 
the shares until the decision, §§ 122 (1), (2), 142 (2) sentence 2. 
(2) The minority has to provide an explanation or a proposal for a resolution, 
§ 122 (2) sentence 2. 
 (3) The minority has to submit its demand to the company at least 30 days prior to the 
general meeting, § 122 (2) sentence 3. 
2.3.2. Consequences 
If a general meeting is still not convened despite a successful minority request, the court can 
empower the minority to convene the general meeting, § 121 (3). However, even if the 
request is successful and the vote is put on the agenda, the general meeting can decide to 
remove the item from the agenda and not to vote on the matter.
968
 
3. Subject-matter of the Resolution (Beschlussgegenstand) 
3.1. The “System of Remuneration” 
The next thing that will be examined is what, precisely, the general meeting can take 
resolutions on. The often used terms “say-on-pay” and “Vergütungsvotum” (“remuneration 
                                                         
967 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 911. 
968 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 122, m.no.9. 
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vote”) are misleading. The resolution does not concern the actual pay of managers, rather the 
“system for the remuneration of management board members”.  
However, the meaning of “remuneration system” is unclear.969 The AktG does not state 
(directly) what such a system is.
970
 The travaux préparatoires offer interpretative help stating 
that the formulation “system for remuneration” in § 120 (4) follows the one in 4.2.3. and 
4.2.5. GCGC.
971
 The reference to the GCGC, however, is unfortunate as it refers to the 
provisions of a private body for the interpretation of a statutory provision.
972
  
§ 289 (2) no 5 HGB could offer further help.
973
 It recommends that listed companies report 
the main features of the remuneration system in the management report. Yet, as 
aforementioned regarding this provision the details are not entirely clear either.
974
 
Based on this (limited) interpretative help “remuneration system” in § 120 (4) should be 
interpreted as the “abstract and general overall concept”, which guides the supervisory board 
when setting the management board members’ individual and precise remuneration,975 i.e. the 
remuneration policy.
976
 
3.2. Temporal Dimension 
Following the travaux préparatoires, the resolution concerns the approval of the existing 
remuneration system. Thus, the resolution is related to the past.
977
 Thereby the legislator 
ensured that the supervisory board’s decision on the remuneration setting is not anticipated.978  
In practice, the threat of a possible negative vote, however, may induce the supervisory board 
to consult shareholders prior to the resolution. Hence, like the closely related Entlastung, the 
say-on-pay resolution has a future-related aspect.
979
  
4. Informational Basis of the Resolution 
The question arises on which informational basis the general meeting decides.  
                                                         
969 KS Hohenstatt, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (2009) ZIP, 1349-1358, 1356; G Annuß, I 
Theusinger, “Das VorstAG – Praktische Hinweise zum Umgang mit dem neuen Recht” (2009) BB, 2434-2442, 2439. 
970 E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss” (fn.936941), 2137. 
971 BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
972 M Döll (fn.882887), 108. 
973 E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss” (fn.936941), 2138. 
974 cf. above. 
975 B Deilmann, S Otte, “‘Say on Pay’ – erste Erfahrungen der Hauptversammlungspraxis” (2010) DB, 545-547, 546; H 
Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 682. 
976 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 682; M Döll (fn.882887), 109; J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher, (fn.937942), 625. 
977 G Spindler, “§ 120” (fn.919924), m.no.61; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski, (fn.958963), 681. 
978 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 681. 
979 G Spindler, “§ 120” (fn.919924), m.no.61. 
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Generally, the information on the management board members’ remuneration system in the 
management report, § 289 (2) no 5 HGB, and the remuneration report, 4.2.5. GCGC, should 
suffice as informational basis for the resolution.
980
  
The general meeting does not have a claim to have the remuneration system disclosed as a 
basis for its resolution.
981
 The legislator considered it to be sufficient to rely on self-
regulation.
982
  
In practice, reference is usually made to the remuneration report or the management report 
and sometimes the system is explained in the invitation to the general meeting.
983
  
5. Approval  
Following the general rules a simple majority – meaning a majority of the votes cast – 
suffices for approval, § 133 (1).  
6. Consequences 
6.1. Legal Consequences 
First the legal consequences of the resolution will be examined. 
The resolution on the remuneration system does not cause any rights or duties, § 120 (4) 
sentence 2. It is non-binding and purely consultative.
984
 Disapproval of the remuneration 
system neither renders the existing remuneration agreements invalid nor has it any other legal 
effect on them. 
It is even doubtful whether the validity of remuneration components could contractually be 
made conditional on an approval.
985
 Against the background of the supervisory board’s 
exclusive competence this seems impossible as the supervisory board would bind itself to a 
decision of the general meeting and could thereby breach its duty to independently set the 
remuneration.
986
 
                                                         
980 F Drinhausen, A Keinath (fn.909914), 10; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 682. 
981 G Reger (fn.897902), § 120 m.no.21. 
982 BT-Drucks. 16/13433. 
983 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 627. 
984 U Seibert, “Das VorstAG – Regelungen zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung und zum Aufsichtsrat” (2009) 
63(32) WM, 1489-1493, 1491. 
985 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 684. 
986 ibid., 684. 
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What are the resolution’s (legal) effects on the supervisory board? The supervisory board is 
not obliged to change the remuneration system.
987
 Also the supervisory board’s duties under § 
87 remain unaffected. The supervisory board members remain liable to pay damages if they 
set excessive remuneration which is in breach of § 87 (1), as § 116 (3) – declaratorily988 – 
states.
989
 According to the travaux préparatoires this should also ensure a protection of the 
shareholder minority.
990
 
6.2. Factual Consequences 
In the absence of legal consequences factual consequences shall achieve the desired results.
991
 
One potential factual consequence is negative coverage in the media. The so-called “power of 
the pen”992 and the fear of reputational damage shall be effective against excessive 
remuneration.
993
 Severe criticism by shareholders shall induce a change of mind in the 
supervisory board or the manager regarding remuneration.
994
 
A negative vote does not “automatically” lead to changes to the system as remuneration-
setting remains the supervisory board’s autonomous decision.995 The absence of an 
“automatic” adaptation to shareholder wishes is not necessarily negative as de lege lata 
shareholders may not interfere with remuneration-setting.
996
 Also, shareholders’ interests 
cannot readily be equated with the interest of the company.
997
 
Finally, the question arises how the managers’ service contract can be adjusted following a 
negative vote or serious opposition. The easiest way is to adjust successively when forming 
new contracts. An adjustment temporally closer to the criticism could be possible in two 
ways: (1) a consensual adjustment of the existing contract,
998
 or (2) the supervisory board 
leaves room for adjustment when concluding the contract,
999
 e.g. through shorter contract 
                                                         
987 F Drinhausen, A Keinath (fn.909914), 7. 
988 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 908. 
989 U Seibert, “Das VorstAG” (fn.9951000), 1489; J v Kann, A Keiluweit, “Das neue Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der 
Vorstandsvergütung” (2009) DStR, 1587-1592., 1588. 
990 BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
991 ibid., 12. 
992 Expression coined by JE Corel, W Guay, DF Larcker, “The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation” (2008) 88(1) 
JFinancEcon, 1-25, 1. 
993 M Döll (fn.882887), 110. 
994 cf. H Fleischer, “Das Vorstandsvergütungs-Offenlegungsgesetz” (fn.542534), 1612; but critical JE Corel, W Guay, DF 
Larcker (fn.10031008), 1. 
995 M Döll (fn.882887), 110. 
996 E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss” (fn.936941), 2142. 
997 M Döll (fn.882887), 110. 
998 G Thüsing, “§ 5. Abberufung und Kündigung der Anstellung des Vorstands ” in H Fleischer (ed),  Handbuch (fn.129122), 
m.no.39. 
999 M Döll (fn.882887), 110. 
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periods, a revocation clause (Widerrufsvorbehalt)
1000
 or a re-negotiation clause 
(Nachverhandlungsklausel)
1001
.  
VI. Evaluation of § 120 (4) AktG 
1. Introduction  
As a next step, § 120 (4) will be evaluated. In particular it will be examined whether 
commentators were right who called the vote a “toothless tiger”1002 which merely increased 
the general meeting’s “entertainment value”1003.  
Initially, criticism and concerns were widespread. Some thought the vote would hardly ever 
be put on the general meeting agendas
1004
 and would therefore have no practical relevance.
1005
 
Others questioned whether factual consequences alone would suffice.
1006
 There were fears 
that the vote and the preceding discussions would hinder the effective conduct of AGMs.
1007
 
Also doubts regarding its compatibility with AGs’ traditional governance structure1008 and 
regarding the general meeting’s qualification1009 were voiced.  
Now, with the experience of several general meeting seasons, a more substantiated evaluation 
will be presented. It will first focus on the § 120 (4) itself, its strengths and weaknesses and 
then the question of systematic inconsistency. Subsequently, the provision’s effectiveness in 
theory and practice and its ability to fulfil its objectives will be analysed before looking at 
future developments. 
2. Merits and Shortcomings 
2.1. Additional Value 
One of the main criticisms regarding the § 120 (4) vote is that the provision was unnecessary. 
Even before the reforms, managers’ remuneration could be discussed at general meetings and 
shareholders could signal their (dis-)approval of the manager’s remuneration. 
                                                         
1000 ibid., 110. 
1001 G Thüsing, “§ 6. Vergütung des Vorstands” in H Fleischer (ed), Handbuch (fn.129122), m.no.38ff. 
1002 A Begemann, B Laue (fn.911916), 3; M Schüppen (fn.925930), 907. 
1003 M Habersack, “VorstAG und mitbestimmte GmbH – eine unglückliche Beziehung” (2010) 174 ZHR, 2-11, 3. 
1004 U Noack, “Vorstandsvergütung – eine endlose Geschichte” (2009) BB, 1, 1. 
1005 C Förster, “Aktionärsrechte in der Hauptversammlung – quo vaditis?” (2011) AG, 362-373, 368. 
1006 J Jahn, “Das VorstAG – neue Vorschriften gegen „unangemessene“ Managerbezüge” (2009) GWR, 135-137, 136; A 
Begemann, B Laue (fn.911916), 2446. 
1007 WP Schick (fn.913918), 593. 
1008 Inter alia KS Hohenstatt (fn.980985), 1356; JC Nicolay, “Die neuen Vorschriften zur Vorstandsvergütung – Detaillierte 
Regelungen und offene Fragen” (2009) NJW, 2640-2647, 2645. 
1009 Prior to the reform already A Arnold (fn.890895), 149; KP Martens (fn.575567), 149. 
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However, as seen above the resolution pursuant to § 120 (4) has the advantage that it offers a 
clear statement as to the shareholders’ view on remuneration. As a special consultative right 
with its focus on the remuneration system it is more precise and better suited to positively 
influence the remuneration policy of the company than the Entlastung. Being a separate item 
on the agenda is beneficial for the discussion of remuneration and the Entlastung. The latter 
could otherwise lose some of its informational value if overshadowed by discontent with the 
management’s remuneration. 
§ 120 (4) provides shareholders with a better and more precise instrument to monitor 
remuneration. It has indeed an additional value. 
2.2. Non-Mandatory 
The legislator did not elaborate on the reasons for opting for a non-mandatory solution. 
Would a mandatory, annual vote on the remuneration system be advantageous? 
For a mandatory, annual resolution on the remuneration system it could be argued that the 
effectiveness of § 120 (4) depends largely on the management board as it has primary 
responsibility for putting the resolution on the general meeting’s agenda. Shareholders have to 
fulfil a relatively high quorum to put the vote on the agenda. Moreover, rational apathy 
problems exist. Even if a shareholder minority sets the vote on the agenda, the majority can 
remove it. A mandatory provision could lift the burden of initiative of the shareholders and 
make the instrument’s success less dependent on the administration.  
It could be argued that especially repeated, periodic votes could force the supervisory board to 
deal with the adequacy of the management remuneration continuously. Permanent pressure to 
justify the remuneration makes the supervisory board deal with particular diligence. It will 
take care to be able to react to negative votes e.g. by agreeing on short term contracts only. 
Often the true character of a remuneration contract becomes evident over time so that the 
shareholders should be able to voice their discontent as soon as they notice a negative 
agreement instead of having to wait until the remuneration system is changed and a new vote 
is initiated. Finally, it could be argued that mandatory votes could increase the shareholders’ 
experience with remuneration issues in the long run and, therefore, be beneficial for the 
control of management remuneration by the shareholders. 
Then again, the purpose of mandatory annual voting on the remuneration system may be 
questioned if the remuneration system has not been changed since the last vote. AGMs would 
be extended by yet another mandatory item. Remuneration is also a particularly controversial 
 176 
 
issue so that lengthy debates could take up time, which could be spent more efficiently on 
other topics.  
The debate on (non-)mandatoriness might be less relevant in practice than expected. As early 
as 2010, the year after the provision’s introduction, all but three DAX30-companies held a § 
120 (4) vote.
1010
 In 2011 the shareholders of all DAX30-companies had the opportunity to 
vote.
1011
 In most cases the administration put the vote on the agenda. Reasons could be 
internal factors, e.g. the administration wants to stay in charge of the agenda and wants to 
avoid being accused of shying away from a discussion.
1012
 Also external factors such as the 
effort of institutional investors and shareholder organisations for the vote are possible. 
The prediction that the provision would not be used has been falsified. However, a distinction 
should be made between major listed companies like DAX30 ones and smaller ones listed in 
other indices. For example only 62% of MDAX companies voted on the remuneration system 
in 2010.
1013
 By 2011 it had increased to 78%.
1014
 In the segments for smaller companies the 
percentage of companies whose shareholders voted was significantly more limited – in the 
TecDAX and SDAX 46% and 22% respectively.
1015
 One reason could be different 
shareholder structures, namely dispersed ownership in DAX30-companies, which have a free 
float of about 83% compared with block-holdings in the smaller SDAX with a free float of 
about 42%,
1016
 along with a greater role of international investors (DAX30: 52.6%) compared 
with mainly German shareholders.
1017
 A second reason could be the difference in media 
attention. A third could be the size of the remuneration packages, which tend to grow with the 
company’s size. 
Despite not being mandatory the vote has become a standard item on the agenda for big 
companies.
1018
 Thus, although theoretically the arguments for a mandatory vote seem 
convincing, in practice the need for it is less evident. Possibly the best solution would be to 
                                                         
1010 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 623; cf also M Eulerich et al, “Ausgewählte Aspekte der Vorstandsvergütung: 
Say-on-Pay-Abstimmungen im Rahmen der Hauptversammlung – Ergebnisse einer empirischen Analyse der HV-Saison 
2010” (2012) HHL Research Paper Series in Corporate Governance No 07<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998813> accessed 18 
September 2014, 4. 
1011 DSW, “Say on Pay: 78% aller MDAX Unternehmen stimmen über Vergütung ab / Bei SDAX Unternehmen herrscht 
noch ein Nachholbedarf ” (2011) <http://www.dsw-info.de/Pressemitteilungen-2011.1774.0.html> accessed 18 September 
2014, 1. 
1012 B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 545. 
1013 M Eulerich et al (fn.10211026), 4. 
1014 DSW (fn.10221027), 1. 
1015 ibid., 1. 
1016 J Lieder, P Fischer, “The Say-on-Pay Movement – Evidence From a Comparative Perspective” (2011) ECFR, 376-421, 
412. 
1017 ibid., 412. 
1018 M Eulerich et al (fn.10211026), 4 
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explicitly allow companies to require annual votes on the remuneration system in their 
articles, since annual mandatory voting can have its merits. Smaller companies that have 
different ways to communicate with their (majority) shareholders would not be obliged to 
waste resources on organising the vote whilst bigger companies could require it.  
2.3. Non-Binding 
The vote pursuant § 120 (4) is non-binding. Against a binding vote it could be argued that it 
would conflict with the strict allocation and separation of competences in AGs. The 
supervisory board is competent to set remuneration independently, which includes 
independence from the shareholders. A binding vote could compromise this independence. 
Moreover, a strengthened general meeting would imply that the supervisory board, and with it 
the workforce representatives that represent other stakeholders, lose influence.
1019
 It could be 
seen as another step in the direction of shareholder value.  
Moreover, a binding vote could be unnecessary, since a non-binding vote on the agenda leads 
to more discussions on management remuneration and greater interest of shareholders and the 
public in the topic. Factual consequences could compensate for the lack of legal 
consequences. The vote could be considered to have quasi-binding effects due to public 
pressure on the supervisory board. The bigger and more well-known the company is and the 
better the coverage of the media is, the greater the pressure can be. This can also be supported 
by the finding that bigger companies’ administrations generally are more willing to let 
shareholders vote on the remuneration system.
1020
  
A binding effect could, furthermore, be seen as less important, since an actual negative 
resolution would be rare anyway. In practice, already 10%
1021
 of negative votes are very 
critically reported by the media, and with 20%
1022
 of negative votes the supervisory board is 
inclined to react swiftly. Company-specific thresholds and reactions could be considered 
advantageous. 
Nevertheless, companies’ administrations which are strong and do not have to fear being 
dismissed can ignore the vote.
1023
 The supervisory board is not obliged to act on it. The vote 
therefore cannot – and is not intended to – be a means to coerce the general meeting to 
                                                         
1019 D Hexel, “Stellungnahme des DGB zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” 
<http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1373&id=1136> accessed 18 September 2014, 12. 
1020 M Eulerich et al (fn.10211026), 4. 
1021 B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 547. 
1022 ibid., 547; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 685. 
1023 P Jaspers (fn.355350), 10. 
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enforce its interests vis-à-vis the administration. The non-binding nature weakens the vote’s 
ability to ensure adequate remuneration.  
2.4. Systematic Inconsistency? 
The possibility of interference by the general meeting through a resolution on the 
remuneration system could be considered to be systematically inconsistent with the allocation 
of competences in the AG.
1024
 It is the supervisory board’s exclusive task to find and 
remunerate talented managers whilst it is the general meeting’s task to find the right 
supervisors to do this. The division of tasks ensures an independent and responsible 
administration of the company. Undesirable developments such as excessive remuneration 
should not lead to rash changes to proven remedies. § 120 (4) could be seen as an “unjustified 
systematic inconsistency” which disturbs the well-balanced distribution of competences 
between the organs.
1025
  
Then again, the exclusive responsibility of the supervisory board for the management 
remuneration is neither dogmatically nor from a legal policy point of view compelling.
1026
 
Competences can be changed – especially if the supervisory board does not fulfil the task 
more effectively than the shareholders.
1027
 
2.5. Further Strengths and Weaknesses 
A strength of § 120 (4) is that it considers the protection of minority shareholders by not 
exempting the liability of the supervisory board. Otherwise the majority could agree on 
excessive remuneration to the detriment of the minority. Moreover, by excluding 
contestability of the resolution it prevents the instrument’s abuse. More generally, the 
resolution and its preparation can intensify the dialogue between the company’s 
administration and the shareholders. Ensuring adequate remuneration with a shareholder vote 
is deemed to have an effect on the remuneration of highly paid employees of the company.
1028
 
The thrust of § 120 (4) is positive. The empowerment of shareholders who in the long run pay 
for the manager’s remuneration could be regarded as a particularly effective means to ensure 
adequate management remuneration. 
                                                         
1024 A Begemann, B Laue (fn.911916), 2446; M Hoffmann-Becking (fn.890895), 6; M Schüppen (fn.925930), 905; J v Kann, 
A Keiluweit (fn.10001005), 1588. 
1025 M Hoffmann-Becking (fn.890895), 6. 
1026 P Jaspers (fn.355350), 9. 
1027 ibid., 9. 
1028 KS Hohenstatt (fn.980985), 1349. 
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However, the absence of a negative vote can easily be misinterpreted as an indicator of 
adequate remuneration. The mechanism faces problems such as rational apathy. It could be 
argued that even the legislator was not entirely convinced by § 120 (4), given its non-binding 
character and the exclusion of contestability. Furthermore, § 120 (4) merely allows an 
“approve or disapprove” decision. Such a resolution lacks meaning. Yet the supervisory board 
is likely to get the reasons for the result through informal channels. Also, the vote can be seen 
as inconsistent with other reforms of recent years, e.g. it impedes the UMAG-reform’s1029 
intention to limit the length of general meetings.
1030
 The provision could also lead to 
inefficient one-size-fits-all-solutions if institutional investors tried to install the same 
remuneration system in different companies leaving no room for particularities. Finally, the 
quorum could be a weakness. It seems high considering that the instrument has no legal 
consequences.  
3. Effectiveness  
Central to the evaluation of § 120 (4) is the question of whether the introduced mechanism is 
an effective instrument for preventing excessive remuneration. Because theory and practice 
can differ, both will be examined. 
3.1. Theory 
The main argument against the vote’s effectiveness is the lack of legal consequences. The 
supervisory board can ignore the vote. However, simultaneously the vote does not exempt the 
supervisory board from liability for setting excessive remuneration. The threat of liability 
could incentivise the supervisory board not to set unnecessarily high remuneration.  
Also, factual consequences could be even more effective than legal consequences, as there is 
no definite threshold for them. For each company the ideal threshold at which the supervisory 
board should respond to shareholder discontent differs. Simultaneously, the vote offers the 
supervisory board a clear indicator of what the shareholders think of the remuneration system. 
Ignoring it could lead to the supervisory board’s dismissal. 
Furthermore, the “power of the pen” should not be underestimated. Negative media coverage 
could be harmful to both the company and the career prospects of managers and supervisors. 
Even the possibility of reputational damage can have disciplining effects.
1031
  
                                                         
1029 Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts, BGBl. I 2005/2802. 
1030 cf. KS Hohenstatt (fn.980985), 1349. 
1031 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 911. Feldfunktion geändert
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Moreover, having a voice leads to greater shareholder interest in remuneration. Strengthening 
the shareholders is the “most effective means” 1032 to ensure adequate management board 
remuneration. Their ability to effectively decide on remuneration has already been proven 
with respect to supervisory board remuneration according to § 113. 
The vote’s effectiveness, however, is limited in cases where multi-year contracts have been 
agreed with the managers. The supervisory board would face difficulties reacting swiftly to a 
negative vote even if it wanted to. 
Altogether, in theory the vote on the remuneration system can be an effective instrument for 
preventing excessive remuneration.  
3.2. Practice 
In practice supervisory boards react quickly even if the percentage of disapproving 
shareholders is relatively low, e.g. 20 %.
1033
 This can be explained with usual approval rates 
of over 90%
1034
 and the fact that even 10% of disapproving votes cause negative reports in the 
media.
1035
 The vote has been widely accepted from the beginning and has become standard 
practice at least for DAX30-companies.
1036
 Usually the administration puts the vote on the 
agenda but shareholder initiatives have been made as well.
1037
 Hence, it can be said that the 
vote has exceeded the expectations. The general opinion in the literature is more positive now, 
admitting that the vote can contribute to the improvement of remuneration governance.
1038
 Its 
use also indicates that the shareholders perceive it as an effective instrument.  
Then again, participation in the votes is relatively low – according to an empirical study on 
average 57% in the DAX30 and 65% in the MDAX
1039
 – so that the interest of the 
shareholders could be questioned. Furthermore, there are no empirical studies yet which prove 
that the vote leads to more adequate remuneration.  
A look at the case of HeidelbergCement AG, the DAX30-company, whose remuneration 
system was rejected by the general meeting, will shed light on the consequences in practice. 
At the 2010 AGM of HeidelbergCement only 46% of the shareholders voted for the 
                                                         
1032 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116), 525. 
1033 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 685. 
1034 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 623-624. 
1035 M Schüppen (fn.925930), 907. 
1036 M Eulerich et al (fn.10211026), 7; DSW (fn.10221027), 1. 
1037 B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 545. 
1038 e.g. H Fleischer, “Regulierungsinstrumente der Managervergütung in rechtsvergleichender Perspektive” (2010) 56(8) 
RIW, 497-503, 501; D Wilm, “Beobachtungen der Hauptversammlungssaison 2010” (2010) 31 DB, 1686-1693, 1687. 
1039 M Eulerich et al (fn.10211026), 7. 
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
 181 
 
remuneration system whilst 54% voted against it.
1040
 The reasons given were a lack of 
transparency, a lack of linkage to sustainable growth and doubling the remuneration for the 
management board over the preceding year.
1041
 The influence of the dominant shareholder, a 
family, had been reduced and the other shareholders, especially international investment 
funds, demanded a stronger link between the variable remuneration and the share value and 
individualised disclosure of management board members’ remuneration (the general meeting 
had opted out of individualised disclosure).
1042
 Also due to a lack of information on the 
system investors voted against it.
1043
 The negative vote was widely reported.  
Shortly after the vote, in May 2010 HeidelbergCement’s supervisory board announced that it 
would present a new remuneration system in the autumn.
1044
 This new system increased the 
weighting of the long-term flexible remuneration in order to guarantee sustainable growth and 
remuneration was also disclosed individually.
1045
 The new system was welcomed by the 
shareholders and approved by 96% at the 2011 AGM.
1046
 Hence, in HeidelbergCement’s case 
the vote was effective. The shareholders’ aims were achieved. But the level of remuneration 
did not decrease.  
To summarise, the vote’s effectiveness in practice should not be underestimated. However, 
the impact on the absolute remuneration level is disappointing. 
4. Fulfilling the Objectives 
Finally, it will be examined whether § 120 (4) fulfils its aforementioned objectives. 
(1) The first objective is improved monitoring. Before deciding on a § 120 (4) resolution the 
shareholders can discuss the remuneration system and request information. Receiving 
information, asking the administration directly and exchanging views with other shareholders 
constitutes a form of monitoring. Monitoring consists also of acting against perceived 
shortcomings. A resolution offers this opportunity. The effects, however, depend on uncertain 
                                                         
1040 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 623. 
1041 B Freytag, “Heidelcement reagiert auf Kritik” FAZ of 7 May 2010; DSW, “Geplantes Abstimmverhalten der DSW auf 
der Versammlung der HeidelbergCement AG am 6. Mai 2010 in Leimen” <http://www.dsw-info.de/index.php?id=1666> 
accessed 18 September 2014. 
1042 B Freytag (fn.10521057). 
1043 DSW (fn.10521057). 
1044 B Freytag (fn.10521057). 
1045 HeidelbergCement AG, “Geschäftsbericht 2011” <http://www.heidelbergcement.com/NR/rdonlyres/66E1302E-2E29-
4AD1-8E3D-C42D166108AF/0/GB_2011_D_WebLinks.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 131-138.  
1046 HeidelbergCement AG, “Abstimmungsergebnisse – Hauptversammlung am 5. Mai 2011”, 
<http://www.heidelbergcement.com/NR/rdonlyres/C32F1FA7-7C93-461A-A335-
E73CEFA63701/0/Abstimmungsergebnisse_HV2011_Internet.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
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factual consequences. Thus, the legislator improved monitoring by creating an additional 
instrument but left it relatively weak. 
(2) Linked to the first objective is the creation of factual consequences. The extensive 
reporting on remuneration and especially on the say-on-pay vote in the media
1047
 shows that 
the first aspect of the envisaged factual consequences works. Even just 10% of disapproving 
votes usually causes extensive reporting. The second aspect is the supervisory board’s 
reaction. Empirical studies showed that 20% disapproval leads to swift reactions on the part of 
the supervisory board in order to accommodate the shareholders views.
1048
 In the rare case of 
a majority vote against the remuneration system the reaction has been even more decisive as 
HeidelbergCement shows. Factual consequences have been created. 
(3) This goes some way toward answering the question regarding the third objective, namely 
the disciplinary effect. It is already the case that relatively few shareholders can induce the 
supervisory board to rethink the remuneration system. This does not necessarily mean that the 
vote leads to the setting of more adequate remuneration. Also, shareholders may lack the 
qualification to assess the adequacy of complex remuneration systems correctly. They may be 
less vigilant when the company performs well. Nevertheless, the vote may effectively 
encourage the supervisory board to adhere to the § 87 requirement of adequacy. In particular 
rewards for failure are unlikely to be tolerated. However, absolute levels of remuneration 
remain unaffected. 
(4) Finally, it was the legislator’s intention to comply with the relevant EU recommendation. 
This aspect will be dealt with subsequently. 
VII. Outlook 
The response to § 120 (4) in the legal literature is divided. Whilst some deny the mechanism’s 
effectiveness
1049
 others demand further competences for the general meeting.
1050
  
It is likely that the discussion on making the vote binding which is topical elsewhere
1051
 will 
reach Germany as well. High compliance rates make rendering the vote mandatory less likely. 
However, improving compliance in the indices for smaller companies remains one of the aims 
for the future.  
                                                         
1047 e.g. J Jahn, J Löhr, “Managergehälter- Höher geht’s immer”, FAZ of 23 April 2012; C Knop, M Theurer, 
“Managerbezüge – Gehälter jenseits von Eden”, FAZ of 8 May 2012. 
1048 B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 547. 
1049 A Begemann, B Laue, (fn.911916), 2446; E Vetter, “Der kraftlose Hauptversammlungsbeschluss?” (fn.936941), 2143. 
1050 M Döll (fn.882887), 111; P Jaspers (fn.355350), 11; M Lutter, “Stellungnahme VorstAG” (2009) 
<http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1373&id=1136> accessed 18 September 2014, 8. 
1051 e.g. in the UK. 
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Addendum: 
In 2013, following the introduction of corresponding legislation in Switzerland, the German 
legislator drafted a reform proposal which should, among other things, make the shareholder 
vote binding. The draft act found the majority’s support in the Bundestag but failed to pass 
the Bundesrat before the end of the legislative period. A similar reform is likely in the new 
legislative period.
1052
 
VIII. Interim Findings: Say-on-Pay in Germany 
The evaluation of § 120 (4) is ambiguous mainly due to the provision’s reliance on uncertain 
factual consequences. The costs and time for holding the vote seem limited. Weighing this 
with the opportunity for shareholders to voice their discontent in a focused manner and the 
potential prevention of flawed remuneration, the evaluation is positive. Overall, § 120 (4) may 
not be a miracle cure. However, it is not a “toothless tiger” either. Hence, regarding Germany, 
the third hypothesis – that say-on-pay is useful but in need of improvement – can, by and 
large, be supported by this section’s findings.  
                                                         
1052 CDU, CSU and SPD, “Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten” coalition treaty of 27 November 2013 
<https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 17. 
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C. United Kingdom 
Following the examination of the German say-on-pay rules the relevant UK rules will be 
analysed to test the third hypothesis that say-on-pay is a helpful tool in need of further 
refinement. 
I. Development 
In the 1970s, executives of UK plcs belonged to the lowest paid, relative to their counterparts 
in other industrialised countries. In the 1990s they were amongst the highest paid following a 
600% increase in CEO remuneration within 20 years.
1053
 The history of the modern-day vote 
begins with the controversy in the 1990s when significant and hard-to-justify pay increases 
for executives of privatised utility companies and high levels of unemployment coincided.
1054
 
The Government considered statutory amendments regarding executive remuneration but 
decided in favour of soft-law measures.
1055
  
In 2002 statutory rules on say-on-pay were introduced.
1056
 The DRRR introduced the 
requirement of a shareholder vote on the DRR in s. 241A CA 1985 making the UK the 
first
1057
 jurisdiction to introduce such a vote. Since the 2006 reform, s. 439 (1) CA states:  
“A quoted company must, prior to the accounts meeting, give to the members of the 
company entitled to be sent notice of the meeting notice of the intention to move at the 
meeting, as an ordinary resolution, a resolution approving the directors’ 
remuneration report for the financial year.” 
Recently, the discussion on executive remuneration reached high levels again. A reform of the 
say-on-pay regulation came into force in October 2013.
1058
 
II. Background 
First, the general meeting, which plays a central role in say-on-pay, will be examined briefly.  
1. General Meeting as the Shareholders’ Organ 
A UK public company has two “organs”1059 namely the shareholders in general meeting and 
the board of directors.
1060
 Essentially, general meeting can be defined as “meeting of ordinary 
                                                         
1053 BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 279. 
1054 ibid., 279. 
1055 BR Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (OUP, 1997), 375.  
1056 D Gilsham (fn.794786), 7. 
1057 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 382. 
1058 An assessment has been added below. 
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shareholders together with any other shareholders who are entitled to attend”1061. It is the 
main forum for shareholders.
1062
 Rules on the holding and conducting of general meetings can 
be found in ss. 301ff. CA 2006 with special requirements for public and quoted 
companies.
1063
  
The general meeting’s business is not prescribed by statute. It can deal with any matter as 
long as proper notice has been given. Shareholders at a general meeting can take note of 
reports, elect directors, use their right to speak and the right to information and, finally, can 
participate in the company’s decision-making by voting on resolutions. The general meeting 
is the forum in which the directors present to the shareholders how they conducted the 
company’s business and the shareholders can question or approve. 
2. The Relationship between the General Meeting and the Board of Directors 
As mentioned earlier, the CA does not contain a general statement on the board’s powers, nor 
does it contain any general statement regarding the general meeting’s authority or powers.1064 
The relationship and the distribution of powers between the two are left to the articles.  
3. Competences of the General Meeting 
The general meeting’s main competence is to decide on the company’s affairs by resolution. 
Its approval is required by the CA 2006 – and potentially the articles – before certain 
decisions are able to bind the company. The assent to a resolution makes the act one of the 
company and subsequently the board is obliged to put the resolution into effect.
1065
 The CA, 
however, does not generally prescribe what the general meeting shall resolve on.
1066
  
There are a number of matters that are usually considered at an AGM.
1067
 Certain decisions 
are reserved for the shareholders e.g. the amendment of the articles, s. 21 (1) and measures 
regarding the share capital e.g. reducing it, s. 626 (1). 
III. Objectives 
As a next step, the shareholder vote’s objectives will be examined.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1059 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 97. 
1060 A Higgs, SH Goo, Cases and Materials on Company Law (7th ed, OUP, 2011), 213. 
1061 B Pettet, J Lowry and A Reisberg, Pettet’s Comapny Law: Company and Capital Markets Law (3rd ed, Longman, 2009), 
144. 
1062 B Hannigan, Company Law (3rd ed, OUP 2012), 303ff. 
1063 Ss. 336ff and ss. 341ff respectively.  
1064 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 191. 
1065 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 461. 
1066 B Hannigan (fn.10731078), 303ff. 
1067 cf. list in SW Mayson et al, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law (OUP, 2013), 389. 
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The Government intended to improve “accountability, transparency and linkage of rewards to 
performance”.1068 Thus, against the background of persisting conflicts of interest of directors 
one of the main objectives is to empower shareholders and thereby improve the board’s 
accountability to them.
1069
 The shareholders should be provided with a way to influence the 
executive remuneration structures and the most “effective and focused”1070 way to achieve 
this would be through a shareholder vote. This goes hand in hand with the aim of improving 
the shareholders’ engagement.  
Another aim was to ameliorate the dialogue between shareholders and the board regarding 
executive remuneration.
1071
 Moreover, the shareholder vote is supposed to provide a “focal 
point for shareholder voice” meaning that, although rational apathy and collective action 
issues may not be overcome by the vote, the resolution should still offer interested 
shareholders a prime focus which draws the attention of the press.
1072
 Thereby it can achieve 
another objective namely facilitating “outrage”. 
The vote shall also encourage boards to focus more on the setting of ideal remuneration 
packages.
1073
 The regulation aims at encouraging the boards to “overcome psychological 
barriers” to the negotiation of remuneration.1074 Moreover, it shall offer shareholders an 
alternative to voting against committee members who may otherwise be good directors. 
Hence, another objective is containing “outrage” instead of affecting other resolutions. 
Finally, although not stated explicitly by the legislator, another objective is to improve 
remuneration practices by destabilising the existing ones that have led to excessive 
remuneration.
1075
  
IV. Legal Framework 
Next, a look at the legal framework in which the say-on-pay mechanism operates is indicated. 
Again emphasis will be placed on alternative instruments.  
                                                         
1068 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (DTI, 1999), 2.7. 
1069 BIS, Executive Remuneration: discussion paper (fn.771763), m.no.55. 
1070 ibid., m.no.55. 
1071 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (DTI, 1999), ch. 7. 
1072 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 297. 
1073 D Gilsham (fn.794786), 12. 
1074 F Ferri, DA Maber (fn.859842), 1. 
1075 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 323. 
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1. Existing Shareholder Approval Requirements 
Even before the DRRR 2002, the UK legislator tried to influence the setting of executive 
remuneration by giving shareholders more influence in the matter.  
1.1. Directors’ Service Contracts of More Than Two Years Duration 
Shareholders can influence the setting of executive remuneration through the approval of 
service contracts with a duration exceeding two years. These may lead to significant 
compensation packages when an underperforming director is dismissed.  
Section 188 requires that the shareholders approve by resolution if a director’s “guaranteed 
term” of employment is or may be longer than two years. The contract’s terms must have 
been made available to the shareholders, s. 188 (5). If not approved, the relevant terms are 
void to the extent of the contravention, s. 189 (a), and the company is deemed entitled to 
terminate the contract at any time on reasonable notice, s. 189 (b). 
The period of two years is deemed to be too long for public companies.
1076
 Greenbury 
suggested a reduction to a one year period. Now, D.1.5 UKCGC recommends notice or 
contract periods of one year or less except for initial contracts for directors from outside. 
Similarly, the BIS recently suggested a one-year period.
1077
  
The recommendation and institutional investors’ pressure led to one-year notice or contract 
periods in most listed companies. Hence, the provision’s significance in practice is limited. 
1.2. Compensation for Loss of Office 
Sections 215-222 CA 2006 deal with payments to directors after loss of office. “Loss of 
office” is defined broadly, s. 215. Section 217 renders compensation payments for loss of 
office or in connection with the director’s retirement unlawful unless there was prior 
disclosure of the payment’s particulars and approval of the proposal by the members. The aim 
is to prevent directors from increasing the costs of their removal. 
However, according to s. 220 there are exceptions to the approval requirement. Especially the 
exception “pension payments in respect of past services” offers significant scope for 
companies wishing to award gratuitous payments to leaving or retiring directors.
1078
 An 
                                                         
1076 cf. Greenbury Report, para 7.13. 
1077 Speech by V Cable to the Social Market Foundation, 24 January 2012 <http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/speeches/vince-
cable-executive-pay-remuneration--2012> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1078 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 300. Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
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example was the increase of CEO Fred Goodwin’s “pension pot” by £8.1m when he left RBS 
in 2008.
1079
  
Payments made without approval are held by the receiving director on trust for the company, 
s. 221 (1) (a). Directors that authorised the payment are jointly and severally liable to 
indemnify the company for any loss suffered, s. 221 (1) (b).
1080
 
1.3. Further Shareholder Approval Requirements for Listed Companies 
For listed companies which are admitted to the Official List and traded on the London Stock 
Exchange’s Main Market, the UK Listing Authority provides additional shareholder approval 
requirements in its Listing Rules (LR).  
According to LR 9.4.1, directors’ share option schemes and LTIPs have to be approved by the 
shareholders prior to their adoption. Exceptions exist ‒ first, if participation is offered to 
(substantially) all employees, and second, if the LTIP is required in “unusual circumstances” 
to facilitate the recruitment or retention of a particular director, LR9.4.2. The exception is 
subject to disclosure of the scheme’s main terms and the reasons that it was an “unusual 
situation” in the next annual report, LR 9.4.3. 
Finally, LR 9.4.4 requires separate shareholder approval for the issuing of discounted share 
options unless they are issued to (substantially) all employees. In contrast to normal share 
options they immediately transfer value to the director without further effort from his side. 
Being less suited to motivate directors than “normal” share options, discounted share options 
are seen by regulators with suspicion and there is not an exception for recruitment or retention 
in “unusual circumstances”.1081 
To summarise, all the shareholder approval requirements have a limited scope and differ from 
the say-on-pay vote. 
2. Pre-Existing Options to Express View on Executive Remuneration 
Shareholders have further opportunities to voice concerns and discontent about executive 
remuneration. 
                                                         
1079 J Croft, G Parker, “Vilification of Goodwin fuelled further by retirement pot”, Financial Times of 27 February 2009; D 
Kershaw (fn.382377), 300. 
1080 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 419. 
1081 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 300. 
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
 189 
 
2.1. Speaking at the AGM 
Under the point, “annual reports and accounts”, on the agenda the shareholders have the 
opportunity to question the remuneration arrangements and express their views.
1082
  
This option is straightforward but may be of limited impact as no direct consequences follow. 
Yet, press coverage of voiced concerns could influence board decisions. Voicing concerns is 
particularly likely to be effective if done by large shareholders. However, they often have 
good links with the board enabling them to voice concerns in an informal way rather than at 
the AGM. 
2.2 Shareholders Requisitioned Resolution and General Meeting 
A specific resolution might be more effective. Shareholders can require the company to give 
notice of a resolution to be moved at the next general meeting, s. 338 CA 2006. The quorum 
set out in s. 338 (3) has to be fulfilled. The subject-matter in such resolutions undergoes very 
little regulation.
1083
 The shareholders can make proposals regarding remuneration.
1084
 In the 
case the concern is too urgent to wait until the next AGM, shareholders can have an 
extraordinary general meeting called if the quorum of s. 303 is fulfilled. A resolution on 
executive pay can be moved then. A vote similar to s. 439 was already possible, but it had to 
rely on a shareholder initiative. 
Shareholders face substantial practical obstacles. For instance they face costs for the 
circulation of the resolution proposal,
1085
 relatively high thresholds and, more generally, the 
burden of action. Even if passed, the resolution’s enforceability could be difficult as the board 
could ignore the resolution depending on the company’s articles.1086 Therefore, in practice 
shareholder-requisitioned resolutions – especially on executive remuneration – are rare.1087 
2.3. Vote against the Company Accounts 
Another option is a vote against the company accounts. In practice usually a resolution is 
taken “approving” the accounts or “taking note” of them.1088  
                                                         
1082 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 461. 
1083 cf. s. 338 (1), (2). 
1084 BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 287. 
1085 ibid., 288. 
1086 ibid., 289. 
1087 M Conyon, G Sadler (fn.878883), 298. 
1088 J Rickford (fn.384379), 95. 
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A vote against the annual accounts is not “particularly popular”1089 in practice as most 
investors are not inclined to disapprove the accounts merely because of concerns regarding 
executive pay. Investors do so only in “extreme cases”.1090 
2.4. Vote against a Director 
Another option for shareholders is not to re-elect or vote out of office a director who was 
member of the remuneration committee or who has received excessive remuneration. 
However, this option is not very popular either as it is “too severe”.1091 The director may 
contribute significantly to the company otherwise and be valued.
1092
 Still, the measure has the 
advantage that it is more targeted than a vote against the accounts.
1093
 
3. Provisions in the Articles 
A final option could be to make provisions on executive remuneration in the company’s 
articles.  
It is theoretically possible for shareholders to change the articles as to set remuneration limits 
or to provide for a shareholder vote on executive remuneration. Although this option already 
existed, it has neither been widely used in practice nor has it been discussed extensively in the 
literature.
1094
 
4. Summary 
Pre-existing options already made discussing and voting on executive remuneration possible. 
However, they are mostly insufficient in their effect or too severe or not targeted enough or 
too narrow. A satisfactorily balanced and targeted instrument which can prevent excessive 
remuneration is not apparent.  
A vote on executive remuneration was theoretically already possible. Still, s. 439 is not 
merely declaratory as it makes the vote mandatory for all quoted companies, standardises it 
and does not leave the vote to the disposition of majority shareholders or the board, thereby 
protecting minority shareholders.  
                                                         
1089 BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 289. 
1090 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (fn.10791084), 7.2. 
1091 L Roach (fn.782774) 144. 
1092 ibid., 7.15. 
1093 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (fn.10791084), 7.15. 
1094 J Hupka (fn.950955), 87. 
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
 191 
 
V. The UK Say-on-Pay Regulation in Detail 
1. Personal Scope 
Quoted companies are required to prepare the DRR and give notice of the intention to move 
an ordinary resolution approving the DRR, ss. 420 (1), 439 (1). Their directors have to ensure 
that the resolution is put to the vote, s. 439 (4). 
2. Mandatory Vote 
A resolution on the approval of the DRR has to be put to vote before the AGM. It is the duty 
of the directors who are directors immediately before the meeting (“existing directors”) to 
ensure that the resolution is put to a vote, s. 439 (4). A notice expressing that intention has to 
be sent to the members of the company who are entitled to be sent one, s. 439 (1). 
If notice of a resolution according to s. 439 (1) is not given an offence is committed by every 
defaulting director, s. 440 (1). Similarly, every existing director has committed an offence if 
the resolution is not put to the vote at the general meeting in question, unless all reasonable 
steps were taken to ensure its being put to the vote, s 440 (3). Following s. 440 (4) the penalty 
in both cases is a fine.  
2. Subject-matter of the Resolution 
The resolution has as its subject-matter the approval of the DRR for the financial year in 
question, s. 439 (1).  
2.1. The DRR 
For the DRR’s content the chapter on disclosure can be consulted. 
2.2. Temporal Dimension 
Regarding the resolution’s temporal dimension the two-fold structure of the DRR means that 
it has a “backwards looking”1095 component regarding the payments already made and a 
“forward looking”1096 component regarding the remuneration policy for the following 
years.
1097
 
                                                         
1095 cf. M Webster, “Executive Pay and Shareholder Votes” (2012) 35(26) CSR, 206-207, 206. 
1096 cf. J Copp, “Corporate governance: change, consistency and evolution” (2003) 14(3) ICCLR, 115-128, 126. 
1097 cf. J Hupka (fn.950955), 109. Feldfunktion geändert
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3. Consequences 
Finally, the consequences of the resolution will be examined. 
3.1. Legal Consequences 
The resolution does not have (direct) legal consequences for the remuneration arrangements, 
s. 439 (5). Even if a shareholder majority disapproved the DRR, the remuneration agreement 
would remain unaffected and the directors would not be (legally) required to act on the 
remuneration entitlements or the remuneration policy.
1098
 
The question arises why the legislator opted for the “novelty”1099 of an advisory vote. The 
reasons were mainly of a practical nature.
1100
 There were concerns regarding the effects of a 
binding vote on remuneration agreements made before the AGM and the problems regarding 
the recruitment of new managers whose remuneration could not be confirmed until the next 
AGM.
1101
 The feasibility of a binding vote was doubted
1102
 and the opinion was widely held 
that actual remuneration levels should not be set by the shareholders.
1103
 
Despite the resolution’s non-binding nature it may have indirect legal consequences. Director 
and company could agree that the remuneration package – or certain items of it – should be 
conditional on the shareholders’ approval of the DRR.1104 Thereby the advisory vote could 
gain indirect legal consequences. It is doubtful, however, whether a director would accept 
such a condition.
1105
 
The non-binding nature of the vote faced some criticism by commentators. It was argued that 
all the objectives could be achieved by a binding vote, that the arguments against a binding 
vote were unconvincing and that the protection of vested rights was possible despite a binding 
effect.
1106
 Moreover, due to factual consequences the advisory vote, too, would lead to the 
criticised renegotiation of contracts.
1107
 
What are the resolution’s consequences for the board? The board is neither obliged to change 
the remuneration arrangement nor the policy. Nor are the board’s duties and liabilities altered, 
                                                         
1098 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (fn.10791084), 3.15. 
1099 ibid., 7.18; BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 293. 
1100 BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 293. 
1101 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (fn.10791084), 7.16. 
1102 ibid., 7.16. 
1103 J Rickford (fn.384379), 96. 
1104 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 405. 
1105 Critical: J Baird, P Stowasser, “Executive compensation and disclosure requirements: the German, UK and US 
approaches” (2002) Global Counsel, 29-42, 35. 
1106 J Rickford (fn.384379), 96. 
1107 ibid., 96. 
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as the resolution is not some sort of “discharge” of the directors.1108 The option to “discharge” 
directors is neither provided in the CA 2006 nor is it practiced.
1109
 Under certain conditions 
the CA provides an exception, namely that the general meeting can ratify the behaviour of 
directors that would give rise to liability, s. 239. However, when it comes to the setting of 
executive remuneration the board has discretion. The legislature does not determine executive 
remuneration levels, no adequacy requirement exists as in Germany, and the courts are 
unwilling to scrutinise executive remuneration.
1110
  
The board remains (legally) unaffected by the resolution. 
3.2. Factual Consequences 
Although the resolution on the DRR does not have legal consequences it is not necessarily a 
“toothless tiger”. The government expected the aforementioned factual consequences to be 
very effective: a negative vote is expected to “send a very strong signal” to the directors with 
the consequence that they wish to pay attention to the shareholders’ view and “respond 
appropriately”.1111  
The threat of reputational damage may encourage boards to discuss (contentious) 
remuneration issues with their major shareholders prior to the vote in order to avoid 
“outrage”.1112 Even if this opportunity has not been used, an adverse vote can have factual 
consequences in that it may induce the board to quickly amend their remuneration 
arrangement or policy to diffuse shareholder discontent.
1113
  
Significant shareholder opposition may cause both individual and collective reputational 
damage to the directors, which they are strongly interested to avoid.
1114
 In practice dissent is 
already considered to be significant if 20%
1115
 of the shareholders fail to back the DRR, since 
the average level of dissent for other resolutions amounts to merely 3%
1116
. Hence, a factual 
                                                         
1108 cf. also ss. 232, 239 
1109 C van der Elst, “Shareholder Rights and Shareholder Activism: The Role of the General Meeting of Shareholders” (2012) 
ECGI Law Working Paper No. 188/2012 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017691> accessed 18 
September 2014, 10. 
1110 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 401. 
1111 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (fn.10791084), 3.16. 
1112 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 406. 
1113 ibid., 406. 
1114 S Davis, “Does ‘Say on Pay’ Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable”(2007) Yale Millstein Center 
Policy Briefing No. 1 <http://www.shareholderforum.com/op/Library/20070620_Davis-briefing.pdf> accessed 18 Sepember 
2014, 10. 
1115 BIS, Executive Pay: Shareholder voting rights consultation (2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31372/12-639-executive-pay-shareholder-voting-rights-consultation.pdf> accessed 18 
September 2014. 14. 
1116 Institutional Shareholder Service, “2011 Voting Results Report: Europe” (2011) <http://www.phoenix-
ir.com/blog/?p=151> accessed 18 September 2014. 
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consequence is that remuneration policies and arrangement are likely to be aimed at 
convincing not only the director but also the shareholders.
1117
  
Factual consequences are not predictable. A negative vote does not necessarily lead to 
changes to the system since remuneration-setting remains – depending on the articles – an 
autonomous board decision.  
VI. Evaluation of the Say-on-Pay Regulation 
1. Introduction 
The vote’s effectiveness has been debated for a long time.1118 According to the proponents, 
improved shareholder voice and reputational concerns enhance the negotiations between 
boards and managers, resulting in more efficient remuneration arrangements.
1119
 Following 
this view the say-on-pay vote is a “tool that gives shareholders a voice to curb excessive pay 
practices”1120. 
Opponents argue that, in the best case, the vote leads to no significant changes at all.
1121
 The 
main reasons are the vote’s non-binding character, the shareholders’ rational apathy that 
prevents them from acting,
1122
 and institutional investors’ potential self-interest in high 
executive remuneration.
1123
 In the worst case the shareholder vote interferes “in an unhelpful 
way”1124 with remuneration setting, making the recruiting of excellent managers more 
difficult and leading to the adoption of suboptimal remuneration practices.  
About ten years have passed since the vote’s introduction. After initial enthusiasm1125 has 
passed, it is time to assess whether it was a success. The regulation’s merits and 
shortcomings, its effectiveness and its ability to fulfil the objectives set will be analysed. 
2. Merits and Shortcomings 
2.1. Mandatoriness 
A key characteristic of the UK say-on-pay regulation is the vote’s mandatory nature.  
                                                         
1117 S Davis (fn.11261131), 10. 
1118 F Ferri, DA Maber (fn.859842), 2. 
1119 ibid., 2. 
1120 RF Göx, F Imhoff, AH Kunz, “Say on Pay Design and its Repercussion on CEO Investment Incentives, Compensation 
and Firm Profit” (2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588682> accessed 18 September 2014, 4. 
1121 cf. S Bainbridge, “Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified Incursion on Director Authority” (2008) UCLA School of 
Law Research Paper No. 08-06, 10. 
1122 ibid., 10. 
1123 J Plender, “What a Performance”, FT of 28 March 1999. 
1124 BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 295. 
1125 J Rickford (fn.384379), 99ff. 
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Against the mandatory nature of the vote one could argue that an annual vote is unnecessary if 
the remuneration has not changed since the last vote. Though costly and time-consuming it 
would have no effect. If the vote was not required unless the system changed, boards might be 
more inclined to draft longer-term remuneration policies. Moreover, the lengthy AGM could 
be shortened and additional time would be left to discuss other issues. Finally, a non-
mandatory vote would offer the advantage of flexibility. Companies for which a vote seemed 
unnecessary would not have to hold one. 
Then again, mandatoriness offers advantages. The mandatory vote maintains constant 
pressure on the board to control executive remuneration and engage with shareholders 
regarding remuneration. Simultaneously, the shareholders are required to deal with executive 
remuneration regularly, which should increase their expertise. Finally, mandatory voting lifts 
the burden of action from the shareholders. The requirement of an annual vote counters the 
relatively low incentive to act – especially in good performance years – and helps to prevent 
votes not taking place due to rational apathy. 
2.2. Non-Binding 
A second key characteristic is the vote’s advisory nature. This has been criticised 
frequently.
1126
 It could be argued that a non-binding vote is less effective than a binding one. 
However, at least in theory the factual consequences should lead to similar results albeit 
allowing more flexibility.  
A binding vote could change the distribution of power. Remuneration-setting by the 
shareholders is not necessarily desirable. However, a binding vote regarding the abstract 
policy for example would not mean that shareholder set the executives’ remuneration. 
Another argument against a binding vote is that it could upset vested rights. This concern 
certainly has some merits, yet, in practice the factual consequences of a non-binding vote lead 
to the board being induced to renegotiate the director’s contract.  
Whether a binding vote would be advantageous would also depend on the details, e.g. its 
precise subject-matter. 
3. Effectiveness 
It is essential to evaluate whether the mechanism introduced is an effective instrument for 
preventing excessive, not performance-related remuneration. 
                                                         
1126 ibid., 96. 
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3.1. Theory 
The say-on-pay vote does not have legal consequences. The board is neither obliged to amend 
the contracts with the directors nor does it have to alter the remuneration policy. Thus far the 
vote seems ineffective.  
The vote’s effectiveness depends largely on factual consequences. In theory, these are 
supposed to effectively prevent excessive remuneration and rewards for failure. The basic 
idea is that the board is interested in avoiding negative publicity and reputational damages.  
The board would have to pay more attention to executive remuneration if it wanted to avoid 
negative voting outcomes. The remuneration policy and arrangements would have to be 
explained better and the shareholders would need to be convinced.
1127
 This would require an 
improved dialogue with the shareholders, aimed at preventing negative votes and therefore 
preventing excessive remuneration agreements in the first place. The threat of reputational 
damages gives the directors, furthermore, the necessary incentive to show more 
“backbone”1128 in remuneration negotiations and to overcome psychological barriers and 
conflicts of interest.  
The resolution on the DRR addresses the issue of executive remuneration in a more direct, 
balanced, focused and effective manner than the previously existing alternatives mentioned 
above.
1129
 The advisory vote’s effectiveness could be even higher than that of a binding vote 
as there is no definite threshold for factual consequences. This flexibility allows the ideal 
threshold for taking action to be chosen. At the same time the vote effectively indicates what 
the shareholders think of the remuneration system. 
Then again, there is the danger that following the development of remuneration “best 
practices” by institutional investors, shareholders will not consider the individual situation of 
a company when assessing the remuneration schemes.
1130
 Deviations from a one-size-fits-all 
remuneration concept could lead to negative votes.
1131
 It could lead to inefficient, not 
performance inducing remuneration schemes. Still, following consultations with key 
shareholders companies should be able to deviate for good reasons.
1132
  
                                                         
1127 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 343. 
1128 S Baldachandran, F Ferri, D Maber, “Solving the executive compensation problem through shareholder votes? Evidence 
from the U.K.” (2008) ALEA Annual Meetings Paper 94, 10. 
1129 cf. BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 293. 
1130 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 400. 
1131 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 347. 
1132 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 400. 
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Critics have also suggested that the vote could be divisive, driven by special interests or 
misused by some shareholder groups to extract personal benefits from boards.
1133
 This would 
hamper its effectiveness in ensuring ideal remuneration agreements. However, an increase in 
extortion opportunities is hard to see – even if the investors were so inclined.  
Altogether, in theory the UK say-on-pay regulation seems effective in ensuring that the 
remuneration of executives is not excessive. 
3.2. Practice 
It has been seen above that theory and practice may diverge. Is the shareholder vote as 
effective in practice as it is in theory? 
3.2.1 Experience with the Vote 
The vote’s “major impact”1134 has been the improvement of communication between boards 
and investors. Potentially contentious aspects of remuneration agreements and policies are 
discussed with key shareholders prior to adopting them or to voting on the DRR.
1135
 
“Overnight”1136 the dialogue between companies and key shareholders, institutional investor 
groups and proxy service providers has increased significantly.
1137
 Examples are the 
Association of British Insurers whose contacts with boards tripled after the vote’s introduction 
and RREV that had 20 contacts in 2002 compared with 130 in 2006.
1138
 The dialogue’s result 
was frequently that the board altered the remuneration agreement or policy in order to meet 
shareholder objections.
1139
  
Both shareholders and boards have been affected by the vote’s introduction. Boards consider 
remuneration packages with greater clarity aware of the strong criticism they will face if the 
shareholders disapprove.
1140
 Also, their negotiating hand has been improved as the risk of a 
negative vote impresses managers as well.
1141
 Shareholders are taking a more holistic view 
since they can vote on the entire DRR including all remuneration aspects rather than just 
certain areas as with the pre-existing approval requirements.
1142
 The shareholders have clear 
ideas regarding the details of remuneration packages and policies they are willing to accept 
                                                         
1133 S Bainbridge (11331138), 47. 
1134 PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 406. 
1135 ibid., 386. 
1136 S Davis (fn.11261131), 10. 
1137 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 343. 
1138 S Davis (fn.11261131), 10. 
1139 ibid., 10. 
1140 Institutional Shareholder Service (fn.11281133), 11. 
1141 ibid.,11. 
1142 ibid., 11. 
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and the companies are aware of the potential “reputational and relational costs” caused by 
ignoring respective concerns and demands.
1143
 Non-compliance with executive remuneration 
best practice guidelines of organisations like ABI and NAPF often leads to media campaigns 
and negative voting by investors.
1144
 However, such a prescriptive and proactive approach 
from shareholders bears the aforementioned risk of suboptimal one-size-fits-all remuneration 
arrangements.
1145
  
The experience regarding the effect on the absolute amount and the design of remuneration is 
split. The hope that the vote would be the “biggest stimulus to the reduction of over-generous 
compensation packages”1146 has been disappointed. Although institutional investors were 
inclined to oppose remuneration packages which they regarded as overly generous, the 
absolute amount of executive remuneration has continued to climb since the vote’s 
introduction.
1147
 The rates at which the remuneration of executives increased were 
significantly higher than those of ordinary employees or inflation.
1148
 Yet the increase was at 
a “more measured pace”1149. It indicates that the assumption was right that the vote is better 
suited to preventing sudden increases of executive remuneration in a company than 
preventing the constant increase of the remuneration in all companies.
1150
 
However, remuneration levels alone do not allow a judgement on the regulation’s success. 
The absolute level may not have been affected but the pay-performance-link has been 
strengthened. Fixed-base salaries have dropped while the proportion of performance 
dependent remuneration components has increased.
1151
 Performance conditions have been 
toughened.
1152
 The structure of the remuneration has changed, to wit from executive share 
option schemes to LTIP share awards, which shows that companies have become more 
innovative following the vote’s introduction.1153  
                                                         
1143 C Villiers, “Controlling Executive Pay” (fn.802794), 320. 
1144 J Trevor (fn.838821), 3. 
1145 J Trevor (fn.838821), 3. 
1146 S Thompson, “The Impact of corporate Governance Reforms on the Remuneration of Executives in the UK” (2005) 
13(1) Corporate Governance, 19-25, 23. 
1147 S Davis (fn.11261131), 11; D Gilsham (fn.794786), 7; C Villiers, “Controlling Executive Pay” (fn.802794), 322. 
1148 K Sheehan, “Is the outrage constraint an effective constraint on executive remuneration? Evidence from the UK and 
preliminary results from Australia” (2007) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=974965> accessed 18 
September 2014, 19. 
1149 S Davis (fn.11261131), 11. 
1150 BR Cheffins, RS Thomas (fn.380375), 310ff; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski, (fn.958963), 678. 
1151 D Gilsham (fn.794786), 16. 
1152 New Bridge Street Consultants, “The 2006 FTSE 100 Executive Directors’ Remuneration Survey”, 3 and 24.  
1153 D Gilsham (fn.794786), 23. 
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Finally, the vote has been successful in reducing “rewards for failure”.1154 Investors consider 
any severance exceeding one year’s basic salary as a reward for failure.1155 The vote’s 
introduction led to a fast and widespread reduction of directors’ notice periods to one year or 
less.
1156
 Another remuneration practice investors had been objecting to for a while –
performance retesting – has been virtually eliminated by the vote.1157 
Taking a decrease of performance-unrelated executive remuneration and of rewards for failure 
as proxies for agency costs, the shareholder vote on the DRR seems to be an effective 
instrument for controlling agency costs.
1158
  
Rejections of DRRs have been rare exceptions.
1159
 The “anxiety over a tide of investor 
uprisings”1160 was unfounded. Shareholders have not been as active as they could have 
been.
1161
 Shareholders consider a negative vote to be a measure of near-last resort.
1162
 Then 
again, in 2011 the level of dissent on DRR resolutions was 10% compared with 3% on other 
resolutions.
1163
 It is not necessary that more than 50% vote against the DRR. If a DRR 
receives combined dissent – meaning “no” votes and abstentions together – of more than 20% 
it constitutes high dissent in the opinion of boards, shareholders and the public.
1164
 This high 
dissent would cause major concern and most boards try to avoid it.
1165
 Since the introduction 
of the reforms, the dissent – median and average – has generally decreased after its peak in 
2003.
1166
 Still, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis the number of negative votes 
increased.
1167
 In 2011 fifteen FTSE100 companies received more than 20% dissenting votes 
on their DRR.
1168
 Also the 2012 “shareholder spring” showed that investors are still able and 
willing to voice their concerns.
1169
 
                                                         
1154 ibid., 25. 
1155 Institutional Shareholder Service (fn.11281133), 8. 
1156 ibid., 8. 
1157 ibid., 8. 
1158 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 300. 
1159 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 343; Institutional Shareholder Service (fn.11281133), 11. 
1160 S Davis (fn.11261131), 10. 
1161 M Dong, A Ozkan, “Institutional Investors and Director Pay: an Empirical Study of UK Companies” (2008) 18 JIFMA, 
16-29, 16. 
1162 S Davis (fn.11261131), 10. 
1163 J Morris, “Executive pay: power to the shareholders?” (2012) <http://plc.practicallaw.com/0-518-6470> accessed 18 
September 2014, 1. 
1164 cf. BIS, Executive Pay: Shareholer voting rights consultation (fn.1127859), 14. 
1165 ibid., 14. 
1166 K Sheehan, “Say on Pay and the Outrage Constraint” (fn.7069), 277. 
1167 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 678. 
1168 BIS, Executive Pay: Shareholer voting rights consultation (fn. 1127859), 14. 
1169 critical: A Dignam, “Remuneration and Riots: Rethinking Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Entitlement” 
(2013) 66 Current Legal Problems, 401-441, 437. 
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The vote is not often ignored in practice.
1170
 If a company suffered a negative vote the voting 
result is usually much more positive in the subsequent year, which indicates that these 
companies made amendments to accommodate the shareholders’ concerns.1171 Recently the 
number of complaints about companies that do not respond adequately increased.
1172
 Some 
companies are notorious – four companies in the FTSE100 received more than 20% of 
negative votes four times between 2003 and 2011.
1173
 
However, usually the board reacts quickly. The most famous example is GlaxoSmithKline 
(GSK). In 2003 the shareholders of GSK rejected the DRR with 50.72% of the votes. 
Including abstentions over 60% dissented. The shareholders had objections to several aspects 
of the remuneration structure.
1174
 Most concerning was the severance arrangement for CEO 
Garnier. It provided, in case of termination, the payment of two years’ salary plus bonus and 
other benefits. The severance package was estimated at £22m.
1175
 GSK argued the package 
was necessary to compete with the remuneration of US managers. In fact, by American 
standards the package was not extraordinary.
1176
 In response to the rejection the package was 
amended. The contract length and the severance multiple were halved to one year. Garnier’s 
bonus was made dependent on certain conditions.
1177
 Moreover, GSK introduced a 
shareholder consultation process.
1178
 
GSK was considered a “landmark in corporate governance”.1179 Since then several other 
boards bowed to shareholder discontent. In 2012 a number of companies experienced 
“shareholder revolts”. Probably the most commented on was the rejection of Aviva’s DRR 
with 54% voting against it, making it the fourth time that a FTSE100 company lost such a 
vote
1180
. The reason was the significant increase in total executive pay by 90% in five years 
despite poor performance, exemplified by decreasing revenue, profit, dividend and share 
price.
1181
 It was especially a pay rise for the CEO and a “golden hello” for another manager 
that sparked the revolt.
1182
 As a result, the CEO handed back his pay rise, and the board 
promised a better dialogue with the shareholders in remuneration matters, a review of 
                                                         
1170 D Kershaw (fn.382377), 297. 
1171 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 343. 
1172 cf. BIS, Executive Pay: Shareholer voting rights consultation (fn.1127), 14. 
1173 ibid., 14. 
1174 Institutional Shareholder Service (fn.11281133), 5. 
1175 S Thompson (fn.11581163), 23; Institutional Shareholder Service (fn.11281133), 5. 
1176 Institutional Shareholder Service (fn.11281133), 5. 
1177 S Thompson (fn.11581163), 23. 
1178 Still there was another high dissent vote in 2008. 
1179 “Have fat cats had their day?” The Economist of 22 May 2003. 
1180 K Burgess, D McCrum (fn.883888). 
1181 J Treanor, J Kollewe, “Aviva rocked by shareholder rebellion over executive pay” The Guardian of 3 May 2012. 
1182 ibid. 
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generous recruitment offers for candidates, and an assessment of the justification of executive 
remuneration by shareholder returns.
1183
 About one week after the lost vote, Aviva’s CEO 
announced that he was leaving the company shortly ‒ receiving a £1.75m severance package, 
though he forewent LTIP awards and bonuses worth £2.4m.
1184
 
The vote according to s. 439 can be an effective remuneration governance instrument. The 
cases mentioned support the theory of factual consequences. A small number of institutional 
investors could influence boards with (the threat of) adverse votes to amend executive 
remuneration in the shareholders’ interest. Usually the vote has not significantly influenced 
the remuneration level but helped to improve the pay-performance-link and prevent rewards 
for failure. It has also encouraged investors to “develop relationships with the companies they 
invest in”1185. This has had “knock-on effects” meaning shareholders are interested in matters 
beyond remuneration.
1186
 
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Effectiveness 
Next, this thesis will address whether the impression gained can be supported by empirical 
evidence. 
Several empirical studies have examined the connection between shareholder voice and 
executive remuneration in the UK. A first study commissioned by the DTI was conducted by 
Deloitte as early as 2004.
1187
 Since 2008, five comprehensive economic studies have been 
published which examine the impact of the DRRR on the remuneration practice of UK 
companies.
1188
 
The Deloitte study dealt with the shareholder approval of the DRR only as a side-aspect but 
found that both remuneration policy and design have changed since the vote’s introduction ‒  
e.g. the length of notice periods has changed significantly.
1189
 The study showed that certain 
changes to performance conditions of share options, which shareholders had been demanding 
                                                         
1183 P Farrow, “Investors: take a stand against executive excess” The Telegraph of 3 May 2012. 
1184 A Gray, “Moss quits after pay revolt at Aviva” FT of 8 May 2012. 
1185 BIS, Executive Pay: Shareholer voting rights consultation (fn.1127), 14. 
1186 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 405. 
1187 Deloitte (fn.792784). 
1188 WM Alissa (fn.793785); M Conyon, G Sadler (fn.878883); S Balachandran, F Ferri and DA Maber (fn.11401145); more 
up-to-date is F Ferri, DA Maber (fn.859842); ME Carter, V Zamora, “Shareholder Remuneration Votes and CEO 
Compensation Design” (2009) Boston College Working Paper <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1004061> accessed 18 September 
2014; I Gregory-Smith, B Main, “Binding Votes a Response to the BIS” (2012) 
<http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/images/bindingvotes_response_FINAL_27-04-2012.pdf > accessed 18 September 
2014. 
1189 Deloitte (fn.792784), 36. 
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for a while, happened quickly.
1190
 The study admits that there is no proven causality between 
the vote and the changes but suggests that there is a strong link between vote and subsequent 
change.
1191
 Although a Government-commissioned study has to be considered with care, this 
assumption seems valid. 
The studies by Carter/Zamora and by Alissa – both in 2009 – analysed whether there is a 
direct link between votes and alterations in executive remuneration.
1192
 Carter/Zamora find a 
positive relationship between shareholder voting dissent and excessive remuneration. 
Furthermore, they provide evidence that, as a response to shareholder dissent, boards reduce 
selectively by “curbing excess salary and dilution of option grants as well as improving pay-
performance links”.1193 However, the evidence for board reaction is generally weak. Alissa’s 
study is similar to the one by Carter/Zamora. It examines how the DRRR influenced the 
behaviour of boards and shareholders. Alissa finds evidence that shareholders use their vote to 
convey dissent with excessive remuneration.
1194
 The answer to the question of whether boards 
react to this by reducing excess compensation is answered ambivalently, since there is no 
evidence for such a reaction for the overall sample but only for companies whose CEOs have 
“above the mean excess compensation”.1195 
The “most significant”1196 empirical study of say-on-pay in the UK is the one by 
Ferri/Maber.
1197
 First, Ferri/Maber do not find evidence that the overall level or growth of 
executive remuneration has changed following the DRRR’s introduction.1198 However, they 
do find a significant increase in the sensitivity of CEO remuneration due to poor performance 
after the introduction of say-on-pay.
1199
 The increase in sensitivity of remuneration for poor 
performance is particularly pronounced in companies with controversial remuneration 
practices.
1200
  
The Conyon/Sadler study of 2010 contrasts with the ones mentioned above in some respects. 
Like the others they found that dissent on executive remuneration is generally low (on 
                                                         
1190 ibid., 19. 
1191 ibid., 19. 
1192 ME Carter, V Zamora (fn.12001205), 4. 
1193 ibid., 24. 
1194 WM Alissa (fn.793785), 2. 
1195 ibid., 3. 
1196 ACW Lund, “Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems” (2010-2011) 99 Kentucky Law Review, 119-162, 127. 
1197 A first version was published in 2008, then a modified under a different title in 2010 on SSRN and finally again updated 
in 2012 in the Review of Finance. 
1198 F Ferri, DA Maber (fn.11401145), 28. 
1199 ibid., 28. 
1200 Proxies for controversial remuneration practices were high (combined) dissent of over 20% in 2003 as well as high levels 
of “excess CEO pay” before the regulations introduction; ibid., 32-33. 
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average less than 10%).
1201
 Still, shareholders are more likely to vote against the DRR than 
against other matters e.g. a director’s re-election.1202 They find a positive relationship between 
voting dissent and the level of executive remuneration.
1203
 In that they concur with 
Carter/Zamora. Most importantly, they find only little evidence that high shareholder dissent 
has altered the level or design of executive remuneration.
1204
 Regarding the ineffectiveness in 
preventing an increase in the remuneration level they confirm Ferri/Maber. 
Finally, in their 2012 study Gregory-Smith/Bain present evidence that higher levels of 
executive remuneration are associated with higher levels of shareholder dissent.
1205
 The link 
between dissent and remuneration is statistically significant but empirically modest.
1206
 The 
authors doubt that the – still not high – increase in dissent would deter executives and 
remuneration committees from negotiating higher remuneration. Gregory-Smith/Bain also 
examine whether the dissent has a moderating effect on future remuneration. According to 
their interpretation the findings imply that the remuneration committees have not reduced 
subsequent remuneration after experiencing high dissent.
1207
  
To summarise, it can be said that the above findings regarding the say-on-pay vote’s 
effectiveness can be empirically supported. The studies varied in their detail but it became 
clear that shareholders make use of their right to voice their dissent. They use this right 
carefully and do not try to further their own (rather than all shareholders’) interest. Regarding 
central problems, such as rewards for failure, it has led to improvements. Also, the generally 
increased sensitivity toward pay-for-performance can be attributed to the say-on-pay 
regulation. However, the theory has been misleading regarding the impact on the level of 
executive remuneration. Following the empirical studies that level has not been affected.  
Hence, UK say-on-pay is in some respects an effective instrument to reduce agency costs but 
in other respects there remains room for improvement. 
4. Ability to Achieve Objectives 
Finally, the say-on-pay regulation will be examined for whether it has fulfilled its objectives.  
                                                         
1201 M Conyon, G Sadler (fn.878883), 297. 
1202 ibid., 297. 
1203 ibid., 297. 
1204 ibid., 297. 
1205 I Gregory-Smith, B Main (fn.12001205), 3. 
1206 ibid., 3. 
1207 ibid., 4. 
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A main objective is empowering shareholders and, consequently, improving the board’s 
accountability to them.
1208
 Shareholders should be provided with a way to influence executive 
remuneration structures. This objective has been achieved to some extent. Shareholders can 
voice their concerns and dissent and boards cannot ignore them as the cases and the example 
of rewards for failure shows. 
Another aim was improving the engagement of shareholders with executive remuneration and 
ameliorating the dialogue between shareholders and the board regarding executive 
remuneration.
1209
 It has been seen that this dialogue has improved significantly. In the cases 
examined, the introduction of consultations with the shareholders and the attempt to establish 
and maintain contact with them were always among the initial reactions to high dissent.  
Another objective was that boards should focus more on the setting of ideal remuneration 
packages.
1210
 The increased pay-for-performance sensitivity seems to confirm the 
achievement of this objective. Yet the rise in absolute levels raises doubts. 
The resolution was also supposed to be an “outlet” for shareholder discontent in order to 
“contain” the outrage. Shareholders use the vote to voice their discontent, as the empirical 
studies show. Alternatives such as votes against directors are used as mean of last resort, as a 
more targeted outlet for discontent with executive remuneration exists. 
An important – although not explicitly stated – objective was to destabilise existing 
remuneration practices that have led to excessive remuneration.
1211
 The example of the 
reduction in contract length and severance payments as well as lower fixed salaries shows that 
this objective has been achieved to some extent. Executive remuneration has become more 
performance-sensitive. However, there is an important shortcoming, namely that the absolute 
levels of executive remuneration remain unaffected. 
VII. Innovations 
It is important to note the changes to the say-on-pay rules that have entered into force very 
recently. The aforementioned reform of October 2013 led to changes of the CA 2006 
including inter alia a new s 439A on the shareholder approval of directors' remuneration 
policy. 
                                                         
1208 DTI, Directors’ Remuneration: A Consultative Document (DTI, 1999), 7.13. 
1209 ibid., ch. 7. 
1210 D Gilsham (fn.794786), 12. 
1211 JN Gordon (fn.778770), 323. 
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1. Binding Vote on Remuneration Policy 
The future remuneration policy must be approved at least every three years by a binding 
shareholder vote, s 439A (1). Companies are unable to (legally) make payments to a director 
outside the approved policy’s scope, ss 226B, 226C, unless approved by a specific resolution, 
s 226D. The policy in the DRR can be revised, s 422 A.  
Generally, shareholders have the opportunity to vote on the report annually. An annual vote is 
not mandatory but the vote has to be taken again within three years, s 439A (1). This shall 
encourage companies to devise long-term policies and prevent remuneration increases. If the 
shareholders reject the new policy, the existing policy has to be used until an amended policy 
is agreed. If the implementation report according to s 439 was disapproved at the last AGM 
and there has not been a vote on the policy according to s 439A then, then it has to be voted 
on the policy report. 
2. Advisory Vote on the Policy’s Implementation 
Besides the new binding vote on the remuneration policy shareholders will still have an 
annual advisory vote. Section 439 remained unaltered except for the clarification than it does 
not concern the policy report, which is covered by s 439A. Shareholders have an advisory 
vote on the policy’s implementation, which includes the actual sums paid in the preceding 
year.  
If the implementation report is rejected, the company has to put their overall remuneration 
policy back to a binding shareholder vote in the following year, s 439A (2). 
3. First Evaluation of Proposed Changes 
The first reactions differed widely. Some suggested that the reform constitutes the “most far-
reaching attempt in a decade to reign in soaring executive pay”1212, that it will “completely 
overhaul the approval process”1213 for executive remuneration, and that it will “potentially 
bring the most significant change to market practice”1214. Others claimed that the proposed 
                                                         
1212 E Rigby, K Burgess, “Cable outlines executive pay plans” FT of 24 January 2012. 
1213 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, “Binding Shareholder Say-on-Pay Vote on Route to Reality in the UK: US 
Companies Take Note” (2012) <http://www.cgsh.com/de/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=3b4b3be5-0f26-49ce-9c95-
0bfd5207e8df> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1214 J Morris (fn.11751180), 3. Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
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reform would have a “disappointingly modest impact”1215 and that would be “futile to rely on 
a binding vote”1216.  
More generally, some critics said that the (old) advisory vote “works well in practice” and 
that the reform would constitute a significant shift in the way in which shareholders are able 
to influence executive remuneration.
1217
 The government was sometimes accused of 
interfering with corporate affairs. However, both investor groups and businesses broadly 
welcomed the reform.
1218
 
Since the new regulations entered into force, a number of – mostly brief – articles have been 
published on it.
1219
 However, they are merely descriptive. Substantive and critical literature on 
the new regulations does not yet exist.
1220
 Whether the reform is to be welcomed will be 
examined.  
3.1. Binding Vote on Remuneration Policy 
Central to the reform is the introduction of a binding vote on the policy. It seems like the 
logical next step but it raises concerns as well.  
The aforementioned study of Gregory-Smith/Main examines the difference between the use of 
a binding and an advisory vote.
1221
 They state that shareholders would use a binding vote less 
than they would an advisory vote, so the reform would have no (positive) effect. However, 
Gregory-Smith/Main use the vote on director re-election as a proxy for the binding vote on 
the remuneration policy. Although the re-election is a binding vote as well, its meaningfulness 
as a proxy is doubtful. Voting against a director’s re-election is traditionally a measure of last 
resort and is perceived to be more far-reaching than the vote disapproving the remuneration 
policy. Shareholders are more reluctant to use it due to its severe consequence of losing an 
otherwise maybe highly valued director. Findings regarding the use of the re-election vote 
cannot be transferred to the binding vote on remuneration policy. Statements on the potential 
use of the vote therefore remain difficult. The acceptance and use of the old advisory vote, 
                                                         
1215 I Gregory-Smith, B Main (fn.12001205), 3. 
1216 ibid., 3. 
1217 CBI, “CBI response to BIS consultation on shareholder voting rights” (2012) 
<http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/1469003/cbi_response_to_bis_consultation_on_shareholder_voting_rights.pdf> accessed 18 
September 2014, 2. 
1218 K Burgess, “ABI backs plan for binding pay vote” Financial Times 24 January 2012. 
1219 Anonymous, “Executive remuneration: new regime comes into force” (2014) 35(2) Company Lawyer, 50; M Ehrenstein, 
“Understanding the new voting and reporting rules” (2013) 145(Nov) EmpLJ, 8-11; P Ellerman et al, “Directors’ 
remuneration reports: the final picture.” (2013) 24(9) PLC, 29-37; K Gompertz, “Corporate governance and executive 
remuneration: have the fat cats been reduced to semi-skimmed?” (2014) 19(1) CovLJ, 42-43; N Stretch, I Pooley, “Directors’ 
remuneration: the new regime finally starts.” (2014) 25(1) PLC, 4-5. 
1220 First attempts in: J Gajjar, “The carrot and the stick: the issue of director’s remuneration and the scope for employee 
participation, a comparative analysis” (2014) 25(1) EBLR, 103-139. 
1221 I Gregory-Smith, B Main (fn.12001205), 4. 
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despite pessimistic predictions regarding its application, make a similar use of a binding vote 
likely. 
The increased consequences of a negative vote on costs and time could serve as a deterrent 
and simultaneously encourage both companies and investors to engage regarding the 
remuneration policy from early on. 
The possibility of  “avoiding” annual voting by providing longer-term remuneration policies 
that apply for three years is a useful innovation and corresponds to the criticism above. First, 
it would promote a longer-term approach. Secondly, it could also free up time which could 
then be used for other important matters.
1222
 
3.2. Advisory Vote on Implementation 
The backward-looking and merely advisory vote on the implementation is less controversial. 
It is not as novel and has “fewer teeth” than the binding vote on the policy.  
To summarise, the shareholders receive new important powers. The reform is unlikely to be 
the “silver bullet” for the problems of executive remuneration but they go in the right 
direction. 
VIII. Interim Findings 
The mandatory but merely advisory vote on the DRR was a novelty when it was introduced. 
The vote’s appeal can already be seen by the number of “copies”. Most western economies 
provide for some form of say-on-pay by now. 
The mechanism’s effectiveness leaves room for improvement. Empirical studies show that 
shareholders use the vote and that boards react to negative or high dissent votes in most cases. 
However, the fact that the remuneration level has risen significantly despite the presence of 
the vote clearly questions its usefulness. Then again, the mechanism is apt to prevent “outliers 
in the form of exorbitant executive [remuneration]”1223 and sudden rises in remuneration in a 
company. It has improved the dialogue between companies and shareholders which, first, 
should lead to a more transparent process for the developing of remuneration policies and the 
setting of remuneration and, second, it is likely to have a positive effect on other areas of 
corporate governance. Finally, the say-on-pay regulation has led to an amelioration of the 
                                                         
1222 BIS, Executive pay: consultation on enhanced shareholder voting rights – summary of responses (BIS, 2012), 4. 
1223 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 402. Feldfunktion geändert
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pay-for-performance sensitivity – especially in the case of poor performance companies – and 
it has proven to be an effective tool against rewards for failure. 
The latest reform satisfies some of the suggestions made for improvement in this thesis and is 
a step in the right direction. 
Thus, the findings of the section regarding the UK are strongly in favour of the third 
hypothesis that say-on-pay is a useful instrument but needs improvement.  
 209 
 
D. Comparison 
The analysis of say-on-pay regulation in Germany and the UK will be supplemented with a 
comparison. 
I. Commonalities and Differences 
1. Objectives 
First, the regulations’ objectives will be examined. For the UK legislator the main objective is 
the improvement of accountability, transparency and linkage of rewards to performance. The 
German regulation is also supposed to enhance the supervisory board’s responsibility, 
ameliorate transparency and positively influence the fulfilment of the supervisory board’s 
duties emanating from § 87 AktG. Central to both regulations is the empowerment of 
shareholders. The shareholders are supposed to gain more influence on remuneration-setting. 
A further common objective is improving the dialogue between company and shareholders. 
Both regulations aim at providing a focussed outlet for shareholder concerns regarding 
executive remuneration. In both systems outrage shall be facilitated but simultaneously it 
shall be contained.  
In neither jurisdiction did the legislator explicitly state that the regulation is intended to 
reduce managerial excess. Yet the German travaux préparatoires specifically name the 
adequacy of executive remuneration and incentives aimed at a sustainable long-term 
management as objectives. The UK legal literature sees the reduction of managerial excess 
and improved remuneration practices as aims of the regulation. 
Finally, the German regulation aims to fulfil corresponding EU recommendations. As the UK 
regulation preceded the relevant recommendations, this objective is not shared.  
To summarise, the say-on-pay regulations largely concur in their objectives. 
2. (Pre-)Existing Alternatives 
Next, commonalities and differences regarding the regulatory framework in which the say-on-
pay mechanisms work will be analysed with a particular emphasis on alternatives. 
Both systems offered mechanisms allowing shareholders to voice their discontent before the 
say-on-pay reforms. However, options such as a negative resolution on the Entlastung in 
Germany and the annual accounts in the UK, despite their differences, face similar criticism. 
They are often disproportionate and not sufficiently focussed. 
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The mentioned shareholder approval requirements in the UK are a satisfactory instrument. 
However, their scope is limited to specific areas. In Germany the shareholder approval 
requirements are even more limited both in the circumstances in which they apply and in their 
scope. 
Differences exist regarding the possibility of providing for greater shareholder influence on 
executive remuneration in the articles. The UK approach allows such provisions. In Germany 
there is no room for corresponding provisions in the articles.  
To summarise, in both countries it was possible for shareholders to discuss or even make 
resolutions on executive remuneration matters even before the introduction of the say-on-pay 
regulations. Still, both say-on-pay regulations offer a more targeted and proportionate 
instrument to voice concerns regarding executive remuneration than the alternatives. 
3. Personal Scope 
Next, the regulations’ personal scope will be compared. § 120 (4) AktG refers to listed 
companies. Section 439 (1) CA 2006 refers to quoted companies. In both countries the say-
on-pay rules apply only to public companies that have access to the capital market. The 
reason lies in part in the difference in size and relevance for the overall economy of these 
companies, in the particularities of capital markets such as greater transparency needs and, 
finally, in the higher-level complexity and publicity of the executive remuneration agreements 
of these companies.  
Both approaches include domestic companies that are listed in a comparable foreign market. 
The UK regulation even states which markets are regarded as comparable. Preventing 
avoidance strategies is the common rationale.  
Regarding their personal scope the two regulations are almost identical. This is not surprising. 
There is a common view that different rules should apply to listed companies.  
4. (Non-)Mandatoriness 
The “most important difference”1224 is that the shareholder vote under German law is optional 
whereas under UK law it is mandatory. 
At first glance this difference is astounding. The German travaux préparatoires do not 
explain this deviation from the UK model.
1225
 It is possible that this difference results from 
                                                         
1224 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 407. 
1225 cf. BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
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the different board structures. The UK one-tier structure may necessitate a mandatory vote 
while it might be less necessary in the two-tier system of German companies with a (co-
determined) supervisory board.
1226
 
In practice the difference is less distinctive – at least when it comes to the biggest companies. 
By 2011 the shareholders of all DAX30-companies had voted pursuant to § 120 (4) AktG. 
Usually the administration had put the vote on the agenda.  
To summarise, one of the main differences between the two regulations – at least in theory – 
is the question of whether the vote is mandatory. 
5. Subject-matter of the Resolution 
Another aspect where the two say-on-pay regulations differ is the resolution’s subject-matter.  
According to § 120 (4) sentence 1 AktG the resolution’s subject-matter is the “system for the 
remuneration of management board members”. It has been seen that the term “remuneration 
system” is unclear and needs interpretation. It can be defined as the “abstract and general 
overall concept”, which guides the supervisory board when setting the management board 
members’ individual and precise remuneration.1227 The resolution is related to the past as the 
existing remuneration system is subject-matter. Thereby the supervisory board’s remuneration 
decision is not anticipated. In practice it has a future-related aspect as well, since the 
supervisory board is likely to consult (major) shareholders prior to the resolution and 
shareholders consider future developments too when voting on the “old” remuneration 
system. 
The subject-matter of the resolution according to s. 439 CA 2006 is the DRR. The DRR’s first 
part contains the company’s remuneration policy including a policy statement for the 
following years. The second part contains the payments actually made to the directors in that 
financial year. The vote is hence partly future related and partly related to the past.  
The German legislator has followed the UK model in that the resolution concerns the whole 
remuneration concept rather than individual remuneration agreements.
1228
 Nevertheless, the 
subject-matters clearly differ. Whilst the UK regulation refers to the statutorily defined DRR, 
the term “remuneration system” used by the German legislator needs interpretation.1229 The 
German regulation emphasises the past aspects as future related decisions would conflict with 
                                                         
1226 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 407. 
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the supervisory board’s exclusive remuneration-setting competence. In practice the 
shareholders still consider the future when voting on the system – and the two boards are 
aware of that. The UK regulation is clearly future-related with its explicit reference to the 
remuneration policy for the following years. Also the aspect related to the past differs from 
the German resolution’s subject-matter as it concerns the concrete payments actually made 
rather than merely the abstract remuneration system.  
Still, in both countries the dissent is often detached from the resolution’s actual subject-
matter, since frequently the absolute level of management remuneration or the remuneration 
package of a particular manager causes concern.
1230
 Irrespective of the exact subject-matter, 
both resolutions serve as an outlet for dissatisfaction with executive remuneration. 
The reform in the UK changes the subject-matter. The DRR itself is altered and the vote is 
split.  
6. Consequences 
Regarding the resolutions’ consequences significant commonalities exist. 
6.1. Non-binding 
The regulations concur regarding the lack of legal consequences.
1231
 Both favour a non-
binding vote. Once again, the German regulation followed its UK model closely. However, 
the motives for favouring a non-binding vote differ. In the UK mainly practical reasons were 
mentioned. In Germany the main concern was that a binding vote would infringe the 
supervisory board’s exclusive remuneration-setting competence. Also, the German 
particularity of co-determination played a role. Trade unions opposed the introduction of the 
say-on-pay vote in general as it would increase the influence of shareholders at the expense of 
the other stakeholders – the workers. Hence, the German decision to introduce an advisory 
vote can also be seen as an avowal to a more stakeholder-oriented approach. 
Summarising, both regulations lack direct legal consequences, albeit for different reasons. 
Differences exist with respect to indirect legal consequences. In the UK it is possible to agree 
that (parts of) the remuneration package should be conditional on the shareholders’ approval 
of the DRR.
1232
 The advisory vote would have indirect legal consequences. Under German 
law it is at least doubtful whether the validity of the remuneration components could 
                                                         
1230 cf. M Döll (fn.882887), 108; H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 682. 
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contractually be made conditional on shareholder approval.
1233
 Such a term would infringe the 
supervisory board’s exclusive competence to set remuneration independently because the 
supervisory board would bind itself to a general meeting decision.
1234
  
The picture differs when we consider the latest UK regulation. It provides a binding vote on 
some parts of the DRR, namely the remuneration policy. Regarding implementation the vote 
remains advisory. The differences from the German regulation are more significant now. The 
vote’s character and the distribution of powers within UK companies has been changed. Due 
to the strict allocation of powers and concerns regarding systematic inconsistencies, even with 
respect to a merely advisory vote, it seemed very unlikely that the German system would take 
a similar development. However, surprisingly, a corresponding reform was almost enacted in 
2013. 
6.2. Factual Consequences 
Both regulations rely on factual consequences revolving around the threat of reputational 
damages and improved contact between (supervisory) boards and shareholders.  
In practice, in both countries factual consequences are already noticeable if less than 50% of 
the votes – which would be the threshold for a disapproval – are dissenting. Dissent is already 
considered “high” if more than 20% of the shareholders fail to back the resolution. This 
“high” level of dissent is considered in both countries to require reactions by the (supervisory) 
board. 
7. Effectiveness 
On the face of it, both say-on-pay regulations seem to be ineffective due to their lack of legal 
consequences. However, both intend to compensate for the lack of legal consequences with 
factual consequences. Both assume that, in order to avoid negative publicity and reputational 
damage, (supervisory) boards will be more conscientious regarding executive remuneration 
decisions, consult shareholders prior to the vote, explain the remuneration better to them, and 
overcome psychological barriers and conflicts of interest in their negotiations with potential 
managers. Both resolutions provide a clear indicator of the shareholders’ view on executive 
remuneration which the (supervisory) board should not ignore. In both systems the say-on-
pay resolution is more focused and balanced than the (pre-)existing alternatives.  
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In theory the two regulations’ effectiveness differs. One reason is the non-mandatory nature 
of the German vote which potentially leads to less frequent votes than in the UK where the 
vote is mandatory. As mentioned before, a higher frequency can be beneficial for the vote’s 
effectiveness. In practice the vote has become standard practice in German DAX30-
companies as well. Differences exist in smaller companies.  
Another commonality regarding the resolutions’ effectiveness is that in both countries the 
threshold for shareholder dissent leading to quick reactions by the (supervisory) board is 
relatively low at 20%. Even dissent exceeding 10% leads to negative reports in the media. 
This can be explained with the usual high approval rates of over 90% for other resolutions in 
both systems. Disapprovals of over 50% have been rare in both countries.  
Evidence from cases such as HeidelbergCement and GSK shows that in both countries the 
causes for concern and dissent were similar, namely a lacking pay-performance-link, 
excessive increases in remuneration and excessive termination payments. In both countries 
negative votes led to amendments of the remuneration system which provided for a better 
pay-performance-link and fewer rewards for failure. Overall levels of remuneration were 
usually not affected. 
Thorough empirical studies comparable to the aforementioned ones on the effect of the UK 
shareholder vote do not exist for Germany, yet. The existing empirical studies deal mainly 
with the questions of how many companies had a given vote, who initiated the vote and 
whether the remuneration system was approved or disapproved.
1235
 In both countries there are 
no studies showing that the vote leads to lower levels of executive remuneration. The studies 
show that shareholders of UK quoted companies use their vote, and in addition they show that 
the vote has led to increased sensitivity of pay to poor performance and improvements in the 
field of rewards for failure. The use of the vote can be proven for Germany as well but there is 
no empirical research on the influence of the vote. Nevertheless, against the background of 
overall similarity and comparable experiences with the vote it is likely that the vote in 
Germany generally has a similar effect on the pay-for-performance relationship.  
II. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The analysis of commonalities and differences has brought many similarities to light. That is 
not surprising, since the German regulation used the UK one as a model. Correspondingly, the 
differences are of particular interest and will be examined for their benefits and drawbacks.  
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1. Mandatory vs Non-mandatory 
The “most important difference”1236 between the regulations is that the vote is optional in 
Germany whilst being mandatory in the UK. The German legislator did not give any 
explanation for the non-mandatory vote despite prominent voices in the legislative process
1237
 
in favour of a mandatory vote. A reason for the legislator’s preference for a non-mandatory 
vote could be the opposition of influential trade unions, given that they saw a shift from 
stakeholder influence to shareholder influence,
1238
 so that the Government tried to find a 
compromise. The question arises as to which approach is advantageous. 
The mandatory annual vote offers the advantage of maintaining constant pressure on the 
board to monitor and deal with executive remuneration and to engage with the shareholders 
regularly. The shareholders have to deal with executive remuneration details at least once a 
year. This should lead to greater expertise and experience regarding this complex matter and 
in the long run to better board accountability, which is after all one of the main objectives. If 
the vote is recurring “automatically” it lifts the burden of action from the shareholders. 
Finally, the mandatory annual vote has the advantage that even if the true character of a 
remuneration contract or policy just becomes evident over time, the shareholders can voice 
their concerns promptly.
1239
 Also, the board or supervisory board will be more careful to leave 
room for possible contractual amendments in order to react to negative votes if the vote is 
frequent.
1240
 
Then again, a mandatory annual vote faces the risk of being unnecessary if the remuneration 
has not been changed since the last vote. This would be a time-consuming exercise without 
any useful effect. Time is scarce at AGMs and it should not be wasted. Furthermore, a vote 
can be costly. Costs incurred include dialogue with shareholders, hiring remuneration 
advisers, drafting relevant documents and distributing them.
1241
 If the vote is merely optional 
these costs have to be incurred only if necessary. Moreover, the (supervisory) board could be 
more inclined to draft remuneration policies with a longer-term focus. Correspondingly, the 
new UK regulation provides that a vote is not necessary for three years. This indicates that the 
                                                         
1236 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 407. 
1237 G Thüsing, “Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) (BT-
Drucks. 16/12278)” <http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1373&id=1136> accessed 18 September 
2014, 20. 
1238 cf. D Hexel (fn.10301035), 12. 
1239 M Döll (fn.882887), 108. 
1240 ibid., 108. 
1241 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 404. 
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BIS, too, came to the conclusion that a mandatory annual vote is too strict and potentially 
inefficient. 
The non-mandatory vote offers greater flexibility. Shareholders vote only if it is considered 
necessary. Especially for smaller listed companies this can be beneficial. Often their 
shareholder structure differs significantly from that of DAX30- or FTSE100-companies. They 
have different and potentially more efficient ways to communicate with their shareholders. A 
mandatory vote would be unnecessary and inefficient in these cases. Finally, a non-mandatory 
vote is also a less intrusive regulation of companies’ internal affairs than a mandatory vote. 
Regulations should not be more intrusive than necessary to achieve their aim. 
The non-mandatory vote has to face criticism as well. Due to the optional nature the 
effectiveness of the entire say-on-pay regulation depends largely on the companies’ 
administrations. Shareholders may be insufficiently inclined to initiate the vote due to 
collective action and rational apathy problems.
1242
 Moreover, they have to fulfil a relatively 
high quorum. However, against this argument it can be said that in practice DAX30-
companies treat the vote as a standard item despite its optional nature and smaller companies 
who do not put the vote on the agenda regularly may not need to do so. The plus in flexibility 
would allow a more efficient application of this instrument. 
Thus, the optional vote’s advantages seem to outweigh those of the mandatory vote. However, 
the decision as to whether the vote should be mandatory or optional depends largely on one’s 
view regarding the vote’s regulatory purpose.1243 If the vote is considered to be primarily a 
monitoring tool for shareholders to prevent excessive remuneration, an optional vote is 
sufficient and preferable since the shareholders can use it if they see the need to do so.
1244
 If 
the vote is regarded as a measure to inform the (supervisory) board about the shareholders’ 
view on the company’s executive remuneration arrangements, a mandatory solution is 
preferable so that the board receives “feedback” regularly. The first view is the one taken 
here. The shareholders should have the option to use the say-on-pay vote as an additional 
instrument if they consider it necessary. The divergence of the German approach from its 
model regarding the mandatoriness has proven itself to be positive.  
The 2013 reform indicates that the UK regulation is converging to the German one to some 
extent. Still, different board structures may require different solutions without one solution 
being the superior choice for one-tier and two-tier systems. The supervisory board which is 
                                                         
1242 M Döll (fn.882887), 108. 
1243 cf. J Hupka (fn.950955), 324. 
1244 ibid., 324. 
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elected by the shareholders (at least partially if co-determination rules apply) and which 
separates remuneration-setting from managing the company decreases the need for additional 
shareholder influence compared with the one-tier system.
1245
 Differences in the company 
organisation and the absence of an adequacy requirement may increase the need for more 
shareholder involvement. A mandatory vote may be more indicated in the UK than it is in 
Germany. However, the introduction of independent NEDs and remuneration committees 
weakens this point. 
2. Binding vs Non-binding 
Both jurisdictions opted for an advisory vote. Now, the new regulation in the UK favours a 
binding vote on the policy report. The question arises whether the advisory vote is 
advantageous or whether it is a failed experiment.  
The main argument why a non-binding character could be a weakness is lack of effectiveness. 
Strong (supervisory) boards and managers can ignore the vote. However, as mentioned before 
there are factual consequences which can be almost as “binding” as a binding vote. 
Furthermore, the advisory vote is not designed to be a coercive instrument. Rather it is an 
outlet for shareholder dissent which is supposed to lead to more discussions on and publicity 
around executive remuneration.  
A binding vote can lead to practical difficulties. Yet, if the factual consequences are as 
compelling as intended then the difference should be marginal. Also, binding votes bear the 
risk of either being too prescriptive, thus, hindering recruiting and retaining the best personnel 
possible or leaving too much leeway and hence being ineffective. An advisory vote may 
concern a very detailed policy but if the board has to diverge from it in order to retain or 
recruit a manager it considers important to the company, it can do so – albeit at the risk of a 
negative vote at the next AGM. 
Then again, since a binding vote increases the costs and the potential loss of time if a vote is 
lost, it may be a more effective deterrent vis-à-vis both boards and managers. Similarly, it 
may be more effective in encouraging shareholders and boards to engage in the remuneration 
setting from an early stage on and communicate with each other.  
Hence, a binding vote may indeed have advantages – first experiences should be awaited.  
                                                         
1245 Similar: J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 408. Feldfunktion geändert
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3. Remuneration System vs DRR 
The resolutions’ subject-matter differs. Their advantages and disadvantages will now be 
examined. 
The main criticism regarding the subject-matter “remuneration system” is a lack of clarity.1246 
The term is not legally defined. Its meaning has to be deduced from HGB and GCGC 
disclosure rules. The reference to the disclosure provisions, however, is of limited use as their 
details are not entirely clear either.
1247
 Regarding the GCGC rules one can criticise that the 
legislator referred to a private organisation’s regulation in order to define a statutory term. 
Furthermore, the GCGC provisions are merely recommendations and § 389 (2) no. 5 HGB is 
just a “shall”-provision.1248 The shareholders are not necessarily provided with information on 
the remuneration system.
1249
 Some have doubted that there has to be a remuneration system at 
all.
1250
  
In practice the issues mentioned here are less problematic. According to empirical studies the 
vast majority (91.3%) of AGs present a remuneration report which outlines the management 
board members’ remuneration system.1251 Most companies’ shareholders have a basis for their 
resolution.
1252
 Following other empirical research the resolution’s subject-matter is usually 
clarified by a reference to the content of the remuneration report.
1253
 The shareholders do not 
approve the “remuneration system as described in the remuneration report”.1254 Rather, the 
invitation to the AGM usually contains a reference to the remuneration report, stating that the 
report shall be the resolution’s basis.1255 Nevertheless, the resolution remains not self-
explanatory.
1256
 Also, the remuneration report’s content is defined neither by statute nor by 
the GCGC itself.
1257
 
                                                         
1246 Inter alia KS Hohenstatt (fn.980985), 1356; G Annuß, I Theusinger (fn.980985), 2439; WP Schick (fn.913918), 596. 
1247 G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (2009) AG, 517-529, 525. 
1248 G Reger (fn.980985), § 120 m.no.21. 
1249 ibid., m.no.21. 
1250 G Annuß, I Theusinger (fn.980985), 2439; G Spindler, “Vorstandsgehälter auf dem Prüfstand” (2009) NJOZ, 3282-3291, 
3290; G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 525. 
1251 T Talaulicar, A v. Werder, “Kodex Report 2010: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und Anregungen des Deutschen 
Corporate Governance Kodex” (2010) 16 DB, 853-861, 858. 
1252 J Hupka (fn.950955), 282. 
1253 B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 564. 
1254 ibid., 564. 
1255 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 625; B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 564. 
1256 Similar: B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 564. 
1257 J Hupka (fn.950955), 282. 
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In contrast to that, the UK regulation provides in s. 439 (1) that the subject-matter of the 
resolution is the approval of the DRR for the financial year in question. The content of the 
DRR is defined by statute. 
The subject-matter of the say-on-pay resolution under UK law seems advantageous due to its 
superior precision and clarity.  
III. Possible Improvements 
The question that logically follows is how might the two say-on-pay regulations be improved. 
1. Germany 
1.1. Binding Vote 
A first possible improvement of the German system would be to render the vote on the 
remuneration system binding.
1258
  
The main argument against a binding say-on-pay resolution in Germany is that this would be 
incompatible with the division and allocation of competences in AGs. The supervisory 
board’s exclusive competence to independently set the management board members’ 
remuneration would be compromised. However, this may be right de lege lata but there are 
several arguments that weaken a categorical refusal of this option. The supervisory board has 
the exclusive competence in the areas stated by the AktG but this does not imply that the 
competences cannot be altered.
1259
 Moreover, the supervisory board has no original rights but 
only derived ones.
1260
 It should have the competences only for as long and to such an extent 
as it is best placed to use them, especially better placed than the general meeting.
1261
 Hence, if 
the supervisory board does not succeed in setting adequate remuneration, it could lose this 
competence.  
Transferring the competence regarding management board remuneration to the shareholders is 
worth considering, as the shareholders already have the competence to set the supervisory 
board members’ remuneration, § 113, and they have fulfilled this task satisfactorily.1262 Still, 
                                                         
1258 cf. also G Thüsing, “Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung” (fn.116109), 526; P Jaspers (fn.355350), 
10. 
1259 P Jaspers (fn.355350), 10. 
1260 Different opinion: E Vetter, “Begrenzung der Vorstandsbezüge durch Hauptversammlungsbeschluss?” (2009) ZIP 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 1307-1309, 1308. 
1261 P Jaspers (fn.355350), 10. 
1262 cf. H Hirte, “Stellungnahme zum Fraktionsentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung 
(VorstAG) für den Deutschen Bundestag” (2009) <http://www.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche-
einrichtungen/handelsrecht/wissenschaft_projekte_/VorstAG.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 10. 
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the perception that the general meeting is unable to set efficient and adequate remuneration 
persists. Some expect lower whilst others expect higher management board remuneration if 
the general meeting was competent to set it.
1263
 Either is possible but in a positive sense: 
shareholders may pay successful managers who increased share value and dividends more 
whilst paying failing managers less if their performance is unsatisfactory.
1264
 Hence, increased 
influence for shareholders may prevent rewards for failure and enhance the pay-for-
performance link. 
Finally, the feared loss of influence of other stakeholders such as workers by weakening the 
co-determined supervisory board’s remuneration setting competence is comprehensible.1265 
Increased shareholder influence is not necessarily desirable. However, for the workforce 
representatives the same criticism applies as for the supervisory board in general, namely that 
they have not succeeded in ensuring the remuneration’s adequacy. Giving more influence to 
another organ which might be more successful is the logical consequence. 
This does not mean that the power to set management board members’ remuneration should 
be transferred entirely from the supervisory board to the shareholders. A binding vote would 
still leave the supervisory board the power to negotiate and determine the remuneration. 
However, there could be limits to its discretion set by the shareholders to ensure the 
remuneration’s adequacy more effectively. 
1.2. Lower Quorum? 
Another change worth considering could be a lower quorum to initiate a resolution. As early 
as the consultation period a lower quorum was suggested.
1266
 Likewise, the scholarship feared 
that the quorum could be too high so that the shareholders would not (be able to) use the 
vote.
1267
  
The quorum of § 120 (4) is substantially higher than for other minority shareholder rights 
under German law such as § 142 (2) on special investigations into a company’s affairs 
(Sonderprüfung), and § 148 on derivative action (Klagezulassungsverfahren).
1268
 Both rights 
require an aggregated holding of at least one-hundredth of the share capital or par value of at 
least €100,000.1269 The initiation of a say-on-pay vote requires an aggregated holding of at 
                                                         
1263 cf. D Hexel (fn.10301035), 12. 
1264 P Jaspers (fn.355350), 10. 
1265 cf. D Hexel (fn.10301035), 12. 
1266 H Hirte, “Stellungnahme” (fn.12741279), 10 and 12. 
1267 M Döll (fn.882887), 108. 
1268 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 414. 
1269 § 142 (2), § 148 (1). 
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least one-twentieth of the share capital or par value of at least €500,000.1270 There is no 
satisfactory reason for this difference in quorum requirements.
1271
 Similarly, the argument that 
in practice the vote is usually initiated by the company’s administration, therefore, the 
shareholders hardly ever have to initiate the vote, hence, a lower quorum is unnecessary is 
unconvincing.
1272
 First, the fact that currently the need in practice – at least regarding 
DAX30-companies – seems limited is not a satisfactory reason for refraining from aligning 
the quorum to the quorum of related rights. Second, in recent years €100,000 has become a 
“standard figure in German corporation law” which seems to strike the right balance between 
enabling shareholders to get involved and preventing litigious shareholders from abusing the 
right.
1273
 Third, smaller shareholders with a significant shareholding would be enabled to 
initiate the vote.
1274
 This is particularly important since bigger shareholders often have 
different means to influence supervisory board decisions and also because minority 
shareholders would be protected against majority shareholders. Fourth, the argument that the 
vote is usually initiated by the administration does not apply to smaller companies to the same 
extent as to DAX30-companies. Minority shareholders of smaller companies should have to 
rely less on an initiative by the administration or a majority shareholder. Changing the 
quorum seems indicated. 
1.3. Voting Requirement in the Articles 
The non-mandatory nature of the German say-on-pay vote offers advantages. In order to 
preserve flexibility whilst at the same time allowing companies to lift the burden of initiative 
from the shareholders, companies should be explicitly allowed to require annual say-on-pay 
votes in their articles. 
By doing so companies for which a regime of mandatory annual votes is beneficial are able to 
establish such a regime. Simultaneously, it leaves sufficient flexibility so that other companies 
which have different ways to communicate with their shareholders are not obliged to waste 
resources on an annual, mandatory vote.  
Explicitly allowing the requirement of a shareholder say-on-pay vote in the articles would 
clarify the legal situation and would allow greater flexibility, which in turn would lead to 
greater efficiency since the companies could find solutions best suited to their individual 
needs. 
                                                         
1270 § 122 (2). 
1271 cf. J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 414. 
1272 J Hupka (fn.950955), 324. 
1273 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 415. 
1274 cf. ibid., 415. 
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1.4. Change subject-matter 
Another improvement would be to change the resolution’s subject-matter. The main criticism 
regarding the German subject-matter is that it is not sufficiently clear.  
One possible solution would be to refer, in the actual § 120 (4) resolution, to the remuneration 
report.
1275
 This would make the resolution at least self-explanatory and more precise. In the 
literature the objection has been raised that the remuneration report serves only to inform 
rather than to determine the content of the resolution.
1276
 Otherwise, the legislator would have 
made the AktG provide for a vote on the remuneration report instead of a vote on the 
remuneration system.
1277
 
However, the fact that the AktG does not provide for a resolution on the remuneration report 
but on the remuneration system is not hewn in stone. A resolution regarding the approval of 
the remuneration report would be preferable for several reasons. First and foremost, the 
subject-matter of the resolution would be clearer. However, this would also necessitate 
additional precursor steps, namely to make the remuneration report mandatory and to 
prescribe its content more precisely. Positive effects would be that the constitutionally 
questionable reference to the GCGC for the interpretation of the statutory term “remuneration 
system” would be avoided.1278 Also, doubts as to the content and temporal dimension of the 
resolution would be avoided. Furthermore, the German regulation would comply with the EU 
Recommendation which suggests a clear and comparable subject-matter.
1279
  
The vote on a mandatory, standardised remuneration report would lead to a better-informed 
decision. A clearer, more precise and comparable subject-matter would enhance the 
effectiveness of this remuneration governance tool. 
1.5. Statement Responding to High Dissent 
A final suggestion would be to introduce for cases of high dissent – which fall short of a 
rejection – the requirement for supervisory boards to issue a statement on how the supervisory 
board will address the shareholders’ concerns. A possible threshold could be 20% of votes not 
supporting the resolution, which is widely regarded as high dissent.  
                                                         
1275 Similar: B Deilmann, S Otte (fn.986991), 564. 
1276 J v Falkenhausen, D Kocher (fn.937942), 626. 
1277 ibid., 626. 
1278 cf. M Döll (fn.882887), 109. 
1279 cf. Art. 5.2. Recommendation 2009/385/EC, OJ L 120 of 15.5.2009, 28-31, 30; G Thüsing, “Stellungnahme” (fn. 
12491254), 20. 
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Such a statement would improve the shareholders’ monitoring of the supervisory board. The 
latter would be unable to ignore high dissent votes. The statement would increase the vote’s 
publicity and thereby increase the threat of reputational damages. Hence, it would strengthen 
the factual consequences as an enforcement mechanism. Finally, it would adapt the say-on-
pay vote to the reality as in practice negative votes of over 50% are rare. 
2. United Kingdom 
Also regarding the UK say-on-pay regulation improvements will be suggested. 
2.1. Binding 
A first improvement could be increasing the vote’s consequences. Instead of merely relying 
on factual consequences the resolution could be made more effective if it had direct legal 
consequences.  
A binding vote on the remuneration policy would encourage the board to engage with 
shareholders in the remuneration setting process from an early point on. Moreover, it would 
deter the board, first, from ignoring the shareholders’ will as payments outside the policy are 
not permitted and, second, from suggesting excessive remuneration in the first place, as a 
negative vote would lead to time-consuming and costly consequences. Consequences would 
be calling an extraordinary general meeting or trying to use the old policy until the next 
AGM. Finally, the introduction of a binding vote in the UK faces fewer concerns than its 
introduction in Germany due to the different approach to the allocation of powers in the 
company.  
The recently introduced binding vote on the remuneration policy, s 439A, corresponds to the 
suggested improvements. 
2.2. Non-mandatory 
Another possible improvement would be rendering the resolution on the DRR merely 
optional. The aim would be to avoid unnecessary and costly resolutions whilst at the same 
time keeping the pressure on the board to set executive remuneration conscientiously. 
The comparison has shown that the UK requirement of a mandatory vote is relatively rigid 
compared with the German approach. A mandatory vote offers several positive aspects as 
mentioned earlier and may lead to greater board accountability. However, a possible 
consequence of a non-mandatory vote is that merely costly and time-consuming instead of 
useful votes could be avoided. Also, longer-term remuneration policies could be encouraged 
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if votes were only required after changes or upon request. Companies in which neither 
shareholders nor the administration consider the vote necessary save time and costs by having 
the vote less frequently or not at all. The optional nature of the resolution offers the advantage 
of allowing companies and shareholders to choose the corporate governance setting which 
suits them best. The positive aspects of a regular vote can be achieved without burdening 
companies for which a different regime is more efficient. Long-term planning could be 
encouraged.  
Still, a non-mandatory vote faces concerns. It has been argued that due to organisational 
differences from German companies, namely the absence of a supervisory board, greater 
shareholder involvement could be necessary in the UK.
1280
 This is unconvincing against the 
background of the existence of independent NEDs and remuneration committees.  
A first step in the direction of more flexibility is the voting requirement’s reduction by the 
2013 reform from annual to every three years.  
IV. Interim Findings 
The comparison of the two say-on-pay regulations evinced many similarities but also 
differences. Similarities were anticipated because the UK regulation served as a model for the 
German regulation.  
Extensive similarities draw the attention all the more to the differences. Their analysis showed 
that some divergences are advantageous whilst others are owed to structural differences. 
  
                                                         
1280 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 408. Feldfunktion geändert
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E. Findings of this Chapter 
This chapter dealt with the third layer of executive remuneration regulation. The preceding 
chapters revealed the shortcomings of the first two layers. Neither the (supervisory) board’s 
remuneration-setting nor disclosure could fulfil the expectations. Therefore, this chapter’s 
underlying question was whether shareholder voting is the solution. The current say-on-pay 
mechanisms in Germany and the UK are useful instruments but not the “silver bullet”. 
The say-on-pay votes were introduced to enable shareholders to monitor and discuss 
executive remuneration and to signal their acceptance or refusal. Disciplining the 
(supervisory) board, increasing its accountability and improving the dialogue between 
shareholders and the (supervisory) board were further objectives. As well as facilitating 
outrage the regulations also try to contain it. 
Although most of these objectives have been achieved by both regulations, the effect on 
executive remuneration is split. The levels of executive remuneration rose significantly in 
both countries despite the introduction of the vote. In this respect the regulations have been 
ineffective. However, greater effectiveness can be noted regarding the prevention of “outliers 
in form of exorbitant executive [remuneration]”1281, sudden rises of executive remuneration in 
a company, and an improved pay-performance-link. Hence, agency costs could be reduced to 
some extent. Also the communication between shareholders and (supervisory) board in 
remuneration matters has improved. This is important for a more transparent and accountable 
remuneration-setting. The introduction of the vote created a focal point for concerns, 
increased the awareness of shareholders and the public regarding remuneration and it has also 
given smaller shareholders a way to voice their concerns. 
The evaluation is, hence, ambiguous. Despite positive results, the fact that the effect on the 
levels of executive remuneration – one of the main triggers for its introduction – is 
insufficient cannot be ignored. In their current form the two regulations are not satisfactory. 
Therefore, to strengthen the effect of the resolution the vote should be made binding, so that 
the (supervisory) board would not able to deviate from a remuneration policy accepted by the 
shareholders. This would give the shareholders more influence on the remuneration-setting-
process. Moreover, several minor changes are suggested, such as rendering the vote optional 
in the UK and lowering the quorum in Germany. Finally, against the background of the rarity 
of negative votes the impact of high-dissent votes of over 20% should be increased by 
                                                         
1281 J Lieder, P Fischer (fn.10271032), 402. Feldfunktion geändert
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requiring the remuneration setting organ to state how it will address the shareholders’ 
concerns. 
Providing the vote with “more teeth” should increase its effectiveness. More flexibility should 
prevent votes in circumstances in which they are merely a costly and time-consuming burden 
rather than a useful corporate governance tool. However, if the vote is merely optional 
shareholders have to be able and encouraged to use it. 
All in all, the findings of this chapter are, on balance, strongly in favour of the third 
hypothesis that say-on-pay is a useful instrument in need of further improvement. The recent 
reform in the UK, which deals with some of the suggested improvements, is to be welcomed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EU Measures and Their Influence on National Remuneration Governance 
Rules 
 
A. Introduction 
The previous chapters showed constant reforms of remuneration governance rules throughout 
the last decade. Not all the developments were initiated nationally but some have “European” 
roots.  
Influence of EU law in the area of remuneration governance and in company law in general is 
not surprising, given that the EU was originally founded as a European Economic 
Community.
1282
 Today EU company law is considered a “cornerstone of the internal 
market”1283. Company law is the most “Europeanised” area of private law.1284 Public 
company law constitutes the “preferred item” for measures harmonising national company 
laws.
1285
 Many national reforms anticipate EU measures.
1286
 Correspondingly, it has been 
estimated that e.g. up to 80% of the German legislation in the field of economic law is 
influenced by the EU.
1287
  
An examination of the remuneration governance regulations in Germany and the UK would 
be incomplete without the European context in which they are embedded, which influences 
and shapes them. Therefore, past, current and future regulatory measures of the EU on 
remuneration governance will now be examined. The aim is to understand the national 
regulations of executive remuneration better and to be able to suggest the most effective 
improvements. The central questions will be (1) how the EU has influenced German and UK 
remuneration governance rules in the past, (2) what the EU currently does in this field, (3) 
whether, based on these findings, the EU should act in this field in the future and (4) if yes, 
what it should do. The hypothesis that is to be tested in this chapter is that further EU 
measures could ensure better remuneration governance. 
                                                         
1282 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt, Europäisches Unternehmens- und Kapitalmarktrecht (5th ed, De Gruyter, 2012), 3. 
1283 COM(2012) 740/2, 4. 
1284 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt (fn.12941299), 3. 
1285 M Habersack, “Das Aktiengesetz und das Europäische Recht” (2006) 27(10) ZIP, 445-451, 445. 
1286 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt (fn.12941299), 7. 
1287 KJ Hopt, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und deutsche Unternehmensverfassung – Aktionsplan und Interdependenzen” 
(2005) 26(11) ZIP, 461-474, 461. 
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First, an analysis will reveal how the EU can influence national remuneration governance 
regulations. Then, the development, content and implementation of the relevant EU measures 
will be examined. Subsequently, recent developments will be analysed, followed by an 
evaluation and suggestions for the future. 
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B. Foundations  
Before turning to the EU measures on remuneration governance, theoretical and practical 
foundations will briefly be addressed. 
It is also important to emphasise that the EU has “made agency costs the basis for controlling 
director’s remuneration at a European level”.1288 
I. Regulatory Levels  
1. Centralised and Decentralised Regulation 
The first, fundamental question concerns the right regulatory level, i.e. whether “uniform 
regulation on the European level or decentralised regulation on the national level” is 
preferable.
1289
 
In the EU’s early years, centralised, uniform regulation – harmonisation – was preferred to 
solve the problem of “distorting effects” caused by differences in company law.1290 A wide 
range of company law directives was enacted to this end.
1291
 Since the 2003 Action Plan the 
Commission favours adopting a common approach at EU level regarding “a few essential 
rules” and ensuring “adequate coordination of corporate governance codes”1292. Hence, the 
corporate governance regulation changed from centralised to decentralised.  
The two approaches’ merits and shortcomings will be examined.1293 Decentralised regulation 
offers the advantage that different national preferences, cultures and traditions can be 
accommodated.
1294
 Furthermore, it can lead to more policy innovations,
1295
 which allow swift 
responses to changing (market) conditions.
1296
 It enables competition between jurisdictions, 
which can improve regulation and can even lead to de-facto approximation. Some argue that 
decentralised regulation prevents overregulation and allows better control of the policy-
                                                         
1288 J Lee, (fn.6564), 614. 
1289 H Merkt, “Die Pluralisierung des europäischen Gesellschaftsrechts” (2004) 50(1) RIW, 3-7, 5. 
1290 J Armour, “Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus Regulatory Competition” (2005) 58(1) Current 
Legal Problems, 369-413. 375. 
1291 Overview: E Wymeersch, “Company Law in Europe and European Company Law” (2001) Universiteit Gent Financial 
Law Institute Working Paper No 2001-06 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273876> accessed 18 
September 2014, 9-11. 
1292 COM(2003) 284 final, 12. 
1293 Overview: G Hertig, “On-Going Board Reforms: One Size Fits All and Regulatory Capture” (2005) 21 (2) Oxf Rev Econ 
Pol, 269-282; L Enriques, M Gatti, “The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the European Union” 
(2006) 27(4) UPenn J Int’l  Econ Law, 939-989.  
1294 S Ederveen, G Gelauff, J Pelkmanns, “Assessing Subsidiarity” in G Gelauff, I Grilo, A Lejour (eds), Subsidiarity and 
Economic Reform in Europe (Springer, 2008), 19-40, 22. 
1295 A Portuese, “The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency” (2011) 17 CJEL, 231-262, 238. 
1296 S Mock, “Harmonization, Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law” (2002) GLJ 
<http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=216> accessd 5 March 2013 m.no.12. 
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makers.
1297
 Yet research indicates that policy makers at a lower level are more susceptible to 
lobbying activities than those at higher levels.
1298
 Moreover, it could be argued that 
centralised regulation resembles a “cartel among national law makers”1299 with the potential 
consequences of over-regulation or excessive innovation.
1300
 Others see, regarding centralised 
regulation, the risk of “petrification” when the central law-making process takes longer than 
the decentralised one.
1301
 The slow responsiveness to developments or discovered 
shortcomings could lead to deficient laws.
1302
 
Centralised regulation offers economies of scale and synergy effects. It can also correct 
market failures
1303
 and integrate markets.
1304
 If a market failure exists and the individual 
Member States are unable or unwilling to correct it, centralised regulation could be 
advantageous.
1305
 The aspect of market integration is multi-faceted. Centralised regulation 
could diminish obstacles to the “four freedoms”.1306 It could decrease divergence and 
standardise rules creating a level playing field,
1307
 reduce transaction costs between 
companies or between companies and investors,
1308
 and substitute domestic rules that 
“practically impede” the creation of a common market.1309 It could also prevent a “race to the 
bottom”. Finally, a centrally steered exchange of information and knowledge fosters “cross-
national learning”.1310  
Both regulatory levels have their merits and drawbacks. The question as to which one is 
preferable cannot be decided in the abstract.
1311
  
2. Competence 
The regulatory level also depends on questions of competence, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
                                                         
1297 cf. H Fleischer, “Corporate Governance in Europa als Mehrebenensystem” (2012) ZGR, 160-196, 175. 
1298 cf. S Ederveen, G Gelauff, J Pelkmanns, (fn.13061311), 23; A Portuese (fn.13071312), 239. 
1299 L Enriques, “EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?” (2005) 27(1) UPenn J Int’l  Econ 
Law, 1-78. 41. 
1300 ibid., 41. 
1301
 MM Siems, “The Case Against Harmonization of Shareholder Rights”(2005) 6 EBOR, 539-552, 542. 
1302
 ibid., 542. 
1303 L Enriques, “Company Law Harmonisation Reconsidered – What Role for the EC?” in SM Bartmann (ed), European 
Company Law in Accelerated Progress (Kluwer, 2006), 59-82, 68ff. 
1304 L Enriques, M Gatti (fn.13051310), 22. 
1305 L Enriques, “Company Law Harmonisation Reconsidered – What Role for the EC?”(fn.13151320), 68. 
1306 L Enriques, M Gatti, (fn.13051310), 23. 
1307 ibid., 23. 
1308 ibid., 23. 
1309 ibid., 23. 
1310 H Fleischer, “Corporate Governance in Europa als Mehrebenensystem” (fn.13091314), 175. 
1311 Similar: C Gerner-Beuerle, “United in Diversity. Maximum vs. minimum harmonisation in EU securities regulation” 
(2012) CMLJ, 317-342, 321.  
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A first, fundamental question is that of competence. Due to the principle of conferral, Art 5 
(2) TEU, the EU needs a legal basis to act. The central legal basis for EU (harmonisation) 
measures in company law is Art 50 (2) lit g) TFEU.
1312
 It is the legal basis of almost all 
company law directives enacted.
1313
 However, it merely empowers the EU to enact directives. 
The enactment of Regulations for example requires another legal basis such as Art 114 and 
Art 352 TFEU.  
3. Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
Even if the EU has the competence to act, it may be limited by the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, which are frequently raised as arguments against EU measures. 
The subsidiarity principle limits the exercise of a competence. It means that where there is no 
exclusive EU competence, the EU “shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States […] but can […] be 
better achieved at Union level”, Art 5 (2) TEU. Subsidiarity makes it easier to find the most 
efficient regulatory level.
1314
  
The proportionality principle signifies that “content and form of Union action shall not exceed 
what is necessary” to achieve the Treaties’ objectives, Art 5 (3). 
II. Regulatory Instruments 
Next, the different regulatory instruments will be examined. According to Art 288 (1) TFEU 
the EU institutions can adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions.  
The most intrusive instrument is a Regulation. Regulations have general application and 
create binding, directly applicable and uniform law for all EU citizens, Art 288 (2). The 
national legislator does not act at all. The EU law has precedence if it conflicts with national 
law.
1315
 As Regulations are a “heavy-handed intervention” in the national legal orders the EU 
has generally refrained from using them in traditional company law except for e.g. the 
introduction of new company forms.
1316
  
                                                         
1312 H Fleischer, “Corporate Governance in Europa als Mehrebenensystem” (fn.13091314), 164. 
1313 M Adenas, F Wooldridge, European Comparative Company Law (CUP, 2010), 8. 
1314 H Fleischer, “Corporate Governance in Europa als Mehrebenensystem” (fn.13091314), 174. 
1315 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- 
und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, m.no.3. 
1316 E Wymeersch (fn.13031308), 13. 
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Directives, which are defined in Art 288 (3) TFEU, generally have to be implemented in the 
national legal orders. They are only binding as to the outcome. Form and method are left to 
the Member States, which can use the legal language and terminology specific to their 
jurisdiction. This facilitates “integrating” the EU-originating provisions into national law. The 
rules’ national character can be maintained whilst attaining material convergence.1317 The 
significant variances between the legislative traditions of the Member States can be bridged 
more easily.
1318
 Furthermore, in the multicultural and multilingual EU it may be difficult to 
agree on a precise wording and easier to agree on the general principles and aims.
1319
  
However, directives do not lead to uniform law. The reasons for this are the embeddedness in 
the national legal order and the specific influences emanating from each national legal order 
so that differences between the implementations exist and may increase over time.
1320
 The 
directive merely sets minimum standards and Member States are allowed to set stricter 
standards.
1321
 National legal particularities can thereby be reinforced.
1322
 Despite these 
drawbacks, directives have long been the means of choice in EU company law.
1323
 
Another instrument is the recommendation. Recommendations are non-binding, Art 288 (5). 
Their main objective is to induce the national legislator to change the domestic law.
1324
 For a 
long time recommendations were hardly used in company law.
1325
 This has changed since the 
2003 Action Plan.
1326
 The necessary legislative process for the adoption of directives was 
considered to be difficult and time-consuming.
1327
 Therefore, the Commission increasingly 
used recommendations.  
Finally, for the sake of completeness other instruments such as decisions, Art 288 (4) and 
opinions, Art 288 (5) TFEU, should be mentioned as well.   
                                                         
1317 cf. M Habersack, D Verse, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht (4th ed, CH Beck, 2011), § 3 m.no.48. 
1318 ibid., m.no.49. 
1319 cf. RM Buxbaum, KJ Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate and Capital Market Law 
Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A (De Gruyter, 1988), 232ff. 
1320 cf. M Habersack, D Verse (fn.13291334), § 3 m.no.49. 
1321 E Wymeersch (fn.13031308), 8. 
1322 ibid., 8. 
1323 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt (fn.12941299), 16. 
1324 M Habersack, DA Verse (fn.13291334), § 3 m.no.60. 
1325 E Wymeersch (fn.13031308), 13. 
1326 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt (fn.12941299), 45. 
1327 ibid., 45. 
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C. Development 
Sections C and D will answer the first central question of this chapter, namely how the EU 
has influenced the national remuneration governance regimes.  
I. Setting the Scene 
The EU’s legislative activity regarding company law can be divided into two phases separated 
by about a decade of legislative stagnation. The first phase began in 1968 with the First 
Council Directive
1328
 and ended in 1989 with the Single Member Company Directive.
1329
 
Within this time nine directives and one regulation were enacted.
1330
 The EU’s approach was 
“codificatory”1331 i.e. a “movement towards an EU Companies Act”1332. The early strategy 
sought a theme-oriented, extensive harmonisation of substantive company law.
1333
 
Fundamental, irreconcilable differences regarding corporate governance
1334
 and the increasing 
number of Member States led to the abandonment of this approach.
1335
 A period of legislative 
inactivity followed.
1336
  
A decade later the company law reform was restarted. The catalyst was a combination of 
decisions of the Court of Justice such as Centros
1337
, corporate scandals such as Enron, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
1338
 in the US, and the new, innovative legislative approach of the 
Commission.
1339
 The new approach was problem-oriented, defining the questions that need to 
be and which can be harmonised at EU level.
1340
 Since then over ten company law directives 
and several regulations have been enacted.
1341
  
Important documents on remuneration governance were the Report of the High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts, the Action Plan 2003 and the recommendations of 2004, 2005 and 
2009. 
                                                         
1328 68/151/EEC. 
1329 AM Fleckner, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht” in S Grundmann et al, Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag 
am 24. August 2010 (de Gruyter, 2010), 657-687, 658. 
1330 A Engert, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht” in K Langenbucher (ed) Europarechtliche Bezüge des Privatrechts (2nd ed, 
Nomos, 2008), 225-280, 227ff. 
1331 M Habersack, “Das Aktiengesetz und das Europäische Recht” (fn.12971302), 446. 
1332 H Lega, F Parrein, “Corporate Governance in a European Perspective” in K Geens, KJ Hopt (eds), The European 
Company Law Action Plan Revisited (Leuven University Press, 2010), 79-125, 81. 
1333 H Merkt (fn.13011306), 2. 
1334 J Armour, WG Ringe, “European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis” (2011) 48 CMLR, 125-174, 125. 
1335 H Lega, F Parrein (fn.13441354), 81. 
1336 T Baums, “European Company Law Beyond the 2003 Action Plan” (2007) 8(1) EBOR, 143-160, 143. 
1337 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selksabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459. 
1338 Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted 30 July 2002. 
1339 cf. J Armour, WG Ringe (fn.13461356), 125. 
1340 H Merkt (fn.13011306), 3. 
1341 e.g. the Directives on takeover bids (2004/25/EC) and shareholder rights (2007/36/EC). 
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II. The Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts 
In 2001 the Commission appointed the so-called High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts.
1342
 Their final report
1343
 (2002) presented suggestions on the modernisation of 
corporate governance in the EU, including tools for the control of executive remuneration.
1344
  
The report emphasised the importance of disclosure and recommended a directive which sets 
out the principles but leaves to the Member States the details of what has to be disclosed.
1345
 
However, the EU was to co-ordinate the setting of the detailed rules. Detailed 
recommendations included those made for (supervisory) boards, their role, competence and 
independence. Executive remuneration was identified as a “key area of conflict of 
interest”.1346  
The report suggested a recommendation establishing a regulatory regime for executive 
remuneration which should apply to all listed companies in the EU.
1347
 The Commission 
would monitor compliance with the regime by and in the Member States.
1348
 The new regime 
included rules for:
1349
 (1) annual disclosure of the remuneration policy (2) annual 
individualised disclosure of executive remuneration (3) AGM approval of share incentive 
schemes. Showing awareness of the risks of transplanting control mechanisms from one 
corporate governance system to another,
1350
 the report did not suggest requiring an annual 
shareholder vote on the remuneration policy.
1351
 
                                                         
1342 Group’s history in KJ Hopt, “Zur Arbeit der High Level Group of Company Law Experts” in P Nobel (ed) 
Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht einschliesslich internationales Kapitalmarktrecht (Stämpfli, 2004), 73. 
1343 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in 
Europe <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1344 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, “Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence and 
Reform Perspectives” (2004) 3 ECFR, 251-339, 332. 
1345 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (fn.13551364), 46. 
1346 ibid., 64. 
1347 ibid., 67. 
1348 ibid., 67. 
1349 ibid., 65-67. 
1350 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, “Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence and 
Reform Perspectives” (fn.13561366), 332. 
1351 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (fn.13551364), 65. 
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III. The 2003 Action Plan  
1. General 
The 2003 Action Plan followed the report’s recommendations closely.1352 It constitutes the 
starting point of the recent developments and was – according to Hopt – the “most important 
document with regard to European company law in many years”1353. 
2. Objectives 
Its two main objectives were: (1) strengthening shareholders’ rights and protecting other 
stakeholders
1354
 and (2) fostering the efficiency and competitiveness of businesses.
1355
 
Moreover, the Commission intended to overcome the legislative standstill, to coordinate 
national corporate governance initiatives,
1356
 and to develop European company law 
further.
1357
  
3. Content 
The Action Plan contained 24 measures prioritised and divided into short-term (2003-2005), 
medium-term (2006-2008) and long-term (2009 and after) measures.
1358
 The Commission 
suggested different regulatory instruments for their realisation.
1359
 The guiding principle was 
that the EU corporate governance regulation should be “flexible in application while firm in 
principle”1360.  
Corporate governance was clearly the plan’s centrepiece.1361 Key elements were disclosure, 
the board, and process rules.
1362
 Corresponding measures included those concerning enhanced 
disclosure requirements, strengthening of shareholder rights, modernisation of companies’ 
                                                         
1352 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt (fn.12981303), 359. 
1353 KJ Hopt, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und deutsche Unternehmensverfassung ” (fn.12991304), 461. 
1354 COM(2003) 284 final, 8. 
1355 ibid., 9. 
1356 G Bachmann, “Der ‘Europäische Corporate Governance-Rahmen’ – Zum Grünbuch 2011 der Europäischen 
Kommission”(2011) 65(28) WM, 1301-1348, 1301. 
1357 S Maul, G Lanfermann, E Eggenhofer, “Aktionsplan der Europäischen Kommission zur Reform des Europäischen 
Gesellschaftsrechts” (2003) 58(25) BB, 1289-1295, 1289. 
1358 COM(2003) 284 final, Annex 1. 
1359 COM(2003) 284 final, Annex 1. 
1360 N Moloney, “Time to Take Stock on the Markets: The Financial Services Action Plan Concludes as the Company Law 
Action Plan Rolls Out” (2004) 53 ICLQ, 999-1023, 1010. 
1361 S Maul, G Lanfermann, E Eggenhofer (fn.13691382), 1289. 
1362 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, “Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence and 
Reform Perspectives” (fn.13561366), 332ff. 
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internal structure – including the board composition, directors’ remuneration and 
responsibilities – and the co-ordination of national corporate governance efforts.1363 
The Action Plan suggested a “governance/disclosure matrix” aimed at “minimising conflicts 
of interest in remuneration-setting” and informing shareholders.1364 A recommendation should 
establish a disclosure-focused regime requiring, among other things: (1) disclosure of the 
remuneration policy in the annual accounts; (2) detailed, individualised disclosure of 
executive remuneration in the annual accounts; and (3) prior AGM approval of share 
incentive schemes.
1365
 A second recommendation should address the board’s modernisation. 
Decisions in areas such as remuneration, where the conflicts of interest of directors were 
considered to be particularly likely, should be “made exclusively by non-
executive/supervisory directors who are in the majority independent”.1366 The 
recommendation should set out minimum standards for the “creation, composition and role of 
the nomination, remuneration and audit committees”.1367 
4. Responses 
The responses to the Commission’s proposals were mainly positive.1368 In the Member States 
it received much attention.
1369
 Even industry saw it positively.
1370
 A majority endorsed the 
remuneration governance proposals’ content and the regulatory instrument chosen.1371 It was 
stressed that the plan complied with the subsidiarity principle and modern economic 
regulatory theory and that it was less “overregulating” than the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act.1372  
Criticism was voiced, too. It ranged from “fundamental opposition” based on the “subsidiarity 
principle and the concept of regulatory competition” to criticism of individual measures.1373 
                                                         
1363 COM(2003) 284 final, 15. 
1364 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, “Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence and 
Reform Perspectives” (fn.13561366), 333. 
1365 COM(2003) 284 final, 16. 
1366 ibid., 15. 
1367 ibid., 15. 
1368 Commission, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration of Directors - Consultation Document 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directors-remun/2004-consult_en.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 6. 
1369 e.g. J Jahn “EU will Unternehmensrecht verschärfen” FAZ of 21 May 2003, 11; B Jenne, D Grass, “EU nimmt Vorstände 
an die kurze Leine” FTD of 15 May 2003; P Aldrick “EU aims to show US a good set of books” The Telegraph of 22 May 
2003; KJ Hopt, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht – Der Aktionsplan und die ersten Durchführungsmaßnahmen” in G 
Crzelius, H Hirte, K Vieweg, Festschrift für Volker Röhricht zum 65. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, 2005), 235-249, 236. 
1370 J Jahn, “Schärfere Kontrolle für Vorstände, mehr Rechte für Geldgeber” FAZ of 13 May 2003. 
1371 Arbeitsguppe Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, “Zur Entwicklung des Europäischen Gesellschaftserechts: Stellungnahme 
der Arbeitsgruppe Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht (Group of German Experts on Corporate Law) zum Report of the High 
Level Group of Company Law Experts on a modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe” (2003) 24(19) 
ZIP, 6. 
1372 cf. J Jahn, “Schärfere Kontrolle” (fn.13831397). 
1373 KJ Hopt, “European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where Does the Action Plan of the European 
Commission Lead?” in KJ Hopt et al, Corporate Governance in Context (OUP, 2005), 119-142, 126. 
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Some saw no need for intervention at EU level.
1374
 Others doubted the effectiveness of the 
proposed changes, expected that they would foster bureaucratic interventions, and saw a mere 
duplication of national requirements.
1375
 The  German literature noted
1376
 and to some extent 
criticised
1377
 the fact that the proposed measures were significantly influenced by Anglo-
American corporate governance. 
IV. Recommendations 2004/913/EC 
The result of the Action Plan was the adoption of a recommendation in December 2004 (2004 
Recommendation).
 1378
 It will be examined.  
1. Choice of Legal Instrument
1379
 
A first point to consider is the choice of legal instrument. The non-binding character of 
recommendations could be considered a weakness. However, recommendations can become 
more influential if – as happened in this case – the Commission combines them with a 
credible threat to enact binding measures with a similar content if the Member States ignore 
the recommendation.
1380
 A major advantage is that the Commission may enact 
recommendations on its own.
1381
 This is particularly important if the Member States consider 
the recommendation as “too far-reaching”.1382 Furthermore, they leave room to the Member 
States regarding the provisions’ realisation and their adaptation to national characteristics.1383 
This is particularly important in the field of executive remuneration, since culture and 
corporate governance systems differ significantly among the Member States.
1384
 Finally, 
                                                         
1374 Commission (fn.13801394), 6. 
1375 G Hertig, JA McCahery, “Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonisation Efforts or 
Regulatory Competition?” in J Armour, JA McCahery, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities 
Regulation in Europe and the US (Hart, 2006), 545-575, 555; L Enriques, “Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old 
Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms” (2003) 38 Wake Forest L Rev, 911-934, 918. 
1376 S Maul, G Lanfermann, E Eggenhofer (fn.13691382), 1295. 
1377 M Habersack, “Das Aktiengesetz und das Europäische Recht” (2006) 27(10) ZIP, 445-451, 450. 
1378 Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of 
listed companies, OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, 55. 
1379 The sections on the choice of legal instrument, legal basis and scope apply equally to the Recommendations of 2005 and 
2009. 
1380 M Lutter, “The commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 and of 15 December 2005 and their implementation 
in Germany” in M Tison et al (eds) Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation, Essays in Honour of Eddy 
Wymeersch (CUP, 2009), 132-144, 132. 
1381 ibid., 132. 
1382 S Maul, “Gesellschaftsrechtliche Entwicklungen in Europa – Bruch mit deutschen Traditionen?” (2005) 60(34) BB, BB-
Special, 2-17, 2. 
1383 A Kouloridas, J von Lackum, “Recent Developments of Corporate Governance in the European Union and their Impact 
on the German Legal System” 5(10) GLJ, 1275-1294, 1280. 
1384 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, “Executive remuneration in the EU: the Context for Reform” (2005) 21(2) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 304-323, 317. 
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using a recommendation helps avoiding a “one-size-fits-all” solution at both firm and national 
level.
1385
 
2. Legal Basis 
The legal basis is the second indent of the (then) Art 211 EC Treaty. It allowed the 
formulation of recommendations in order to ensure the proper development and functioning 
of the common market. 
3. Scope  
The recommendation concerns “listed companies”.1386 A “listed company” is legally defined 
as “a company whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market as defined in 
Directive 2004/39/EC in one or more Member States”.1387 
The recommendation makes suggestions for the remuneration of “directors”. A “director” is 
not just a member of the listed company’s managerial body but also of its administrative or 
supervisory bodies.
1388
  
4. Objectives 
Next, the recommendation’s objectives will be examined. The overarching aim is to promote 
“an appropriate regulatory regime for directors’ remuneration” in the Member States.1389  
The recommendation’s main objectives are ensuring the “transparency of remuneration 
practices, shareholder control of the remuneration policy and individual remuneration through 
disclosure and the introduction of a […] vote on the remuneration statement and shareholder 
approval for share-based remuneration schemes"
1390
. Regulating the precise level and 
structure of executive remuneration was not the aim.
1391
 
5. Substantive Rules 
The recommendation focuses on four main issues: disclosure of remuneration policy
1392
, 
individualised disclosure
1393
, shareholder vote
1394
, and share-based remuneration
1395
. The 
                                                         
1385 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (2010) 10(1) JCLS, 73-118, 90. 
1386 Para 1.1., 1.2. 
1387 Para 2.2. 
1388 Para 2.1. 
1389 2004/13/EC, reason (2); also Com(2003) 284 final, 16. 
1390 Recommendation 2009/385/EC, reason (1). 
1391 C Teichmann, “Pay without performance?” (fn.337332), 234. 
1392 Para 3.1.ff. 
1393 Para 5.1.ff. 
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content corresponds with the Action Plan and merely goes into more detail. An in-depth 
analysis of the content can be found below. 
V. Recommendation 2005/162/EC 
The Action Plan’s implementation proceeded with the 2005 Recommendation1396. It dealt 
with the (supervisory) board’s role in remuneration governance. Using the previously 
mentioned layer model of executive remuneration regulation, with the 2004 Recommendation 
the Commission addressed the second and third layer, and with the 2005 Recommendation the 
first layer. The latter will be examined. 
Regarding the choice of legal instrument, the legal basis and the scope, please refer to the 
corresponding sections concerning the 2004 Recommendation. 
1. Objectives 
The fundamental aim was to ameliorate the governance of listed companies leading to 
improved protection of actual or potential investors and a restoration of confidence in 
companies and financial markets.
1397
 To restore confidence, the recommendation’s aim was to 
“eliminate and prevent conflicts of interest”1398. It strived to strengthen the role of non-
executive/supervisory directors as those dealing with situations of conflicts of interest.
1399
 It 
set out to promote the independence, objectivity and effectiveness of non-executive 
supervision.
1400
 Similarly, it intended to facilitate, professionalise and improve supervision by 
establishing specialised committees.
1401
  
Further objectives were to increase the qualification and commitment of non-
executive/supervisory directors
1402
 and to promote the transparency of companies’ internal 
structures.
1403
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1394 Para 4.1.ff. 
1395 Para 6.1.ff. 
1396 Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the role of non-executive directors of listed companies and on the 
committees of the (supervisory) board, OJ L 52, 25.2.2005, 51. 
1397 Reasons (3), (6). 
1398 Reason (2). 
1399 Reason (3). 
1400 Reasons (7), (8). 
1401 cf. Reason (9). 
1402 Reasons (15)-(17). 
1403 S Maul, “Gesellschaftsrechtliche Entwicklungen in Europa – Bruch mit deutschen Traditionen?” (2005) 60(34) BB, BB-
Special, 2-17, 2. 
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2. Substantive Rules 
Two main areas can be distinguished concerning the content, namely provisions regarding 
structure and functioning of (supervisory) boards and regarding the profile and independence 
of their members. They will be examined in detail below. 
VI. Recommendation 2009/385/EC 
Soon the Commission saw the need to strengthen and complement the existing executive 
remuneration regime again. In April 2009 it adopted another recommendation (2009 
Recommendation).
1404
 The main reason for this third recommendation was the 2008 global 
financial crisis.
1405
 The 2009 Recommendation will be examined. 
Regarding the choice of legal instrument, the legal basis and the scope please refer to the 
respective sections concerning the 2004 Recommendation. 
1. Objectives  
The central objective pursued was to improve the existing executive remuneration regime in 
listed companies.
1406
 Regarding remuneration governance, the aim was to strengthen the 
shareholders’ role by facilitating their assessment of the company’s remuneration policy, 
improving the company’s accountability towards them,1407 and encouraging them to exercise 
their voting rights on remuneration.
1408
 The Commission also wanted to strengthen 
remuneration committees
1409
 and improve their efficiency.
1410
 Mitigating potential conflicts of 
interest of remuneration consultants was another goal.
1411
 
2. Substantive Rules 
The content can be divided into two main parts: remuneration design
1412
 and remuneration 
governance
1413
. With regard to remuneration governance, the recommendation addresses all 
                                                         
1404 Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as 
regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies, OJ L 120/28, 15.5.2009. 
1405 2005/162/EC, reason (2). 
1406 Reason (5). 
1407 Reasons (9), (10). 
1408 Reason (10). 
1409 Reason (11); COM(2009) 211 final, 3. 
1410 COM(2009) 211 final, 3-4. 
1411 Reason (12); COM(2009) 211 final, 3. 
1412 Paras 3, 4. 
1413 Paras 5-9. 
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three layers. It entails provisions on (1) disclosure of the remuneration policy
1414
, (2) 
shareholder vote
1415
 and (3) remuneration committees
1416
.   
                                                         
1414 Para 5. 
1415 Para 6. 
1416 Paras 7-9. 
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D. Implementation of the Recommendations 
The question of how the three recommendations have influenced the remuneration 
governance regulation in Germany and the UK will now be analysed. The national regulatory 
frameworks prior to the recommendations will be compared with the ones subsequent to 
them. Also the national measures’ travaux préparatoires will be analysed. 
I. Recommendation 2004/913/EC 
1. Disclosure of Remuneration Policy 
A central aspect of the 2004 Recommendation is the annual remuneration statement, which 
shall describe and explain the company’s executive remuneration policy for the subsequent 
year(s) and the policy’s implementation in the preceding year. 
1.1. Germany 
The GCGC provided prior to its 2006 amendment merely that “the salient points of the 
compensation system […] shall be published on the company’s website in plainly 
understandable form and be detailed in the annual report”.1417 
Since 2006 the GCGC has provided that disclosure regarding the remuneration system shall 
be  made in a “compensation report as part of the Management Report” outlining the 
remuneration system for management board members in a generally understandable way.
1418
 
The legislator also followed the recommendation by introducing § 289 (2) no 5 HGB, which 
provides that the main features of the remuneration system shall be disclosed in the 
management report or in the notes.
1419
 
The recommendation clearly influenced German disclosure rules. However, the German 
implementation in both GCGC and HGB differs from the recommendation. The 
recommendation is more detailed regarding the precise information that has to be disclosed 
and the German remuneration statement’s temporal scope differs.1420 
                                                         
1417 4.2.3. GCGC 2003; identical with GCGC 2005. 
1418 4.2.5. GCGC 2012; 4.2.5. GCGC 2006: “as part of the Corporate Governance Report”. 
1419 Also M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (2009) EuZW, 799-804, 800. 
1420 cf. S Maul, “Gesellschaftsrechtliche Entwicklungen in Europa – Bruch mit deutschen Traditionen?” (2005) 60(34) BB, 
BB-Special, 2-177. 
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1.2. United Kingdom 
In the UK the 1995 Greenbury Report provided that remuneration committees should set out 
“the company’s general policy on executive remuneration” in an annual remuneration 
report.
1421
  
Due to low compliance with the soft law provisions, the government reformed the rules on 
disclosure as part of the DRR-reform.
1422
 A new s 234B required quoted companies to publish 
a remuneration report annually and, according to Schedule 7 A Part 2, the report must state 
the policy on directors’ remuneration for the following and subsequent financial years. Hence, 
a requirement for remuneration policy disclosure similar to the one in the EU 
recommendation pre-dates the EU recommendation. 
The corresponding provision moved to Part 15 CA 2006 in conjunction with Schedule 8 of 
the Large and Medium Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 
2008.
1423
 The main provision, requiring a statement on the policy, remained unaltered.  
Thus, the EU recommendation did not influence the UK rules on remuneration policy 
disclosure. 
2. Shareholder Vote 
The involvement of shareholders is another central aspect of the recommendation. The 
remuneration policy and significant changes to it should be an explicit item on the AGM’s 
agenda, and the shareholders should have a binding or advisory vote on the remuneration 
statement at the AGM. However, it could be made conditional on shareholders, representing 
at least 25% of the votes present at the AGM, requesting it.  
2.1. Germany 
At the time of the recommendation neither soft nor hard law provided that the remuneration 
policy should be an explicit item on the AGM’s agenda let alone that the shareholders should 
vote on it.  
The recommendation’s shareholder-related provisions fell for a long time on deaf ears.1424 
Surprisingly, and against the prevailing view in the literature,
1425
 the legislator decided in the 
                                                         
1421 5.4. Greenbury Report. 
1422 J Rickford (fn.384379), 94. 
1423 Moved again in 2013, cf. above. 
1424 M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (fn. 14321495), 801. 
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last stages of the VorstAG-reform process to introduce the shareholder vote. The legislator 
stated explicitly that one “source”1426 for this new instrument was the 2004 
Recommendation.
1427
 The legislator used the option of quorum requirements.
1428
 However, 
the quorum requirement differs. The German quorum should be easier to achieve. Also the 
subject-matter is not identical as the recommendation suggests that the remuneration 
statement is submitted to a vote whilst the German provision contains a vote on the 
remuneration system.
 
 
Hence, the recommendation’s provision on a say-on-pay have been implemented albeit – in 
contrast to Lutter’s view1429 – not exactly but with deviations. 
2.2. United Kingdom 
Already in 2002 the requirement of a mandatory, advisory vote of the shareholders on a 
quoted company’s DRR was introduced in the UK.1430 Subsequently, it was absorbed 
unaltered in the new CA 2006.
1431
 
Thus, regarding the shareholder vote the EU recommendation remained without impact. 
Rather the EU Commission was influenced by the UK rules.
1432
  
3. Individualised Disclosure 
Furthermore, the 2004 Recommendation recommends detailed, individualised disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration over the relevant financial year in the annual accounts, the notes to 
them or the remuneration statement.
1433
 The recommendation provides a detailed list of 
information that should be disclosed.
1434
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1425 cf. inter alia A Arnold (fn.890895), 150; M Hoffmann-Becking, “Wider die Entmachtung der Räte” (fn.890895), 3; KP 
Martens (fn.575567), 148; R Marsch-Barner(fn.599591), 410ff. 
1426 C Förster (fn.10161021), 367. 
1427 BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
1428 cf. § 122 (2) AktG. 
1429 M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (fn. 14321495), 801. 
1430 S. 241 A CA 1985. 
1431 G Morse (fn.391386), s. 8.1016. 
1432 H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 679. 
1433 Para 5.1. 
1434 Paras 5.2., 5.3. 
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3.1. Germany  
Recommending individualised disclosure was, as Lutter put it, “a case of teaching the pope 
Latin”1435. Even the GCGC’s first version provided that managers’ remuneration “shall be 
reported in the Notes of the Consolidated Financial Statements […]. The figures should be 
individualized”1436. The individualisation was not “recommended” but merely “suggested”. 
Due to low compliance and mounting public discontent the provision was upgraded to a 
“recommendation” in 2003.1437 Hence, at the time of the EU recommendation the GCGC 
already recommended individualised disclosure. 
The 2005 VorstOG introduced a statutory requirement for individualised disclosure. This 
“upgrade” was according to the travaux préparatoires aimed at implementing the 2004 
Recommendation.
1438
 It was probably also due to low compliance of AGs with the GCGC 
recommendation even in the DAX30.  
The implementation differs from the EU recommendation. The recommendation requires the 
individualised disclosure of “directors’” remuneration, including both management and 
supervisory board members, whilst the VorstOG concerns only management board members. 
The provisions in the recommendation regarding the information to be disclosed are more 
detailed than in the GCGC or HGB.
1439
 Importantly, the HGB provision offers the possibility 
of an opt-out.
1440
  
3.2. United Kingdom 
In the UK the 1995 Greenbury Report had recommended individualised disclosure of 
executive director’s remuneration1441 and provided what should be disclosed individually.1442 
The recommendation became part of the 1998 Combined Code.
1443
 
Also statutory provisions on individualised disclosure existed prior to the EU 
recommendation. In 2004, in Part 3 of Schedule 7 A CA 1985, the DRRR introduced the 
provision that the “directors’ remuneration report shall for the relevant financial year show, 
                                                         
1435 M Lutter, “The commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 and of 15 December 2005 and their implementation 
in Germany” (fn.13931376), 135. 
1436 4.2.4. GCGC 2002. 
1437 M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (fn. 14321495), 800. 
1438 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung vom 18.05.2005: Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Offenlegung der 
Vorstandsvergütungen, 6. 
1439 S Maul (fn.14161439), 8. 
1440 § 286 (5) HGB. 
1441 5.4. Greenbury Report. 
1442 5.8.ff. Greenbury Report. 
1443 B.3. Combined Code 1998. 
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for each person who has served as a director […]” the total amount of salaries, bonuses, etc. 
Since the 2006 Company Law Reform, this provision can be found unaltered – except for a 
“must” instead of the “shall” – in Part 3 para 7 of Schedule 8 of the Large and Medium Sized 
Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008.
1444
 The tightening is 
unlikely to be due to the 2004 Recommendation, as the EU recommendation merely uses 
“should” as well.1445 
4. Share-based Remuneration 
The 2004 Recommendation also made provisions on share-based remuneration. The granting, 
main conditions, exercise terms, conditions for subsequent changes of share option schemes 
as well as any other LTIP scheme should need prior shareholder approval.
1446
  
4.1. Germany 
The AktG had required shareholder approval for the emission of share options, §§ 192, 193, 
even prior to the recommendation. However, the recommendation goes further than the pre-
existing German rules in that it requires detailed information regarding the main conditions 
etc.,
1447
 and it provides an approval requirement also for other LTIP-measures.
1448
 The 
legislator did not implement this as the danger of “watering down” shareholders’ shares exists 
only regarding share options .
1449
  
4.2. United Kingdom 
Approval requirements already existed in the UK, too. For some time, the Listing Rules have 
made the granting of share options subject to shareholder approval.
1450
 Later LTIPs, too, 
required this approval. These provisions can be found in Listing Rule 9.4.1. Rule 9.4.4 
requires a shareholder approval requirement for the mentioned “discounted share options”. 
These rules existed, albeit under a different number, even before the 2004 Recommendation, 
e.g. in Rule 13.13 of the 2002 Listing Rules.
1451
 Also the 2003 Combined Code provided that 
                                                         
1444 Moved in 2013 again. 
1445 Para 5.1. 
1446 Para 6.2. 
1447 S Maul (fn.14161439), 8. 
1448 KJ Hopt, “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und deutsche Unternehmensverfassung – Aktionsplan und Interdependenzen” 
(fn.12991304), 467. 
1449 S Maul (fn.14161439), 8.  
1450 Listing Rule 9.4.1; PL Davies, S Worthington (fn.383378), 385; D Kershaw (fn.382377), 404. 
1451 FSA, The Listing Rules <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/merged_lrs.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
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shareholders should be “invited specifically to approve all new long-term incentive schemes 
[…] and significant changes to existing schemes”.1452  
Hence, the UK rules provided respective rules already. 
5. Summary 
The 2004 Recommendation influenced the German rules on executive remuneration. 
However, the influence varies between issues, and several deviations exist. Most significant 
was the influence on the introduction of a shareholder vote. The 2004 Recommendation had 
practically no impact on the remuneration governance rules in the UK, which generally pre-
date the corresponding EU rules and seem rather to have themselves influenced the EU 
Recommendation. 
II. Recommendation 2005/162/EC 
Next, the impact of Recommendation 2005/162/EC will be analysed. 
1. Board Composition 
Regarding the board composition it recommended three main measures: (1) the ratio of 
executive/management to non-executive/supervisory directors should be balanced and the 
number of the latter should be sufficient to deal with conflicts of interest;
1453
 (2) in unitary 
systems the roles of CEO and chairman should be separate, and in dualist systems the “CEO” 
should not immediately become chairman of the supervisory board;
1454
 and (3) in fields with a 
high potential for conflicts of interest (e.g. remuneration) a “sufficient number” of 
independent directors should play an effective role.
1455
  
1.1. Germany 
A requirement of sufficient supervisors, balanced with the managers is “unfamiliar to German 
law”1456 since, in the two-tier system, “executives” and “supervisors” are on separate boards. 
The AktG requires (even) for listed AGs merely one or two management board members 
depending on the company’s share capital (Grundkapital), § 76 (2). The number of 
supervisory board members varies between three and twenty-one, § 95.  
                                                         
1452 B.2.4 Combined Code 2003; D.2.4 UKCGC 2012. 
1453 Paras 3.1., 4. 
1454 Para 3.2. 
1455 Para 5. 
1456 S Maul (fn.14161439), 3. 
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However, since 2005 the GCGC has provided that the “Supervisory Board shall include what 
it considers an adequate number of independent members”1457. Like the EU recommendation, 
the GCGC leaves it to the supervisory board to decide how many independent members it 
considers necessary.
1458
 Establishing general criteria for independence is not necessary but it 
is necessary to report in the Corporate Governance Report on the sufficient number of 
independent supervisory board members.
1459
 Still, the implementation differs in that the EU 
recommendation recommends a majority of independent supervisory board members in 
certain committees, such as the remuneration committee, whereas the GCGC does not 
recommend this.
1460
 Overall, with some differences the recommendation has been 
implemented.  
Concerning the recommendation on the change from being “CEO” to being supervisory board 
chairman, it should be noted that this was a widespread practice in Germany.
1461
 In 2005 in 
fifteen out of thirty DAX30 companies the supervisory board chairman was the company’s 
former “CEO”.1462 The GCGC merely provided that not more than two former management 
board members shall be supervisory board members.
1463
 The first revision after the EU 
recommendation introduced that “it shall not be the rule for the former [“CEO”] or a 
Management Board member to become Supervisory Board chairman”.1464 The EU 
recommendation had influenced the GCGC Commission to address this issue.
1465
 
The provision became even stricter in 2009, requiring a two year cooling-off period for all 
management board members before they could be appointed as supervisors. An exception 
existed, however, if the appointment was based “upon a motion presented by shareholders 
holding more than 25% of the voting rights in the company”.1466 The provision’s tightening 
was due to an amendment of § 100 (2) no. 4 AktG by the VorstAG, requiring the described 
“cooling-off period”.1467 Still, the German rules differ from the 2005 Recommendation, which 
                                                         
1457 5.4.2 GCGC 2005. 
1458 HM Ringleb, T Kremer, M Lutter, A von Werder, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (4th ed, CH 
Beck, 2010), m.no.1041. 
1459 ibid., m.no.1041. 
1460 J Lieder “The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism” 11(2) GLJ, 115-158, 133. 
1461 GH Roth, U Wörle, “Die Unabhängigkeit des Aufsichtsrats – Recht und Wirklichkeit” (2004) 33 ZGR, 565-630, 585; G 
Dieling “Der Wechsel aus dem Vorstand in den Aufsichtsrat” in W Bayer (ed) Die Aktiengesellschaft im Spiegel der 
Rechtstatsachenforschung (JWV, 2007), 111-129, 116-121. 
1462 J Lieder “The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism” 11(2) GLJ, 115-158, 134. 
1463 5.4.2 GCGC 2003. 
1464 5.4.4 GCGC 2005. 
1465 cf. statements of GCGC-Commission’s chairman G Cromme “Ausführungen von Herrn Dr. Gerhard Cromme zur 
Pressekonferenz“ <http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/ger/download/Cr_Redefassung_Pressemappe_11_03_2005.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014, 7. 
1466 5.4.4. GCGC 2009; identical in GCGC 2012. 
1467 BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 11. 
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recommended a five year cooling-off period.
1468
 Jumping to the conclusion that the German 
provisions were less strict than the recommendation is wrong, since the latter concerns merely 
the question of whether a candidate or member is independent whilst the former addresses the 
question of whether the candidate can be appointed.  
Hence, regarding the board composition, the 2005 Recommendation significantly influenced 
the German development. Most changes were implemented via the GCGC. The 
recommendations were neither all implemented swiftly nor word for word. 
1.2. United Kingdom 
Already the 1998 Combined Code explicitly recommended “a balance of executive and non-
executive directors (including independent non-executives)” on the board.1469 It is striking 
that the wording is almost identical to that of the subsequent 2005 EU Recommendation. 
Regarding the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman Cadbury recommended that they 
“should in principle be separate”.1470 The stricter 1998 Combined Code recommended that the 
decision to combine the two posts should be publicly justified.
1471
 The 2003 Combined Code 
was already as strict as the 2005 Recommendation stating that the “roles of chairman and 
chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual”.1472 
Finally, Cadbury had already recommended that “that the majority of non-executives on a 
board should be independent of the company”,1473 exceeding the subsequent EU 
Recommendation which merely recommended a “sufficient number” of non-executives. 
The commonalities between the EU Recommendation and the earlier UK rules indicate that 
the latter influenced the former rather than vice versa. 
2. Committees 
The 2005 Recommendation also addresses committees. Nomination, remuneration and audit 
committees should be created.
1474
 As long as the tasks are carried out satisfactorily, fewer 
committees suffice.
1475
 The committees generally prepare the (supervisory) board’s 
                                                         
1468 Annex II para 1 (a). 
1469 A.2.1 Combined Code 1998. 
1470 4.9 Cadbury Code. 
1471 A.2.1 Combined Code 1998. 
1472 A.2.1 Combined Code 2003. 
1473 4.12 Cadbury Code. 
1474 Para 5.  
1475 Para 7.1. 
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decision.
1476
 They could be given the competence to decide if this is declared and 
disclosed.
1477
 The committees should be composed of three members, only NEDs/supervisors 
and most of them independent.
1478
 
2.1. Germany 
The Recommendation corresponds to some degree with earlier German rules.
1479
 Since 1965 § 
107 (3) sentence 1 AktG provides that the supervisory board can create committees from 
among its members. But it leaves it to the companies to decide whether/which committees are 
necessary.
1480
 In order to incentivise supervisory boards to form more committees, § 171 (2) 
sentence 2 AktG was amended, requiring a statement of the supervisory board on 
committees.
1481
 
The GCGC recommended already in 2002 that the supervisory board should form committees 
with sufficient expertise to increase the supervisory board’s efficiency but the establishment 
should depend “on the specifics of the company and the number of its members”, para 5.3.1.  
Remuneration committees are recommended by neither the GCGC nor the AktG. The 2009 
VorstAG-reform addressed them, stating that they cannot decide on management board 
remuneration. The GCGC has mentioned them since 2009 as an optional committee in para 
5.3.4. Since 2003 para 4.2.2. The GCGC mentions the ”committee dealing with Management 
Board contracts” which is involved in the setting of management board remuneration, but this 
does not necessarily mean a remuneration committee.
1482
  
Neither the law nor the GCGC require a general minimum size for committees.
1483
 Yet, from 
the term “committee” it is generally deduced that it has to be more than one person.1484 The 
prevailing view is that only committees competent to take decisions have to consist of at least 
three people as otherwise § 108 (2) sentence 3 AktG could be undermined.
1485
  
                                                         
1476 Para 6.1. 
1477 Paras 6.1., 6.2. 
1478 Annex 1. 
1479 M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (fn.14321495), 803. 
1480 ibid., 802. 
1481 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 171 m.no.12. 
1482 G Spindler, “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance 
Kodex” “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance Kodex” 
(2005) 26(46) ZIP, 2033-2045, 2036. 
1483 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 107 m.no.17. 
1484 ibid., § 107 m.no.17. 
1485 H Henze, Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zum Aktienrecht (5th ed, RWS Verlag, 2002), m.no.694; M Lutter, G 
Krieger (fn.165158), § 9 m.no.632; K Rellermeyer, Aufsichtsratsausschüsse (Heymanns, 1986), 90ff; different: D Schäfer, 
“Aktuelle Probleme des neuen Aktienrechts” (1966) BB, 229-233, 232. 
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The 2005 Recommendation’s provision that committees should generally prepare decisions 
but can under certain circumstances also take decisions, corresponds largely with the pre-
existing German regulation. It is deduced e contrario from the list in § 107 (3) sentence 3 
AktG, which entails matters that cannot be decided by a committee but only by the whole 
supervisory board, that regarding all other matters delegating the decision-making is 
possible.
1486
 Since 2009, amongst the matters on this list has been the setting of management 
board remuneration.  
Hence, regarding committees the German regulation corresponded already largely with the 
EU Recommendation. The latter goes further in that it is more detailed, for example regarding 
numbers of members or by recommending particular committees. Importantly, with the 2009 
VorstAG, the AktG has diverged from the EU recommendation regarding the remuneration 
committee’s decision-making-competence. 
2.2. United Kingdom 
Cadbury mentioned that committees increase board efficiency.
1487
 Inter alia remuneration 
committees
1488
 were explicitly recommended, including recommendations on their tasks and 
composition: they were to consist mainly or wholly of independent NEDs and be chaired by 
an NED.
1489 
 
The 1998 Combined Code already recommended that remuneration committees should 
consist of independent directors only, which corresponds with the current UKCGC 
provision.
1490
 Also the recommendation that remuneration committees should consist of “at 
least three, or in case of smaller companies two, members” pre-dates the EU 
Recommendation.
1491
 
Regarding the remuneration committee’s competence, provisions can be found in para 4.42 
Cadbury Code. In 1998 and 2003 the recommendation was amended to its current form. It 
states that the “remuneration committee should have delegated responsibility for setting 
remuneration for all executive directors and the chairman”.1492  
                                                         
1486 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 107 m.no.18. 
1487 cf. 4.21 Cadbury Code. 
1488 4.42 Cadbury Code. 
1489 4.42 Cadbury Code. 
1490 B.2.1 Combined Code 1998; D.2.1 UKCGC 2012. 
1491 B.2.1 Combined Code 2003; D.2.1 UKCGC 2012. 
1492 B.2.2 Combined Code 2003; D.2.2 UKCGC 2012. 
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Thus, the UK rules were not influenced by the EU Recommendation. The former even go 
further than the latter, recommending the delegation of decision-making.
1493
 
3. Self-Evaluation 
The 2005 Recommendation recommends annual self-evaluation of the (supervisory) board of 
its performance both as a group and individually.
1494
 
3.1. Germany 
The AktG did not contain a self-evaluation mechanism at the time of the Recommendation’s 
adoption nor does it today.  
However, GCGC 2002 had recommended self-evaluation of the supervisory board “on a 
regular basis”, para 5.6. Individual evaluation was not recommended. Para 5.6. has not been 
changed after the 2005 Recommendation. Individual evaluation was refused as it could create 
conflicts within the supervisory board, disturbing its collegial modus operandi.
1495
 
3.2. United Kingdom 
Board performance evaluation has a longer tradition in the UK.
1496
 Nevertheless, respective 
recommendations were only inserted into the Combined Code in 2003. It recommended 
annual performance (self-)evaluation of the board, its committees and its individual 
directors.
1497
 In the annual report it was to describe how the performance evaluation had been 
conducted.
1498
 The UKCGC 2012 still provides the same.
1499
  
Thus, also regarding the board’s self-evaluation the EU Recommendation did not influence 
the UK rules. 
4. Profile 
The EU Recommendation also contained provisions regarding non-executive/supervisory 
directors’ profile. The (supervisory) board as a whole should possess the desired knowledge 
and experience to fulfil their task.
1500
 New members should receive a tailored induction i.e. 
                                                         
1493 cf. Annex I para 3.2. Recommendation 2005/162/EC. 
1494 Para 8 Recommendation 2005/162/EC. 
1495 S Maul (fn.14161439), 6. 
1496 S Sick, Die Effizienzprüfung des Aufsichtsrats, Arbeitshilfen für Aufsichtsräte 16, (Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2011), 6. 
1497 Principle A.6. 
1498 Recommendation A.6.1. 
1499 Now B.6.1, B.6.3. 
1500 Para 11.1. 
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relevant training.
1501
 Members’ skills and knowledge should be reviewed annually by the 
(supervisory) board.
 1502
 
Finally, the directors should devote the necessary time and attention and, therefore, should 
limit and disclose the number of other commitments such as other board memberships.
1503
  
4.1. Germany 
Corresponding rules existed to some extent in Germany already.
1504
 As aforementioned the 
AktG sets out only basic prerequisites for becoming a supervisory board member, § 100 (1). 
Minimum requirements follow from the fact that every supervisory board member declares 
implicitly when accepting the mandate that he/she can participate in the supervisory board’s 
tasks.
1505
  
However, already the GCGC 2002 stated explicitly that the supervisory board should be 
“composed of members who, as a whole, have the required knowledge, abilities and expert 
experience to properly complete their tasks and are sufficiently independent”.1506 
Furthermore, supervisory board members “must take care that he/she has sufficient time to 
perform his/her mandate” and that members shall “not accept more than a total of five 
Supervisory Board mandates in non-group listed companies”.1507 In order to achieve further 
professionalisation of the supervisory board para 5.4.5 GCGC was amended in 2009 
recommending that management board members shall not “accept more than a total of three 
Supervisory Board mandates in non-group listed companies”. 
The EU recommendation goes further than the pre-existing German provisions in that it 
recommends offering every new member a tailored induction program and disclosing each 
member’s particular competences. A similar German provision does not exist.1508 Another 
new point was that the supervisory board itself should determine the required qualifications of 
its members and evaluate them regularly.
1509
  
                                                         
1501 Para 11.3. 
1502 Para 11.3. 
1503 Paras 12.1., 12.2. 
1504 G Spindler, “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance 
Kodex” (fn.1495), 2039; more critical S Maul (fn.14161439), 7. 
1505 cf. BGHZ 85, 293, 295; M Lutter, “Auswahlpflichten und Auswahlverschulden bei der Wahl von 
Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern” (2003) ZIP, 417-419, 419; G Wirth, “Anforderungsprofil und Inkompatibilitäten für 
Aufsichtsratsmitglieder” (2005) ZGR, 327-347, 332ff. 
1506 5.4.1. GCGC 2002. 
1507 5.4.3. GCGC 2002 since 2005 para 5.4.5. 
1508 G Spindler, “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance 
Kodex” (fn.1495), 2039. 
1509 ibid., 2039. 
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To summarise, the EU recommendation did not have significant influence regarding 
supervisory board members’ qualification. 
4.2. United Kingdom 
The Combined Code 2003 already contained a provision similar to the recommendation’s 
provision that the board should ensure that it is composed of members who have together the 
required knowledge, judgement and experience to perform their task. It stated that the 
“nomination committee should “evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on 
the board”.1510 The provision remained almost unaltered. Merely the additional characteristic 
of “independence” has been added.1511 
The EU recommended in 2005 that all new members should be offered a tailored induction 
and that skills and knowledge should be reviewed annually by the board.
1512
 A provision 
corresponding to the first part regarding the induction could be found in the 2003 Combined 
Code.
1513
 The only difference is that it is the Chairman’s task rather than the whole board’s 
task under UK rules to ensure that new members receive the induction. This provision did not 
change following the EU Recommendation.
1514
 However, the second part regarding the 
annual review of training needs did not have an equivalent in the Combined Code. This 
changed in 2010. A new provision recommended that the “chairman should regularly review 
and agree with each director their training and development needs”. Although the travaux 
préparatoires
1515
 mention that this reflects recommendations made by the Walker Review,
1516
 
it can be assumed that Walker and the FRC were aware of the respective EU 
Recommendation and that it influenced the decision to recommend such an annual review. 
This assumption can be supported by the fact that in the same travaux préparatoires the 
recommendations on executive remuneration are said to be intended to reflect both the Walker 
Review and the EU Recommendations.
1517
 
Finally, the EU Commission recommended that the NEDs should devote sufficient time to 
their commitments and that other professional commitments should be limited and 
                                                         
1510 A.4.2 Combined Code 2003. 
1511 B.2.2. UKCGC 2012. 
1512 Para 11.3 Recommendation 2005/162/EC. 
1513 A.1.1. Combined Code 2003. 
1514 B.4.1. UKCGC 2012. 
1515 Financial Reporting Council, 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report (FRC, 2009), m.no.3.12. 
1516 ibid., 5. 
1517 ibid., 6. 
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disclosed.
1518
 In the UK the Combined Code 2003 provided this already
1519
 and it has not 
been changed since.
1520
 
To summarise, the UK rules on the board members’ profile and qualification corresponded 
widely to the EU Recommendation already. Minor changes such as the annual review of 
training needs have been introduced subsequently. 
5. Independence 
Non-executive/supervisory directors’ independence was central to the 2005 Recommendation. 
It is defined as being “free of any business, family or other relationship, with the company, its 
controlling shareholder or the management of either that creates a conflict of interest such as 
to impair his judgement”.1521 The (supervisory) board should decide on a member’s 
independence and disclose its respective findings.
1522
 National independence criteria should 
be established.
1523
 The Recommendation contained a catalogue of criteria for lacking 
independence.
1524
 
5.1. Germany 
The AktG does not define independence.
1525
 Nor does it provide that every supervisory board 
member has to be “independent” in the sense of being absolutely unaffected by potential or 
actual individual interests that could conflict with the company’s interests.1526 It provides 
merely basic rules on conflicts of interest and provisions on supervisory board members’ 
independence are rare.
1527
 § 100 (2) and § 105 (1) AktG set out cases in which a conflict of 
interest was likely to arise and which prevented a person from becoming supervisory board 
member.
1528
 In § 100 (5) AktG independence is required but not defined.
1529
 It can be deduced 
from these provisions that non-independent members exist as well. The EU Recommendation 
did not lead to changes of the AktG regarding independence. 
                                                         
1518 Para 12.1, 12.2. 
1519 A.4.4 CC 2003. 
1520 B.3.2 UKCGC. 
1521 Para 13.1. 
1522 Para 13.2, 13.3. 
1523 Para 13.2. 
1524 Annex II, para 1. 
1525 K Hasselbach, J Jakobs, “Die Unabhängigkeit von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern“ (2012) 12 BB, 643-652, 644; HM Ringleb 
et al (fn.14711534) m.no.1034. 
1526 U Hüffer, Aktiengesetz (fn.185178), § 100 m.no.2a. 
1527 HM Ringleb et al (fn.14711534), m.no.1034; M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 
15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in Deutschland” (fn.14321495), 803. 
1528 G Spindler, “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance 
Kodex” (fn.1495), 2039. 
1529 HM Ringleb et al (fn.14711534), m.no.1018. 
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The GCGC 2002 already dealt with independence. Para 5.4.1 recommended that the 
supervisory board should “at all times, [be] composed of members who […] are sufficiently 
independent”. Para 5.4.2. provided that to ensure independent advice and supervision not 
more than two former management board members shall be supervisory board members and 
“Supervisory Board members shall not exercise directorships or similar positions or advisory 
tasks for important competitors […]”. Regarding conflicts of interest the GCGC was even 
more extensive, stating supervisory board members “shall inform the Supervisory Board of 
any conflicts of interest which may result from a consultant or directorship function with 
clients, suppliers, lenders [etc.]”. 
Following the 2005 Recommendation, para 5.4.2. was amended to recommend that the 
supervisory board “shall include what it considers an adequate number of independent 
members”, and to include a definition of independence ‒ namely that a supervisor is 
“independent if he/she has no business or personal relations with the company or its 
Management Board which cause a conflict of interests.”  
Regarding the first point (“adequate number”) the GCGC previously only expressed that 
independent members must exist.
1530
 This less strict approach can be explained with the lower 
importance of “independent directors” for effective supervision in two-tier systems.1531 Since 
the amendment the whole supervisory board decides on the sufficient number of independent 
supervisors but an explicit resolution to define a “sufficient” number is not required.1532 Also, 
defining general criteria for independence is not necessary.
1533
 Another difference from the 
EU Recommendation which persists is that an “adequate number” of independent supervisory 
board members is recommended whereas the EU Recommendation, para 13.1., recommends a 
“sufficient number”.1534 
Regarding the second point (definition of independence) the Recommendation’s para 13.1. 
was implemented “almost word-by-word”.1535 However, differences exist.1536 For example 
according to the EU definition a relationship to controlling shareholders is deemed to impede 
                                                         
1530 U Hüffer, “Die Unabhängigkeit von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern nach Ziffer 5-4-2- DCGK” (2006) ZIP, 637-644, 641; E 
Vetter, “Update des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex” (2005) BB, 1689-1695, 1691; J Lieder, “Das unabhängige 
Aufsichtsratsmitglied – Zu den Änderungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex” (2005) NZG, 569-574, 572; HM 
Ringleb et al (fn.14711534), m.no.1041. 
1531 J Lieder, “Das unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglied” (fn.15431606), 572. 
1532 HM Ringleb et al (fn.14711534), m.no.1041. 
1533 ibid. 
1534 J Lieder “The German Supervisory Board on Its Way to Professionalism”(fn.14731536), 133. 
1535 M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (fn.14321495), 804. 
1536 HM Ringleb et al (fn.14711534), m.no.1037. 
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the supervisory board member’s independence. This was intentionally not implemented.1537 
The assumption of a lack of independence in these instances was considered to be “hardly 
adequate”.1538  
In 2012 the GCGC was reformed again and several (but not all) of the Recommendation’s 
rules on independence were implemented in German (soft) law.
1539
 Inter alia the definition of 
independence was altered again and was worded negatively, namely a supervisory board 
member “is not to be considered independent in particular if he/she has personal or business 
relations with the company, its executive bodies, a controlling shareholder or an enterprise 
associated with the latter which may cause a substantial and not merely temporary conflict of 
interests”, para 5.4.2.  
The inclusion of controlling shareholders implements aspects of the Recommendation that 
had been left out before. According to the EU Commission the controlling shareholder’s 
representative could have interests conflicting with minority shareholders’ interests and, 
therefore, should not be considered independent.
1540
 This aspect of the definition of 
independence had caused the most criticism in Germany as it fails to recognise that the 
sophisticated German law of groups of companies (Konzernrecht) offers sufficient safeguards 
to restrict the influence and to compensate for potential disadvantages.
1541
 A “strict 
understanding of ‘shareholder equality” and the extensive opportunity to challenge 
shareholder resolutions’ validity are further safeguards for the minority.1542 Traditionally, 
representatives of controlling shareholders are on German supervisory boards.
1543
 The 
legislator’s approval of controlling shareholder representatives on supervisory boards can also 
be seen when assessing § 100 (2) sentence 2 which states that “no account shall be taken of up 
to five seats which a legal representative […] of the controlling enterprise of a group holds in 
                                                         
1537 M Lutter, W Bayer, J Schmidt (fn.12941299), 374. 
1538 HM Ringleb et al (fn.14711534), m.no.1038. 
1539 K Hasselbach, J Jakobs, (fn.15381601), 644. 
1540 J Lieder, “Das unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglied” (fn.15431606), 571. 
1541 That this recommendation is surrounded by controvery illustrates the amount of literature on it e.g.T Bürgers, R Schilha, 
“Die Unabhängigkeit des Vertreters des Mutterunternehmens im Aufsichtsrat der Tochtergesellschaft” (2010) AG, 221-230, 
228; H Diekman, K Bidmon, “Das ‘unabhängige’ Aufsichtsratsmitglied nach dem BilMoG – insbesondere als Vertreter des 
Hauptaktionärs” (2009) NZG, 1087-1092, 1090; M Habersack, “Aufsichtsrat und Prüfungsausschuss nach dem BilMoG” AG 
(2008), 98-107, 105; M Habersack, “Kirch/Deutsche Bank und die Folgen – Überlegungen zu § 100 Abs. 5 AktG und Ziff. 
5.4, 5.5 DCGK” in M Habersack, P Hommelhoff (eds.), Festschrift für Wulf Goette (CH Beck, 2011), 121-135, 127; M 
Hoffmann-Becking, “ Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex – Anmerkungen zu Zulässigkeit, Inhalt und Verfahren” in P 
Kindler et al (eds.) Festschrift für Uwe Hüffer zum 70. Geburtstag (CH Beck, 2010), 337-355, 349; KJ Hopt, 
“Modernisierung der Unternehmensleitung und -kontrolle” in L Aderhold et al (eds.) Festschrift für Harm Peter Westermann 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, 2008), 1039-1053, 1042; E Vetter, “Neue Vorgaben für die Wahl des Aufsichtsrats durch 
die Hauptversammlung nach § 100 Abs. 2 Satz 1 Nr. 4 und Abs. 5 AktG” in B Grunewald, HP Westermann (eds.), 
Festschrift für Georg Maier-Reimer zum 70. Geburtstag (CH Beck, 2010), 795-819, 802. 
1542
 WG Ringe (fn.511505), 20. 
1543 S Maul (fn.14161439), 6. 
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supervisory boards of commercial enterprises which are members of such group […]”.1544 
Furthermore, controlling shareholders’ “veritable interest” in the supervision of management 
cannot be denied against the background of Art 14 Grundgesetz.
1545
 Moreover, the 
management is dependent on the controlling shareholder’s representative rather than the other 
way round.
1546
 Also § 17 and § 311 AktG support this view.
1547
 The 2012 amendment may 
have overshot the mark. 
To summarise, regarding supervisory board members’ independence, the Recommendation 
contained many aspects which were new to the German system. The GCGC’s rules on 
independence were influenced heavily by the 2005 Recommendation.
1548
 The AktG was not 
affected.  
5.2. United Kingdom 
The almost literal resemblance of the 2005 Recommendations independence requirements to 
those of the respective UK provisions is striking.
1549
 The independence of NEDs has been 
central to UK corporate governance reforms for the last twenty years. Already Cadbury 
recommended that the majority of NEDs should be independent.
1550
  
The 1998 Combined Code recommended a “strong and independent non-executive element on 
the board”.1551 The majority of NEDs should be “independent of management and free from 
any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgement”.1552 Independent NEDs should be identified in the annual report.1553 
The Code’s 2003 version is even more extensive regarding independence. It states that the 
board should determine whether an NED is “independent in character and judgement and 
whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to 
affect, the director’s judgement”.1554 The Code provides a non-exhaustive list of relationships 
and circumstances which indicate a lack of independence.
1555
 It is very similar to the EU 
                                                         
1544 J Lieder, “Das unabhängige Aufsichtsratsmitglied – Zu den Änderungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex” 
(fn.15431606), 571. 
1545 ibid., 571. 
1546 M Lutter, ”Die Empfehlungen der Kommission vom 14.12.2004 und vom 15.2.2005 und ihre Umsetzung in 
Deutschland” (fn.14321495), 804. 
1547 ibid., 804. 
1548 K Hasselbach, J Jakobs (fn.15381601), 643. 
1549 Similar: PC Leyens, “Corporate Governance in Europe: Foundations Developments and Perspectives“ in T Eger, HB 
Schäfer (eds) Research Handbook on the Economics of European Union Law (Elgar, 2012), 183-198, 190. 
1550 4.1.2. Cadbury Code. 
1551 A.2.1. Combined Code1998. 
1552 A.3.2. Combined Code 1998. 
1553 ibid. 
1554 A.3.1. Combined Code 2003. 
1555 ibid. 
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Recommendation’s list. In some aspects it is even stricter. If the board considers the NED to 
be independent despite the existence of a ground for non-independence the board should 
explain why it does so.
1556
 This concurs with the EU Recommendation’s para 13.2. Later 
versions of the Combined Code show no significant changes regarding independence. 
The striking similarity of the EU Recommendation’s list with the pre-dating UK list infers 
that the EU Recommendation was influenced by the UK rules rather than vice versa. 
6. Summary 
The 2005 Recommendation’s impact on the German rules varied from subject-matter to 
subject-matter. In some areas such as independence its impact was significant. In other fields 
such as self-evaluation and qualification the influence was limited. The EU 
Recommendation’s ideas were largely implemented via the GCGC. The EU’s 
recommendations were mostly not followed word-by-word. Some changes were only made 
several years after the recommendation. 
Regarding the UK the 2005 Recommendation’s provisions were largely identical with pre-
dating UK rules. 
III. Recommendation 2009/385/EC 
Finally, the 2009 Recommendation’s impact will be assessed.  
1. Disclosure 
First, the impact of the recommendation’s provisions on disclosure will be analysed. It 
recommended a clear and understandable disclosure of the information required by earlier 
recommendations and information or explanation of additional aspects. 
1.1. Germany 
In Germany the disclosure rules had been changed significantly by the VorstOG which 
implemented the 2005 Recommendation. The 2009 VorstAG led merely to minor changes to 
§ 285 no 9 a sentence 6, specifying that all benefits granted on termination have to be 
disclosed as well as changes to these agreements within the last year.  
Also the GCGC was amended in 2005. It was not changed to implement the 2009 
Recommendation. It was merely adapted to the changed AktG.  
                                                         
1556 ibid. 
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Thus, the 2009 Recommendation did not significantly influence the German rules regarding 
disclosure. 
1.2. United Kingdom 
In the UK the 2009 Recommendation did not lead to changes of the disclosure rules.  
However, the aforementioned 2013 reform shares the aims of clarity and comprehensibility 
for executive remuneration disclosure.
1557
 The information required to be published by the 
reformed act corresponds to some extent to the information which the 2009 Recommendation 
recommends requiring. However, the former is more specific than the latter. Moreover, there 
is neither a reference to the 2009 Recommendation nor is significant influence of the 
reformed act noticeable. 
2. Shareholder Vote 
The 2009 Recommendation also recommended that (institutional) shareholders should be 
encouraged to attend AGM’s and make considered use of the vote on executive remuneration. 
2.1. Germany 
In Germany the first recommendation in 2004 to introduce a shareholder vote was met with 
widespread scepticism and this did not change when the EU Commission complemented this 
recommendation in 2009.
1558
 Somewhat surprisingly, the shareholder vote became part of the 
VorstAG-reform. In the travaux préparatoires it is explicitly stated that § 120 (4) “fulfils” the 
2004 and 2009 EU Recommendations.
1559
 
Regarding say-on-pay the EU Recommendation’s impact was significant. The introduction of 
this new instrument would have been less likely if there had not been the respective EU 
Recommendations. Also, the explicit mentioning of the EU Recommendations merely for the 
shareholder vote and not for other aspects of the VorstAG-reform indicates that the EU 
Recommendations played an important role. A motive could have been the legislator’s 
intention to deflect some criticism by pointing at the EU Recommendation. 
2.2. United Kingdom 
The 2009 EU Recommendation has not led to changes of the UK rules regarding the 
shareholder vote. As mentioned earlier, certain changes to the shareholder vote are part of a 
                                                         
1557 cf. BIS, Directors‘ Pay: Consultation on revised remuneration reporting regulations (BIS, 2012), 4 and 12. 
1558 cf. above and also H Fleischer, D Bedkowski (fn.958963), 679 with further references. 
1559 BT-Drucks. 16/13433, 12. 
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2013 reform. However, they do not take up the 2009 EU Recommendation’s ideas but are 
original initiatives by the UK government. 
3. Remuneration Committee 
The 2009 Recommendation complemented the 2005 Recommendation providing that (1) at 
least one remuneration committee member should have experience and knowledge regarding 
remuneration policy, (2) the committee should periodically review the remuneration policy 
and its implementation, and (3) the management board members’ remuneration is 
proportionate to the remuneration of other managers and staff. 
3.1. Germany 
These recommendations did not lead to alterations of either the AktG or the GCGC. This is 
not surprising against the background of the limited provisions on committees in Germany. 
3.2. United Kingdom 
Similarly, in the UK these EU provisions did not lead to changes of the already existing rules. 
4. Summary 
The 2009 EU Recommendation generally did not receive much attention in Germany.
1560
 
However, it concurred with the VorstAG as both assumed flawed remuneration systems were 
causal for the 2008 financial crisis and sought solutions.
1561
 Some ideas from the 2009 
Recommendation found their way into the VorstAG, the most important being the 
introduction of the shareholder vote. Regarding the other aspects of remuneration governance 
dealt with by the Recommendation, the impact was much less significant. 
Also in the UK the 2009 EU Recommendation did not receive much attention. Regarding 
remuneration governance, the 2009 EU Recommendation remained without significant 
impact. 
IV. Interim Findings: The EU’s Influence 
The first central question of this chapter was whether and how the EU influenced executive 
remuneration regulation in Germany and the UK in the past.  
                                                         
1560 Similar: C Link, “Die Empfehlung zur Regelung der Vergütung von Mitgliedern der Unternehmensleitung 
börsennotierter Gesellschaften im Lichte der Rechtslage in Deutschland und in Frankreich” (2009) 5 GPR, 229-235, 230. 
1561 BT-Drucks. 16/12278, 1; Recommendation 2009/935/EC, reason (2). 
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Ferrarini/Moloney/Ungureanu suggested that it is “unclear” whether the national reform 
movement is “directly linked” to the Recommendations.1562 During the time of the 2004 and 
2005 Recommendations national legislators were engaged in reforms of the national corporate 
governance frameworks in order to “deepen capital market liquidity and support industry 
competitiveness”.1563 At the time of the 2009 Recommendation the national legislators tried to 
draw the consequences from the 2008 global financial crisis.
1564
 Still, it was “not 
unreasonable” to assume influence by the Recommendations on the national reforms.1565 The 
Commission’s monitoring of the implementation, together with reputational sanctions, could 
have “had some effect”.1566  
The analysis of the national regulations of executive remuneration before and after each of the 
three Recommendations in conjunction with an examination of the respective national travaux 
préparatoires and consultations, textual analyses and an analysis of the literature led to mixed 
results.  
First, both national systems have been influenced by the EU Recommendations but the impact 
differs between Germany and the UK. All three EU Recommendations had a greater impact in 
Germany than in the UK, where the results were limited and restricted to certain (minor) 
subject-matters. The main reason for this lies in the pre-existence of respective rules in the 
UK so that there was less need for implementation and less room for influence. Hence, the 
recommendations’ effectiveness depends on the pre-existing regulatory framework. 
Second, the impact on both national systems varies from subject-matter to subject-matter. Not 
all areas were equally affected. The 2005 Recommendation for example influenced the 
German rules in some areas, e.g. independence, significantly whilst in other fields such as 
self-evaluation and qualification the influence was limited. Hence, the national regulators 
selected and implemented only those recommendations that they deemed necessary.  
Third, differences exist as to how the Recommendations’ provisions were implemented. For 
example the 2005 Recommendation’s ideas were mostly implemented via the GCGC in 
Germany whereas the AktG remained mainly unaffected. In contrast to that, the 
Recommendations of 2004 and 2009 led to significant changes of the AktG and HGB. In the 
                                                         
1562 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (2010) 10(1) JCLS, 73-118, 92. 
1563 ibid., 92; L Enriques, P Volpin, “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe” (2007) 21(1) J Econ Perspect, 
117-140, 127ff. 
1564 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (fn.15751638), 92. 
1565 ibid., 92. 
1566 ibid., 92. 
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UK they were mainly implemented via the corporate governance codes. This corresponds to 
the measures’ character, which left it to the national legislators to choose the legal measure 
best suited to implement the recommendations. 
Fourth, the EU Recommendations were often not followed word-for-word. This was accepted 
if not intended by the EU as it allows adapting the rules to the national circumstances which 
differ widely between Member States. Moreover, the rules can be adapted to the national legal 
language and terminology. This improves their comprehensibility, acceptance and 
“integration” into the legal order. 
Fifth, there was some delay between certain recommendations and their implementation. 
Some recommendations were implemented several years after they were made. This could be 
due to changing perceptions of the national legislator. A good example is say-on-pay in 
Germany.  
Finally, a direct link between the Recommendations and the national reforms exists clearly 
where the national legislator explicitly refers to the EU measures e.g. in the travaux 
préparatoires. An absence of such a reference does not necessarily imply a lack of EU 
influence. The national legislators sometimes pointed at the EU when they deemed a measure 
unpopular but intended to take the credit for popular reforms. Apart from clear references also 
other signs such as identical wording indicate that some reforms do not merely coincide with 
a recommendation. 
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E. Recent Developments  
Turning to current and future EU remuneration governance measures, these will be analysed 
and evaluated in order to decide whether the development is going in the right direction.  
Since the 2008 crisis the Commission has published a plethora of ideas, initiatives and 
measures to deal with perceived shortcomings. It published Green Papers almost annually, 
presented reports and conducted consultations. In December 2012 the Commission presented 
a new “Action Plan”1567 on European company law and corporate governance which is the 
first comprehensive review in this field since its 2003 predecessor. The new Action Plan’s 
genesis, content and related documents will be analysed. 
I. Green Paper “The EU corporate governance framework” (2011) 
1. General 
According to the Commission the 2008 financial crisis revealed deficiencies in the European 
corporate governance framework.
1568
 A Green Paper of 2010
1569
 was intended to improve 
financial institutions’ corporate governance.1570 The corporate governance of listed companies 
did not give rise to concern to the same extent but certain shortcomings had been 
observed.
1571
 A broader review of corporate governance in listed companies was launched 
with a 2011 Green Paper
1572
.  
2. Content 
The 2011 Green Paper deals with four issues: (1) General, preliminary questions, (2) board of 
directors, (3) shareholders, and (4) application of the “comply or explain” approach.1573 
Firstly, the Commission asks whether listed companies’ size should be relevant for the 
application of corporate governance rules.
1574
 Corporate governance requirements could be 
unnecessary and burdensome for small and medium-sized listed companies (SMEs). Another 
                                                         
1567 Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged 
shareholders and sustainable companies, COM(2012) 740/2. 
1568 ibid., 3. 
1569 COM(2010) 284 final. 
1570 cf. HA Hilgers, L Kurta, “Die fachlichen und persönlichen Anforderungen an Mitglieder von Verwaltungs- und 
Aufsichtsräten“ (2010) ZBB, 471-479; KJ Hopt, “Europäische Corporate Governance für Finanzinstitute?” (2010) EuZW, 
561. 
1571 COM(2012) 740/2, 3. 
1572 COM(2011) 164 final. 
1573 ibid., 3-4. 
1574 ibid., 4. 
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question is whether the EU should introduce corporate governance rules for unlisted 
companies.
1575
 
Secondly, regarding the (supervisory) board the Commission presents a number of measures 
to improve its effectiveness such as ensuring a clear separation of the roles of CEO and 
chairman.
1576
 The Green Paper also contains possible measures regarding board 
composition.
1577
 It also considers the limitation of board mandates NEDs/supervisors can hold 
and the encouragement of regular (e.g. triennial) external evaluations.
1578
 
Thirdly, the Green Paper addressed directors’ remuneration. It considers whether the 
remuneration policy should be disclosed mandatorily, and whether an annual remuneration 
report on the policies implementation as well as individualised disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration should be mandatory.
1579
 Moreover, views on a mandatory shareholder vote on 
remuneration policy and remuneration report are invited.
1580
  
Fourthly, the Green Paper turns to the “comply or explain” principle. According to the 
Commission, which bases its view on a study
1581
 conducted on its behalf, there are significant 
shortcomings in the principle’s application.1582 The study criticises the quality of 
“explanations” for departing from code recommendations. The Green Paper suggests 
improving the explanations’ quality and requiring – like the Swedish model1583 – detailed 
explanations.
1584
 Furthermore, the Commission expresses discontent with the monitoring of 
corporate governance statements in the Member States. Therefore, it considers whether 
monitoring authorities should be competent to check the statements’ informative quality and 
comprehensiveness and require companies to provide additional information and explanation 
where necessary.
1585
 
                                                         
1575 ibid., 4. 
1576 ibid., 5. 
1577 ibid., 5-7. 
1578 ibid., 8. 
1579 ibid., 9. 
1580 ibid., 10. 
1581 RiskMetrics Group, “Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the Member States” 
(2009) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/studies_en.htm> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1582 COM(2011) 164 final, 18. 
1583 European Commission, Feedback Statement: Summary of Responses to Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate 
Governance Framework <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-framework_en.htm> 
accessed 18 September 2014, 17. 
1584 ibid., 18. 
1585 ibid., 18. 
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3. Assessment 
3.1. Literature 
The responses during the consultation were mostly restrained if not negative – especially 
those from Germany.
1586
 In the literature as well, the opinions on the Green Paper were 
divided and varied from initiative to initiative. Relatively widespread was the concern that the 
EU could “overregulate” corporate governance due to the recent high number of regulatory 
proposals.
1587
 Moreover, it was said that the Commission chose a bad moment as in Germany 
after over a decade of permanent reform many have grown tired of changes and “corporate 
governance bashing” had begun.1588  
The considerations regarding a differentiation depending on the size of listed companies was 
mostly criticized or rejected. Different codes depending on the company’s size would increase 
complexity and could cause confusion.
1589
 If differentiations were to be introduced then a 
general code should merely have exemptions or easing of rules for companies of a certain 
size.
1590
 Alternatively, for smaller listed companies a rule could be non-binding while it could 
be binding for bigger companies.
1591
 Others, however, support such a differentiation.
1592
 
Rules that are aimed at e.g. DAX30 companies’ organisational and financial abilities could 
ask too much of smaller listed companies.
1593
 Differentiations could also encourage smaller 
companies to access a regulated market.
1594
 
The Green Paper’s second preliminary question concerning EU corporate governance 
measures for non-listed companies was mostly seen sceptically, since the principal-agent-
conflict underlying the corporate governance regulation was less developed in non-listed 
companies.
1595
 Some, however, argued for a comprehensive set of rules with general rules for 
                                                         
1586 Responses available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-
framework/index_en.htm> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1587 M Habersack, “Staatliche und Halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung, Gutachten E” in Ständige 
Deputation des Deutschen Juristentags, Verhandlungen des 69. Deutschen Juristentags, Band I, (CH Beck, 2012), E9-E106, 
E20. 
1588 M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission vom 5.4.2011 und die Deutsche Corporate Governance” (2011) NZG, 
961-968, 967. 
1589 P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth, “Reformüberlegungen zum Corporate Governance Framework in Europa” (2011) DB 1432-
1440, 1434. 
1590 ibid., 1434. 
1591 cf. M Habersack, “Staatliche und Halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung” (fn.16001676), E33. 
1592 J Jahn, “Brüssel knöpft sich die Corporate Governance vor” (2011) AG, 454-459, 455. 
1593 G Bachmann, “Der ‘Europäische Corporate Governance-Rahmen’” (fn.13681381), 1309. 
1594 ibid., 1309. 
1595 U Seibert, “Grünbuch der EU-Kommission ‘Europäischer Corporate Governance-Rahmen‘” (2011) KPMG Audit 
Committee Quarterly II/2011, 14-20, 14. 
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all companies and specific rules separately for listed, non-listed and family-owned 
companies.
1596
 
The proposed initiatives regarding the board’s composition, especially the qualifications, were 
seen mostly positively as it was considered to be the key to efficient monitoring and 
sustainable growth.
1597
 Some preferred EU action in form of a Recommendation.
1598
 Some 
saw national rules as advantageous due to their “adaptability and responsiveness”.1599 Others 
rejected any EU measures as breaching the subsidiarity principle.
1600
 Initiatives to ensure 
adequate time commitment by NEDs/supervisors and a limit of mandates were generally 
welcomed.
1601
 Yet, some criticised that some NEDs would be unable to cope with the 
maximum number of board mandates while others could successfully handle even more 
mandates.
1602
 Its effectiveness was also dubious as the required time and effort depend on 
individual factors such as the company’s size, economic situation and complexity.1603 Some 
argued that a limitation went against the (supervisory) board’s professionalisation,1604 whilst 
others argued the exact opposite.
1605
 
Also regarding external evaluation the literature was divided. Opponents regarded a 
mandatory external evaluation as absolutely inappropriate and even a corresponding 
recommendation would have to be weighed against the cost, time and resulting problems like 
questions of the facilitator’s independence and knowledge.1606 Others argued that 
“professional” NEDs/supervisors could assess the (supervisory) board’s performance so that 
external evaluation was unnecessary.
1607
 Some proponents supported a recommendation for a 
triennial external evaluation, provided that it not merely a window window-dressing 
exercise.
1608
 Others pleaded that external evaluation every three to five years would make 
sense, that a catalogue of criteria to assess the performance should be developed and applied 
                                                         
1596 P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth (fn.16021678), 1433. 
1597 G Bachmann“Der ‘Europäische Corporate Governance-Rahmen’” (fn.13681381), 1308; J Jahn, “Brüssel knöpft sich die 
Corporate Governance vor” (fn.16051681), 455; M Lutter, “Ein Grünbuch der Kommission zur Corporate Governance” 
(2011) KPMG Audit Committee Quarterly II/2011, 10-13, 12-13. 
1598 M Lutter, “Ein Grünbuch der Kommission zur Corporate Governance” (fn.16101686), 12-13. 
1599 C van der Elst, E Vermeulen, “Corporate Governance 2.0: Assessing the Corporate Governance Green Paper of the 
European Commission” (2011) 8(4) European Company Law, 165-174, 168. 
1600 J Jahn, “Brüssel knöpft sich die Corporate Governance vor” (fn.16051681), 455. 
1601 G Bachmann, “Der ‘Europäische Corporate Governance-Rahmen’” (fn.13681381), 1303; M Lutter, “Ein Grünbuch der 
Kommission zur Corporate Governance” (fn.16101686), 12. 
1602 M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 963. 
1603 P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth (fn.16021678), 1436. 
1604 ibid., 1436. 
1605 M Lutter, “Ein Grünbuch der Kommission zur Corporate Governance” (fn.16101686), 10. 
1606 M Habersack, “Staatliche und Halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung” (fn.16001676), E85. 
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EU-wide, and that for greater transparency the results of the evaluation should be published 
according to an EU-wide standard.
1609
  
A more mediating view agreed that external evaluation would enhance the (supervisory) 
board’s work but sees problems:1610 (1) individual directors’ evaluation could be very 
“delicate”,1611 (2) the assumption that external facilitators “add value to the evaluation” in 
particular “at times of crisis, or of a breakdown of communication between board members” 
is doubtful because if there is no communication the board would not be able to agree on an 
external facilitator and in a crisis there might be no contact partner,
1612
 and (3) the external 
facilitator could lack objectivity as he would like follow-up business relations with the 
board.
1613
  
The Green Paper’s ideas on directors’ remuneration have been neglected by most scholars. 
Often the section on directors’ remuneration in journal articles does not deal with the 
initiatives but with remuneration and its development in general.
1614
 Others (mis)interpret the 
section as being aimed at the supervisory board only,
1615
 whereas the Green Paper explicitly 
mentions executive and non-executive directors.
1616
 The ones that address the topic are 
sceptical regarding further (European) regulation.
1617
 
The last main initiative concerned the enhancement of the comply-or-explain principle’s 
effectiveness. Most scholars opposed the initiatives. It was argued that – at least in Germany – 
the informative quality left nothing to be desired and complaints about poor quality were 
unheard of.
1618
 The mechanism was working just as well in Germany as in the Commission’s 
role model, Sweden.
1619
 Also, the second initiative in this respect, proposing monitoring of 
non-compliance statements’ informative quality by monitoring authorities, received mainly 
negative feedback.
1620
 It was not the state’s task to ensure the quality of information.1621 
                                                         
1609 P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth (fn.16021678), 1437. 
1610 M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 964. 
1611 ibid., 964. 
1612 ibid., 964. 
1613 M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 964. 
1614 cf. e.g. M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 965; J Jahn, “Brüssel knöpft sich die Corporate 
Governance vor” (fn.16051681), 456. 
1615 “Vergütung des Aufsichtsrats” in P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth (fn.16021678), 1437; “Vergütung von Verwaltungs- und 
Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern” in S Jung, “Das Grünbuch der Kommission zu einem Corporate Governance-Rahmen und die 
Weiterentwicklung des Europäischen Gesellschaftsrechts” (2011) BB, 1987-1993, 1989. 
1616 COM(2011) 164 final, 9. 
1617 P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth (fn.16021678), 1437. 
1618 U Seibert, “Grünbuch der EU-Kommission ‘Europäischer Corporate Governance-Rahmen‘” (fn.16081684), 14; M 
Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 963. 
1619 M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 968. 
1620 “völlig abzulehnen“ [to be rejected completely] M Peltzer, “Das Grünbuch der EU-Kommission” (fn.16011677), 967. 
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Moreover, a review by a monitoring authority would have the negative consequence that the 
authority’s guidelines as to what a “good” statement should look like would encourage 
companies to adopt the officially accepted formulation.
1622
 Nevertheless, some considered the 
initiative to be a “commendable, compellingly necessary approach” and supported a 
substantive review of non-compliance statements by a monitoring authority.
1623
 
Overall, it was seen positively that the EU did not intend to introduce a European corporate 
governance code,
1624
 and that the focus was on monitoring and transparency as the least 
intrusive means of regulatory intervention. The criticism was raised that the grown structures 
in the national systems were not considered sufficiently.
1625
 It was acknowledged that some 
important issues were addressed and that the recommendations could improve corporate 
governance in the EU.
1626
 Similarly, it was stated that the Commission had initiated an 
interesting discussion albeit the solutions should mainly not be mandatory EU rules
1627
 but 
recommendations.
1628
 Then again, others stated that the initiatives had caused a “stunned 
astonishment” and that the EU had demonstrated an “unrestrained regulatory appetite”.1629 
Initiatives and conclusions were said to ignore differences e.g. between monist and dualist 
systems and would lead to formalism and bureaucracy.
1630
  
3.2. Opinion 
The Green Paper is a useful and thought-provoking addition to the corporate governance 
debate in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. However, the impression of “overregulation” arises 
easily against the background of an uninterrupted stream of EU and national consultations, 
reform proposals and reforms in recent years. But are the Green Paper’s measures 
“overregulation” and not to be taken further? 
First, the general questions will be addressed, i.e. whether the EU should enact different 
measures for listed companies of different sizes. The idea is generally a good one as corporate 
governance measures are usually aimed at large listed companies which have different means 
and needs than those of SMEs. Also the shareholder structure is likely to differ. A single code 
could address the wrong issues. Therefore, prima facie a differentiation seems sensible. 
                                                         
1622 ibid., 14. 
1623 P Wollmert, P Oser, C Orth (fn.16021678), 1439. 
1624 M Habersack, “Staatliche und Halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung ” (fn.16001676), E55. 
1625 ibid., E55. 
1626 M Lutter, “Ein Grünbuch der Kommission zur Corporate Governance” (fn.16101686), 13. 
1627 U Seibert, “Grünbuch der EU-Kommission ‘Europäischer Corporate Governance-Rahmen‘” (fn.16081684), 14. 
1628 G Bachmann, “Der ‘Europäische Corporate Governance-Rahmen’” (fn.13681381), 1309. 
1629 E Scheffler, “Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat: EU Grünbuch zur Corporate Governance” (2011) AG-Report, R262-R264, 
R262. 
1630 ibid., R262. 
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However, there are several problems inherent in such a differentiation. The first is which 
criteria to use to differentiate and where to draw a line. A suggestion could be to introduce 
stricter rules for companies with a large market capitalisation (large-caps) such as those in the 
DAX30. Yet it could be objected that there would be difficulties for companies acceding or 
leaving the DAX30. However, (mid-cap)companies at the upper end of a lower segment such 
as the MDAX would probably already follow respective recommendations without being 
obliged to do so. A change would be of limited impact. Rules could be mandatory for large 
caps and recommendations for mid-caps. But is such a differentiation necessary? Even if a 
rule was merely a recommendation for all companies large-caps would consider them as 
“almost binding” due to investors’ pressure. Still, a differentiation as put to discussion could 
be worth considering.  
The Green Paper also enquired whether corporate governance measures should be taken for 
non-listed companies. As this work is focused on listed companies it shall suffice to say that 
the differences among non-listed companies are even greater than between listed companies. 
The second main complex deals with the board. The Green Paper’s question as to whether the 
EU should seek to ensure the division of the roles of CEO and chairman has to be answered in 
the negative. Such rules are only required in monist systems and are usually already dealt with 
nationally. Also closely related dual-board issues such as changing from being CEO to 
becoming supervisory board member or chairman are already dealt with nationally. The 
initiative regarding the profile and qualifications of board members, however, is to be 
welcomed. It is desirable that criteria addressing these aspects are set out in advance as this 
facilitates the recruitment process and enhances its transparency. Recommending setting out a 
recruitment profile in advance does not seem like an urgent but a sensible step.  
The initiative regarding the limitation of the number of mandates an NED/supervisory board 
member can hold seems good regarding its content. The main argument against it is that it 
should be left to the companies as such a limit would not take individual circumstances into 
account. However, this generalisation should be weighed against the advantages. It is 
certainly true that different NEDs vary in the number of mandates they can fulfil well. Still, a 
limitation draws a line where it is assumed that more mandates would lead to inadequate 
performance due to a lack of time. The limit should take into account the nature of the other 
commitments. All this seems very familiar from national rules. Overall, the existence of 
national rules and the considerable differences in the tasks of NEDs/supervisory board 
members between the systems argue against binding EU rules on this matter. 
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Another aspect is the board’s regular external evaluation. Generally, such an external 
evaluation seems reasonable as it ensures an objective, independent review of the board‘s 
performance. Shortcomings are more likely to be discovered and voiced by someone external. 
The report of such an external evaluation could give shareholders a good insight into the 
board and be a valuable basis for decisions. The costs seem reasonable and proportionate. 
Still, the external facilitator’s independence could be doubtful due to interest in receiving 
more business from the reviewed company. This problem seems solvable when looking at the 
rules for auditors. It could furthermore be argued that confidential information could become 
public or that individual reviews could bring disquiet into the board. The disquiet argument is 
understandable, since individual reviews can be delicate, but people in such positions should 
be able to cope with it. The most convincing arguments against the external review initiative 
is that it is unnecessary if the (supervisory) board is sufficiently professional and that there is 
the risk that the evaluation report is “just another report” which is likely to be ignored. It 
could rather be indicated to focus on the improvement of the board itself. Also the 
Commission’s assumption that external evaluation could be particularly helpful in times of 
crisis is unconvincing. In times of crisis the board should focus on dealing with the crisis 
rather than focusing on an external performance review. Nevertheless, triennial external 
evaluation on a voluntary basis is positive. A respective recommendation by the EU should be 
welcomed. Criteria for the evaluation process should also be provided to enhance its 
objectivity and the comparability of its results.  
Improving the comply-or-explain mechanism’s functioning was another main aspect. One 
proposal required a detailed explanation for non-compliance. Improving statements’ 
informative quality is generally a laudable idea as the quality varies. Merely stating non-
compliance without giving any (helpful) explanation is usually a futile exercise. It would 
resemble rather a “comply or declare” than a “comply or explain” approach. However, in 
Germany and the UK the quality of the non-compliance statements is usually satisfactory. The 
burden of a detailed explanation for non-compliance, including justification of the alternative, 
could lead to companies complying with the provisions merely to avoid the non-compliance 
explanation. Also, a mere “no” or a short explanation for non-compliance can sometimes 
suffice as a signal to the capital market. Not every aspect requires a detailed explanation. It 
would also be difficult to determine the level of detail required and how precise alternatives 
had to be described. Therefore, it might be recommended that companies give sufficiently 
meaningful explanations. The capital market could then “sanction” companies that give 
unsatisfactory explanations. 
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Closely related was the idea that certain authorities monitor the explanations’ informative 
quality. Such a control is not desirable. It would face the problem of defining criteria for a 
satisfactory level of detail and in the long run “authority approved” explanations would 
probably lead to formulaic explanations rather than real improvements. 
Finally, the initiatives regarding executive remuneration will be examined. The proposed 
measures are relatively broad, namely mandatory disclosure of remuneration policy and 
individual remuneration, mandatory shareholder vote on the remuneration policy and the 
remuneration report.  
Previous recommendations on the disclosure of the remuneration policy were implemented by 
a majority of member states but the disclosures’ content and form vary.1631 Differences in 
implementation in conjunction with additional national disclosure rules have led to companies 
across the EU applying a wide range of different disclosure rules. Lacking comparability and 
transparency have resulted, rendering informed decision-making difficult for investors. 
Mandatory disclosure rules could reduce investors’ information costs.1632 However, it is 
important that the disclosure rules also harmonise the disclosure statements’ content. The EU 
should provide a catalogue of required data and information that has to be presented in a 
certain format with standardised definitions.
1633
 The aim would be a clear and standardised 
statement on remuneration policy. National rules cannot achieve the same level of 
comparability and transparency. EU action is required.  
The individualised disclosure of executive remuneration has been implemented by more 
Member States.
1634
 Most of them require it by law.
1635
 The individual disclosure standards are 
often high and most Member States follow the 2004 Recommendation’ basic 
requirements.
1636
 However, the rules regarding the content differ. Mandatory rules on the 
disclosed content could be beneficial for transparency and consistency. Similarly, the 
remuneration report should – as argued earlier – be standardised in order to improve clarity 
                                                         
1631 European Comission, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the application by Member States of the EU of 
the Commission Recommendation on directors’ remuneration, SEC(2007) 1022, 5. 
1632 Similar: MC Ungureanu, “Re: European Commission Consultation on the EU Corporate Governance Framework 
COM(2011) 164” (2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/corporate-governance-framework> 
accessed 18 September 2014, 2. 
1633 ibid., 2. 
1634 European Comission, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the application by Member States of the EU of the 
Commission Recommendation on directors’ remuneration, SEC(2007) 1022, 6. 
1635 ibid., 6. 
1636 ibid., 6-7. 
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and comparability, reduce investors’ information costs and facilitate cross-border 
investments.
1637
 
The proposal of a mandatory shareholder vote is generally positive. The vote should be 
informative and comparable. As already mentioned differences exist between the Member 
States’ rules e.g. regarding the vote’s subject-matter. The Green Paper’s proposal is positive 
as it is more precise regarding the subject-matter. Its clarification, standardisation and 
definition could be advantageous, as information costs would decrease and investors would 
have fewer problems using their rights when investing in another Member State. Together 
with standardised remuneration reports, burdens to cross-border investments would diminish. 
Finally, rather than making the shareholder vote mandatory, the EU should consider making 
the vote binding. See the relevant discussion above. 
All in all, the impression of “overregulation” turns out to be a misperception. The 
Commission has highlighted a number of shortcomings that should be addressed. Several of 
the Green Paper’s proposals are convincing and should be taken further at least in the form of 
an EU Recommendation or nationally. Concerning executive remuneration it can be said that 
the EU addresses important aspects. Its initiatives could have been more detailed but the 
general idea of mandatory disclosure is positive. Further harmonisation and standardisation of 
the disclosures’ content is desirable and should be part of the reform. Regarding the 
mandatory shareholder vote, the subject-matter should be harmonised and its effectiveness 
could be increased by making it binding. 
II. Action Plan “European company law and corporate governance” (2012) 
The next step in the development was the Action Plan of December 2012 (2012 Action 
Plan).
1638
 It builds on the 2011 Green Paper and addresses developments that have taken place 
since its 2003 predecessor.
1639
  
1. Content 
The Action Plan presents initiatives the Commission intends to take in the field of company 
law and corporate governance. Corresponding to the responses received during the 
consultations following the 2011 Green Paper and the reflection group’s Report, the 2012 
                                                         
1637 cf. MC Ungureanu (fn.16451721), 2-3 for similar ideas. 
1638 European Commission, Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for 
more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, COM(2012) 740/2. 
1639 ibid., 2; W Bayer, “Grundfragen der Regulierung der aktienrechtlichen Corporate Governance” (2013) NZG, 1-16, 2. 
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Action Plan deals with merely some of the measures put forward in these documents.
1640
 The 
measures in the Action Plan are grouped around three main objectives: (1) transparency 
enhancement, (2) shareholder engagement and (3) support of companies’ growth and 
competitiveness.
1641
  
Regarding the transparency enhancement the Commission announced that it was to take an 
initiative, probably a Recommendation, to enhance the quality of corporate governance 
reports.
1642
 Especially explanations provided by companies for non-compliance with 
corporate governance codes should be improved.
1643
  
More relevant are the initiatives regarding shareholder engagement. First and foremost, the 
“better shareholder oversight of remuneration policy” has to be mentioned.1644 The 
Commission intends to ensure “basic harmonisation of disclosure requirements” in order to 
provide shareholders with “clear, comprehensible and comparable” information on 
remuneration policies and directors’ individual remuneration.1645 Furthermore, a mandatory 
shareholder vote on the company’s remuneration policy and remuneration report – the latter 
offering an overview of the policy’s implementation – shall be introduced.1646 The 
Commission intends to achieve this by amending the Shareholders’ Rights Directive.1647  
2. Assessment 
2.1. Literature 
At the time of writing, literature assessing the 2012 Action Plan rather than just 
summarising
1648
 its content is rare.
1649
 Generally it is noted that the Commission was 
                                                         
1640 W Bayer, J Schmidt, “BB-Gesetzgebungs- und Rechtsprechungsreport Europäisches Unternehmensrecht 2012” (2013) 
BB, 3-16, 3. 
1641 European Commission, Action Plan (fn.16511727), 4-5. 
1642 ibid., 6-7. 
1643 ibid., 6-7. 
1644 ibid., 9. 
1645 ibid., 9. 
1646 ibid., 9. 
1647 ibid., 9. 
1648 cf. Anonymous, “EU-Kommission legt Aktionsplan zum Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht und zur Corporate Governance 
vor” (2013) AG, R26-R27; W Bayer, J Schmidt, (fn.16531734); C Müller, “EU-Kommission legt Aktionsplan zum 
Europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht und zur Corporate Governance vor” (2013) GmbHR, R25; J Schmidt, “Aktionsplan 
Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und Corporate Governance” (2013) GmbHR, R33-R34; C Teichmann, “EU-Aktionsplan 
zum Gesellschaftsrecht: Transparenz, Aktionäre und Konzernrecht” (2013) 3 BB, 1. 
1649 KJ Hopt, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht im Lichte des Aktionsplans der Europäischen Kommission vom Dezember 
2012, ZGR (2013) 42(2), 165-215; G Friedel, “Der Aktionsplan ‚Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und Corporate Governance 
– ein moderner Rechtsrahmen für engagierte Aktionäre und überlebensfähige Unternehmen‘ der Kommission im Überblick 
(Teil 1)” (2013) AnwZert HaGesR, Anm. 1; G Friedel, “Der Aktionsplan ‚Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht und Corporate 
Governance – ein moderner Rechtsrahmen für engagierte Aktionäre und überlebensfähige Unternehmen‘ der Kommission im 
Überblick (Teil 2)” (2013) AnwZert HaGesR, Anm. 2. 
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surprisingly “reserved” and “lacked courage”.1650 The suggested measures were considered to 
be “interesting” but improvable.1651 Very recent and more detailed evaluations are mainly 
positive.
1652
 
2.2. Opinion 
Compared with the ambitious 2003 Action Plan, its 2012 counterpart seems very modest. 
Most of its proposed measures are neither new nor mandatory. Rather, several ideas are 
familiar, and regarding many aspects the plan intends to limit itself to “further investigations”, 
a “study” or non-binding instruments.1653 
Acting with that much reserve is surprising, as several of the initiatives proposed in the 2011 
Green Paper received positive feedback. However, it comes as a positive surprise that the 
feared “wave of regulations”1654 for all listed companies as a reaction to shortcomings in the 
financial industry did not materialise. It is commendable that the Commission, which has 
often been accused of overregulation, refrained from knee-jerk reactions – in contrast to some 
national legislators. 
Several of the 2011 Green Paper’s measures are not mentioned in the Action Plan. Some of 
them had received much criticism. Their disappearance is not unexpected. The responses to 
others that were abandoned such as external evaluation were more balanced. It is not entirely 
clear why certain measures have been abandoned whilst others have not. Some additional 
information on the reasons for taking certain measures further whilst abandoning others 
would have been desirable. 
Fortunately, the initiatives regarding executive remuneration were not abandoned. They are 
welcome although they could have been more courageous. The Commission reiterates that 
“shareholders need clear, comprehensive and comparable information on remuneration 
policies and individual remuneration of directors” and states that this could be achieved 
through “basic harmonization of disclosure requirements”.1655 It remains to be seen how 
“basic” this harmonisation will be. It should not be too reserved in order to achieve greater 
clarity, transparency and comparability. Despite the probable national opposition, the 
                                                         
1650 J Schmidt, (fn.16621743), R34. 
1651 ibid., R34. 
1652 P Böckli et al, “Making Corporate Governance Codes More Effective: A Response to the European Commission’s Action 
Plan of December 2012“ (2013) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366273> accessed 18 Sepember 2014, 
13. 
1653 COM(2012) 740/2, 17. 
1654 J Jahn, “Brüssel knöpft sich die Corporate Governance vor” (fn.16051681), 459. 
1655 European Commission, Action Plan (fn.16511727), 9. 
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Commission should have striven for harmonisation of content and definitions in order to 
achieve the plan’s objectives of greater transparency and enable shareholders to oversee 
executive remuneration. The Action Plan also states that shareholders should “be able to 
express their views on the matter” through a vote and “have an overview how the 
remuneration policy has been implemented” and vote on this as well.1656 The only real 
information added to the Green Paper is that the Commission intends to introduce these rules 
in the form of a directive.  
Another interesting aspect is the initiative to improve the informative quality of corporate 
governance reports and especially the quality of explanations for non-compliance. However, 
again details are scarce. The measure shall be a recommendation. The related initiative of a 
monitoring of the explanations’ informative quality by a competent authority has – rightly – 
not been taken further. 
All in all, the 2012 Action Plan is below the expectations of those who had hoped for an 
innovative and ambitious document like the 2003 Action Plan. Simultaneously, it has calmed 
those who feared overregulation and a wave of new rules. Regarding remuneration 
governance, the Action Plan pursues the commendable initiatives from the 2011 Green Paper 
further. It is to be hoped that the “basic harmonization of disclosure requirements” is not too 
basic to achieve the aims set.  
III. Interim Findings: Recent Development’s  
The second main question of this chapter is whether the recent developments in EU 
remuneration governance point in the right direction and what has to be expected in the near 
future. 
Since the 2009 Recommendation the Commission has been very active in the field of 
corporate governance and remuneration governance. The analysis of the different initiatives, 
the responses during the consultations and of views in the literature has led to a mainly 
positive result. The Commission seems to be on the right track. 
The two initiatives in the 2012 Action Plan that are explicitly aimed at improving the 
shareholder monitoring of executive remuneration tackle central problems, namely that the 
disclosure of individual remuneration and remuneration policy are often not sufficiently clear, 
transparent and comparable. Standardised disclosure is long overdue. Different disclosure 
rules can lead to investors restricting their activities to the markets familiar to them. 
                                                         
1656 ibid., 9. 
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Moreover, investors’ information costs and burdens to cross-border investments are likely to 
decrease if the remuneration policy and remuneration reports are standardised and easily 
comparable. It is to be hoped that the announced “basic harmonisation” suffices to achieve 
this. Also, the provisions on shareholder votes are positive. Harmonisation and 
standardisation of the votes’ subject-matters is likely to improve their comparability and may 
increase their use. 
Not all initiatives from the 2011 Green Paper found their way into the 2012 Action Plan. 
Abandoning some initiatives is not particularly problematic, as corresponding rules exist – at 
least in Germany and the UK – at a national level. Other initiatives such as mandatory 
external evaluation are unconvincing, and further research on their effectiveness and 
consequences should be awaited before acting on the EU level. The considerations regarding 
a differentiation of rules depending on the listed company’s size seem worth being followed 
up. It is disappointing that the Commission stopped mentioning this idea. 
The Commission has generally chosen appropriate instruments to implement their ideas. 
Harmonisation can easily neglect the historical, cultural and socio-economic differences 
between the member states and their corporate governance systems. The focus on further 
studies and non-binding measures in the Action Plan may seem reserved but is certainly 
preferable to overregulation and knee-jerk regulation. 
To summarise, the recent development is reserved but goes in the right direction.  
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F. Evaluation 
The EU’s influence on German and UK remuneration governance will now be evaluated. 
Based on the interim findings positive and negative aspects of the EU’s influence will be 
examined.  
Both national remuneration governance systems have been influenced by EU measures. Yet  
the influence on the German system is considerably more significant. Even within each 
system the EU’s influence differs from subject-matter to subject-matter. The implementation 
in both systems has often been neither literal nor swift but adapted to national conditions and 
introduced with delays. 
I. Choice of Legal Instrument 
The first aspect to be evaluated is the choice of legal instrument. The Commission has chosen 
Recommendations, which offer as aforementioned a wide range of advantages compared with 
other legal instruments. Choosing recommendations rather than regulations allowed the 
national character of the executive remuneration rules to be maintained and simultaneously 
led to material convergence. The say-on-pay rules are a good example of this. The national 
division of competences for remuneration-setting remained unchanged and national 
terminology was used. Also compared with a directive the choice was advantageous. First, 
psychologically it was easier to find compromises as the rules are “merely non-binding”. 
Secondly, the Commission alone could enact the Recommendation. Thirdly, Member States 
could implement those rules only that they considered necessary. Fourthly, the Member States 
could choose the adequate legal instrument for implementation. Correspondingly, it has been 
seen that Germany and the UK – due in part to differing national legislative traditions – chose 
different legal instruments for implementation. Fifthly, the fact that implementation was 
permitted through codes ensured that a one-size-fits-all-solution on company level was 
avoided.  
However, choosing Recommendations also had disadvantages, namely less effective 
harmonisation than would have been desirable, most effective and efficient.
1657
 Examples are 
differences that persisted regarding the information required to be disclosed, regarding the 
required form of disclosure or regarding the say-on-pay vote’s subject-matter, which impede 
greater comparability. Moreover, the Recommendations may have been enacted swiftly and 
                                                         
1657 cf. M Habersack, D Verse (fn.13291334), § 3 m.no.49. 
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without the need of Member States’ agreement but this is futile if the national legislators 
ignore central provisions like the shareholder vote, which was ignored for years in Germany.  
The recommendation has generally been a good choice. The EU has been able to instigate 
convergence between the national systems without interfering excessively with national 
particularities, systems and terminologies. This convergence has led to greater commonalities 
and comparability in some areas e.g. NEDs’/supervisors’ independence. In other areas, such 
as the subject-matter of the shareholder vote or the content and form of disclosed information, 
(further) harmonisation remains desirable. Hence, recommendations have proven to be the 
means of choice for instigating discussions and reforms. Yet, to achieve harmonisation and 
comparability of specific aspects, binding measures are advantageous. 
II. Content and Implementation 
A discussion will follow concerning whether the implementations could achieve the 
recommendations’ objectives and whether the recommendations’ provisions were beneficial 
or disadvantageous.  
The EU’s overarching objectives pursued with its recommendations were to improve listed 
companies’ corporate governance, to encourage “an appropriate regulatory regime for 
directors’ remuneration”, and to eliminate and prevent conflicts of interests.1658 The 
“appropriate regulatory regime for directors’ remuneration” has been specified as entailing the 
objectives of ensuring “transparency of remuneration practices, shareholder control on the 
remuneration policy and individual remuneration through disclosure and the introduction of a 
[…] vote on the remuneration statement and shareholder approval for share-based 
remuneration schemes".
1659
  
1. Transparency and Shareholder Control through Disclosure 
The objectives transparency and shareholder control should be attained through annual 
disclosure of the remuneration policy and individualised disclosure of each executive’s 
remuneration. 
Providing shareholders with information on the remuneration policy and individualised 
information on executives’ remuneration is likely to increase transparency. Greater 
transparency enables shareholders to form an opinion on the remuneration’s adequacy. 
Consequently, the exercise of control by the shareholders should be facilitated and improved.  
                                                         
1658 cf. above; e.g. 2005/162/EC, reason (2). 
1659 2009/385/EC, reason (1). 
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Yet merely providing information does not suffice. The 2004 Recommendation does not 
entail a standardised form for the disclosure which would facilitate the information’s analysis. 
Standardisation of the disclosed information would ameliorate transparency, increase 
comparability and enhance the possibility of shareholder control of executive remuneration. 
This standardisation may however require binding rules rather than Recommendations. 
Rules on individualised disclosure existed prior to the 2004 Recommendation in both 
countries. The recommendation to publish an annual remuneration report had a positive effect 
in Germany.
1660
 In the UK corresponding rules already existed. 
Overall, the recommendations’ disclosure provisions do not add much to the examined 
national regulatory regimes. The recommendations lacked innovations to lead to more 
positive changes in terms of transparency. However, the EU measures were not merely made 
for progressive and innovative national systems but also serve the purpose of harmonising the 
diverse systems in the EU. For some of them the measures may have been highly innovative. 
2. Introduction of a Shareholder Vote 
Another central aim was the introduction of rules to empower shareholders. This consisted of 
(1) the shareholder vote on the remuneration statement and (2) shareholder approval of share-
based remuneration.  
The provisions on the vote in the 2004 and 2009 recommendations have played an important 
role in the introduction of the vote in Germany. The recommendations achieved their 
objective of introducing the shareholder vote albeit its introduction in Germany was delayed 
for years. In the UK respective rules existed already.  
Taking a closer look at the provision it can be noted that it is drafted well – for example by 
setting out a clear subject-matter for the vote, namely the remuneration statement. The 
recommendation is superior and preferable to its implementation in Germany which suffers 
from an unclear subject-matter. The vote’s subject-matter in the recommendation is similar to 
and probably inspired by the relevant UK provision. The German deviation shows that more 
emphasis on an identical subject-matter in the different Member States would have been 
advantageous. 
Another positive aspect is the many options the 2004 recommendation left to national 
legislators: they could make the vote binding or advisory and mandatory or depending on a 
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respective shareholder request.
1661
 These choices certainly made the recommendation less 
controversial and easier to accept. They also allowed national legislators to select a 
configuration compatible with national traditions and particularities. Moreover, companies 
and shareholders in national systems which did not provide this instrument before could get 
used to the vote by introducing the least intrusive option, namely non-mandatory and 
advisory. Later on the rule could then be made more intrusive, e.g. with a binding vote. This 
second step currently seems to happen in Germany and the UK. The inhibition level would 
have been much higher and the opposition much greater if the recommendation had suggested 
a binding and/or mandatory vote (without alternatives) from the beginning. Furthermore, the 
recommendation has given national legislators the possibility of deflecting criticism and 
introducing the initially unpopular say-on-pay. 
The recommendations on shareholder voting were essential for introducing this new 
instrument in continental legal systems. Without the EU’s interference this additional tool 
would be missing in Germany. 
Introducing prior shareholder approval for share-based remuneration was another aim of the 
Commission. However, corresponding rules existed already in Germany and the UK. The 
problem was well-known and had already been dealt with. The recommendation did not 
present innovations. The objective of improving listed companies’ corporate governance 
could not be achieved. Still, it can be seen as a confirmation of an appropriate regime 
regarding share-based remuneration in Germany and the UK.  
3. Improve Supervision and Eliminate Conflicts of Interest 
Another main objective of the Commission was the elimination and prevention of conflicts of 
interest.
1662
 This was to improve the protection of investors and restore the confidence in 
companies and financial markets.
1663
  
Non-executive/supervisory directors like those dealing with situations of conflicts of interest 
were seen as playing a pivotal role and the 2005 Recommendation intended to strengthen 
them.
1664
 Their independence, objectivity and effectiveness were to be ameliorated.
1665
  
First, the improvement of supervision through increased effectiveness of NEDs/supervisors 
will be dealt with. The provisions on the NED’s/supervisor’s profile resemble the respective 
                                                         
1661 2004/913/EC, para 4.2. 
1662 cf. 2005/162/EC, Reason (2). 
1663 Reasons (3), (6). 
1664 Reason (3). 
1665 Reasons (7), (8). 
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provisions in Germany and the UK that pre-date the 2005 Recommendation. Thus, the aim of 
further improving supervision could only be achieved regarding details which exceeded the 
pre-dating national provisions. Such details were e.g. tailored induction programs and annual 
reviews of training needs. Induction and training are certainly helpful for the qualification and 
effectiveness of NEDs/supervisors. Even highly qualified candidates require firm-specific 
knowledge which they could acquire through an induction. Similarly, the required knowledge 
changes just as in any other profession and further training adjusted to individual needs can 
certainly improve NEDs’/supervisors’ performance. However, in Germany the 
Recommendation has not been followed either regarding induction or training. In the UK the 
Recommendation was more influential. The evaluation of this provision is therefore split. On 
the one hand, the underlying idea of ensuring qualification through tailored induction and 
individualised training is laudable. On the other hand, it has only been implemented where 
similar provisions already existed.  
Another measure aimed at increasing NEDs’/supervisors’ effectiveness is limiting the number 
of other commitments and requiring their disclosure.
1666
 It is commendable that the 
Commission refrained from being more prescriptive and left it to the national legislator to 
decide whether they want to set precise maximum numbers and if yes which. Setting a 
maximum number of board mandates would necessarily be generalising, ignoring differences 
between the tasks and the required time for board mandates in different systems. Already 
within one system differences between companies and between individual 
NED’s/supervisor’s ability exist. However, once again lacking innovation can be criticised, 
since corresponding rules already existed e.g. in Germany. 
A third measure to increase the (supervisory) board’s effectiveness was the recommendation 
that specialised committees be established for the areas prone to conflicts of interest. The 
basic idea of forming committees in order to deal with the problems of conflicts of interest, 
unwieldy (supervisory) boards and lacking expertise is not new. Respective rules had been 
introduced in Germany and the UK already. It is positive that the Commission merely 
recommended establishing committees, leaving room for discretion to national legislators and 
especially companies, thus avoiding inefficient one-size-fits-all solutions. 
A fourth measure to achieve increased effectiveness and better supervision was the 
recommendation of the annual self-evaluation of the (supervisory) board. This self-evaluation 
is not a new idea and such provisions already existed in German and UK corporate 
                                                         
1666 2005/162/EC, Para 12.1., 12.2. 
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governance codes. However, the recommendation exceeded the German provision by 
suggesting also individual performance evaluation. Individual evaluation is likely to spur 
NEDs/supervisors to give their best and, hence, improve (supervisory) board’s effectiveness. 
The other main objective of the 2005 Recommendation was promoting NEDs’/supervisors’ 
independence and objectivity. The emphasis on independence illustrates the Anglo-American 
influence on the EU’s corporate governance policy.1667 The independence focused approach 
seems to be primarily tailored to monist systems.
1668
 Their independence is essential for 
ensuring “outsider control”.1669 Independence is (more) inherent in the two-tier systems, and 
solutions for monist-system-specific problems cannot be transferred easily to dualist 
systems.
1670
 It could be criticised that the strict rules on independence – as recently 
implemented in Germany via the GCGC – are an “inappropriate over-regulation” 
incompatible with the composition of German supervisory boards.
1671
 However, conflicts of 
interest are not unknown in dualist systems, either.
1672
 Addressing independence with a non-
binding measure seems adequate. Against the background of different corporate governance 
structures and traditions – the previously mentioned  representatives of controlling 
shareholders is a good example – it is commendable that the Commission left it to the 
Member States to define precise independence criteria. Another positive aspect of the 
Recommendation is that it provides that the decision as to whether a (supervisory) board 
member is independent should rest with the (supervisory) board. Although critics could object 
that this is opening potential loopholes, it is good that, even if a lack of independence seems 
to be given, the supervisory board can decide that the person is nonetheless independent if it 
considers it necessary. The recommended disclosure of the details of the decision can help to 
prevent abuse. 
Independence is a controversial topic. The Commission tried to strike a balance between strict 
rules on independence and respecting national particularities. Setting out strict rules but 
leaving details and the decision of implementation to the Member States seems to be a good 
solution. The EU has managed to instigate discussions about independence even in legal 
                                                         
1667 S Maul (fn.14161439), 4. 
1668 G Spindler, “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance 
Kodex” (fn.1495), 2033. 
1669 KJ Hopt, “Vergleichende Corporate Governance” (2011) ZHR, 444-527, 467; T Kremer, A v. Werder, “Unabhängigkeit 
von Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern: Konzept, Kriterien und Kandidateninformation” (2013) 9 AG, 340-348, 340. 
1670 G Spindler, “Die Empfehlungen der EU für den Aufsichtsrat und ihre deutsche Umsetzung im Corporate Governance 
Kodex” (fn.1495), 2033. 
1671 cf. K Hasselbach, J Jakobs (fn.15381601), 643. 
1672 cf. T Kremer, A von Werder (fn.16821763), 340. 
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt.
Feldfunktion geändert
Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
 284 
 
orders that previously regarded this issue as immaterial for them. A positive impact on 
conflicts of interest is likely.  
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G. The EU’s Future Role 
Based on the interim findings, light will be cast on the role the EU should play regarding 
remuneration governance in the future. Hence, the last central question of this chapter will be 
addressed, namely whether the EU should act and – if yes – how it should act. 
I. Further EU Measures? 
Further action by the EU would be desirable if its benefits and advantages outweighed its 
costs and disadvantages.
1673
 Central to EU action is the motive of harmonising and reducing 
differences. The EU measures have decreased differences between the national remuneration 
governance systems. In all three layers, convergence between the German and the UK 
systems were notable. This convergence has in part been caused or at least facilitated by EU 
measures. 
Convergence of remuneration governance and executive pay practices is not an end in itself. 
Reduced transaction costs benefit companies and investors.
1674
 Especially pan-European 
corporate groups benefit from harmonised rules as they currently have to comply with a 
number of differing regimes.
1675
 Institutional investors can monitor more effectively, e.g. 
approximated disclosure rules facilitate the analysis of the disclosed information. Similarly, 
“monitoring of the monitors” is facilitated through an approximation of rules on 
NEDs’/supervisory board members’ profiles and the functioning of supervision. The costs of 
familiarising oneself with the corporate governance systems of different Member States and 
companies decrease.  
Another effect is that measures fostering adequate remuneration practices apply in a similar 
way to companies throughout the EU, promoting a level playing field. Companies from 
Member State A are not in a better position than those from Member State B due to less strict 
rules on remuneration governance but they have to compete on the basis of better products or 
services. The recommendations also foster market integration. Simultaneously the protection 
of the interests of other stakeholders – especially investors – is approximated as well, creating 
a level playing field for them, too. 
Moreover, the EU Recommendations have repeatedly worked as a catalyst for national 
reforms. The prime example is the say-on-pay which was introduced in Germany following 
                                                         
1673 cf. similar approach of G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical 
assessment of reforms In Europe” (fn.15751638), 83. 
1674 cf. L Enriques “Company Law Harmonisation Reconsidered – What Role for the EC?” (fn.13151320), 68. 
1675 N Moloney, “The EU and executive pay: managing harmonization risks” in RS Thomas, JG Hill (eds) Research 
Handbook on Executive Pay (Elgar, 2012), 466-485, 476. 
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two recommendations. They eased national political tensions because the German legislator 
could defuse criticism by pointing to the EU Commission.
1676
 Hence, the Recommendations 
fostered innovations. 
Finally, they made it possible to discourage national legislators from taking short-term, 
populist measures.
1677
 Yet, national legislators’ willingness and determination to take actions 
contradicting recommendations should not be underestimated. An example is the German 
VorstAG-reform which gave the decision-making power on management remuneration back 
to the full supervisory board. This diametrically opposed EU provisions.  
Harmonisation and standardisation certainly have merits and may save costs but diverging 
rules on remuneration governance can be beneficial, too. First, different solutions to similar 
problems in the Member States lead to more innovations. It has been seen that in the field of 
remuneration governance the UK has been very progressive and innovative since the early 
1990s. Several of the German and EU reforms had the UK as a model. National legal systems 
served as “laboratories” for testing new ideas and instruments which could be adopted by 
other jurisdictions if they are successful. The UK has been such a “laboratory” with great 
success. Harmonisation was able to prevent regulatory competition, which has led to swift 
responses to changing conditions in the past and the adoption of successful solutions by other 
jurisdictions. Moreover, this competition leads to de facto approximation of the rules, as the 
convergence between Germany and the UK shows. This in turn decreases transaction costs.  
Second, it could be argued that EU measures are necessarily too general and do not take 
differences between the legal systems sufficiently into account. This can be illustrated through 
the different problems in monist and dualist systems. The recommendations are too focused 
on monist systems, neglecting differences between the latter and dualist systems. For 
example, rules on NEDs’/supervisors’ independence are primarily aimed at monist systems. 
Nor does the provision on the lack of independence of representatives of controlling 
shareholders take different preferences, cultures, traditions and regulatory frameworks into 
account. Harmonisation can lead to rules that in some Member States are useless or even 
incompatible with the traditional economic model. However, if the EU wanted to avoid this it 
would have to restrict itself to general rules, but the usefulness of yet another layer of general 
rules can be doubted.  
                                                         
1676 cf. ibid. 
1677 ibid. 
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Thirdly, the recommendations to date have not established an effective system of 
remuneration governance.
1678
 Despite a “permanent reform” in the last decade, the current 
remuneration governance regulation has not prevented excessive remuneration. It is not 
apparent how further Recommendations could achieve this in the future. 
Fourthly, harmonisation may lead to a level playing field in the EU but the competition is not 
restricted to the EU. Although the argument of the global market for top managers may be 
exaggerated, there are sectors whose managers could leave the EU if remuneration 
governance was overregulated and too restrictive. An approximation of the remuneration 
governance rules in the EU may – if the result is inefficient – be disadvantageous for the 
competitiveness of EU companies. 
Then again, the EU legislator is likely to be less responsive to populist demands for regulation 
than national legislators. It is notable that, especially during the “general meeting season” and 
shortly before general elections, the national legislators become very active regarding 
executive remuneration to please voters, despite widespread and potentially well-founded 
criticism. Examples are the surprising introduction of the shareholder vote in Germany shortly 
before the 2009 general elections and the (attempted) 2013 reform shortly before the next 
general elections.  
Regarding conflicts with some national corporate governance systems it has to be accepted 
that they are inevitable due to the wide range of different national systems. However, that is 
the reason why the EU chose non-binding recommendations. They offer flexibility and avoid 
one-size-fits-all solutions.
1679
 Provisions that are less suited to a national system due to 
different economic or legal conditions do not have to be followed. It is the national 
legislator’s responsibility if it overshoots the mark and implements rules that are not suited. 
The argument that just an additional but useless layer of recommendations was added does 
not hold water. For example the changes to the German remuneration governance system 
show the effectiveness of recommendations despite their non-binding nature. Yet, it is true 
that some rules, such as the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman, did not need to be 
made at EU level. Monist systems were already aware of the problem and dualist systems 
were not affected. 
                                                         
1678 cf above; similar view: G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical 
assessment of reforms In Europe” (fn.15751638), 84. 
1679 ibid., 90. 
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Thus, the EU’s role in the past shows that harmonisation can be beneficial in this area. EU 
intervention is certainly not the “silver bullet” to solve all the problems of executive 
remuneration but that could not be expected. Further action in limited fields can certainly lead 
to improvements in remuneration governance in Germany and the UK. 
II. Content and Modus of Further Measures  
What should be done in the future and how should it be done? Any measure introduced by the 
EU should be only as intrusive as absolutely necessary, be specific rather than general, and 
the overarching aim of ensuring adequate remuneration and preventing excesses and self-
serving behaviour should always be borne in mind.
1680
  
All three layers of remuneration governance still show room for improvement. Regarding the 
first layer, additional rules at the EU level are not indicated. Further EU regulation of the 
board does not promise to lead to more effective remuneration governance. First, the 
differences between the various corporate governance systems in the EU are particularly 
significant regarding the board. Despite the convergence in both theory and practice the 
differences between monist and dualist systems cause different problems and require different 
solutions. Further rules by the EU would either be too general to be meaningful in order to be 
applicable to both systems or – even worse – ignore the differences and treat unequal matters 
equally. Secondly, there is no regulatory “adjusting screw” apparent which could be tightened 
in order to make the (supervisory) board more effective.  
Rather, tightening other “adjusting screws” such as disclosure and shareholder vote could be 
more effective. 
A first measure to be suggested would be reforming the disclosure rules. The 2004 
Recommendation’s aim of a clear and comprehensive overview of the company’s 
remuneration has not been achieved, yet.
1681
 The majority of Member States has implemented 
the rules on the disclosure of the remuneration policy but the rules differ widely regarding 
both the substance and form of the disclosed information.
1682
 A wide range of different 
disclosure rules is applied by companies throughout the EU. Due to comply-or-explain rules 
differences exist even between different companies within one jurisdiction.
1683
 The result is a 
lack of comparability and transparency. This makes informed investment decisions difficult. 
                                                         
1680 cf. ibid., 111. 
1681 cf above; similar: ibid., 112. 
1682 European Comission, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the application by Member States of the EU of 
the Commission Recommendation on directors’ remuneration, SEC(2007) 1022, 5. 
1683 MC Ungureanu (fn.16451721), 2. Formatiert: Schriftart: 9 Pt., Englisch
(USA)
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The quality of monitoring suffers. Mandatory, standardising disclosure rules could be 
beneficial, reduce investors’ information costs and improve supervision.1684  
Currently, disclosure ranges from minimal information to information overload and the 
information’s presentation can be instructive, with tables and graphs, or complex and unclear 
with continuous texts. The information on remuneration can be “scattered across the annual 
report” with the result of “opaque and incomplete” disclosure.1685 Laudable exceptions are the 
UK and Germany.
1686
 Most companies from these jurisdictions present information on 
remuneration in a relatively clear way. However, as Ferrarini/Moloney/Ungureanu found 
most of the other FTSE Eurofirst 300 companies “scatter” the information across the annual 
accounts, resulting in unclear disclosure that cannot fulfil its purpose.
1687
 Yet, it has been seen 
that even the remuneration disclosure in Germany and the UK differs considerably, 
preventing comparability and an efficient use of the disclosed information. The effectiveness 
of disclosure as a remuneration governance mechanism is hampered.  
Disclosure is meant to inform shareholders, enable them to monitor the remuneration setting 
by the (supervisory) board and its remuneration committee respectively and to protect 
shareholders by increasing accountability to them and prevent directors from rent seeking. In 
order to fulfil these objectives transparency, comprehensibility and comparability need to be 
attained.  
The EU should provide a catalogue of required data and information that has to be presented 
in a certain format with standardised definitions.
1688
 The aim would be a clear and 
standardised statement on remuneration policy and individual remuneration. National rules 
cannot achieve the same level of comparability and transparency. EU action is required.  
There are several arguments for standardised, mandatory disclosure of the remuneration 
policy. First, the monitoring of remuneration practices can be improved if the information is 
clear and easy to evaluate. Second, investors could be encouraged to invest in other Member 
States if the costs for assessing information are low. Markets would be more integrated. 
Third, national legislators previously unwilling to require separate remuneration reports could 
not avoid introducing them. Fourth, regarding disclosure, the differences between the national 
systems are less significant. Although disclosure may be most important in systems with 
                                                         
1684 Similar: ibid., 2. 
1685 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (fn.15751638), 112. 
1686 cf. ibid., 112. 
1687 cf. ibid., 112. 
1688 Similar: MC Ungureanu (fn.16451721), 2. 
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widely dispersed share-ownership structures, disclosure is also important in systems with 
more concentrated ownership structures.
1689
 Controlling shareholders could gather the 
information differently but disclosure could reduce their costs, minor shareholders could 
benefit from the information and outrage, which is facilitated by disclosure, might be 
beneficial.
1690
 Furthermore, (supervisory) boards of companies with a more dispersed 
shareholder structure may use the remuneration statements of the concentrated-ownership 
companies as a benchmark.
1691
 Hence, rules on disclosure would benefit jurisdictions with 
different share-ownership structures. 
The second aspect regarding disclosure is individualised disclosure of executive 
remuneration. It has been implemented by more member states than the disclosure of the 
remuneration policy.
1692
 Most member states introduced mandatory, “hard law” 
requirements.
1693
 Still, differences in substance and form exist. Mandatory rules on substance 
and form of the individualised remuneration disclosure could be beneficial for transparency 
and consistency.  
Thus, the requirement of a separate remuneration report which presents the data on executive 
remuneration in a clear, comprehensible and standardised manner should be introduced by the 
EU.
1694
 It should contain information on the remuneration actually paid in an individualised 
manner and on the remuneration policy. The required information should be standardised, 
definitions should be provided centrally, and a uniform presentation should be prescribed. 
This would improve clarity and comparability, allow an easy assessment of the remuneration 
practice, reduce investors’ information costs, and facilitate cross-border investments.1695 The 
standardisation should not hinder (supervisory) boards from adopting innovative and unique 
remuneration policies. The measure should merely harmonise the disclosure but not the 
design of executive remuneration.  
The requirement to publish a separate, standardised remuneration report should be binding.
1696
 
Only binding measures can achieve the necessary level of comparability. The Commission 
                                                         
1689 G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (fn.15751638), 112. 
1690 cf. ibid., 112. 
1691 ibid., 112. 
1692 European Comission, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the application by Member States of the EU of 
the Commission Recommendation on directors’ remuneration, SEC(2007) 1022, 6. 
1693 ibid., 6. 
1694 Similar suggestions already in the 2011 Green Paper and 2012 Action Plan (cf. above) and by G Ferrarini, N Moloney, 
MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In Europe” (fn.15751638), 112. 
1695 cf. MC Ungureanu (fn.16451721), 2-3 for similar ideas. 
1696 Similar G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (fn.15751638), 112. 
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suggested a similar measure in the 2011 Green Paper and the 2012 Action Plan. The 
introduction of a (hopefully) sufficiently standardised remuneration report should be 
welcomed. 
Secondly, the EU should reform the say-on-pay mechanism. The mechanisms in Germany 
and the UK are not entirely convincing. Other Member States still do not even provide such 
an instrument.
1697
  
It has been argued that say-on-pay presented “the most difficulties in terms of further 
harmonisation” due to the complexities of national company law and of corporate governance 
systems that differ significantly.
1698
 Several differences exist regarding this instrument 
between the Member States. It has been argued in the literature that the differences reflect 
differences in the shareholder structures and in the role of the GM in the various legal 
systems.
1699
 Moreover, the effectiveness of this instrument is doubtful.
1700
 Finally, it was 
unlikely that a harmonised, mandatory say-on-pay would have an “easy legislative passage” 
in the EU.
1701
 
There is some truth in these criticisms. The effect of say-on-pay on executive remuneration, 
especially the absolute amount, is modest. However, drastic excesses and sudden rises were 
prevented, the communication between shareholders and the (supervisory) board was 
improved, and the pay-performance-link was ameliorated. A focal point for executive 
remuneration concerns was created, public awareness was increased and also smaller 
shareholders received a voice. Say-on-pay is not a “perfect solution” but certainly a useful 
addition to the tools for effective remuneration governance.  
The differences between the say-on-pay mechanisms are less significant that one could 
expect. The example of Germany and the UK shows that the main differences are the  
(non-)mandatoriness and the subject-matter. The differences cannot necessarily be explained 
with the differences in the shareholder structures or the GM’s role. Generally, the differences 
between the national corporate governance systems, as the examples of Germany and the UK 
show, do not argue against a harmonised say-on-pay mechanism. 
                                                         
1697 COM(2011) 164 final, 11. 
1698 cf. G Ferrarini, N Moloney, MC Ungureanu, “Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A critical assessment of reforms In 
Europe” (fn.1638), 114. 
1699 cf. ibid., 114. 
1700 cf. ibid., 114. 
1701 cf. ibid., 114. 
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Regarding the unlikeliness of an “easy legislative passage”1702 of a harmonised, mandatory 
say-on-pay, see the proposal in the 2011 Green Paper and the 2012 Action Plan. Here a 
change in the public opinion as well as in the opinion of legal literature and practice has taken 
place since Ferrarini/Moloney/Ungureanu voiced their scepticism. Three years after their 
article an introduction of a mandatory, standardised shareholder vote seems realistic – 
especially against the background of recent reforms in Germany and the UK.  
The vote should be informative and comparable. A harmonised subject-matter would facilitate 
this. The 2009 Recommendation merely recommends a “clear and comprehensible” subject-
matter. However, if the vote’s subject-matter varies between Member States the votes’ 
comparability is reduced. A rejection in one Member State could mean something else in 
another Member State. Harmonising the subject-matter would change this. The already 
suggested standardisation of the remuneration report would predestine this standardised 
remuneration report to be the votes’ subject-matter. This would increase the votes’ 
comparability and facilitate and improve monitoring by investors.  
As mentioned above, the EU is already considering such a reform. Its proposal is positive. It 
could decrease information costs and investors would have fewer problems using their rights 
when investing in another Member State. Yet, rather than making the shareholder vote 
mandatory, the EU should consider making the vote binding.  
The two suggested measures have in common that they would depart from the EU’s mainly 
recommendation-based approach to remuneration governance. A first step in this direction 
can already be seen in the 2012 Action Plan’s suggestion to prescribe by directive mandatory 
remuneration disclosure and a mandatory shareholder vote. These measures generally go in 
the right direction. It is to be hoped that the standardisation is sufficiently precise and detailed 
to be effective.  
To summarise, in the future the EU should adopt mandatory, binding instruments regarding 
certain limited aspects, in which non-binding measures cannot achieve satisfactory results. 
This would ensure the comparability of remuneration practices across the EU, enable more 
effective supervision and decrease agency costs. Further EU measures could ensure better 
remuneration governance. 
  
                                                         
1702 cf. ibid., 114. 
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H. Findings of This Chapter 
This chapter examined the impact of EU legislative measures on remuneration governance in 
Germany and the UK. The focus has been on (1) EU influence on executive remuneration 
regulation in Germany and the UK in the past, (2) the EU’s current measures, initiatives and 
plans, and (3) the role the EU should take in the future. The answers to these questions clearly 
support, on balance, the fourth hypothesis that further EU measures could ensure better 
remuneration governance. 
The EU’s regulatory approach in this field has changed over time. Full harmonisation is not 
intended anymore. Rather the approach is problem-oriented. Since the 2003 Action Plan a 
plethora of measures has been taken. The most important ones regarding remuneration 
governance were the recommendations of 2004, 2005 and 2009. They addressed all three 
layers of remuneration governance.  
The examination of their implementation in Germany and the UK has shown that both 
systems have directly and indirectly been influenced by the recommendations. Generally, all 
three recommendations had a greater impact in Germany than in the UK. In the latter the 
influence was limited to certain (minor) subject-matters. The principal reason for this lies in 
the progressive state of the UK remuneration governance system at the time of the 
recommendations. Within the two legal orders not all areas were equally affected. The 
national legislators implemented only the provisions they deemed necessary. This 
corresponds with the EU measures’ legal nature and was intended by the EU. 
Differences exist regarding the regulatory instruments used. In Germany the 2004 
Recommendation was mainly implemented via “hard law” and the 2005 Recommendation via 
“soft law” whereas in the UK almost all implementations took place through corporate 
governance codes. Moreover, in both jurisdictions the rules deviated from the 
recommendations, and sometimes several years passed before implementation. 
The measures’ effectiveness varies. None of them can solve the problems of remuneration 
governance. 
Since the 2008 financial crisis executive remuneration has been in the Commission’s focus. 
Particularly interesting are improvements suggested in the 2011 Green Paper and the 2012 
Action Plan. Most important are the proposed mandatory, standardised disclosure of 
remuneration policy and individual remuneration and the mandatory shareholder vote. Instead 
of using a recommendation the Commission is considering using a directive for these reforms. 
The 2012 Action Plan’s suggestions concur with this author’s ideas regarding the future role 
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the EU should play in the field of remuneration governance. The reforms could be more 
courageous but the Commission seems to be on the right track.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In this chapter the findings of the previous chapters will be brought together in a conclusion. 
Finally, an outlook on possible future research will be given. 
A. Conclusion 
The underlying questions of this thesis were (1) how remuneration governance works in 
Germany and the UK, (2) whether the remuneration governance instruments work effectively 
or need improvement, (3) how enhancements could be achieved, and (4) at what regulatory 
level action should be taken. Answers to these questions will follow. 
I. Where We Are 
The thesis has shown that the current remuneration governance regulation in Germany and the 
UK is not satisfactory. Using effectiveness and especially agency cost reduction as a 
yardstick, all three layers are – to varying degrees – not satisfactory in their current form.  
The setting and monitoring of executive remuneration by (supervisory) boards is not 
satisfactory and should be improved in both countries. Common problems are the 
remuneration-setters’ lack of independence in practice, insufficient commitment and 
unsatisfactory qualification. The remuneration-setting processes also lacks transparency. 
Several options exist for enhancing this remuneration governance instrument. Yet, improving 
one aspect such as independence can negatively affect another aspect such as professionalism. 
The same applies to transparency and practicability. The right balance between these axioms 
is difficult to strike and the two systems opted for different solutions. Neither can overcome 
the (supervisory) board’s inherent shortcomings. 
The current disclosure rules, which form part of an accountability system, go in the right 
direction. Both jurisdictions provide adequate rules on the disclosure’s content. Despite the 
failure to curb the absolute level of remuneration, the current regulation has been effective in 
enabling the control of managerial agency costs, especially if one takes pay increases 
unrelated to performance and “rewards for failure” as indicators for managerial agency costs. 
Nevertheless, both systems should be improved. The main shortcomings both systems have 
are the lack of force of the sanctions for incorrect or incomplete information, the inability to 
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help to curb the level of remuneration, and the lack of requirements regarding the disclosed 
information’s form.  
The 2013 reforms in both systems go in the right direction. They discovered standardisation 
as a possible solution to the problem of opaque remuneration disclosure. Clarity and 
comparability of the disclosed information could be ensured by rules on the substance and 
form of the disclosed information. Shareholders’ monitoring of executive remuneration 
should be facilitated and, consequently, agency costs reduced. Ideally, binding (EU) 
provisions should require standardised disclosure. 
The current say-on-pay mechanisms in Germany and the UK are useful instruments but need 
further improvement. Both regulations have been effective in preventing outliers in the form 
of extortionate executive remuneration, sudden rises of executive remuneration in a company, 
and remuneration unrelated to performance. Moreover, a focal point for concerns regarding 
executive remuneration has been created, awareness of shareholders and the public regarding 
executive remuneration has been increased and smaller shareholders have been given a voice. 
However, the mechanisms were not able to prevent a significant increase in the executive 
remuneration levels in both countries despite the introduction of the votes. Both systems’ say-
on-pay rules are not satisfactory as the votes lack “teeth”. The resolutions’ consequences 
should be increased, e.g. by rendering the vote on the remuneration policy binding. The 
(supervisory) board should not be able to deviate from a remuneration policy accepted by the 
shareholders. Importantly, the subject-matter of the say-on-pay votes in Germany and the UK 
differ. The former also lacks clarity. The subject-matter should be harmonised to ensure 
comparability. A standardised remuneration report would be an ideal subject-matter.  
The combination of standardised disclosure and standardised say-on-pay is the key to 
improved remuneration governance and reduced agency costs.  
II. Fundamental Change? 
It could be seen throughout the analysis that the national and supranational legislators relied 
on agency theory to address the problems of executive remuneration. Thus, according to the 
legislators, managers need to be incentivised and executive remuneration is understood as a 
tool to align the interests of managers and shareholders. Monitoring instruments have to be 
established or refined to avoid “shirking” and excessive remuneration. Reducing agency costs 
is the underlying rationale of the current remuneration governance framework.  
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It has been shown that the problems of executive remuneration have been addressed with a 
tightening of agency-theory-based rules. However, the current remuneration governance 
mechanisms are not entirely satisfactory.  
Coming back to the initial debate on different theoretical approaches to executive 
remuneration it could be asked whether other approaches would lead to better results. It could 
be argued that alternative measures based on e.g. stewardship theory such as CEO 
empowerment would be preferable as they could lead to lower absolute levels of executive 
remuneration. However, this view has to face doubts: It fails to acknowledge the proven 
positive effects of the current remuneration mechanisms for example on the pay-performance-
link and the reduction of “rewards for failure”. The reduction of the absolute amount of 
executive remuneration is (currently) not the objective of remuneration governance. The 
existing measures reduce agency costs. In the absence of a better model to measure executive 
remuneration’s effectiveness, this has to be seen as a proof of success. The improvements 
suggested in this thesis are supposed to refine the current instruments in order to lead to even 
greater effectiveness. Against stewardship-theory-based reforms it can also be argued that it is 
merely a hope that executive remuneration will rise less or even decline if stewardship-based 
measures are used. Evidence for this does not exist. It is at least as probable that refinements 
of the agency-based instruments will lead to the desired results. 
The use of entirely different rules based on other theories has to be seen critically. Provided 
that shareholder value and the interests of the company are the yardsticks, it is doubtful that 
another approach would lead to better outcomes. Some stewardship-theory-based suggestions 
– such as the empowerment of CEOs and the weakening of independent NEDs – are based on 
dubious assumptions. Moreover, they ignore the reasons (and scandals) that led to the 
introduction of improved control mechanisms in the first place. Importantly, the success of 
these measures is uncertain, whilst agency-theory-based instruments have reduced executive 
remuneration problems. The view that agency-theory-based instruments should be used 
becomes even more convincing when one considers the possible consequences: Using 
agency-theory-based remuneration governance instruments although the stewardship theory 
assumptions about managers are true seems tenable. There would be a set of unnecessary but 
largely harmless rules. In contrast, the consequences seem untenable if stewardship-theory-
based instruments such as empowering executives and reducing monitoring were used but the 
agency assumptions about managers turned out to be true. Self-serving managers could 
receive excessive remuneration at the shareholders’ expense. There would neither be 
disclosed information available, which made such behaviour public, nor would instruments 
exist, which allowed such behaviour to be controlled or prevented. A fundamental change is 
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therefore not desirable. Rather the existing remuneration governance instruments should be 
refined. 
III. The Way Forward 
Thus, the recent national reforms and EU initiatives point in the right direction. The 
standardised disclosure envisaged by the 2013 reforms in the UK and Germany and the 2012 
Action Plan is long overdue. Investors’ information costs and burdens to cross-border 
investments are likely to decrease if remuneration reports are standardised and easily 
comparable. One can hope that the “basic harmonisation” announced by the 2012 Action Plan 
will be sufficient to achieve transparency and comparability. Also, the suggested 
harmonisation and standardisation of the votes’ subject-matters is likely to improve their 
comparability and may increase the use of the vote. 
Further EU measures could ensure better remuneration governance. However, they should be 
only as intrusive as absolutely necessary, and be specific and focused on reducing agency 
costs. Regarding the (supervisory) board, additional rules at EU level are not indicated, since 
the differences between the corporate governance systems in the EU are particularly 
significant with respect to the board. Moreover, additional “adjusting screws” are not 
apparent. The disclosure rules should be reformed. The EU should provide a catalogue of 
information that has to be presented in a certain form with standardised definitions. A clear 
and comparable statement on remuneration policy and individual remuneration would be the 
result. The same result cannot be achieved with national measures. Also the say-on-pay 
mechanism should be reformed. A harmonised subject-matter would facilitate investors’ 
monitoring of executive remuneration.  
Hence, in the future the EU should adopt mandatory, binding instruments with regard to 
certain limited aspects in the field of remuneration governance, in which non-binding 
measures have not and cannot achieve satisfactory results.  
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B. Outlook 
Finally, avenues for future research will be suggested. 
Future research should keep track of the latest reforms. In Germany a reform of the 
shareholder vote, making it binding, could be enacted in the near future. Also, the trend to 
standardisation of disclosure in the GCGC 2013 is interesting. Future developments should be 
observed. Moreover, the effect in practice of the 2013 reforms in the UK and the 
implementation of the 2012 Green Paper’s initiatives promise should be examined. 
Remuneration governance is a fascinating and fast-changing field, which will always offer 
new research questions. 
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